Azizpor v. Lowes Home Centers, LLC

• Court: District Court, S.D. California
• Decided: March 29, 2024
• Docket: 3:23-cv-00452
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 DAVID AZIZPOR, et al., Case No.: 23cv452-LL-DDL [consolidated with 23cv461-LL-DDL] 12 Plaintiffs,

13 v. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION TO 14 LOWE’S HOME CENTERS, LLC, et al., DISMISS 15 Defendants. [ECF No. 53] 16 17 18 19 This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Lowe’s 20 Home Centers, the only named defendant in this case. ECF No. 53. Plaintiffs filed their 21 response in opposition to the Motion [ECF No. 55], and Defendant filed its reply [ECF No. 22 56]. The Court finds this matter suitable for determination on the papers and without oral 23 argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7.1.d.1. 24 Upon review of the parties’ submissions and the applicable law, the Court GRANTS IN 25 PART AND DENIES IN PART Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for the reasons discussed 26 in this Order. 27 28 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiffs David Azizpor, Artemio Angel, Daniel West, Robert Gregory, Edward 3 Shubin, and Ronald Bluhm filed a complaint against Defendant on January 6, 2023, 4 initiating this action, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of 5 California. ECF No. 1. On January 31, 2023, Plaintiffs Juan Rodriguez, Alexandria 6 Blackwell, Bryant Hernandez, Charlene Cannon,1 Eric Greimann, Isabella Islas, Lisa Leon, 7 and Skymeisha Glamours filed separate complaint against Defendant in the Northern 8 District. See No. 3:23cv461-LL-DDL (“Rodriguez”), Dkt. No. 1. The Rodriguez Plaintiffs 9 filed an amended complaint on February 16, 2023, apparently correcting Plaintiff 10 Skymeisha Glamours’ name to Skymeisha Butts, and adding Plaintiff Oscar Garcia. Id., 11 Dkt. No. 15. Upon joint stipulation by the parties, the court ordered Plaintiffs Blackwell, 12 Butts, Connon, Garcia, Hernandez, and Leon to arbitrate their claims on an individual basis 13 and dismissed Plaintiff Islas on March 1, 2023. Id., Dkt. No. 20. On the same day, the court 14 ordered Plaintiffs Azizpor, Angel, Gregory, Shubin, and West to individual arbitration 15 upon joint stipulation by the parties in this case. ECF No. 30. Both cases were subsequently 16 transferred to the Southern District of California in March 2023, and this Court 17 consolidated the cases on June 9, 2023. ECF No. 45. Plaintiffs filed their first amended 18 consolidated class complaint on June 23, 2023 [ECF No. 46], and the Court dismissed 19 Plaintiff Butts on the joint motion of the parties on June 29, 2023 [ECF No. 48]. Plaintiffs 20 filed the operative Second Amended Complaint on August 4, 2023, which added Plaintiff 21 Natalie Sandoval to this action. ECF No. 52 (“SAC”). The Court granted the parties’ joint 22 motion to submit Plaintiff Sandoval’s claims to individual arbitration on October 26, 2023. 23 ECF No. 57. Following that order, only the claims of Plaintiffs Bluhm, Greimann, and 24 Rodriguez remain before the Court. 25

26 27 1 Plaintiffs appear to alternate between “Cannon” and “Connon.” See, e.g., Rodriguez, Dkt. Nos. 1, 15, 19, 20, 24 (identifying Plaintiff Charlene Cannon); ECF No. 54; but cf. ECF 28 1 The SAC alleges that Defendant: (1) violated of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 2 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (“FLSA”) by failing to pay overtime compensation; and violated 3 California law by (2) failing to provide meal periods as provided by Labor Code sections 4 226.7, 512(a), and 1198; (3) failing to provide rest periods as provided by Labor Code 5 sections 226.7(c) and 1198; (4) failing to pay overtime as provided by Labor Code sections 6 510 and 1194; (5) failing to pay wages when due as provided by Labor Code section 204; 7 (6) failing to provide accurate itemized wage statements as provided by Labor Code section 8 226(a); (7) failing to reimburse work expenses as provided by Labor Code section 2802; 9 (8) failure to timely pay wages upon termination as provided by Labor Code sections 201- 10 203; and (9) committing unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent business practices as proscribed 11 by the California Unfair Business Practices Act. Id. at 1. On August 25, 2023, Defendant 12 filed the instant Motion to dismiss claims 1, 4, 5, 7, and 9 of the SAC. ECF No. 53. 