Opinion
FRANSON, Acting P. J.
Appellant, the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action, appeals from judgments of dismissal entered after the trial court sustained the demurrers of respondents—two public hospital districts—without leave to amend. The basis for the trial court’s ruling was that appellant’s complaint was barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5.1
Appellant makes several independent contentions on appeal as to why the judgments should be reversed. First, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying him relief from the claim filing requirements of the California Tort Claims Act because of his excusable neglect in rely[449]*449ing on his first attorney, Mr. Heusdens, to take whatever action was required to pursue his malpractice claims against the defendants, including filing a claim within 100 days of the accrual of his cause of action. Second, he argues that the one-year limitation period provided by Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 was tolled during the time appellant sought judicial relief from the claim filing requirements because of his excusable neglect and the failure of the defendant hospitals to comply with the information filing requirements of Government Code section 53051. 2 Third, appellant asserts that under the joint operation of Code of Civil Procedure sections 3563 and 364,4 the 1-year statute of limitations was tolled and extended for 180 days following appellant’s giving of a notice of intent to sue, thereby rendering his complaint timely filed.
As we shall explain, none of appellant’s arguments have merit, and the judgments are affirmed.
The convoluted procedural labyrinth in which appellant found himself can be described as follows: On August 9, 1978, appellant through his attorney Mr. Durbrow filed a complaint initiating the instant action. The complaint alleged medical malpractice causes of action against respondents Sierra View Local District Hospital and Kaweah Delta Hospital District. It alleged that both hospitals were public entities organized under the local hospital district law of the State of California; that on March 14, 1978, claims had been filed against both hospitals [450]*450pursuant to Government Code section 905 and that these claims had been denied under section 912.4 on April 10, 1978. Attached to the complaint were two exhibits entitled “Application for Leave to Present Late Claim.” These applications, addressed to Sierra View Hospital and Kaweah Hospital respectively, had been filed with the hospitals on March 14, 1978, and sought leave to present late claims on the basis of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and excusable neglect of the claimant and [Attorney] James Heusdens . .. . ”
On the same day the complaint was filed, appellant also filed in the Tulare County Superior Court a petition for relief from the claims requirement under Government Code section 946.6.5 The petition alleged the cause of action arose on or about April 28, 1977, and due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, and excusable neglect of appellant and others, the claims against the hospitals had not been timely filed.
Attached to the petition for leave to file a late claim was the declaration of appellant which stated as. follows. Appellant was hospitalized in Sierra View Hospital following an automobile accident on April 28, 1977; after being diagnosed and treated there, he was transferred to Kaweah Hospital where he underwent surgery. He was hospitalized on 2 separate occasions for a total of 30 days. During his hospitalization, appellant was in contact with Attorney James Heusdens, and appellant told the attorney on several occasions that he thought he had a claim [451]*451for negligent treatment at the hospitals. When appellant realized Attorney Heusdens was not going to take legal action on his behalf, appellant contacted the San Jose law firm of Boccardo et al. in late 1977 or early 1978; that office declined the case. Appellant then contacted Attorney Robert Durbrow of Fresno, who took the case and sought to file a late claim against the hospitals.
Appellant’s declaration stated on information and belief that his first attorney, Mr. Heusdens, “was more concerned with the other legal actions on which he was representing [appellant] and was not sufficiently educated and experienced in the handling of malpractice actions to take the necessary steps to protect [appellant’s] rights in filing the appropriate claims against each of the [subject] hospitals.” The declaration asserted that the negligence of Attorney Heusdens, in failing to file the claims and/or refer the matter to a more experienced attorney, was excusable under Government Code section 946.6.
Appellant’s new attorney, Robert Durbrow, also submitted a declaration in support of the petition. Durbrow’s declaration recited that his office had filed, on appellant’s behalf, an application for filing a late claim and that this was done within a reasonable time to provide the public hospitals with reasonable notice of the nature and type of the claim asserted by appellant.
