Baez-Gil v. USA

2013 DNH 083

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: June 4, 2013
• Docket: CV-12-266-JL
• Status: Published

Opinion

Baez-Gil v . USA CV-12-266-JL 6/4/13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Angel Baez-Gil

v. Civil N o . 12-cv-266-JL Opinion N o . 2013 DNH 083 United States of America

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This case involves the right to effective assistance of

counsel in the context of asserting an arguably novel theory in

plea negotiations or before the court. Angel Baez-Gil pleaded

guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute

cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846, and conspiracy to import

cocaine, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 9 5 2 , 9 6 0 , and 963. He subsequently

filed a pro se motion attacking his conviction and sentence. See

28 U.S.C. § 2255. After the United States moved to dismiss, the

court appointed counsel to represent Baez-Gil. He then amended

the petition to distill it to a single contention: that defense

counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to raise,

during plea negotiations or at sentencing, the issue of whether a

co-conspirator, who died after a cocaine-filled package she had

ingested while transporting the drug burst, had died from the

“use” of the drug. See Mot. to Amend (document n o . 10) at 2 ;

O b j . to Mot. of U.S. to Dismiss (document n o . 11) at 3 . This

issue was critical, Baez-Gil argues, because her death from the

“use” of the drug subjected him to a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment, whereas he would otherwise have faced

a mandatory minimum sentence of only 5 years. See 21 U.S.C. §§

841(b)(1)(B), 960(b)(2).

Following Baez-Gil’s amendment, the parties agreed to a

briefing schedule by which they would submit this matter to the

court for decision. See Status Report (document n o . 1 4 ) ;

Assented-to Mot. to Permit Supp. Briefing (document n o . 1 5 ) .

Having carefully considered the parties’ submissions and heard

oral argument, the court denies Baez-Gil’s petition. Even

assuming the proper interpretation of the statutory term “use”

excludes the ingestion of a drug in order to transport i t , as

Baez-Gil argues, that is a novel proposition that has been

expressly rejected by one court and not endorsed by any authority

this court knows o f . Case law is uniform in holding that counsel

does not fail to provide effective assistance by “failing to

contemplate, or choosing not to advance, [a] novel theory,”

United States v . Davis, 406 Fed. Appx. 2 6 8 , 271 (10th Cir. 2010),

so Baez-Gil has not shown his sentence was imposed in violation

of his right to the effective assistance of counsel.

I. Applicable legal standard

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a prisoner in federal custody may

move for relief from his conviction and sentence on the grounds

“that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution

2 or laws of the United States, or that the court was without

jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in

excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject

to collateral attack.” Where no evidentiary hearing is held on a

§ 2255 motion, the court “take[s] as true the sworn allegations

of fact set forth in the petition unless those allegations are

merely conclusory, contradicted by the record, or inherently

incredible.” Owens v . United States, 483 F.3d 4 8 , 57 (1st Cir.

2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

II. Background

Baez-Gil and several others conspired to import cocaine into

the United States from the Dominican Republic. Among the

conspirators were twin sisters Nelly and Mally Rodriguez, who

agreed to transport the cocaine into the United States by

swallowing a number of “fingers”–-which the court understands to

be either balloons or the snipped-off fingers of rubber gloves–-

each containing about 10 grams of cocaine. Pursuant to this

plan, the sisters each swallowed about 40 fingers in Santo

Domingo, the capital and largest city of the Dominican Republic,

and flew to Boston, Massachusetts. From there, they traveled by

taxi to the Park View Inn in Salem, New Hampshire, where they

drank laxatives to assist in passing the fingers.

3 Not long after consuming the laxatives, Mally fell ill,

began vomiting, and lost consciousness. After the Salem police

were summoned to the inn, they transported Mally to the hospital,

where she was pronounced dead. The medical examiner determined

the cause of death to be acute cocaine intoxication.

The grand jury indicted Baez-Gil and his co-conspirators for

conspiracy to possess cocaine with the intent to distribute, in

violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B)(ii), and 846.

It subsequently handed up a superseding indictment charging the

same defendants with an additional count of conspiracy to import

cocaine into the United States, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§

952(a), 960(a)(1), 960(b)(2)(B)(ii), and 963. Each count of the

superseding indictment alleged that “the use of said cocaine

result[ed] in the death of Mally Rodriguez,” a fact that, if

proven, would have subjected Baez-Gil to a 20-year mandatory

minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B) and 960(b)(2).

