Ayoubi v. Jeffreys

2025 IL App (4th) 240309-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: November 19, 2025
• Docket: 4-24-0309
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (4th) 240309-U NOTICE FILED This Order was filed under November 19, 2025 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-24-0309 Carla Bender not precedent except in the th 4 District Appellate limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

FIRAS AYOUBI, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Lee County ROB JEFFREYS, in His Official Capacity as Director of ) No. 20MR77 Corrections, and BRENDAN F. KELLY, in His Official ) Capacity as Director of the Illinois State Police, ) Honorable Defendants-Appellees. ) Douglas E. Lee, ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE GRISCHOW delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Doherty and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the trial court properly granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment where plaintiff failed to demonstrate he was entitled to mandamus relief.

¶2 Plaintiff, Firas Ayoubi, filed a complaint for mandamus relief, requesting the trial

court order defendants, Rob Jeffreys and Brendan F. Kelly, the directors of the Illinois

Department of Corrections (DOC) and Illinois State Police (ISP), respectively, to correct his

conviction records to state only that he was convicted of indecent solicitation of a child.

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted, finding the

designation for plaintiff’s conviction was accurate, and he therefore was not entitled as a matter

of law to mandamus relief.

¶3 On appeal, plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment

because the description of his offense was inaccurate. In the alternative, plaintiff contends if the description is accurate, the statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutional because it

allows for a conviction for uncharged offenses. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

¶4 I. BACKGROUND

¶5 In 2005, plaintiff was charged with indecent solicitation of a child, a Class 1

felony (720 ILCS 5/11-6(a) (West 2004)), and attempted predatory criminal sexual assault, a

Class 1 felony (id. § 8-4(a), 12-14.1). Plaintiff pleaded guilty to indecent solicitation of a child,

and the State nol-prossed the attempted predatory criminal sexual assault charge. See People v.

Ayoubi, 2021 IL App (2d) 210010-U, ¶ 6.

¶6 A. Complaint for Mandamus Relief

¶7 In August 2021, plaintiff, who is incarcerated on an unrelated offense, filed an

amended complaint for mandamus relief. In his petition, plaintiff stated he received his

verification of incarceration from the Dixon Correctional Center records department. In the

record, his conviction for indecent solicitation of a child is listed as “ ‘INDECENT

SOL/PREDATORY/AGGSEX.’ ” Plaintiff alleged “[n]othing in the plea, or court records

included any aggrevating/predatory [sic] language, and likewise, any aggravation or predatory

elements are found in a separate and distinct offence for in the statute under a different

subdivision.” Plaintiff also affirmed he “never plead [sic] or agreed to plead guilty to any crime

which included a predatory or aggrevated [sic] sex element or component.”

¶8 Plaintiff attempted to get the description of his conviction modified at the Dixon

Correctional Center and Stateville Correctional Center while he was in residence. He also

requested the Dixon Correctional Center records office allow him to challenge the description

directly with the ISP Bureau of Identification. Plaintiff stated DOC did not submit a fingerprint

card and request to ISP for him to challenge his Criminal History Records Information System

-2- (CHRIS) record, despite his request. Plaintiff also submitted grievances relating to the

description of his conviction, but the grievances were denied.

¶9 Plaintiff alleged it was the nondiscretionary duty of DOC and ISP to maintain

complete and accurate criminal records. As relief, plaintiff requested (1) DOC “correct the

inaccurate information by omitting ‘predatory’ and ‘agg sex’ or similar language in the

plaintiff’s master file, its records, and on its website and to only report ‘Indecent Solicitation of a

Child’ ” and (2) ISP similarly correct plaintiff’s CHRIS record.

¶ 10 B. Motion for Summary Judgment

¶ 11 In April 2023, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, attaching several

exhibits pertaining to the underlying criminal case. Defendants attached the information charging

plaintiff, which stated plaintiff was charged with indecent solicitation of a child in that plaintiff,

“a person of 17 year of age and upwards, with the intent that the offense of predatory criminal

sexual assault be committed, knowingly solicited R.S., a child under the age of 17 years to

perform an act of sexual penetration in violation of 5/11-5(a).” In the transcript from plaintiff’s

plea hearing, which defendants also included, the trial court confirmed plaintiff understood he

was pleading guilty to indecent solicitation of a child, a Class 1 felony, and plaintiff confirmed

his understanding. The court continued as follows:

“So then you are prepared to admit today that on or about September 16th of the

year 2005, you committed the offense of Indecent Solicitation of a Child when

you, a person 17 years or older, with the intent that the offense of Predatory

Criminal Sexual Assault be committed, knowingly solicited R.S., a child under

the age of 17, to perform an act of sexual penetration in violation of Illinois law

and that this occurred in Kendall County, Illinois?”

-3- Plaintiff responded affirmatively.

