Bank Commissioners v. Bank of Buffalo

6 Paige Ch. 497
CourtNew York Court of Chancery
DecidedJune 23, 1837
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 6 Paige Ch. 497 (Bank Commissioners v. Bank of Buffalo) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Chancery primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bank Commissioners v. Bank of Buffalo, 6 Paige Ch. 497 (N.Y. 1837).

Opinion

The Chancellor.

It is not denied by the counsel for the Bank of Buffalo that there has, as to that bank, been an actual violation of the provision of the revised statutes which prohibits the directors of a monied corporation from making loans or discounts to the directors of the corporation, or upon paper on which they or any of them are responsible, to an amount exceeding in the aggregate one third of the capital stock of the company. (1 R. S. 590, § 1, sub. 9.) It is insisted, however, in behalf of all these banks, that this is not such a violation by the corporation of its act of incorporation as will authorize the bank commissioners to apply to the chancellor for an injunction against the corporation and its officers to restrain them from exercising their corporate privileges, and for the appointment of a receiver to wind up the affairs of the company, in pursuance of the directions contained in the eighteenth section of the safety fund act. This objection proceeds upon the supposition that the restrictions contained in the several subdivisions of the first section of the title of the revised statutes relative to monied corporations are only binding upon the directors of the company as individuals, and not restrictions upon the corporation itself. In this, however, I am fully satisfied the counsel for the defendants are wrong. The object of the legislature was to prevent the corporation from doing any of the acts prohibited in this section of the statute. And the term directors is used for the corporation itself, or as the board or body exercising the corporate franchises, by whom or under whose direction or authority alone these violations of the statute could ever occur. The 33d section of the act incorporating the Bank of Buffalo, (Laws of 1831, p. 81,) and the corresponding section in the charters of the other two companies, in terms, make these provisions of the revised statutes and all provisions contained in the same chapter, except such as have been repealed or modified, applicable to the corporations of the several Buffalo Banks, as if they were actually contained in their acts of incorporation. The restriction upon the amount of loans and discounts to the directors, or upon their security, is therefore a provision of the acts of incor[503]*503poration of these several companies, within the intent and meaning of the 39th section of the article of the revised statutes relative to proceedings against corporations in equity, (2 R. S. 463;) the violation of which by the company or its authorized officers will authorize a proceeding against the company in this court by injunction, and the appointment of a receiver of the effects of the corporation. The statute does not in terms authorize this court, upon such a suit instituted here, to decree a formal dissolution of the corporation. But by an examination of the 44th section of this article relating to proceedings against corporations in equity, it will be perceived that the legislature contemplated the making of a final decree on the bill or petition against the company, which was to deprive it of all its corporate property and powers. And as the receiver who is appointed upon such a proceeding, unless restricted in his powers by the order for his appointment, is absolutely vested with all the corporate property and effects, and is authorized to distribute the surplus thereof among the stockholders after paymént of the debts of the company, it follows of course that a final order or decree for the appoinment of such receiver is a virtual dissolution of the corporation, (See 2 R. S. 464, § 41, 42, 44; Idem, 469, § 68, and 471, § 83.) I have no doubt, therefore, that this court has the jurisdiction and power to decree such a dissolution of either of these companies whose board of directors has violated' the provisions of their charter restricting the amount of loans or discounts to directors, or has authorized or permitted the officers of the bank to violate the same.

All loans and discounts made by the officers of the company from its corporate funds must be presumed to have been made by the authority of the directors, unless they show that the funds of the bank constituting such loans have been improperly appropriated for that purpose, against the instructions of the board of directors or without authority, so as to make the officers guilty of a fraud or embezzlement. And even where the officers of the bank have been guilty of a fraud by violating the charter against the positive instructions of the directors or otherwise, if the directors neg[504]*504lect to remove such officers and continue to entrust them" with the bank funds, they will be considered as sanctioning the fraudulent act.

A neglect by the officers of the corporation to inform themselves of the amount- already loaned to directors, cannot justify a violation of a positive law of the state which it is their duty to know and conform to. If the board of directors authorize or allow their president or cashier, or any other officer of the bank to make loans or discounts in his own discretion, without having the same formally passed upon at a regular meeting of the board, the corporation is liable for a violation of its charter, or of any law binding on such corporation, in the making of such loans or discounts.

The objection that it does not appear from the' petitions that all the bank commissioners met together and consulted as to the propriety of making the applications before' the petitions were presented, is not well founded. The petitions are presented in the names of all the commissioners, by one of them as solicitor for the whole. Where several persons join in a suit in this court by their solicitor, the. court will not inquire whether the same is authorized by such parties,- unless some of them object to the proceeding, or the adverse party shows affirmatively that the suit has been imy properly instituted by some of the complainants or petitioners in the names of the others without authority. In' the-case of Bronson v. Mann, (13 John. Rep. 460,) the supreme court held that where a legal proceeding was- to be instituted' by the commissioners of highways as such, it was not necessary that they should all meet or consult and agree to make the application in order to render the institution of such proceeding valid. In the present case the statute expressly authorizes the bank commissioners or any or either of them to make the inspection and examination for the purpose of ascertaining whether any bank has violated its' charter, or any other law of the state binding, on the corporation ; and if upon such- examination- or otherwise, such commissioners shall discover any. such violation, they should immediately apply to the chancellor for an injunction. The? [505]*505statute evidently contemplates a very summary remedy for the abuse of chartered privileges, and to protect the rights of those who are interested in the funds of the bank, either as creditors or stockholders ; to whom great injury might result if it was absolutely necessary to assemble all the commissioners from distant parts of the state to consult together before any application could be made to the court for relief. The section of the revised statutes relied upon by the counsel for the banks, (2 R. S.

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Bluebook (online)
6 Paige Ch. 497, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bank-commissioners-v-bank-of-buffalo-nychanct-1837.