Durbrow’s declaration also stated that he had obtained copies of statements filed by both of the defendant hospitals with the roster of public agencies maintained by the Clerk of Tulare County. The statements, attached as exhibits to the petition, failed to show “substantial changes” which had occurred in the name and address of the secretary of each hospital.
Appellant submitted points and authorities to establish that he had made a sufficient showing of mistake or excusable neglect to entitle him to file a late claim, and in any event, that the defendant hospitals could not assert noncompliance with the claims statutes as a defense because of their failure to keep an up-to-date public record of information as required by law. He cited Government Code. section 946.46 and Wilson v. [452]*452San Francisco Redevelopment Agency (1977) 19 Cal.3d 555 [138 Cal.Rptr. 720, 564 P.2d 872].
The hospitals filed general and special demurrers to the complaint. The hospitals specially demurred on the ground of uncertainty because the complaint alleged that claims against the hospitals had been filed on March 14, 1978, which allegation was inconsistent with the filing of a petition for relief from the claim filing requirements.
The trial court sustained the special demurrers on the ground of uncertainty but allowed appellant leave to amend his complaint. In the same ruling, the court also denied appellant’s leave for application to file a late claim on the ground that appellant had failed to make the required showing of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; however, the court did grant appellant relief under Government Code section 946.4 from the requirement of presenting a claim because the hospital had not filed the required information with the roster of public agencies.
Appellant thereafter filed an amended complaint which omitted any reference to the claims requirement.
Respondents then demurred to the amended complaint on the ground that the action was barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5. After receiving points and authorities, the trial court sustained the demurrers and filed the following opinion explaining the reasons for this ruling: “The demurrer of the defendants is sustained without leave to amend. It appears from the face of the complaint that more than one year has elapsed between the date of injury and the date of the filing of the complaint.
[453]*453“There is no authority for the proposition that seeking relief from the hospital district for filing a late claim tolls the applicable statute of limitations.”
A judgment dismissing the complaint against Sierra View Hospital was entered on January 22, 1979.
Appellant then moved for reconsideration on the ground that the applicable statute of limitations was tolled while relief from the claim filing statutes was being sought. The points and authorities in support of this motion cited Code of Civil Procedure section 356 and cases interpreting that section as authority for the proposition that the statute of limitations was tolled while appellant was seeking relief from failure to file a timely claim.
The trial court issued a written ruling on the motion, noting that “. .. where the filing of a claim is a prerequisite to the filing of a lawsuit the statute does not run until the application is granted.” However, “[tjhere is no such requirement in the instant case. . Since no claim needed to be filed as a prerequisite for the filing of a lawsuit there was no tolling of the statute.”
The court then entered a judgment dismissing the complaint against Kaweah Hospital on February 6, 1979. On that same date, the court entered a formal order denying appellant’s petition for relief from the claim filing requirements on the ground of excusable neglect. (This petition had been ruled on about four months earlier on Oct. 10, 1978, but the order was first entered on Feb. 6, 1979.) Notice of entry of this order was sent on February 8, 1979.
On March 15, 1979, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the judgments of dismissal.
Discussion
We shall first treat appellant’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion in denying him relief from the claim filing requirements on the ground of excusable neglect.7
[454]*454In determining whether an injured party’s failure to present a timely claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, the trial court shall make an independent determination upon the basis of the petition for relief and any supporting or opposing affidavits and any additional evidence received at the hearing on the petition. (Gov. Code, § 946.6, subd. (e).) The only evidence presented at the hearing below as to why appellant did not file a claim within 100 days of discovery of defendant’s alleged negligence was appellant’s own affidavit. The affidavit stated that after appellant had been injured in a car accident on April 28, 1977, he was confined in the defendant hospitals on 2 separate occasions for periods of about 30 days. During the time he was confined to the hospital and again after he was released from the hospital the last time, he was in contact with Attorney James Heusdens. (Heusdens apparently was representing appellant on a drunk driving charge arising out of the accident which had hospitalized appellant.) Appellant alleged: “I advised [Heusdens] of the problems that I had encountered while being treated in each of the above hospitals. At the same time Mr. Heusdens was also handling some other legal matters for me. At this time I mentioned to Mr. Heusdens that I thought that I had a claim for negligent and careless treatment at the above hospitals. In fact, I mentioned this to Mr. Heusdens on several occasions.” Seven months after the accident, appellant contacted the Boccardo firm for representation, and when that firm declined the case, appellant consulted his present attorney.