¶ 12 Defendants noted indecent solicitation of a child is a Class 1 felony “when the act,

if done, would be predatory criminal sexual assault of a child or aggravated criminal sexual

assault.” 720 ILCS 5/11-6(c)(1) (West 2004). Class 2 and Class 3 felonies, meanwhile, require

the intended act to be criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual abuse, respectively.

Id. § 11-6(c)(2), (c)(3).

¶ 13 Defendants argued plaintiff’s guilty plea was an admission to all the facts alleged

in the indictment, which are part of the offense charged. Therefore, DOC and ISP records were

correct when describing plaintiff’s conviction, as the description provides the offense and the

required elements for the class of offense. Because the records were correct, plaintiff could not

demonstrate a clear and affirmative right to relief. Irrelevant to this appeal, defendants also

argued plaintiff’s claim was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).

¶ 14 Plaintiff responded to defendants’ motion for summary judgment. In sum,

plaintiff argued four points: (1) “Aggrevated [sic] Predatory Criminal Sexual Assault is non-

existent in the Illinois compiled criminal statutes (a conviction of which would mean actual

innocence)”; (2) “Aggrevated [sic] Criminal Sexual Assault is no where in the indecent

solicitation Statute, Nor is ‘Agg Sex’ for that matter”; (3) “Aggrevated [sic] sex assault and

predatory sex assault lumped in one conviction is unconstitutional”; and (4) “Such a statute that

lumps together such crimes violates the Single Subject Rule, and One act one crime Doctrines or

the U.S. and Illinois constitutions, which Plaintiff can challenge anytime.”

¶ 15 In December 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the State’s motion. After

hearing the parties’ general arguments, the court elected to review the statute with the parties as

follows:

-4- “THE COURT: Let’s walk through the statute. Because it seems to me

that the issue is whether there is any dispute of material fact or any question of

law as to whether the description, which is indecent SOL, slash, predatory, slash,

agg sex, accurately describes the offense that [plaintiff] was convicted of.

And again, as I understand it, under section 720 ILCS 5/11-6, indecent

solicitation of a child can be committed in four basic ways. Three of those involve

knowingly soliciting a child to perform an act of sexual penetration or sexual

conduct, and those are the offenses generally described in (6)(a).

***

*** [O]ne of those three, involves discussing matters of a sexual nature

with a child over the Internet; and then three involve sexual conduct, and then

they’re broken down further.

And under 6(c)(1), it’s a Class 1 felony if the defendant has an intent to

commit predatory criminal sexual assault or aggravated criminal sexual assault.

And then (6)(c)(2) says it’s a Class 2 felony if the defendant has an intent

to commit a criminal sexual assault.

And under (6)(c)(3), it’s a Class 3 felony if the defendant has an intent to

commit aggravated criminal sexual abuse.

*** Then there is another one in (6)(c)(1) about discussing the matters of a

sexual nature, and that’s the Class 4 felony.

And [plaintiff] pled guilty to and was convicted of the Class 1 felony,

right?

-5- MS. KRAMER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: [Plaintiff]?

[THE PLAINTIFF]: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. And so then for [DOC] to describe that ***, the

indecent SOL part of it obviously describes the offense, and the predatory and agg

sex describes the intent that makes it a Class 1 felony.

Is that where we are?

MS. KRAMER: Yes.

THE COURT: And then, [plaintiff], how is that wrong?

[THE PLAINTIFF]: Well, this was not part of the plea agreement for me

to plead guilty to an intent to aggravated sexual assault.

THE COURT: Well , again *** that might be, but that’s been litigated

somewhere else. The only issue before me is whether [DOC] and ISP are

correctly describing the Class 1 felony that you were convicted of.”

The court granted defendants’ motion, stating it believed “that under (6)(c)(1) that the defendants

have accurately described that offense. And again, I understand [plaintiff] doesn’t think that’s

what he pled guilty to, but again, I don’t think that’s the issue today.”

¶ 16 This appeal followed.

¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18 On appeal, plaintiff contends the trial court erred in granting defendants’ motion

for summary judgment. Specifically, plaintiff contends (1) the description of his offense was

inaccurate or (2) in the alternative, if the description is accurate, the statute under which he was

convicted is unconstitutional because it allows for conviction for uncharged offenses.

-6- ¶ 19 A. Standard of Review

¶ 20 Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to

any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735

ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2022). Because summary judgment is a drastic measure, it should only

be granted when the moving party’s right to judgment is “clear and free from doubt.” Outboard

Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992). All pleadings,

depositions, admissions, and affidavits are construed against the moving party in determining

whether there is a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 131-32. Summary judgment in favor of a

defendant is appropriate where the plaintiff has failed to establish an essential element of the

cause of action. Rogers v. Matanda, Inc., 393 Ill. App. 3d 521, 526 (2009). Appellate courts

review grants of summary judgment de novo. Hutson v. Pate, 2022 IL App (4th) 210696, ¶ 37.

