Baker v. Local 2977, State Council 93, American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees

Massachusetts Appeals Court

Baker v. Local 2977, State Council 93, American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees

519 N.E.2d 1352, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 439, 1988 Mass. App. LEXIS 126

CourtMassachusetts Appeals Court

DecidedMarch 2, 1988

DocketNo. 87-510

StatusPublished

Cited by9 cases

This text of 519 N.E.2d 1352 (Baker v. Local 2977, State Council 93, American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Baker v. Local 2977, State Council 93, American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees, 519 N.E.2d 1352, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 439, 1988 Mass. App. LEXIS 126 (Mass. Ct. App. 1988).

Pincite

Opinion

Kaplan, J.

William Ames, the plaintiff Albert Baker, and four others applied to fill an advertised vacancy for the position of section foreman, highway division, Barnstable department of public works, W-12. After evaluation of these persons, the defendant town of Barnstable, as employer, through the department, selected Baker for the post.² Ames filed a grievance [440]*440under'the collective bargaining agreement between the town and the defendant union, the exclusive representative of the relevant unit of employees, of which Ames and Baker were members. The grievance charged that the selection of Baker was in violation of article V (“Seniority”) of the collective agreement, quoted in the margin,³ and that, upon a proper application of this provision, Ames deserved the appointment. Ames’s grievance was denied at the first and second stages of the grievance procedure, but at the third stage, consisting of submission to the selectmen, the town allowed the grievance and appointed Ames to the post. Accordingly, Baker reverted to his previous position as mechanic in the highway division.

Baker then filed his grievance, asserting a violation of article V in the appointment of Ames, and claiming his, Baker’s, right to the appointment. This grievance was denied through the third stage, and the union, although requested by Baker, did not press the grievance to the final stage, arbitration.⁴ Baker, as plaintiff, commenced the present action in Superior Court with the union and the town as defendants, alleging that the union’s decision not to go to arbitration was in breach of its duty of fair representation. Baker prayed for a judgment directing the town to proceed to the arbitration of his grievance.⁵

What emerged upon trial may be briefly stated. It was common ground that, if seniority were disregarded, Baker was better qualified for the position than Ames by a substantial [441]*441margin; Ames could be found to be minimally qualified. Ames, however, had a wide advantage over Baker in seniority: Ames had twenty-four years of service, Baker eight. The judge, upon findings of fact and rulings of law, holding in effect that Baker had failed to establish breach of duty on the part of the union, entered judgment denying the application to compel arbitration. Baker appeals.

As a rule a court will not compel last-stage arbitration of a grievance at the suit of an individual employee when his union has declined to request arbitration under the collective agreement. Exceptionally, the individual may secure such relief when he is able to establish by “substantial evidence”⁶ that the union’s negative decision was “arbitrary” or “discriminatory” or actuated by “bad faith,”⁷ and the union thus stands in breach of the duty of fair representation. Our Labor Relations Commission has expressed a union’s responsibility in other words that come to much the same thing. “Because bargaining agents’ obligations often require that they represent conflicting interests, the National Labor Relations Board and the courts allow them a wide range of reasonableness in fulfilling their statutory duties, subject to good faith and honesty in the exercise of their discretion. . . . Consequently, an aggrieved employee, notwithstanding the possible merits of his claim, is subject to a union’s discretionary power to pursue, settle, or abandon a grievance, so long as its conduct is not improperly motivated, arbitrary, perfunctory or demonstrative of inexcusable neglect.”⁸ Under such a canon, it is not enough for the em[442]*442ployee to show that his grievance was “meritorious,”⁹ or that the union made a “judgmental error”,¹⁰ or employed reasoning which, as an original matter, would not satisfy an expert Labor Relations Commission¹¹ or, by extension, a judge. That a union did not reach the correct interpretation of a collective agreement¹² — was “inartful, unskillful, or erroneous” in contract analysis¹³ — would not endow the grieving employee with a right to correction at the hands of a court. The distinction often to be observed is “between honest, mistaken conduct, on the one hand, and deliberate and severely hostile and irrational treatment, on the other.”¹⁴

On the present record, there is nothing approaching “substantial evidence” that the defendant union was other than “honest” in deciding not to pursue the grievance to the end. We do not enter upon a detailed inquiry whether the union’s implicit interpretation of the seniority provision was correct. The view that an employee with much greater seniority than another, but with much less, yet minimal, merit qualified for promotion [443]*443over that other, is not on its face irrational or indicative of any ulterior or malign motive on the part of the union.¹⁵

Judgment affirmed.¹⁶

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Kaplan, J.