The glaring defect in appellant’s affidavit is its failure to indicate that Mr. Heusdens had been retained or had agreed to assert a claim against anyone in connection with appellant’s malpractice claims. Any inference to this effect would be pure speculation.
The cases cited by appellant where the claim for relief was granted based upon the omission of an attorney all involved situations where the attorney was actually hired to represent the plaintiff, and some factual [455]*455basis for excusable neglect on the attorney’s part was shown or the attorney’s neglect was so inexcusable or extreme as not to be chargeable to the client.
City of Fresno v. Superior Court (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 25, at page 32 [163 Cal.Rptr. 807], states the rules governing relief on the ground of excusable neglect: “The showing required as to mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect in proceedings to file a late claim against a governmental agency is the same as required tinder section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure for relieving a party from a default judgment. [Citation.]
“... ‘As a general rule, neglect authorizing relief under section 473, Code of Civil Procedure, may not be predicated upon that of the party’s attorney unless shown to be excusable [citation], because the negligence of the attorney in the premises is imputed to his client and may not be offered by the latter as a basis for relief. [Citation.]’
“‘“Jt is not the purpose of section 473 of the Code of Civil Procedure to permit the setting aside of judgments ‘which are the result of inexcusable . . . neglect of defendants, themselves, or of their attorneys in the performance of the latter’s obligations to their clients.”” [Citation.] Excusable neglect is that neglect which might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person (attorney) under the same circumstances.” (Italics added.)
In short, looking at appellant’s own declaration, we cannot find that appellant was justified in assuming Mr. Heusdens would pursue appellant’s cause of action for medical malpractice against respondent hospitals.
We turn now to appellant’s contention the trial court erroneously sustained respondents’ demurrers on the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5. Appellant does not dispute that the cause of action arose for purposes of the demurrer on April 28, 1977. Since the action was not filed until August 9, 1978—103 days beyond the 1-year period—the action is barred unless facts to toll the statute are present.
Appellant relies on Code of Civil Procedure section 356 {ante, fn. 3) for the proposition that the statute of limitations was tolled as of March 14, 1978, when he filed his application for leave to file a late claim. [456]*456Section 356 provides that when the commencement of an action is stayed by “statutory prohibition,” the time of the continuance of the prohibition is not part of the time limited for filing the action. This statute has been interpreted to toll the applicable statute of limitations during the time occupied by the claims procedures. {Cal. Cigarette Concessions v. City of L. A. (1960) 53 Cal.2d 865, 868 [3 Cal.Rptr. 675, 350 P.2d 7.15]; Dillon v. Board of Pension Commrs. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 427, 431 [116 P.2d 37, 136 A.L.R. 800]; see also Olson v. County of Sacramento (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 958, 961-962 [113 Cal.Rptr. 664].) The rationale is that the statute does not run during the time the plaintiff is legally prevented from taking action to protect his rights; until the required claim is filed, the plaintiff may not file suit against a public entity.
In the present case, the trial court acknowledged the existence of the foregoing line of authority but ruled that it was inapplicable because the filing of a claim was not a statutory prerequisite to the maintenance of appellant’s action. The trial court’s analysis was correct.