On September 2 9 , 2009, Baez-Gil, who was represented by

retained counsel, appeared before this court and entered pleas of

guilty to both counts of the superseding indictment. He entered

those pleas pursuant to a plea agreement with the prosecution,

acknowledging that an element of both offenses was “that death

resulted from the use of the cocaine,” and that each offense

carried a mandatory minimum term of 20 years and a maximum term

4 of life imprisonment. The agreement further stipulated that,

absent the prosecution’s filing of a motion under 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(e), “the defendant should be sentenced to serve 240

months imprisonment to be followed by five (5) years of

supervised release on Counts One and Two concurrently.” It is

undisputed that neither of Baez-Gil’s two attorneys advised him

that he should not plead guilty to the “death resulting” element

of the offenses because a victim’s “intentional introduction of

encased ‘fingers’ into her alimentary canal solely for the

purpose of transporting the ‘fingers’ is not ‘the use’ of cocaine

as that term is contemplated in the drug statute.”

The court sentenced Baez-Gil on December 3 1 , 2009.

Application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines yielded a

sentencing range of 168-210 months, which was raised to 240

months in accordance with the mandatory minimum just mentioned.

See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b). The court granted the prosecution’s

motion for a downward departure, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e);

U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, and sentenced Baez-Gil to a term of 180 months

on each of the counts of conviction, to be served concurrently.

Baez-Gil, arguing that the 180-month sentence was unreasonable,

appealed his sentence to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed.

See United States v . Baez-Gil, N o . 10-1104 (1st Cir. Apr. 1 1 ,

2011) (unpublished disposition).

5 III. Analysis

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution

guarantees a criminal defendant “the Assistance of Counsel for

his defence.” U.S. Const. amend. VI . The right to assistance

of counsel, as set forth in the Amendment, “is the right to the

effective assistance of counsel.” Strickland v . Washington, 466

U.S. 6 6 8 , 686 (1984) (emphasis added; internal quotation marks

and citation omitted). As is the case with other constitutional

rights, the government can take actions that violate this right,

e.g., by interfering “with the ability of counsel to make

independent decisions about how to conduct the defense.” Id. at

686. Uncommonly, though, counsel may itself deprive a defendant

of this right “simply by failing to render adequate legal

assistance,” that i s , assistance that is “reasonable considering

all the circumstances,” including “prevailing professional

norms.” Id. at 686-88.

A petitioner alleging that counsel rendered constitutionally

inadequate representation bears “a highly demanding and heavy

burden.” Knight v . Spencer, 447 F.3d 6, 15 (1st Cir. 2006)

(quoting Williams v . Taylor, 529 U.S. 3 6 2 , 393 (2000)). He must

“show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [his] trial

counsel’s conduct fell below the standard of reasonably effective

assistance and that counsel’s errors prejudiced the defense.”

6 González-Soberal v . United States, 244 F.3d 273, 277 (1st Cir.

2001) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; emphasis in original).

This two-part test “applies to challenges to guilty pleas based

on ineffective assistance of counsel,” Hill v . Lockhart, 474 U.S.

5 2 , 58 (1985), like the challenge Baez-Gil raises here.

This court need not venture past the first prong of the test

to examine whether Baez-Gil’s defense was prejudiced by his

counsel’s alleged error, as his attorneys’ conduct did not fall

“below the standard of reasonably effective assistance.” In

assessing the quality of representation under the first prong,

courts employ a highly deferential standard of review and “must

indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; see also Knight, 447 F.3d at 15 (“It

is only where, given the facts known at the time, counsel’s

choice was so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney

would have made i t , that the ineffective assistance prong is

satisfied.”). Baez-Gil has not overcome this presumption.

At the core of Baez-Gil’s claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel is the proper interpretation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(B)

and 960(b)(2), both of which provide for a mandatory minimum

sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment “if death or serious bodily

injury results from the use of” the controlled substance either

7 possessed or imported by a defendant. As already noted, Baez-Gil

argues that the term “use” in these clauses does not include “the

swallowing of packaged drugs for the purpose of transportation.”

Pet’r’s Memo. of Law (document n o . 16) at 4 ; see also id. at 7 .

Instead, Baez-Gil says, the term “use” means the ingestion or

introduction of a controlled substance into one’s body “for the

purpose of obtaining the benefit or reaction from the drug”

(i.e., to take advantage of the drug’s narcotic or psychoactive

properties). O b j . to Mot. to Dismiss (document n o . 11) at 7 . By

failing to appreciate this interpretation of the statute and

advise him accordingly, Baez-Gil argues, his attorneys deprived

him of adequate representation.

Baez-Gil’s interpretation of the statutory term “use” is not

without merit. That interpretation is certainly more consistent

with the common understanding of what it means to “use” a drug

than the United States’ proffered interpretation, which is that

the “use” of a drug is simply the “ingestion of a drug” through

“the act of snorting, injecting or swallowing,”1 no matter what

the ultimate purpose of this ingestion may b e . Resp. to Pet’r’s

Memo. of Law (document n o . 17) at 4 . It is by no means clear,

though, that Baez-Gil’s interpretation is correct (or, for that

1 Or, presumably, through inhalation, topical application, any of the other myriad ways controlled substances are typicall introduced into the body.