13 II. LEGAL STANDARD 14 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a party may move to dismiss based 15 on the Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Plaintiff has the 16 burden of establishing that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian 17 Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction 18 may be facial or factual. Edison v. United States, 822 F.3d 510, 517 (9th Cir. 2016). Facial 19 challenges assert that the allegations are insufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction, while 20 factual challenges dispute the truth of legally sufficient allegations. Id. (citing Safe Air for 21 Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004)). In a facial challenge, the Court 22 accepts a plaintiff’s allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in their favor. 23 Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Pride v. Correa, 719 F.3d 24 1130, 1133 (9th Cir. 2013)) (noting that facial attacks are resolved using the same standard 25 as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss). However, if a defendant brings a factual challenge, 26 usually by introducing evidence outside the pleadings, the plaintiff must support their 27 jurisdictional allegations with competent proof under the same evidentiary standard that 28 governs summary judgment evidence. Id. (citations omitted). 1 If the Court has jurisdiction to address the merits, a complaint may be dismissed 2 under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. 3 Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Court evaluates whether a complaint states a cognizable legal theory 4 and sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires a “short 5 and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. 6 P. 8(a)(2). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must plead “enough facts to 7 state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 8 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 9 that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 10 misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 11 at 555). In reviewing the plausibility of a complaint, courts “accept factual allegations in 12 the complaint as true and construe the pleadings in the light most favorable to the 13 nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th 14 Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Nonetheless, courts are not required to “accept as true 15 allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable 16 inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting 17 Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001)). 18 III. DISCUSSION 19 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, brought under both Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), 20 contends that: (1) Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged their claims under the first, fourth, 21 fifth, seventh, and ninth causes of action; and (2) lack standing to seek injunctive relief 22 under their ninth cause of action under the UCL. ECF No. 53 at 13. 23 A. Overtime and Reimbursement Claims (Counts 1, 4, & 7) 24 The parties’ dispute about the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ overtime (Counts 1 and 4) 25 allegations hinges on the application of Landers v. Quality Commc’ns, Inc., 771 F.3d 638, 26 645 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that “a plaintiff asserting a violation of the FLSA overtime 27 provisions must allege that she worked more than forty hours in a given workweek without 28 being compensated for the hours worked in excess of forty during that week.”); see also 1 Marquez v. Toll Glob. Forwarding, 804 F. App’x 679, 680 (9th Cir. 2020) (applying 2 Landers in the context of wage and hour claims under California law). Defendant contends 3 that Plaintiffs’ claims for overtime, untimely payment of wages, failure to reimburse 4 business expenses, and restitution pursuant to the UCL “are not supported by sufficient 5 factual allegations, or otherwise fail as a matter of law even accepting the (few) factual 6 allegations they plead as true for purposes of this Motion.” ECF No. 53 at 14. 7 As stated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Landers, the circuit courts agree 8 that under Twombly and Iqbal, Rule 8 does not require wage and hour plaintiffs “to plead 9 in detail the number of hours worked, their wages, or the amount of overtime owed to state 10 a claim for unpaid minimum wages or overtime wages.” 771 F.3d at 642. At the time 11 Landers was decided, the Ninth Circuit expressed that no consensus existed “on what facts 12 must be affirmatively pled,” and examined the treatment of wage and hour claims in the 13 First, Second, Third and Eleventh Circuit Courts. Id. at 642-44. In doing so, it adopted the 14 rationale of the First, Second, and Third Circuits, stating that “in order to survive a motion 15 to dismiss, a plaintiff asserting a claim to overtime payments must allege that she worked 16 more than forty hours in a given workweek without being compensated for the overtime 17 hours worked[.]” Id. at 644. 