Since the hospitals had not complied with their statutory duty to file updated information in the roster of public agencies, there was no “statutory prohibition” against appellant filing an action against the hospitals; such an action could have been maintained at any time without the need of compliance with the claims statute {Wilson v. San Francisco Redevelopment Agency, supra, 19 Cal.3d 555, 559-560). As stated jn Wilson at page 560: “... [W]e must reject defendant’s suggestion that section 946.4 performs a more limited function, namely, to furnish a ground upon which a claimant might base either a request to the public agency for leave to file a late claim (§ 911.4) or a petition to the court for an order relieving him from the claim-filing requirement (§ 946.6). To the contrary, a fair reading of the, sections in question suggests that the agency’s failure to comply with section 53051 entitles the claimant to ignore the claim-filing requirement entirely.” The Wilson court also observed that a plaintiff who files a late claim is in the same position as one who files no claim, and the former is equally entitled to avail himself of section 946.4 which excuses the need to file a claim. {Id., at p. 561.)
Thus, we conclude that tolling under Code of Civil Procedure section 356 did not occur during the period appellant was attempting to gain permission from the respondent hospitals to file a late claim and later seeking judicial relief from the claim filing requirements. Appellant [457]*457could have filed his complaint on March 14, 1978, rather than attempting to obtain leave to file a late claim; hence, the statute of limitations was not tolled. We fully appreciate appellant’s argument that this result appears unfair because the only factor distinguishing his case from others where the tolling provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 356, were applied is that appellant’s attempt to obtain relief under Government Code section 946.6 on the ground of excusable neglect failed,8 whereas actions are tolled when the attempt to get relief under section 946.6 is successful.
Appellant’s argument, however, misses the mark in a legal sense; the reason why he is not entitled to the tolling relief of Code of Civil Procedure section 356. is not because he was unsuccessful in showing cause for relief based on excusable neglect under Government Code section 946.6 but rather because he did not have to file a claim at all. Consequently, by its express terms, section 356 does not apply.
We come now to the final contention lightly made by appellant at oral argument as to why his complaint was timely filed. (Although lightly made, the contention is like the mouse which produced an elephant.) Appellant cites Gomez v. Valley View Sanitorium (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 507 [151 Cal.Rptr. 97] for the proposition that in actions against health care providers for professional negligence under Code of Civil Procedure section 364 (see fn. 4, ante), the statute of limitations—in this case 1 year under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5—working in conjunction with Code of Civil Procedure section 356 (fn. 3, ante) was both extended and tolled for 180 days from the date of giving the notice of intent to sue. (For this purpose the application for leave to file a late claim served on the hospitals on Mar. 14, 1978, constituted the required notice under Code Civ. Proc., § 364, subd. (b).) Under this theory, appellant would have until September 10, 1978, to file his complaint; having filed his complaint on August 8, 1978, he would be well within the statute.
Appellant’s argument requires a discussion of two cases which have construed the effect of sections 356 and 364 on the limitation period provided by section 340.5.
[458]*458In Gomez v. Valley View Sanitorium, supra, 87 Cal.App.3d 507, it was held that the wrongful death action filed by plaintiffs more than one year after the decedent’s death was timely filed and not barred by the one-year limitation period of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5. The plaintiffs had given the notice required by Code of Civil Procedure section 364 within 90 days of the date the statute of limitations would run. Because Code of Civil Procedure section 364, subdivision (a), also prohibits the commencement of an action until 90 days have expired after service of the notice, the court held the 90-day period should be excluded when calculating the applicable statute of limitations. Furthermore, since subdivision (d) of section 364 operated to extend the period of limitations 90 days (because plaintiffs’ notice was served within 90 days of the expiration of the limitation period), the plaintiffs were entitled to the 90-day extension in addition to the 90-day tolling of the statute. The court stated: “.. . Incongruously, section 364 prohibits the commencement of the action within the period of limitations as extended. Section 364, however, does not self-destruct, because Code of Civil Procedure section 356 provides: ‘When the commencement of an action is stayed by ... statutory prohibition, the time of the continuance of the ... prohibition is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.’
“... Where section 364 also operates to extend the period of limitations because notice is served within 90 days of the> expiration of the statute, the plaintiff is entitled to that extension as well as the tolling of the statute during the 90 days plaintiff is prohibited from filing his action” (87 Cal.App.3d at pp. 509-510, italics added.)
