B & S Screw Products Co. v. Cleveland Metal Stamping Co.

233 F. Supp. 845, 143 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 284, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9583
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedSeptember 24, 1964
DocketNo. 37116
StatusPublished

This text of 233 F. Supp. 845 (B & S Screw Products Co. v. Cleveland Metal Stamping Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
B & S Screw Products Co. v. Cleveland Metal Stamping Co., 233 F. Supp. 845, 143 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 284, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9583 (N.D. Ohio 1964).

Opinion

CONNELL, Chief Judge.

The plaintiff brought complaint against the defendants on August 9, 1961, alleging that the defendants, by the manufacture and sale of clamping blocks, were infringing United States Patent No. 2,-783,963, which was granted on March 7, 1957 to Glenn Kalberg, plaintiff’s predecessor in interest. On September 1,1961, the defendants, by answer, denied infringement and counterclaimed for a declaration of non-infringement and invalidity of the plaintiff’s patent. The grounds advanced in attacking the validity of the patent were obviousness, lack of patentable novelty, and lack of invention over prior art. In seeking a declaration of non-infringement, the defendants claimed that, even if the plaintiff’s patent is valid, a charge of infringement against [846]*846the defendants’ devices must fall after consideration of the history of the plaintiff’s patent claim, the prior art, and the file wrapper. The plaintiff denied generally the merits of the counterclaim on September 14, 1961.

The plaintiff propounded interrogatories to the defendants on August 29, 1961 and received full answer, after a ruling from this Court on defendants’ objections, on February 2, 1962. The defendants requested Admissions of Fact from the plaintiff on November 19, 1962; there was no response from plaintiff, so these requests are deemed admitted. Rule 36, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The defendants addressed interrogatories to the plaintiff on November 23, 1962, but the plaintiff has failed to make response. Defendants sought additional admissions on December 10, 1963, which are also deemed admitted for lack of response. The defendants seek by this motion a summary judgment on both parts of their counterclaim; the plaintiff has not replied to this motion.

PROPRIETY OF DISPOSITION ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Some courts have been understandably reluctant to grant summary judgment in patent eases, since decision on the merits often demands expert testimony of a highly technical nature. This reticence varies from “extreme caution” (Kollsman Instrument Corp. v. Astek Instrument Corp., 225 F.Supp. 534 (S.D.N.Y.1964) to apparent adamance in the District Court of Massachusetts. Cf. Sponge Products Corp. v. Fowler, 140 F.Supp. 232 (D.C.Mass.1956); Staffin Lewis Corp. v. Rose Derry Co., 9 F.R.D. 704 (D.C.Mass.1950); but cf. Villani v. Industrial Shoe Machinery Corp., 210 F.Supp. 298 (D.C.Mass.1962). But these cases announce no new doctrine nor do they engraft any exception to Rule 56; this apparent exception, judicially established, has been overcome. 6 Moore’s Federal Practice, § 56.17(44). Thus, as stated by Circuit Judge Weick, while sitting as a district judge of this District, in W. E. Plechaty Co. v. Heckett Engineering, Inc., 145 F.Supp. 805, 807 (N.D.Ohio 1956):

“While courts are understandably reluctant to grant a summary judgment, particularly in a patent case, nevertheless, it is the clear duty of the court to do so where no genuine issue of a material fact has been presented.”

The Sixth Circuit Court has indicated that summary judgment is particularly apropos where no triable issue of fact is presented and “where the patents and products involved are sufficiently simple to make expert testimony unnecessary.” Bobertz v. General Motors Corp., 228 F.2d 94, 100 (6th Cir. 1955); cf. also Fromberg, Inc. v. Gross Manufacturing Co., Inc., 328 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1964) ; Ronel Corp. v. Anchor Lock of Florida, Inc., 325 F.2d 889 (5th Cir. 1963). The simplicity and relative brevity of the matter here to be considered clearly dictate disposition of this litigation by summary judgment. Here we have no need of expert testimony; the pleadings, admissions, affidavits, and exhibits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and these materials offer sufficient information to grant this motion.

The pleadings establish certain basic preliminai-y facts: the status of all parties as Ohio corporations, the ownership by the plaintiff of the Kalberg patent in suit, manufacture and sale of clamping blocks by the defendants within this judicial district. Therefore the Court has jurisdiction over the persons of the parties and venue is proper. Jurisdiction of the Court over the subject matter of the complaint and of the counterclaim is admitted.

Although the plaintiff did not respond to defendants’ internogatories seeking identification of the accused clamping blocks, defendants’ blocks as manufactured and sold before suit and thereafter are described in responses to interrogatories propounded by plaintiff, and by drawings and photographs and certain described minor modifications thereof [847]*847identified by the affidavit of an officer of defendants attached to the present motion and supporting brief. No opposing affidavit was filed controverting the contention that this material fairly represents all the blocks manufactured and sold by defendants. Also deemed admitted by plaintiff are the facts that no blocks manufactured or sold by the defendants have ever included certain structure. Cf. Requests for Admissions, Nos. 8-11. This becomes important in construing the plaintiff’s claim of infringement. Cf. infra, p. 850.

Before us as exhibits attached to Requests for Admissions served by defendants and to the motion papers are: printed copies, as sold to the public by the Patent Office (or photo copies thereof), of the Lind patent 1,623,689, the Gessler patent 2,650,436, and the Kalberg patent in suit 2,783,963; copies of file claims 1 to 5 inclusive, in the Kalberg application Serial No. 500,127, as originally filed; the text of a first and only Patent Office action; the text of the application file claim 6 (now the patent claim) and of the “remarks” or argument included in the sole amendment filed in the application, responsive to that Patent Office action. The plaintiff has admitted, by its silence, that these are correct copies.

THE KALBERG PATENT

The Kalberg clamp block as disclosed in the patent (see Figs. 3 and 4) is comprised simply of a set of several perforated metal plates, the bottom plate as a base, a washer, and a bolt through the set. The plates are shown as rectangular, each with a hole near one end, and identical, except that a bottom plate as a base is thicker and has a threaded hole into which the bolt is screwed. The washer is a spring washer between the top plate and the underside of the bolt head, described as flat, but actually shown as upwardly convex. The bolt, pivotally fastening the plates together as a stack on the base, has beneath the head a long plain shank through the aligned plate holes and terminating at a lower threaded end screwed into the base plate, the threaded end reduced in diameter to form a shoulder at the end of the shank bearing on the base to limit the extent of threaded engagement. The shank length, i. e., the distance from the bottom of the head to the shoulder, is slightly greater than the height of the plates stacked on the base, obviously necessary to accommodate the washer.

The essential Kalberg function is to provide a block in which by swinging one or more of the uppermost plates successively out of alignment a selected effective block height remains.

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Bluebook (online)
233 F. Supp. 845, 143 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 284, 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9583, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/b-s-screw-products-co-v-cleveland-metal-stamping-co-ohnd-1964.