18 District courts in the Ninth Circuit have applied Landers to hold both that: (1) a 19 plaintiff alleging wage and hour claims must plead a specific workweek in which a 20 defendant committed a labor code violation, see Ritenour v. Carrington Mortg. Servs. LLC, 21 228 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2017); Shann v. Durham Sch. Servs., L.P., 182 F. 22 Supp. 3d 1044, 1047 (C.D. Cal. 2016); Haralson v. United Airlines, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 23 928, 942 (N.D. Cal. 2016); Perez v. Wells Fargo & Co., 75 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1191 (N.D. 24 Cal. 2014); and (2) a plaintiff need not plead facts about a specific workweek where alleged 25 violations occurred, see Tinnin v. Sutter Valley Med. Found., 647 F. Supp. 3d 864, 870 26 (E.D. Cal. 2022); Tan v. GrubHub, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 3d 998, 1006 (N.D. Cal. 2016); 27 Varsam v. Lab Corp. of Am., 120 F. Supp. 3d 1173, 1178 (S.D. Cal. 2015). Likewise, in 28 two non-precedential cases, the Ninth Circuit reached slightly different conclusions about 1 how to apply Landers. See Boyack v. Regis Corp., 812 F. App’x 428, 431 (9th Cir. 2020) 2 (requiring facts alleging specific workweeks in which violations occurred); Boon v. Canon 3 Bus. Sols., Inc., 592 F. App’x 631, 632 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding it sufficient for plaintiff to 4 plead that there were “tasks for which he was not paid and alleged that he regularly worked 5 more than eight hours in a day and forty hours in a week”). Outside of the Ninth Circuit, 6 the circuit courts to address this issue have likewise reached slightly different results. See 7 Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC, 846 F.3d 757, 777 (4th Cir. 2017) (“a plaintiff must provide 8 sufficient factual allegations to support a reasonable inference that he or she worked more 9 than forty hours in at least one workweek and that his or her employer failed to pay . . . for 10 those overtime hours”); Lundy v. Catholic Health Sys. of Long Island, Inc., 711 F.3d 106, 11 114 (2d Cir. 2013) (“a plaintiff must sufficiently allege 40 hours of work in a given 12 workweek as well as some uncompensated time in excess of the 40 hours”); Davis v. 13 Abington Mem’l Hosp., 765 F.3d 236, 243-43 (3d Cir. 2014) (applying Lundy); Manning 14 v. Bos. Med. Ctr. Corp., 725 F.3d 34, 46-47 (1st Cir. 2013) (applying Lundy); but cf. Pruell 15 v. Caritas Christi, 678 F.3d 10, 13-15 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that specific examples of 16 unpaid time would support the plausibility of a claim for relief). 17 However, both Landers and Pruell were careful to point out that “most (if not all) of 18 the detailed information concerning a plaintiff-employee’s compensation and schedule is 19 in the control of the defendants.” Landers, 771 F.3d at 645 (citing Pruell, 678 F.3d at 15), 20 and that whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is context specific. Id. (citing 21 Lundy, 711 F.3d at 114); Pruell, 678 F.3d at 15 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). In declining 22 to hold that an overtime claim under the FLSA requires an approximation of overtime hours 23 worked to state a plausible claim for relief, the court in Landers explained that “a plaintiff 24 may establish a plausible claim by estimating the length of her average workweek during 25 the applicable period and the average rate at which she was paid, the amount of overtime 26 wages she believes she is owed, or any other facts that will permit the court to find 27 plausibility.” 771 F.3d at 645 (citing Pruell, 678 F.3d at 14). 28 With respect to Plaintiffs’ overtime claims, the SAC states that: 1 As a matter of course during all or a substantial portion of the Class Period, Plaintiffs and certain member[s] of the Class were regularly, uniformly, and 2 systematically required by Defendant to work in excess of eight hours per day, 3 and/or required to work in excess of forty hours per week without being paid the requisite overtime wages[.] [ECF No. 52 ¶ 35]; 4

5 . . . in many instances . . . their shifts exceeded eight hours a day or 40 hours in a week. Whenever Plaintiffs and Class Members exceeded eight hours per 6 day or forty hours per week, Defendant’s managers would often pressure them 7 to clock out while they are/were still required to complete tasks assigned by Defendant. [id. ¶ 36]; 8

9 Collective members regularly work or have worked in excess of forty hours during a workweek. [id. ¶ 63]; 10

11 Plaintiffs, and certain members of the Class, were regularly and consistently required to work overtime during the Class Period but were not paid for all 12 overtime hours worked and were not paid at the correct overtime rate of pay. 13 [id. ¶ 115];