The italicized portion of the Gomez decision is criticized in Braham v. Sorenson (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 367 [174 Cal.Rptr. 39] which holds the tolling provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 356 together with the notice requirements of section 364, subdivisions (a) and (d) operate to extend the 1-year limitation period 90 days but not 180 days from the date of giving of the notice of intent to sue. Braham explains that to the extent Gomez speaks to the contrary, the holding “is truly dictum and ... cannot be deemed to add another 90 days to the 1 year and 90 days to make a statute of limitations of 1 year and 180 days.”9 (119 Cal.App.3d at p. 372.) Braham emphasizes that such a result [459]*459would be contrary to the strong policy favoring statutes of limitation as statutes of repose and not mere technical defenses. {Ibid.)
We believe Braham has correctly analyzed Code of Civil Procedure section 364 as it affects the time within which a plaintiff must file suit against a health care provider for professional negligence, i.e., he must get his suit on file within the time specified in section 340.5 plus 90 days.
Code of Civil Procedure section 364, subdivision (a) provides that no action based upon the health care provider’s professional negligence may be commenced “unless the defendant has been given at least 90 days’ prior notice of the intention to commence the action.” Code of Civil Procedure section 356 provides that the time of a statutory prohibition for commencing the action “is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.” This means that the running of the statute of limitations (in this case 1 year) is suspended during the 90 days the plaintiff is prohibited from commencing the action. (See Dillon v. Board of Pension Commrs., supra, 18 Cal.2d 427, 431; Cal. Cigarette Concessions v. City of L. A., supra, 53 Cal.2d 865, 868.) Once the 90-day statutory prohibition is ended, the statute of limitations commences to run again.
If the plaintiff gives his notice.of intent to sue the defendant more than 90 days before the end of the 1-year period, the tolling provision of section 356, in conjunction with section 364, subdivision (a), effectively produce a 1-year and 90-day limitation period within which plaintiff must file his action. On the other hand, if the plaintiff gives a notice of intent to sue the defendant within 90 days of the expiration of the limitation period provided in section 340.5, he still must get his suit on file within 90 days after the expiration of the 1-year period. The following analysis produces this result: upon giving the notice required by section 364, subdivision (a), the running of the 1-year basic statute is suspended under section 356 for the 90-day period the plaintiff is prohibited from filing suit. When the 90 days expire, the basic 1-year statute commences to run again, thereby giving the plaintiff the time remaining under the basic statute within which to file his action. Thus, plaintiff has 90 days from the date of his notice of intent plus the unexpired balance of the 1-year limitation period within which to file suit.
To illustrate: assume a plaintiff gives his notice of intent to sue 10 days before the running of the 1-year limitation period. The 1-year stat[460]*460ute is suspended for 90 days (until 1 year and 80 days have elapsed from accrual of the cause of action) at which time the 10-day remaining balance of the unexpired 1-year statute is added—giving the plaintiff a total of 1 year and 90 days within which to file suit.
The dissent argues the above analysis renders subdivision (d) of section 364 redundant—that subdivision (a) of section 364 and section 356 produce the same result. The fact, however, that the latter 2 statutes when read together will give a 1-year and 90-day limitation period for all actions against health care providers does not render subdivision (d) of section 364 superfluous. The Legislature enacted subdivision (d) to make clear that a plaintiff who is prohibited from filing suit against a health care provider for 90 days, will receive at least an additional 90 days within which to file suit. Although, as acknowledged in Braham, supra, “[t]his language is somewhat incongruous because it does not explain how much time after the extension the plaintiff still has within which to file the complaint” the incongruity should not be utilized to distort the policy of the statute of limitations. (119 Cal.App.3d at p. 372.) Braham further explains, “[t]his negates the idea that the 90 days runs from the last day of the basic statute of limitations or whatever extension is created by another different express statute.” {Ibid.)
Certain fundamental principles of statutory construction come into play at this point. “To arrive at the legislative intent in the interpretation of statutes the original purpose and object of the legislation must be considered. [Citation.] Statutes must be read and considered in conjunction with the legislative intent and then be liberally construed with the object in view of giving effect to such intent. [Citation.] A construction or conclusion plainly not contemplated by the legislature should not be given to a statute if it can be avoided. When a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one leading inevitably to mischief or absurdity and the other consisting of sound sense and wise policy, the former should be rejected and the latter adopted. [Citation.]
