Azu Otah v. Loretta E. Lynch
This text of 649 F. App'x 484 (Azu Otah v. Loretta E. Lynch) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
MEMORANDUM **
Azu Otah is a citizen of Nigeria who entered the United States in 1980 on a six-month visitor visa and never left. In 2004, Otah was convicted of a misdemeanor violation of Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11550(a) (using or being under the influence of a controlled substance), for which he received a 120-day sentence. In 2006, Otah was convicted of a felony violation of Cal. Veh.Code § 10851(a) (taking or driving a vehicle without the consent of the owner), for which he received a two-year sentence. Immigration authorities detained Otah in 2010 and issued him a Notice to Appear. An immigration judge (“IJ”) found Otah removable for having overstayed his visa and for having been convicted of a controlled-substance offense. The IJ also denied Otah’s requests for asylum, adjustment of status, voluntary departure, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissed Otah’s appeal, and also denied Otah’s motion for reconsideration. Otah petitions for review of the BIA’s decisions. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petitions for review;
1. Otah conceded that he is removable for having overstayed his visa. We agree with the BIA that Otah is also removable for having been convicted of *486 violating a state law “relating to a controlled substance (as defined in [21 U.S.C. § 802]).” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).' California’s controlled-substances laws are divisible by substance, and a violation of Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11550(a) renders an alien removable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i) if the conviction relates to a federally controlled substance. See, e.g., United States v. Torre-Jimenez, 771 F.3d 1168, 1165-67 (9th Cir.2014). Here, the Notice to Appear alleged that Otah was convicted of violating Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11550(a) for using or being under the influence of cocaine, a federally controlled substance. Otah admitted, at the pleading stage, to this charge, which is sufficient to establish removability. See Pagayon v. Holder, 675 F.3d 1182, 1190 (9th Cir.2011) (per curiam) (amended opinion) (“[I]t is clear that Pagayon made a ‘pleading stage’ admission that he had been convicted of a drug offense involving methamphetamine; that admission alone established his removability.”); Perez-Mejia v. Holder, 663 F.3d 403, 410-15 (9th Cir.2011). 1
2. The BIA correctly concluded that Otah is ineligible for adjustment of status because his Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11550(a) conviction-for using or being under the influence of cocaine—renders him inadmissible. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II), 1255(a).
3. The BIA correctly concluded that Otah’s Cal. Veh.Code § 10851(a) conviction is an “aggravated felon/’ conviction that renders him ineligible for asylum and voluntary departure. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(G), 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), (B)(i), 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), 1229c(a)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(b)(1), (c)(l)(iii). Cal. Veh.Code § 10851(a) is an “aggravated felony” if committed as a principal. See Duenas-Alvarez v. Holder, 733 F.3d 812, 814-15 (9th Cir.2013). Otah’s pleading-stage admission to the charges in the Notice to Appear establishes that he was convicted of violating Cal. Veh.Code § 10851(a) as a principal, and, thus, that he was convicted of an “aggravated felony,” rendering him ineligible for these forms of relief. See Pagayon, 675 F.3d at 1190; Perez-Mejia, 663 F.3d at 410-15, 418-19. 2
4. Although Otah presented several grounds supporting his withholding-of-removal claim to the IJ and the BIA, before us, he argues only that, if he were removed to Nigeria, he would be persecuted by Nigerian officials due to his California drug conviction. We agree with the BIA that “drug convicts” do not constitute a “particular social group” entitled to seek withholding of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 946 (9th Cir.2007); Shafiei v. INS, 877 F.2d 64 (9th Cir.1989) (unpublished table decision); Toussaint v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 455 F.3d 409, 417-18 (3d Cir.2006); Elien v. Ash *487 croft, 364 F.3d 392, 397 (1st Cir.2004); Bastanipour v. INS, 980 F.2d 1129, 1132 (7th Cir.1992). We therefore find no error in the BIA’s denial of Otah’s withholding-of-removal claim.
5. Otah claims that he is entitled to CAT relief because, if he were removed to Nigeria, he would be imprisoned for having been convicted of a drug crime in the United States, and that he would consequently be denied necessary medical treatment for diabetes and a kidney condition. The IJ found Otah’s fear of torture speculative, and the BIA summarily affirmed the IJ’s decision. The evidence in the record does not compel the conclusion that it is more likely than not that Otah would be tortured by or with the acquiescence of Nigerian officials if he were removed to Nigeria. See Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1048-49 (9th Cir.2010); see also, e.g., In re J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912, 917-22 (A.G.2006); In re M-B-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 474, 479-80 (BIA 2002). Eneh v. Holder,
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649 F. App'x 484, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/azu-otah-v-loretta-e-lynch-ca9-2016.