14 Throughout the Class Period, Plaintiffs and certain members of the Class 15 worked in excess of 8 hours in a workday and/or 40 hours in a workweek. [id. ¶ 116]; and 16

17 . . . Plaintiffs and the certain Class Members would routinely exceed eight- hour shifts and forty-hour workweeks and would not be paid the required 18 overtime pay. [id. ¶ 118]. 19 20 The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ allegations regarding overtime work are more than 21 “labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” 22 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The SAC clearly alleges that on numerous specific workweeks 23 throughout the class period, Plaintiffs and other class members worked forty hours of work 24 and additional uncompensated time in excess of those forty hours. Plaintiffs “need not 25 identify precisely the dates and times she worked overtime.” Landers, 771 F.3d at 644 26 (describing the Third Circuit’s treatment of overtime claims in Davis and expressing 27 agreement with such treatment). In the context of the other facts alleged by Plaintiffs in 28 their complaint, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have stated a plausible claim for relief under 1 the FLSA and California Labor Code for failure to pay overtime wages. Defendant’s 2 Motion is therefore DENIED with respect to Plaintiffs’ first and fourth causes of action. 3 B. Untimely Payment of Wages (Count 5) 4 Plaintiffs’ SAC alleges that Defendant violated section 204 of the California Labor 5 code because “Plaintiffs and the Class Members were not paid for all of their wages, for 6 each and every hour worked, including inter alia time worked during rest and meal breaks, 7 time worked off the clock and overtime hours, as alleged herein, during every single pay 8 period during the term(s) of their employment.” ECF No. 52 ¶ 125. Defendant argues that 9 this allegation fails to state a claim as a matter of law because “section 204 only requires 10 that employers timely pay wages at specific intervals and does not address the amount of 11 wages to be paid.” ECF No. 56 at 11. Plaintiffs do not disagree that their claims under 12 Count 5 are premised on the underpayment of wages, and instead argue that the plain 13 language of section 204 holds “that it does in fact regulate the amount of wages to be paid, 14 and that violations of this section can be premised on the underpayment of wages.” ECF 15 No. 55 at 15. 16 In relevant part, section 204 states that “[a]ll wages, . . . earned by any person in any 17 employment are due and payable twice during each calendar month, on days designated in 18 advance by the employer as the regular paydays.” Cal. Lab. Code. § 204. However, when 19 read in context with the purpose of the statute, “the reference to ‘All wages’ in section 204, 20 subdivision (a) pertains to the timing of wage payments and not to the manner in which an 21 employer ascertains each employee’s worktime.” See’s Candy Shops, Inc. v. Superior Ct., 22 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 690, 702 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted). “Fundamentally, the 23 question whether all wages have been paid is different from the issue of how an employer 24 calculates the number of hours worked and thus what wages are owed.” Id. at 703. Plaintiffs 25 do not allege that they did not receive bimonthly wage payments as provided for by section 26 204, and instead allege that they “were not paid for all of their wages” and that “Plaintiffs 27 and Class Members have been deprived of wages in amounts to be determined according 28 to proof at trial[.]” ECF No. 52 ¶ 126. Plaintiffs’ argument is foreclosed by the controlling 1 case law on this issue. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claims under Count 5 of the SAC are 2 DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and without leave to amend. 3 C. Failure to Reimburse Work Expenses (Count 7) 4 Similar to the above discussion regarding the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ overtime 5 allegations under Landers, Defendant contends that the parties’ dispute about Plaintiffs’ 6 claims that Defendant failed to reimburse Plaintiffs for work-related expenses under 7 California Labor Code section 2802(a) fails because the SAC fails to include more specific, 8 non-conclusory facts about the work-related expenses that occurred. ECF No. 53 at 16. 