‘““The mere literal construction of a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction it is to be adopted to effectuate that intention. The intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to [461]*461conform to the spirit of the act.’”” (People v. Ventura Refining Co. (1928) 204 Cal. 286, 292 [288 P. 347, 283 P. 60].)
Our dissenting colleague’s argument that a plaintiff is entitled to a 90-day extension of the basic statute from the date of giving notice of intent to sue plus an additional 90-day “exclusion” or tolling period under section 356 engenders mischief in 2 ways. First, it rewards the dilatory plaintiff and punishes the diligent plaintiff. For example, a plaintiff who waits until the last day of the 1-year statute before giving his notice of intent to sue, would receive an additional 180 days beyond the basic 1-year statute within which to file suit. However, a plaintiff who gives his notice of intent to sue at least 90 days before the running of the 1-year statute, would receive only an additional 90 days beyond the 1-year period within which to file suit. Such an incongruous and unfair result could not possibly have been intended by the Legislature. It does not accord with the Legislature’s intent to tighten the procedural requirements for malpractice actions against health care providers as evidenced by the various provisions of the 1975 Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) of which Code of Civil Procedure section 364 is a part. (See Stats. 1975, Second Ex. Sess., ch. 1, § 25.5, p. 3970.)
Second, the dissent’s analysis, grounded on the Gomez dictum, produces a variable limitation period within which to file suit insofar as a plaintiff who gives notice within 90 days of the running of the 1-year statute. We. cannot imagine the Legislature intended such an ad hoc result on a subject of such grave importance to health care providers and injured plaintiffs. Certitude is the hoped-for goal in procedural statutes. We should presume the Legislature intended an objectively ascertainable and uniform limitation period for the commencement of actions against health care providers rather than one dependent upon the particular date the plaintiff elects to give his notice of intent to sue.
The dissent’s analysis does suggest another interpretation of section 364 insofar as it affects the basic limitation period of section 340.5. This is to give effect to the precise language of subdivision (d) of section 364 without considering section 356. The rationale would be as follows: the Legislature intended section 364 to be a wholly contained, self-executing statute insofar as suits for professional negligence against health care providers. It did not intend section 356 to apply when subdivision, (d) of section 364 comes into play. Subdivision (d) is specific: if [462]*462the 90-day notice under subdivision (a) is served within 90 days of the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations, the time for the commencement of the action shall be extended 90 days from the service of the notice. The specific controls over the general; thus, no tolling of the underlying limitation period occurs under section 356.
This interpretation produces as much mischief as does the interpretation adopted by the dissent. Subdivision (d) of section 364 is inapplicable by its terms to a plaintiff who serves his notice of intent to sue at least 90 days before the expiration of the underlying statute of limitations. Section 356 could not be ignored at this point—it would toll the limitation period for 90 days thereby giving a 1-year and 90-day period within which to file suit to any plaintiff who serves his notice 90 days or more before the running of the statute of limitations. On the other hand, a plaintiff who serves his notice within 90 days preceding the running of the statute would have only 90 days from the date of giving his notice. Thus, a plaintiff who serves his notice 89 days before the running of the statute would have 1 year and 1 day within which to file his suit whereas, the plaintiff who serves his notice 90 days before the running of the statute would have 1 year and 90 days within which to file suit. Again, the Legislature cannot have intended such an irrational result.
Both Gomez and Braham were correctly decided on their facts. In Gomez, the plaintiffs filed suit within 90 days after the expiration of the 1-year statute; the suit was timely. In Braham, the plaintiff did not; her suit was barred. In short, sections 356 and 364 provide only a 90-day extension of the basic limitation period under section 340.5. This is a rational answer to a complex question of statutory interpretation.
The judgment is affirmed.
Hanson (P. D.), J., concurred.