8 matter, that the United States’ interpretation is incorrect).

Baez-Gil has not cited, and the court has not found, any cases

that endorse his interpretation of §§ 841(b)(1)(B) and 960(b)(2).

As a matter of fact, it appears that only one court has directly

addressed what it means to “use” a controlled substance within

the meaning of either statute, and that court concluded that a

person who died after consuming a controlled substance in order

to conceal it from the police–-essentially the same reason Mally

Rodriguez consumed the cocaine Baez-Gil conspired to import and

possess–-had made “use” of the drug. See United States v . Baker,

N o . 05-cr-496, 2007 WL 148796, at *7-8 (E.D. M o . Jan. 1 6 , 2007).

This court need not resolve that issue itself at this time.

Assuming that Baez-Gil’s interpretation is the correct one, his

attorneys’ failure to apprehend that interpretation and advise

Baez-Gil of its ramifications did not constitute ineffective

assistance. What is encompassed within the “use” of a controlled

substance for purposes of the offenses for which Baez-Gil was

convicted is not evident on the face of the statute and has not

yet been clarified by controlling case law. “The Strickland

standard does not require counsel to be clever or inventive, or

to advocate a claim not yet announced in the law.” Williams v .

Alabama, N o . 07-cv-1276, 2012 WL 1339905, at *72 (N.D. Ala. Apr.

1 2 , 2012); see also Davis, 406 Fed. Appx. at 271 (“Trial counsel

9 was not deficient for failing to contemplate, or choosing not to

advance, [a] novel theory.”); Meeds v . Moore, N o . 06-cv-25, 2008

WL 301978, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 1 , 2008) (“Federal courts have

long recognized that an attorney’s performance is not deficient,

merely because he has failed to raise a novel argument, even

though that argument is subsequently adopted as the law.”).

Indeed, both the United States Supreme Court and the Court of

Appeals have held that defense attorneys who fail to detect and

raise a novel argument have not rendered ineffective assistance.

See Engle v . Isaac, 456 U.S. 1 0 7 , 131-34 (1982) (the Constitution

“does not insure that defense counsel will recognize and raise

every conceivable . . . claim”); Choudry v . United States, 960

F.2d 143 (1st Cir. 1992) (unpublished) (declining to “fault

defense counsel for failing to raise [a] novel claim”); United

States v . Fusaro, 708 F.2d 1 7 , 26-27 (1st Cir. 1983) (defense

counsel’s “failure to spot” a “novel claim” did “not render

counsel’s assistance below the range of competence of

attorneys”).

Because Baez-Gil has not carried his burden of showing that

his trial counsel’s conduct fell below the standard of reasonably

effective assistance,2 he has not shown that he was convicted and

2 The court notes that one of Baez-Gil’s co-conspirators, who also had the benefit of counsel, likewise entered a plea agreement stipulating that Mally Rodriguez’s death had resulted

10 sentenced “in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United

States.” Consequently, he is not entitled to relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2255.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Baez-Gil’s motion for relief

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is DENIED. Because Baez-Gil has not made

a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,

the court declines to issue a certificate of appealability. See

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Rule 1 1 , Rules Governing Section 2254

from the use of the cocaine, and that he was therefore subject to a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence. See Plea Agreement, United States v . Rodriguez Brito, N o . 09-cr-41-JL-1 (D.N.H. Aug. 2 0 , 2009). Notably, the attorney representing that co-defendant is on this court’s panel of attorneys who provide representation under the Criminal Justice Act, and has been found qualified to provide representation in complex criminal cases. That provides some confirmation that the assistance rendered by Baez-Gil’s attorneys did not fall below prevailing professional norms. Further showing that Baez-Gil’s attorneys did not act unreasonably in failing to recognize the issue is the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in United States v . Shah, 453 F.3d 520 (D.C. Cir. 2006). There, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s application of § 2D1.1(a)(2) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which mandates a base offense level of 38 if “death or serious bodily injury resulted from the use of” a controlled substance, where the defendant’s co-conspirator, like Baez-Gil’s, had died “after ingesting [the controlled substance] while smuggling it” into the United States. Id. at 524. That neither the court of appeals nor the trial court saw fit to question whether this ingestion of the substance constituted the “use” of the substance suggests that this conclusion is not so obvious that any competent attorney should have seized on i t .

11 Cases; First Cir. L.R. 22.0. The clerk of court shall enter

judgment accordingly and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

Jo/eph N.^Laplante U s ited States District Judge

Dated: June 4 , 2013

cc: Howard Esq. Mark E . Howard, Donald A . Feith, Esq.