William Ames, the plaintiff Albert Baker, and four others applied to fill an advertised vacancy for the position of section foreman, highway division, Barnstable department of public works, W-12. After evaluation of these persons, the defendant town of Barnstable, as employer, through the department, selected Baker for the post.² Ames filed a grievance [440]*440under'the collective bargaining agreement between the town and the defendant union, the exclusive representative of the relevant unit of employees, of which Ames and Baker were members. The grievance charged that the selection of Baker was in violation of article V (“Seniority”) of the collective agreement, quoted in the margin,³ and that, upon a proper application of this provision, Ames deserved the appointment. Ames’s grievance was denied at the first and second stages of the grievance procedure, but at the third stage, consisting of submission to the selectmen, the town allowed the grievance and appointed Ames to the post. Accordingly, Baker reverted to his previous position as mechanic in the highway division.

Baker then filed his grievance, asserting a violation of article V in the appointment of Ames, and claiming his, Baker’s, right to the appointment. This grievance was denied through the third stage, and the union, although requested by Baker, did not press the grievance to the final stage, arbitration.⁴ Baker, as plaintiff, commenced the present action in Superior Court with the union and the town as defendants, alleging that the union’s decision not to go to arbitration was in breach of its duty of fair representation. Baker prayed for a judgment directing the town to proceed to the arbitration of his grievance.⁵

What emerged upon trial may be briefly stated. It was common ground that, if seniority were disregarded, Baker was better qualified for the position than Ames by a substantial [441]*441margin; Ames could be found to be minimally qualified. Ames, however, had a wide advantage over Baker in seniority: Ames had twenty-four years of service, Baker eight. The judge, upon findings of fact and rulings of law, holding in effect that Baker had failed to establish breach of duty on the part of the union, entered judgment denying the application to compel arbitration. Baker appeals.

As a rule a court will not compel last-stage arbitration of a grievance at the suit of an individual employee when his union has declined to request arbitration under the collective agreement. Exceptionally, the individual may secure such relief when he is able to establish by “substantial evidence”⁶ that the union’s negative decision was “arbitrary” or “discriminatory” or actuated by “bad faith,”⁷ and the union thus stands in breach of the duty of fair representation. Our Labor Relations Commission has expressed a union’s responsibility in other words that come to much the same thing. “Because bargaining agents’ obligations often require that they represent conflicting interests, the National Labor Relations Board and the courts allow them a wide range of reasonableness in fulfilling their statutory duties, subject to good faith and honesty in the exercise of their discretion. . . . Consequently, an aggrieved employee, notwithstanding the possible merits of his claim, is subject to a union’s discretionary power to pursue, settle, or abandon a grievance, so long as its conduct is not improperly motivated, arbitrary, perfunctory or demonstrative of inexcusable neglect.”⁸ Under such a canon, it is not enough for the em[442]*442ployee to show that his grievance was “meritorious,”⁹ or that the union made a “judgmental error”,¹⁰ or employed reasoning which, as an original matter, would not satisfy an expert Labor Relations Commission¹¹ or, by extension, a judge. That a union did not reach the correct interpretation of a collective agreement¹² — was “inartful, unskillful, or erroneous” in contract analysis¹³ — would not endow the grieving employee with a right to correction at the hands of a court. The distinction often to be observed is “between honest, mistaken conduct, on the one hand, and deliberate and severely hostile and irrational treatment, on the other.”¹⁴

On the present record, there is nothing approaching “substantial evidence” that the defendant union was other than “honest” in deciding not to pursue the grievance to the end. We do not enter upon a detailed inquiry whether the union’s implicit interpretation of the seniority provision was correct. The view that an employee with much greater seniority than another, but with much less, yet minimal, merit qualified for promotion [443]*443over that other, is not on its face irrational or indicative of any ulterior or malign motive on the part of the union.¹⁵

Judgment affirmed.¹⁶

¹⁵

A previous contest between two employees for a position resulted in arbitration under American Arbitration Association auspices in 1982 at the instance of the present union; the same seniority clause was involved. The record before the arbitrator (Harold Fuller grievance) was a full one on how the town made its selection (the arbitrator was critical of the process). In the arbitrator’s view, the collective agreement placed “greatest emphasis on seniority, with merit nonetheless remaining a factor to be taken into consideration.” He considered the candidates of roughly equal merit, and, upsetting the town’s selection, awarded the post to the candidate who had a small edge (about one year) in seniority.

The arbitrator’s decision is not contradictory of the union’s action in the present case. We point out, also, that the function of an arbitrator in deciding priority under the contract is different from that of the Labor Relations Commission, or a court, in deciding whether a union has violated its duty of fair representation in declining to take a grievance to arbitration. See Fitchburg Sch. Comm., 9 M.L.C. 1399, 1415 (1982).

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519 N.E.2d 1352, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 439, 1988 Mass. App. LEXIS 126, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/baker-v-local-2977-state-council-93-american-federation-of-state-county-massappct-1988.

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