9 Section 2802(a) of the California Labor Code provides that “[a]n employer shall 10 indemnify his or her employee for all necessary expenditures or losses incurred by the 11 employee in direct consequence of the discharge of his or her duties, or of his or her 12 obedience to the directions of the employer.” To state a claim under section 2802(a), a 13 plaintiff must state that “(1) the employee made expenditures or incurred losses; (2) the 14 expenditures or losses were incurred in direct consequence of the employee’s discharge of 15 his or her duties, or obedience to the directions of the employer; and (3) the expenditures 16 or losses were necessary.” Gallano v. Burlington Coat Factory of California, LLC, 282 17 Cal. Rptr. 3d 748, 753 (Ct. App. 2021). “To show liability under section 2802, an employee 18 need only show that he or she was required to use a personal cell phone to make work- 19 related calls, and he or she was not reimbursed.” Cochran v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 20 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d 407, 413 (Ct. App. 2014) (acknowledging that an assessment of damages 21 may require further detail than the facts necessary to determine liability). 22 Defendant relies on Herrera v. Zumiez, 953 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2020) to assert that 23 Plaintiffs must allege specific and non-conclusory facts both about what costs were 24 incurred and about whether such alleged costs were necessary. “Whether [Plaintiffs] 25 alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for reimbursement of phone expenses turns on 26 whether it was necessary that the employees make calls and do so with phones that were 27 not provided by the company.” Herrera, 953 F.3d at 1078. 28 1 Although Plaintiffs state that Defendant required them “to use their personal cell 2 phones to perform their job duties each workday” [ECF No. 52 ¶ 55], “to routinely use 3 their personal internet access or their home internet access to connect with Defendant’s 4 portals and to perform their assigned job duties” [id. ¶ 56], and “to use their personal 5 vehicles to commute to different Lowe’s locations for training” [id. ¶ 57], Plaintiffs have 6 not alleged, for instance, that Lowe’s failed to provide alternative means of performing 7 those job duties. As such, the Court finds that the allegations that Defendant required them 8 to use their personal cell phones, personal internet access, and personal vehicles lack are 9 conclusory and fails to state a plausible claim for relief under section 2802(a) even when 10 construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. 11 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Plaintiffs’ claims under section 2802(a) of the 12 California Labor Code. Because further factual allegations may cure the inadequacy of the 13 pleadings with respect to Plaintiffs’ failure to reimburse work expenses claims, Plaintiffs 14 are GRANTED leave to amend their claims brought under Count 7. 15 D. UCL Restitution Claim (Count 9) 16 Plaintiffs’ ninth cause of action is brought under California Business and Professions 17 Code section 17200-17210 (California’s Unfair Competition Law or “UCL”). ECF No. 52 18 at 34-35. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant engaged in unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent 19 practices as described in the SAC, and seek “disgorgement of all profits and monies 20 obtained by Defendants on the benefits withheld, restitution for all monetary benefits 21 payable to Plaintiffs and Class Members but unreasonably and unfairly withheld, as well 22 as a permanent injunction, enjoining such Defendants from the conduct alleged herein.” Id. 23 ¶¶ 162, 168. Defendant argues Plaintiffs cannot seek relief under the UCL because they 24 expressly claim entitlement to numerous other remedies at law and because Plaintiffs lack 25 standing to pursue injunctive relief as former employees. ECF No. 53 at 18-21. 26 “A UCL action is equitable in nature” and “[p]revailing plaintiffs are generally 27 limited to injunctive relief and restitution.” Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 28 63 P.3d 937, 944 (Cal. 2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Non-restitutionary 1 disgorgement is not available under the UCL. Id. at 946. “In order to entertain a request for 2 equitable relief, a district court must have equitable jurisdiction, which can only exist under 3 federal common law if the plaintiff has no adequate legal remedy.” Guzman v. Polaris 4 Indus., 49 F.4th 1308, 1313 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing Sonner v. Premier Nutrition Corp., 971 5 F.3d 834, 843-44 (9th Cir. 2020). Even where an adequate legal remedy is no longer 6 available, failure to timely pursue such a remedy cannot confer equitable jurisdiction on a 7 federal court. See Guzman, 49 F.4th at 1312. Thus, to plead a plausible claim for equitable 8 relief under the UCL, Plaintiffs must allege the absence of an adequate remedy at law. See 9 Fierro v. Cap. One, N.A., 656 F. Supp. 3d 1121, 1131 (S.D. Cal. 2023). 