Ballentine v. Bowery Residence Committee

• Court: District Court, E.D. New York
• Decided: May 1, 2025
• Docket: 1:25-cv-03034
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK QUINTIN J. BALLENTINE, Plaintiff, -against- 25-CV-2980 (LTS) BOWERY RESIDENCE COMMITTEE; TRANSFER ORDER JULIE SALAMON; ERIC ADAMS; KATHY HOCHUL, Defendants. LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, who resides in Brooklyn, New York, brings this pro se action under the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), alleging that Defendants violated his rights at a shelter in Brooklyn, New York. Named as Defendants are Bowery Residents’ Committee (“BRC”), BRC Chair Julie Salamon, New York City Mayor Eric Adams, and New York Governor Kathy Hochul. For the following reasons, this action is transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. DISCUSSION Plaintiff’s claims under the ADA and FHA are subject to the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391. Under Section 1391(b), a civil action may be brought in (1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . ; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction with respect to such action. For venue purposes, a “natural person” resides in the district where the person is domiciled, and an “entity with the capacity to sue and be sued” resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1), (2). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights at a shelter operated by BRC in Brooklyn, New York. Brooklyn is located in Kings County, which falls within the Eastern

District of New York. See 28 U.S.C. § 112(c). Plaintiff does not provide an address for BRC. Nor does he provide residential addresses for Salamon, Adams, and Hochul. Because it is unknown where defendants reside, it is unclear whether venue is proper under Section 1391(b)(1) in this District, the Eastern District of New York, or another district in the state. Even if the Court did assume that Defendants reside in this District and that venue is proper here under Section 1391(b)(1), because the events giving rise to Plaintiff’s claims occurred in Brooklyn, venue would also be proper under Section 1391(b)(2) in the Eastern District of New York. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), even if a case is filed in a jurisdiction where venue is proper, a court may transfer the case to any other district where it might have been brought “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). In

determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following ten factors: (1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of the unwilling witnesses; (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded to the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances. Keitt v. N.Y. City, 882 F. Supp. 2d 412, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge No. Am., Inc., 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors). Under Section 1404(a), transfer appears to be appropriate in this case. The underlying events occurred in Brooklyn, where BRC operates the shelter at which Plaintiff resides and that is the subject of Plaintiff’s claims. It is reasonable to expect that all relevant documents and witnesses also would be in Brooklyn. The Eastern District of New York appears to be a more

convenient forum for this action. Accordingly, the Court transfers this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006) (“District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.”). CONCLUSION The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. A summons shall not issue from this court. This order closes this case in this court. The Court certifies, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962). SO ORDERED. Dated: May 1, 2025 New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN Chief United States District Judge