Bank of Kentucky v. Hickey

14 Ky. 225, 4 Litt. 225, 1823 Ky. LEXIS 164
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedOctober 20, 1823
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 14 Ky. 225 (Bank of Kentucky v. Hickey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bank of Kentucky v. Hickey, 14 Ky. 225, 4 Litt. 225, 1823 Ky. LEXIS 164 (Ky. Ct. App. 1823).

Opinion

Opinion op the Court, by

Judge Mills.

THIS is a summons and petition, brought in the court below against the President, Directors and Company of the Bank of Kentucky, on the following note °f that ifistitution, usually styled a post-note:

“ One hundred and eighty days after date, the President, Directors and Company oflhe Bank of Kentucky promise to pay, at their office of discount and deposite [226]*226ju Glasgow, to William T. Busb, presided, or order, seven hundred dollars. Frankfo.rt, 22d December 1819.

As banks are local, bank notes arc payable at the place mentioned on the'cnntn.of’ is not violated until a demand & mentVtTiiát place. wan<TiU° the place need” not bn slated in llic dentar-lion will lie on a bank `- The want demand at the placo ouThf'thc plea of the defendants,* ako'aíletrean ability &wü-lingnéss on their part to a demand had been made, & court!°nC^ m Action in the Franklin petition' and summons, on a b-uik note thi^Ola^ow branch; píen, rit> demand at ¡.hat branch: Held, that a Petltlün an<^ ue, & that the plea fnn,^ílni1110 ega e en°e’

[226]*226Will. S. Waller,.Cashier”

(Signed) Rob’t. Pres't.

This note was endorsed or assigned to the plaintiff. The petition is in the usual form. The bank appeared and demurred to the petition. The court below overruled the demurrer, and gave judgment for the P^;l’u^^'i from which judgment the bank appealed, and. n°w contends in this court, that as the note was paya-Die at a certain and distant place, the place of payment part of the contract, and imposed upon the plain-Pr('cedent condition of making a demand at the office of discount and deposite in Glasgow, before the commencement of suit; and as there is no demand al-5*Sed> at ^!e proper place, in the petition, and the form of the pclition admits of no such averment, and as this statutory remedy only applies to notes or bonds for the direct, iinj not contingent payment of money, that the court below ought to have sustained the demurrer, and thus terminated the suit.

When we look into the law on the subject of con-h'aets, we ^ave 110 hesitation in saying that the place of payment, in this instance, is a component part of the contract. Such is (he meaning of the words, and the construction put upon them by common sense. Such have been the uniform modern decisions on the subject of promissory notes, even where the notes were made, PaJ'fddc ky one individual to another; although, in bills °f exchange, where the acceptance was thus qualified, by agreeing to pay at a certain place, the authorities are contradictory, some affirming that the acceptance 'ms (¡ualiífea, and that the bill was payable there, and no where else, and of course the demand he made there; and others, that the addition of place was a bare expansion of the engagement; that the acceptance was general, and the annexing the place vtas only a memorandum pointing out, in addition the general engagement, a place where the holder-cad n!1(l get the money: but be was not bound to apply there, before he brought suit against the accep-ter. We shall barely remark, that we do not perceive ^ie d*sldnc*'on between promissory notes and accepted bills in this particular, nor the reason why a contract made by a bill of exchange, by an accepter, should be [227]*227different in effect and construction from <?ne expressed in the bame wórds, made' by a promissory note, while it remains*''lawful fo;- ^n accepter ,,to qualify his accep tance, either^as to time, place or sum, when'the face of the bill is general. That he can do so, is admitted on all hands and in every book: and the holder is at liberty to accept such qualified acceptance, at the risk losing the security of drawer and endorsers, or he may, reject such acceptance, and treat it as a nullity, and protest the bill and give notice, and look to the drawer and endorsers for payment. Without, however, taking up more time, in either attempting to reconcile or give preference to these conflicting decisions on bills of exchange, we shall confine ourselves to promissory notes, as this is one. On these, as said before, the decisions arc unanimous, that the place is part of the contract; that the demand must be made there, and no where else, except in cases where the place of payment was pointed out in a memorandum on the margin or at the bottom of the note. In such cases, the place has, in some decisions, been treated as an expansion of the promise, or direction to the holder, as in bills of exchange. But these latter decisions cannot be entitled to any weight, when tested bv the settled doctrine of this, court, with regard to the effect of such memorandums, or writings,; and that is, if the memorandum was written at the same time when the original writing was, made, by consent of the parties, it becomes as much a part of the original contract, and must be faken as fully iato consideration in giving a construction to the contract, as the words inserted in the body of the instrument. On the contrary, if such memorandum was made without the privity or consent of both, it cannot alter, if it does not destroy the contract. We, therefore, cou-ceive that in all notes, place, when designed to be part of the contract by the parties, is an essential part of the-contract, and there the payment must be. If such be the law with regard to promissory notes between individuals, surely it is peculiarly applicable to notes given by a bank, which is local by law^as well as all its offices. it is created and made stationary by law; and it is understood by all, that it must and docs stand and; pay, and cannot become transitory, and search the-country for its creditors, as individuals generally musí..

[228]*228But, after wc have arrived at this conclusion, that the place pointed ou,t in the contract is the proper one, and becomes part of the contract, and that there,- and no where else, is the place of demand and place of pay-meat, still the question remains, is the holder of the uo^e bound to aver and prove such demand, as part of his title, or may he allege the breach of non-payment generally, as is’done in this instance, and the readiness on the day and at the place, come in, on the part of the defendant, by plea, to excuse from the damages and costs? This is a question of some difficulty, and may be supported and contested by potent reasons. It is well settled law, that where payment is to be made at a particular place, tender and readiness, and want of a demand, must come from the defendant, and the plaintiff may content himself with assigning a general breach. In bonds with condition to pay at a particular place, this is asserted to he law. The defendant there must show his readiness at the lime and place, and thus save the penalty, it must, however, be admitted, that the case of bonds with condition, is not precisely analogous to the present case: because there the action is founded, and the plaintiff must declare on the penalty, without any regard to any averments of performance of any stipulations that the condition of the instrument may contain. But still the case of bonds with condition is not the only case embraced by the rule. Bonds without condition, usually called penal hills, and covenants, are also within it. Rents, by law, arc made payable on the premises leased; and whether the contract between the parlies, or the law of the land, fixes the place, the consequences must be the same. And in all these cases the rule is the saíne.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
14 Ky. 225, 4 Litt. 225, 1823 Ky. LEXIS 164, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bank-of-kentucky-v-hickey-kyctapp-1823.