Bam, Inc. v. Board of Police Commissioners

7 Cal. App. 4th 1343, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738, 92 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6269, 92 Daily Journal DAR 9793, 1992 Cal. App. LEXIS 891
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 30, 1992
DocketB055984
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 7 Cal. App. 4th 1343 (Bam, Inc. v. Board of Police Commissioners) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Bam, Inc. v. Board of Police Commissioners, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1343, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738, 92 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6269, 92 Daily Journal DAR 9793, 1992 Cal. App. LEXIS 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992).

Opinion

Opinion

VOGEL, J.

The Board of Police Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles suspended Bam, Inc.’s permit to operate “Adult World,” Barn’s motion picture arcade. Barn’s challenge to the suspension order by way of a petition for writ of mandate was denied and Bam appeals. We reverse and remand with directions.

Facts

Bam operates a motion picture arcade pursuant to a permit issued by the Board. (Los Angeles Mun. Code, § 103.101(b).) 1 In 1988 and 1989, the Los Angeles Police Department filed accusations for revocation of Barn’s police permit, charging Bam with 33 counts of operating its arcade in a manner which allowed customers to masturbate in the arcade’s viewing booths and one count of operating its premises in a manner which impaired visibility of the interior of its viewing booths from outside the booths. (§§ 103.101(e)(2) and 103.101(i).)

A Board-appointed hearing examiner reviewed the accusations, found insufficient evidence to sustain any of the 33 charges that Bam had allowed customers to masturbate, found the evidence was sufficient to sustain the lack of visibility charge but, notwithstanding the latter finding, concluded there was no basis for imposing a penalty because the deficiency had been corrected. Based on these findings (as detailed in an eight-page report discussed at length below), the examiner recommended that the Board deny the Department’s request to revoke Barn’s permit. Apparently dissatisfied, the Department filed “exceptions" to the examiner’s report and recommended a 30-day suspension of Barn’s permit.

After reviewing the evidence and the examiner’s report, the Board perfunctorily rejected the examiner’s findings and recommendations, refused to discuss Barn’s request for imposition of a fine in lieu of suspension, and suspended Barn’s permit for 30 days. Bam requested findings and the Board directed their preparation and submission to Barn’s attorney for approval. *1346 But before this was done, the Board issued its decision and only later did Barn’s counsel receive the proposed findings (to which he objected on the ground the findings should have been prepared and considered by the Board prior to the issuance of its decision). 2

Bam filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) challenging the Board’s decision on various grounds. The trial court denied the petition and this appeal followed.

Discussion

Bam contends the trial court should have granted its petition and sent the matter back to the Board because findings were never made. At the hearing, the Board agreed that Bam had a right to have findings prepared (Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 509-510 [113 Cal.Rptr. 836, 522 P.2d 12]) but it now contends Bam waived that right by refusing to participate in their preparation. We agree with Bam.

Findings are not supposed to be a post hoc rationalization for a decision already made. To the contrary, they are supposed to “conduce the administrative body to draw legally relevant sub-conclusions supportive of [the Board’s] ultimate decision; the intended effect is to facilitate orderly analysis and minimize the likelihood that the agency will randomly leap from evidence to conclusions.” (11 Cal.3d at p. 516.)

Application of this rule to the facts of this case is not an elevation of form over substance. Indeed, it is in this context—where the decision of the hearing examiner is rejected—that findings by the Board are critical. Had the Board simply adopted the examiner’s recommendation, we would have no problem deeming the examiner’s findings to be those of the Board. But where, as here, the Board rejects those findings, notwithstanding that it did not hear or see the witnesses, the reviewing court has to be told why that was done, so it can “trace and examine the agency’s mode of analysis.” (11 Cal.3d at p. 516.)

We are at a loss to understand why the Board did what it did. At the hearing before the examiner, the Department presented arrest reports for all of the masturbating patrons and an inspection report documenting poor booth visibility. Bam agreed that if the arresting and inspecting police officers were called as witnesses, they would attest to the observations *1347 contained in the reports. But Bam did not agree that any of the arrests led to convictions and Bernard Green, Barn’s owner, testified about his extensive efforts to comply with the conditions of his permit. According to Green, many if not all of the arrests were unjustified and the hearing examiner specifically found that at least one of the men was acquitted following a jury trial.

Clerks patrol the arcade every two or three minutes and eject customers who are discovered masturbating. In the words of the hearing examiner, the Department did “not dispute that Bam has been cooperative in its efforts to police Adult World. It agreed that Bam implemented every suggestion it made to alleviate the problems discovered during police inspections." Indeed, the examiner found that “[m]any of the prevention measures [Bam] has adopted are not required by the arcade regulations.” Green has installed a video camera for further monitoring and, “[o]n his own initiative, Green posted large signs in each booth and along the hallway stating in English and Spanish that public masturbation is unlawful.”

When the police enter the arcade, Barn’s employees must stop their patrolling. On at least one occasion, one of Barn’s employees was arrested for patrolling the arcade while officers were present. Although the case was ultimately dismissed, Green has been told by the Department that his employees cannot patrol when police officers are present. 3

Insofar as the “poor visibility" charge was concerned, the hearing examiner found the problem was that the “fisheye” mirrors originally used by Bam were mobile and the patrons would move them so the clerks (and police) could not see the interiors of the booths from the hallway. “Shortly after the poor visibility report, Green had the mirrors readjusted and set on stationary mounts. He adjusted the mirrors specifically to meet the suggestions of Departmental inspectors.” Since that time, the inspectors have confirmed that the mirrors fully comply with the rules.

Based upon these factual findings, the hearing examiner recommended “that all of the charges claiming that [Bam] operated [its] business in a manner allowing customers to masturbate be dismissed. The Department has presented insufficient evidence that [Bam] did something or failed to act in some way which encourages, entices, assists or permits customers to masturbate. To the contrary, the evidence suggests that Bam was cooperative *1348 with the Department and implemented all of the recommendations it proposed. [Bam] went beyond the arcade requirements in attempting to discourage patrons from masturbating and established clerk patrols, installed a video monitor and posted prominent signs.

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7 Cal. App. 4th 1343, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738, 92 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6269, 92 Daily Journal DAR 9793, 1992 Cal. App. LEXIS 891, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/bam-inc-v-board-of-police-commissioners-calctapp-1992.