Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. United States

17 Ct. Int'l Trade 798
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedAugust 6, 1993
DocketCourt No. 89-07-00399; Court No. 89-07-00430
StatusPublished

This text of 17 Ct. Int'l Trade 798 (Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. United States, 17 Ct. Int'l Trade 798 (cit 1993).

Opinion

Memorandum

Aquilino, Judge:

In Slip Op. 92-26, 16 CIT 133, 787 F. Supp. 224 (1992), familiarity with which is presumed, this court granted in part motions of the above-named plaintiffs focused on the affirmative determination of the International Trade Commission (“ITC”) sub nom. Industrial Belts from Israel, Italy, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, The United Kingdom, and West Germany, 54 Fed.Reg. 24,430 (June 7, 1989). In particular, the motions challenge the determination insofar as it is based on the views of Commissioner David B. Rohr, who concluded that material injury did not exist but that the domestic industries producing V-type and synchronous-type power-transmission belts are threatened with such injury by reason of imports from Italy and Japan found by the International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce (“ITA”) to be sold in the United States at less than fair value and also that the domestic industry producing all other types of power-transmission belts is threatened with material injury by reason of imports from Japan found by the ITA to be sold at less than fair value.1

[799]*799I

In Slip Op. 92-26, the court concluded that the respective motions had to be granted, “at least to the extent that the underlying proceedings be remanded to the ITC to enable Commissioner Rohr to reflect on, and explain further, his views”. 16 CIT at 137, 787 F.Supp. at 227. The remand was based, in part, upon reasoning that the commissioner is presumed to have considered all of the relevant factors regarding determination of threat of material injury, including those listed in 19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)—(F)(i), but that that

presumption alone * * * is not enough to sustain his determination — it must have a reviewable, reasoned basis. See, e.g., A. Hirsh, Inc. v. United States, 14 CIT 23, 25, 729 F.Supp. 1360, 1362 (1990), aff’d, 948 F.2d 1240 (Fed.Cir. 1991), and cases cited therein. As explained in Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores v. United States, 12 CIT 1174, 1177, 704 F.Supp. 1068, 1071 (1988), that an
administrative agency may make varying decisions based on the facts of particular cases does not permit the agency to act arbitrarily. In order to ascertain whether action is arbitrary, or otherwise not in accordance with law, reasons for the choices made among various potentially acceptable alternatives usually need to be explained.
In the cases at bar, the court is unable to determine, for example, either why the commissioner chose to discount the points raised by Bando or the data upon which he relied in reaching his determination as to Italy. In short, he seems to have failed to articulate a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Bowman Transportation, Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Systems, Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 285 (1974), quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962).

16 CIT at 136-37, 787 F.Supp. at 227. Such articulation is particularly important here because “the projection of future events is necessarily more difficult than the evaluation of current data”. Yuasa-General Battery Corp. v. United States, 12 CIT 624, 628, 688 F.Supp. 1551, 1555 (1988), quoting H.R. Rep. No. 1156, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 174 (1984).

A

In compliance with the court’s order, Commissioner Rohr has now filed extensive views2, based to a significant degree on confidential business proprietary information contained in the ITC’s administrative record. At the outset, the commissioner explains the brevity of his original, reported reasoning as follows:

This remand points up a * * * broad issue with respect to Commission decisions. The Court, in finding my determination to be without substantial evidence, made a point of the brevity I used in summarizing the evidence that I felt supported each of the twenty-[800]*800four determinations I found necessary for each of the separate countries and separate products in the original investigations. The court recognized that my brevity was conditioned by the problem of confidentiality. The court contrasted my decision to treat information in general terms with some of my colleagues’ decisions to prepare confidential opinions.
My desire to write a nonconfidential opinion required me to state, in the simplest and most general of terms, the essentials of the foreign capacity, import market shares, and pricing information that I felt were sufficient to form the basis for affirmative and negative threat findings. I did not address many of the specific arguments raised by these plaintiffs in their appeals, or by other parties in the proceedings before the Commission, not because I did not consider them, but rather because, having considered them, I did not feel them to be persuasive, or to detract from the affirmative evidence, or because to answer them would involve disclosure of confidential data.
I continue to believe that as a matter of policy the Commission should not prepare confidential opinions. However, for purposes of this remand, I have concluded that there is no possibility that I can satisfy the Court’s requirement for me to address the arguments, made by plaintiffs in their appeals, in these remand determinations without an extensive review and explanation of confidential information. I have therefore reluctantly decided to prepare a confidential version of this opinion.

Views on Remand, pp. 2-3 (footnote 6 omitted). Footnote 7 to this explanation adds:

A title VTI investigation by the Commission is not like a private dispute between two private parties. It is important that the public be aware to the greatest extent possible the reasons for our decisions. The choice then comes down to whether a statement such as “Production * * * from * * * in 1986 to * * * in 1987 * * * in 1988 for a * * * percent * * * over the period of investigation” is more or less illuminating to the public than the statement “The production indicators provide only a little support for an affirmative determination.” I believe the latter, because it indicates how the “facts” fit into a conclusion, is better. That is why I choose that format. I recognize that not all of my colleagues share this view.

Be this difference in approach on the part of members of the ITC as it may3, Commissioner Rohr concludes anew on remand that

all three domestic industries are threatened with material injury by reason of imports from Japan. I determine that the V-Belt and Synchronous Belt industries are threatened with material injury by reason of Italian imports. I find the All Other Belt industry is not [801]*801materially injured nor is it threatened with material injury by reason of Italian imports.
* * * I find the threats to be real and imminent.

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17 Ct. Int'l Trade 798, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bando-chemical-industries-ltd-v-united-states-cit-1993.