Bank of Giles County v. Mason

98 S.E.2d 905, 199 Va. 176, 1957 Va. LEXIS 177
CourtSupreme Court of Virginia
DecidedJune 14, 1957
DocketRecord 4669
StatusPublished
Cited by29 cases

This text of 98 S.E.2d 905 (Bank of Giles County v. Mason) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bank of Giles County v. Mason, 98 S.E.2d 905, 199 Va. 176, 1957 Va. LEXIS 177 (Va. 1957).

Opinion

Buchanan, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

D. W. Mason and Mingo Lime and Lumber Company, Inc., the appellees, filed their petition for a mandamus to compel the Bank of Giles County and C. A. Lucas, its president, to divulge certain information as therein demanded. The court below held that the petitioners were entitled to the relief prayed for and required the defendants to furnish certain copies of their records and other information as below noted, of which the defendants, the appellants, now complain.

The petition for mandamus, which was filed on August 29, 1956, alleged that Mason owned 58 shares and Mingo owned 326 shares of the 2500 shares of the common stock issued by the bank; that at the annual meeting of the stockholders on August 16, 1956, attended by the petitioners, the president of the bank, Lucas, made an annual report which included an operating statement showing expenses of about $105,000, which included an item designated “Other Expenses” amounting to about $24,000; that the petitioners, for their information regarding the conduct of the bank, requested of Lucas an itemized statement of what was included in said item of “Other Expenses” which was arbitrarily refused by Lucas; that petitioners then made a motion to the chairman of the meeting that they be furnished such itemized statement, which motion was put to a vote and defeated.

*178 The petition further alleged that Lucas and the members of his family owned more than 50% of the stock of the bank and by virtue of this control arbitrarily defeated petitioners’ motion, which was aimed at informing petitioners and other stockholders concerning the item of “Other Expenses”; that Lucas and other officers of the bank still refused to divulge any information about the “Other Expenses” and that the only interest the petitioners had was to ascertain what items were contained therein and they had no intention of making improper inquiries, but that as stockholders they were entitled to full and detailed information in respect to the financial affairs of the bank.

The petition prayed that the defendants be “compelled to divulge a full, complete and detailed report of every item contained in said item ‘Other Expenses’ ”; that a writ of mandamus be awarded compelling defendants to file “the complete, detailed statement of condition rendered at said meeting,” and divulge each and every item of which said report was made up; and that the annual meeting be reconvened or a special meeting be called for these purposes; which was followed by a prayer for general relief.

The defendants’ demurrer to the petition was overruled and they filed an answer asserting that the petitioners were not acting in good faith but to harass and annoy Lucas, for whom Mason held ill will. They filed as an exhibit a copy of a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia and recited other incidents which they claimed established that fact. They stated that if the mandamus proceeding was dismissed voluntarily or by the court, and petitioners would file a written request as required by § 13.1-47 of the Code, they would be permitted to make inspections authorized by that section and defendants would furnish details of the item “Other Expenses”.

Thereafter, on September 11, 1956, the court heard the testimony of D. W. Mason for the petitioners and the testimony of Frank M. Winston, executive vice-president of the bank, for the defendants, which was the only evidence offered.

Mason testified that at the annual meeting he asked for a copy of the president’s report and was told he could have it, but it was not furnished and he had not asked for it again. A copy of this report was then shown to him, he examined and identified it and it was filed as an exhibit. He said the reserve of $7,793.30 for federal income taxes shown in this report was not sufficient and asked for an explanation thereof and for a breakdown of the item of “Salaries *179 and wages,” $52,846.92, and of the item of “Other Expenses” shown in the report. Thereupon defendants exhibited to him and filed a detailed statement entitled “Other Current Operating Expenses,” totaling $23,963.59. He said that the day before the hearing he asked the cashier of the bank for a copy of the minutes of the stockholders meeting, which was refused on the ground that it would have to be approved by the next stockholders meeting. Thereupon defendants exhibited to him and filed a copy of these minutes. He then asked for an explanation of an item of $31,250.41, appearing in the president’s report as “reserved for losses on loans and other adjustments”. He then asked that he be permitted to inspect the bank’s federal income tax return for 1955 and to take an auditor with him to inspect the bank’s records.

Mason further testified that there was then pending a suit in the Circuit Court of Giles County instituted by him and Mingo against the bank’s directors “to have R. F. C. stock retired”; and that he had employed counsel and resisted the action of the directors in having the bank’s charter amended to eliminate cumulative voting.

Winston, executive vice-president of the bank, testified that he would furnish a breakdown of the item of salaries and wages if the court required it. He explained that the small reserve for federal taxes was because the bank had accumulated a reserve over the years of about $30,000 for that purpose; and that the item of $31,250.41 was a reserve against anticipated losses on loans which the government allowed banks to accumulate and deduct from income, and was based on the experience of previous years.

By its final order the court directed the defendants to furnish petitioners (1) a signed copy of the minutes of the stockholders meeting; (2) a correct copy of the report of Lucas, president, to the stockholders; (3) a breakdown of the expenses listed in the report as “Other Expenses”; (4) a breakdown of the items included in the report under “Salaries”; (5) all information necessary to clarify the item of $31,250.41 listed in the report under- “Reserves”; and (6) to make available for inspection by petitioners or their auditor a copy of the bank’s federal income tax return for 1955; and provided that (7) “In the course of the inspection of the records of said bank hereinbefore referred to by petitioners or their duly authorized auditor,” the inspection should be made at the bank on any regular week day except Saturday, between specified hours, and the bank should then *180 make available to petitioners or their auditor “private quarters in which to make said inspections.”

The petition for mandamus alleged no demand for or refusal of information except as to what was included in the item “Other Expenses” and its prayer was that the defendants be compelled to furnish that information. It prayed additionally, without any allegation as a basis, that defendants be compelled to file “the complete, detailed statement of condition rendered at said meeting” and “divulge each and every item of which said report was made up.”

A defendant is supposed to know the plaintiff’s grievances only from his statement of them in his pleading. Pleadings are as essential as proof, and no relief should be granted that does not substantially accord with the case as made in the pleading. Stanley v. Mullins, 187 Va. 193, 196, 45 S.

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Bluebook (online)
98 S.E.2d 905, 199 Va. 176, 1957 Va. LEXIS 177, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bank-of-giles-county-v-mason-va-1957.