10 Plaintiffs contend that they may plead their UCL claim in the alternative to their 11 claim for damages. ECF No. 55 at 19. And this Court agrees that nothing in Sonner 12 precludes Plaintiffs from pleading alternate claims as provided by Rule 8 of the Federal 13 Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(3). However, alternate claims must also 14 be adequately pled. See Sonner, 971 F.3d at 844 (noting that the operative complaint filed 15 to allege that Sonner lacked an adequate legal remedy); Barling v. Apple Inc., No. 22- 16 16164, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 24257, at *5-6 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 2023) (“Plaintiffs were 17 obligated to allege that they had no adequate legal remedy in order to state a claim for 18 equitable relief, and they have failed to explain how the money they seek through 19 restitution is different than the money they seek as damages”). Plaintiffs do not assert that 20 they have pleaded that their legal remedies are inadequate or explained how equitable relief 21 they seek in this case would redress an injury that damages would not. Therefore, Plaintiffs 22 have failed to adequately plead a claim for equitable relief under the UCL. Simply asserting 23 their equitable claims in the alternative does not satisfy their burden to state a plausible 24 claim for relief. 25 The Defendant also argues that, as former employees, Plaintiffs lack standing to 26 pursue injunctive relief under the UCL. ECF No. 53 at 22. Plaintiffs do not meaningfully 27 address this argument with respect to injunctive relief, and instead assert that they have 28 1 sufficiently alleged injuries related to their employment and that UCL claims are not 2 limited to employees. ECF No. 55. 3 The Court notes that injunctive relief is a traditional equitable remedy, Mertens v. 4 Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 255 (1993), and the Court’s discussion of Plaintiffs’ failure 5 to adequately plead the lack of legal remedy applies with equal force to Plaintiffs’ claims 6 for injunctive relief under the UCL. Furthermore, the Court finds persuasive Defendant’s 7 arguments that Plaintiffs may not seek injunctive relief under the UCL as former employees 8 because a “former employee has no claim for injunctive relief addressing the employment 9 practices of a former employer absent a reasonably certain basis for concluding he or she 10 has some personal need for prospective relief.” Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Grp., Inc., 861 11 F.3d 853, 864 (9th Cir. 2017). Plaintiffs cannot be reasonably expected to benefit from 12 prospective relief ordered against Defendant for its employment practices, and therefore 13 may not seek injunctive relief. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 364-65 14 (2011). 15 As Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts supporting the exercise of equitable 16 jurisdiction, the Court DISMISSES their claims under the UCL. As in Fierro, although 17 “[i]t is hard to fathom how Plaintiff[s] can correct this deficiency considering the Court has 18 greenlit several substantive claims that provide for damages[,]” 656 F. Supp. 3d at 1131, 19 Plaintiffs are GRANTED LEAVE TO AMEND their UCL claim with additional facts 20 supporting the absence of an adequate legal remedy. Plaintiffs’ claim for injunctive relief 21 under the UCL is denied without leave to amend. 22 IV. CONCLUSION 23 In accordance with the above, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN 24 PART Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 53. 25 The Court hereby ORDERS that: 26 1. Plaintiffs’ claims for untimely payment of wages (Count 5); failure to 27 reimburse work expenses (Count 7); and for equitable relief under the UCL (Count 9) are 28 DISMISSED for failure to state a claim; 2. The remainder of Defendant’s Motion is DENIED; 2 3. Plaintiffs are GRANTED leave to amend with respect to their claims under 3 ||Counts 7 and 9 to cure the deficiencies identified in this Order; and 4 4. Plaintiffs may file an amended complaint no later than 21 days after the date 5 || of this Order. 6 If Plaintiffs file an amended complaint, Defendant must respond within the time 7 || prescribed by Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. If Plaintiffs do not file an 8 ||amended complaint by the above date, the case will proceed on Plaintiffs’ surviving claims, 9 ||and Defendant’s answer will be due 14 days after the expiration of Plaintiffs’ deadline to 10 || file an amended complaint. 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 || Dated: March 29, 2024 NO 13 Qe | 14 Honorable Linda Lopez 15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13