Baccus v. American States Insurance Co. of Texas

865 S.W.2d 587, 1993 Tex. App. LEXIS 3048, 1993 WL 454530
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedNovember 9, 1993
Docket2-92-180-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by12 cases

This text of 865 S.W.2d 587 (Baccus v. American States Insurance Co. of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Baccus v. American States Insurance Co. of Texas, 865 S.W.2d 587, 1993 Tex. App. LEXIS 3048, 1993 WL 454530 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993).

Opinion

OPINION

FARRAR, Justice.

This is an appeal from a jury verdict in a suit for benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. Appellant, Henry Vernon Baecus, brings two points of error: the jury verdict was so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to result in an unjust judgment and, the trial court erred in setting aside its order granting a new trial. We agree the verdict was against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Because this issue is dispositive, it is not necessary to reach appellant’s point of error regarding the order for new trial. Tex. R.App.P. 90(a).

We reverse and remand for new trial.

In reviewing a point of error asserting that a finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, we must consider and weigh all of the evidence, both the evidence which tends to prove the existence of a vital fact as well as evidence which tends to disprove its existence. See Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.1986) (per curiam); Ford Motor Co. v. Nowak, 638 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.). So considering the evidence, if a jury finding is so contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly unjust, the point should be sustained, regardless of whether there is some evidence to support it. Watson v. Prewitt, 159 Tex. 305, 320 S.W.2d 815, 816 (1959) (per curiam); In re King’s Estate, *588 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951) (per curiam).

The Supreme Court of Texas has cautioned the courts of appeals to detail the evidence relevant to the issue in consideration and clearly state “why the jury’s finding is factually insufficient or is so against the great weight and preponderance as to be manifestly unjust; why it shocks the conscience; or clearly demonstrates bias.” Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986) (opinion on reh’g). Further, the supreme court has instructed that in our opinions we should state in what regard the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence in support of the jury’s verdict. See id.; see also Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp., 720 S.W.2d 804, 805 (Tex.1986) (per curiam).

At trial, the parties agreed and stipulated that appellant sustained a compensable injury in the course of his employment when he fell off a six foot scaffold on June 15, 1989. The evidence showed that appellant suffered a fractured calcaneus and a back injury as a result of the fall. The issues before the jury were whether appellant’s incapacity was total or partial, and what was the duration of the incapacity. In answer to the special questions submitted in the court’s charge, the jury found:

1. Appellant’s injury was a producing cause of total incapacity for the period June 15, 1989 to April 19, 1990.

2. Appellant’s injury was a producing cause of partial incapacity for the period April 20, 1990 to May 1, 1991.

The jury was given these definitions:

‘TOTAL INCAPACITY’ does not imply absolute inability to perform any kind of labor, but means that one is disabled from performing the usual tasks of a workman, not merely the usual tasks of any particular trade or occupation, to such an extent that he cannot get and keep employment performing the usual tasks of a workman.
‘PARTIAL INCAPACITY’ means any degree of incapacity less than total incapacity, whereby a person suffers a reduction in earning capacity.
A person cannot have both total and partial incapacity at the same time.
‘EARNING CAPACITY’ means ability and fitness to work in gainful employment for any type of remuneration, including salary, commissions, and other benefits, whether or not the person is actually employed. It does not necessarily mean the actual wages, income, or other benefits received during the period inquired about.

At trial, appellant provided a detailed employment history. He testified he had not completed high school and had been employed as a laborer and carpenter all his working life. He began as an apprentice carpenter in 1972, advanced to journeyman two years later, and ultimately became a full carpenter. Appellant installed ceilings, walls, doors and trim. This work required the use of stilts, the climbing of ladders and was frequently performed at sites where the ground was uneven. He was expected to lift and carry doors, boxes of tile and pieces of sheet rock; most loads weighed between seventy-five to eighty pounds. It was appellant’s observation that every worker had to carry as much as he could and work efficiently. Those who did were offered additional employment; those who were not productive got laid off. Appellant had little difficulty finding work and he was often called back to work for former employers.

In addition, appellant testified that he had been involved in a car accident in 1984. His back and neck were injured, and he was unable to work for eight weeks. His back healed relatively quickly, but he continued to have problems with his neck which required follow-up treatment. During this time, appellant had to limit overhead work. The evidence shows appellant was last seen for this injury in July 1986. Appellant resumed his former work activities which included using stilts, climbing ladders and installing ceilings.

Approximately 120 days prior to the injury giving rise to the instant case, appellant began work for Watson Commercial. He worked as a carpenter and installed ceilings, erected interior walls and hung interior doors. His work involved carrying loads of sheetrock, climbing ladders, wearing stilts, bending and stooping. Appellant worked eight hours a day, five days a week, unham *589 pered by any ill effects from the 1984 car accident. On June 15, 1989, appellant fell from a six-foot scaffold and shattered his calcaneus.

Following his injury, appellant received extensive medical treatment and therapy. He was unable to perform any work for ten months. On April 19,1990, he found employment helping his brother install ceilings at Carswell Air Force Base. His brother handled the sheetroek, and appellant was limited to operating a screw gun. Climbing ladders was difficult, and he moved slowly. Appellant worked for two weeks. His limp was noticed by the supervisor, and his job performance was adversely affected. When the crew moved on to another site, appellant was not offered additional work.

One week later, appellant found temporary work at Tarrant County Junior College (TCJC). He was not required to complete an application or take a pre-employment physical, and he did not disclose his work limitations. He worked for six months, but other workmen were available to carry his tools.

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Bluebook (online)
865 S.W.2d 587, 1993 Tex. App. LEXIS 3048, 1993 WL 454530, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/baccus-v-american-states-insurance-co-of-texas-texapp-1993.