Baker v. Kijakazi

• Court: District Court, D. Maryland
• Decided: June 12, 2025
• Docket: 1:23-cv-00998
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND CHAMBERS OF 101 WEST LOMBARD STREET CHARLESD.AUSTIN BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATEJUDGE (410) 962-7810 MDD_CDAChambers@mdd.uscourts.gov

June 12, 2025 LETTER TO ALL COUNSEL OF RECORD Re: Jack B. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner, Social Security Administration1 Civil No. 23-0998-CDA Dear Counsel: On June 13, 2024, pursuant to Local Rule 105.10, Plaintiff Jack B. (“Plaintiff”) filed a Motion to Reconsider(the“Motion”) relating totheCourt’s May 29,2024Memorandum Opinion and Order (the “May 29, 2024 Decision”), which affirmed the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA’s” or “Commissioner’s” or “Defendant’s”) decision and closed this case. ECF 16. Defendant filed a response in opposition on June 25, 2024. ECF 18. I find that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). For the reasons explained below, the Court will DENY Defendant’sMotion to Reconsider. I. LEGAL STANDARD The Court’s review of an ALJ’s decision is limited to determining whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and whether the ALJ properly applied the relevant legal standards, see Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). When deciding whether to reconsider a judgment under Local Rule 105.10, the Court uses the standard relevant to motions for reconsideration brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). See Crocetti v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., No. SAG-17-1122, 2018 WL 3973074, at *1 (D.Md. Aug. 1, 2018). Under Rule 59(e), the Court may alter or amend a prior decision if: (1)there has been an intervening change of controlling law; (2) new evidence has become available; or (3) “there has been a clear error of law or a manifest injustice.” Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp. LLC, 599 F.3d 403, 407 (4th Cir. 2010). “The grounds for reconsideration are purposefully narrow to prevent the motion from being used to ask the Court to rethink what the Court had already thought through—rightly or wrongly.” Crocetti, 2018 WL 3973074, at *1 (internal citation omitted). “Rule 59(e) motions may not be used, however, to raise arguments which could have been raised prior to the issuance of the judgment, nor may they be used to argue 1 Plaintiff filed this case against Kilolo Kijakazi, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, on April 13, 2023. ECF 1. Frank Bisignano became the Commissioner of Social Security on May 7, 2025. Accordingly, Commissioner Bisignano has been substituted as this case’s Defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). June 12, 2025 Page 2 a case under a novel legal theory that the party had the ability to address in the first instance.” Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases). II. ANALYSIS Plaintiff asserts two arguments. First, Plaintiff relies on Elijah H. v. O’Malley, No. SAG- 23-1786, 2024 WL 1833608 (D. Md. Apr. 26, 2024), to argue that “there is no evidence that the ALJ explicitly based the RFC provisions on any opinions contained in the record.” ECF 16, at 4- 5 n.6. Second, Plaintiff relies on Hall v. Harris, 658 F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1981), to argue that the Court’s conclusion was “legally erroneous” when it found that “Plaintiff [did] not me[e]t their burden of proof” of showing that “the ALJ’s failure to provide a narrative discussion explaining the RFC’s accommodation of Plaintiff’s CPP limitations” or to include “RFC provisions . . . in lieu of the provision at issue” was harmful error. Id.at 2, 4. Defendant counters that Plaintiff (1) fails to demonstrate a clear error of law and (2) “improperly attempts to relitigate the issue . . . previously decided[.]” ECF 18, at 1, 4. Because neither argument involves intervening law or new evidence, Plaintiff’s challenges raise questions concerning clear error. Neither clears that hurdle. Plaintiff’s reliance on Elijah H. is misplaced. In Elijah H., the Court concluded that “the ALJ . . .fail[ed] to explain how the evidence specifically supported the RFC[]provisions regarding [p]laintiff’s moderate CPP limitation.” 2024 WL 1833608, at *4. Notably, not only did the ALJ make “only one mention throughout their decision regarding . . . [a] restriction for [p]laintiff’s moderate CPP limitation” in the RFC provisions, but, as Plaintiff noted, the ALJ also failed to “explicitly base [the] RFC provisions on any opinions contained in the record.” Elijah H., 2024 WL 1833608, at *4; cf. Sizemore v. Berryhill, 878 F.3d 72, 80-81 (4th Cir. 2017) (affirming an ALJ’s decision where: (1) the ALJ adopted, without explanation, certain RFC limitations suggested in a medical opinion that provided “detailed findings” on a claimant’s “sustained concentration and persistence limitations” and (2) the ALJ assigned persuasive value to the opinion). In fact, the ALJ in Elijah H. did not assign persuasive value to any of the medical opinions opining the claimant’s moderate CPP limitation. Transcript of Record at 23-24, Elijah H., No. SAG-23-1786 (D. Md. Sept. 5, 2023), ECF 6. As a result, the Court concluded that meaningful review could not occur and, accordingly, remand was appropriate. Elijah H., 2024 WL 1833608, at *4; see DeLoatche v. Heckler, 715 F.2d 148, 150 (4th Cir. 1983) (“Judicial Review of an administrative decision is impossible without an adequate explanation of that decision by the [ALJ].”). In contrast, unlike in Elijah H., the ALJ here assigned persuasive value to two medical opinions opining Plaintiff’s moderate CPP limitation. ECF 15, at 6 (explaining that “the opinions of Drs. Ewell and Cott provided substantial support for the RFC [provisions,] . . . and the ALJ’s adoption of such [opinions] permit[ted] meaningful review”). Therefore, unlike inElijah H.,theCourt concluded that meaningful review could occur. As a result, because Plaintiff “ask[s] th[is] Court to rethink what [it] had already thought through[,]” the Court finds that it did not commit a clear error of law on this basis in the May 29, 2024 Decision. Crocetti, 2018 WL 3973074, at *1. Plaintiff’s reliance on Hall also fails. Plaintiff cites Hall for the proposition that “[b]y satisfying either step 3 or 4, [Plaintiff] establishes a prima facie case of disability.” 658 F.2d at June 12, 2025 Page 3 264. However, Plaintiff misconstrues the proper context for applying Hall’s analysis. The language Plaintiff challenges in the May 29, 2024 Decision arises in the Court’s discussion of whether the ALJ’s determination involved harmful error. The context was not one of proving disability. Put simply, the May 29, 2024 Decision explained that Plaintiff failed to suggest how, absent ALJ error,the RFC might have better accommodated her impairments. Nor did she identify further evidence, which had not been considered,suggesting that anadditional RFC limitation was appropriate. As such, it remained Plaintiff’s burden to articulate why the ALJ’s error warranted remand. See Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 409 (2009) (“[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party attacking the agency determination.”); see also Smith v. Colvin, No. TMD-15-1694, 2016 WL 5147195, at *10 (D. Md. Sep. 20, 2016) (finding harmless error where the claimant failed to demonstrate how the result would have changed had the ALJ properly addressed the claimant’s cognitive difficulties in the RFC analysis); Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that the claimant bears the burden of production and of proof during the first four steps of the inquiry). As a result, theCourt finds that it did not commit a clear error of law on this basis in the May 29, 2024 Decision. III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’sMotiontoReconsider,ECF 16, is DENIED. Despite the informal nature of this letter, it should be flagged as a Memorandum Opinion and docketed as an Order. Sincerely, /s/ Charles D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge