Bank of America v. Byrd (In Re Byrd)

250 B.R. 449, 44 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 512, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 674, 36 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 71, 2000 WL 897707
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Georgia
DecidedMay 1, 2000
Docket19-70097
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 250 B.R. 449 (Bank of America v. Byrd (In Re Byrd)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bank of America v. Byrd (In Re Byrd), 250 B.R. 449, 44 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 512, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 674, 36 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 71, 2000 WL 897707 (Ga. 2000).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JAMES D. WALKER, Bankruptcy Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Objection to Confirmation filed by Bank of America (“Creditor”). Creditor objects to confirmation of the Chapter 13,plan proposed by Robert C. Byrd (“Debtor”). This is a core matter within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(L) (2000). After considering the pleadings, evidence and applicable authorities, the Court enters the following findings of fact and conclusions of law in conformance with Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7052.

Findings of Fact

Debtor filed for protection under Chapter 13 on October 28, 1999, owing Creditor $18,113.79, a debt secured by Debtor’s 1996 Sierra pickup truck (the “pickup”). In his Chapter 13 plan, Debtor proposes to retain and use the pickup pursuant to Sections 363(b) and 1303, and he values it at $11,000.00 for the purpose of determining Creditor’s secured status pursuant to Section 506(a). No unsecured claims will receive any dividend under the plan.

Creditor objects to the plan because the pickup’s petition date replacement value was $18,137.00, an amount sufficient to afford Creditor secured status for the entire amount of its claim. Parties have not indicated the pickup’s petition date liquidation value, but it was presumably less than $17,325.00, the pickup’s replacement value on the date of the confirmation hearing.

As is often the case with automobiles, the pickup’s value appears to be inherently depreciable. 1 Even if Debtor properly maintains the pickup, its value in both the replacement and liquidation markets will decline between the petition and the confirmation dates. Creditor has not requested relief from the automatic stay for lack of adequate protection pursuant to Section 362(d)(1), nor has it requested that the *451 Court condition Debtor’s continued use of the pickup, pursuant to Section 863(b) to adequately protect its interest in the pickup.

Conclusions of Law

Creditor’s objection raises the issue as to whether its secured status should be determined, pursuant to Section 606(a) for the purposes of Section 1325(a)(5)(B), based on the pickup’s petition date value or its confirmation date value. Neither the Eleventh Circuit nor the United States Supreme Court has directly addressed this issue. The bankruptcy and district courts have not reached a consensus as to the correct answer.

In In re Kennedy, 177 B.R. 967 (Bankr. S.D.Ala.1995), the court reviewed the theories for timing determination of secured status for the purpose of Section 1325(a)(B), and decided that the determination should be based on collateral’s confirmation date value. Such timing, the court argued, best accounts for the interplay of the Code’s various sections. In re Kennedy, 177 B.R. at 971. In re Kennedy appears to reflect the majority view. However, the argument based on judicial efficiency for fixing secured status based on collateral’s petition date value has merit, at least within the context of Chapter 13 proceedings, and it will be considered when determining Creditor’s secured status.

1. Multiple Valuations Approach to Determination of Secured Status Based on Value as of Confirmation Date

The argument for determining a creditor’s secured status as to collateral’s confirmation date value, also called the “multiple valuations” approach, appears to be the view of the majority of courts that have considered this question. According to courts taking the multiple valuations approach, secured status varies depending on the purpose for which secured status is determined. “Establishing equity, allowing claims, adequate protection, Chapter 13 eligibility, and plan confirmation” are some contexts in which such variable determinations might need to be made pursuant to Section 506(a). In re Cason, 190 B.R. 917, 924 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.1995); see also In re Delta Resources, Inc., 54 F.3d 722, 729-30 (11th Cir.1995) (adequate protection determined early in case, secured claims determined later); but see In re Beard, 108 B.R. 322, 323-24 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.1989) (holding it illogical for secured status to vary as the purpose for determining secured status varies).

The argument for multiple valuations is based on a construction of Section 506(a) that recognizes the conflict that would be created between Section 506(a) and the Code’s adequate protection provisions if a creditor’s secured status were fixed for confirmation purposes as of the petition date. Such a procedure would render superfluous the Code’s provisions for adequate protection of a creditor’s petition date interest in depreciable collateral. See In re Cason, 190 B.R. at 927-28; In re Kennedy, 177 B.R. at 972. The Code’s adequate protection provisions are available to protect a creditor from losses it might incur due to depreciation of the collateral’s value during the period preceding plan confirmation. See In re Delta Resources, 54 F.3d at 729; In re Cook, 205 B.R. 437, 441 (Bankr.N.D.Fla.1997); In re Cason, 190 B.R. at 928; In re Kennedy, 177 B.R. at 972; In re Dunes Casino Hotel, 69 B.R. 784, 793-94 (Bankr.D.N.J.1986); Matter of Melson, 44 B.R. 454, 456-57 (Bankr.D.Del.1984); In re Nixon Mach. Co., 9 B.R. 316, 317 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.1981) (automatic stay protects status quo for debtor; adequate protection protects status quo for secured creditor). Thus, if the Creditor’s secured status were based on the pickup’s petition date replacement value, the Court would effectively negate an important function of the Code’s adequate protection provisions. 2 See In re Cason, *452 190 B.R. at 927 (court refused to “read the statute in a way that deprives creditors of such a fundamental bankruptcy principle as adequate protection”).

When Debtor filed his petition, the automatic stay prevented Creditor from realizing the liquidation value of the pickup and applying the proceeds to the outstanding debt. Because the pickup’s value is inherently depreciable, Creditor may have had reason to move the Court, either for relief from the automatic stay pursuant to Section 362(d)(1), or to condition Debtor’s retention and use of the pickup to adequately protect its interest pursuant to Section 363(e). Furthermore, because Creditor was in the best position to appreciate the risk to its interest, and to move for adequate protection, it was properly Creditor’s duty to consider whether to take such action. See In re Adams, 2 B.R. 313, 314 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1980) (citing In re Pennyrich Int’l, 473 F.2d 417 (5th Cir.1973)).

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Bluebook (online)
250 B.R. 449, 44 Collier Bankr. Cas. 2d 512, 2000 Bankr. LEXIS 674, 36 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 71, 2000 WL 897707, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bank-of-america-v-byrd-in-re-byrd-gamb-2000.