¶ 21 Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, compelling a public official to perform a

purely ministerial act that does not involve the exercise of discretion. People ex rel. Berlin v.

Bakalis, 2018 IL 122435, ¶ 16. To obtain mandamus relief, a plaintiff must establish (1) a clear

right to the relief requested, (2) a clear duty of the public official to act, and (3) clear authority of

the public official to comply. People ex rel. Glasgow v. Carlson, 2016 IL 120544, ¶ 15.

¶ 22 B. The Accuracy of the Description of Plaintiff’s Conviction

¶ 23 In defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and on appeal, they argue the

description of plaintiff’s conviction is accurate, and he therefore cannot establish a clear right to

the requested relief.

¶ 24 Here, plaintiff pleaded guilty to indecent solicitation of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-

6(a) (West 2004)), a Class 1 felony. Class 1 indecent solicitation of a child occurs “when the act,

-7- if done, would be predatory criminal sexual assault of a child or aggravated criminal sexual

assault.” Id. § 11-6(c)(1). This distinguishes the Class 1 felony from Class 2 indecent solicitation,

wherein “the act, if done, would be criminal sexual assault,” and Class 3 indecent solicitation,

wherein “the act, if done, would be aggravated criminal sexual abuse.” Id. § 11-6(c)(2), (c)(3).

¶ 25 The description of the offense in plaintiff’s verification of incarceration is

“INDECENT SOL/PREDATORY/AGGSEX.” The first part of the description clearly refers to

the overall offense of indecent solicitation of a child. However, to distinguish Class 1 indecent

solicitation from the other classes of felonies, the description includes a reference to the offenses

a defendant is alleged to have intended to commit, namely, predatory criminal sexual assault of a

child or aggravated criminal sexual assault. To omit these descriptions would omit what

distinguishes plaintiff’s offense from other indecent solicitation offenses. The description of

plaintiff’s offense matches the statute and is therefore an accurate description of Class 1 indecent

solicitation of a child. As there is nothing to change in the description of his conviction, plaintiff

cannot establish a clear right to effective relief. See Carlson, 2016 IL 120544, ¶ 15.

¶ 26 C. Plaintiff’s Plea Agreement

¶ 27 Plaintiff agrees he pleaded guilty to a Class 1 felony. However, he contends his

plea agreement required all reference to the “predatory” or “aggravated” elements of the offense

be omitted. Therefore, even if the description is accurate for Class 1 indecent solicitation

generally, the description deprives plaintiff of the benefits of his plea bargain. Plaintiff’s

argument is unpersuasive.

¶ 28 First, “[w]hen a plea of guilty is fairly and understandingly made, it admits every

material fact alleged in the indictment and all the elements of the crime with which an accused is

legally charged.” (Emphasis added.) People v. Wilfong, 19 Ill. 2d 406, 409 (1960). Plaintiff is

-8- alleging he pleaded guilty to Class 1 indecent solicitation of a child but not the element of the

offense which makes it a Class 1 felony. This idea is inconsistent with the very concept of a

guilty plea.

¶ 29 Second, plaintiff’s contention is directly contracted by the record. When plaintiff

pleaded guilty to the instant offense, no mention was made of removing any predatory or

aggravating elements of the offense as part of the plea agreement. The trial court addressed the

predatory element of the offense as follows:

“So then you are prepared to admit today *** you committed the offense of

Indecent Solicitation of a Child when you, a person 17 years or older, with the

intent that the offense of Predatory Criminal Sexual Assault be committed,

knowingly solicited R.S., a child under the age of 17, to perform an act of sexual

penetration in violation of Illinois law ***?” (Emphasis added.)

Plaintiff answered in the affirmative. He made no move to correct the court on the predatory

element, nor was the removal of the predatory language included in his discussion of the terms

of his agreement.

¶ 30 It is possible plaintiff misunderstood the terms of his plea agreement. However,

that is not a claim cognizable under a mandamus action. See Oliver v. Kuriakos-Ciesil, 2020 IL

App (4th) 190250, ¶ 23 (Mandamus cannot be used to “ ‘correct, direct[,] or control the action of

a judge in any matter which he has jurisdiction to decide’ ” or “ ‘to circumvent the normal

appellate process.’ ”) (quoting People ex rel. Foreman v. Nash, 118 Ill. 2d 90, 96-97 (1987)). We

will not relitigate plaintiff’s guilty plea here.

¶ 31 D. Due Process

¶ 32 Finally, plaintiff argues, if the description of his conviction accurately reflects his

-9- conviction, then “the statute is unconstitutional if it is so jarbled [sic] together that it allows for

convictions on uncharged offenses.”

¶ 33 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) requires an appellant’s

brief to contain the appellant’s argument, with citation to authority and the pages of the record

relied on. The rule further provides, “Points not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the

reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.” Id. The rules governing briefs are not

“mere suggestions.” Niewold v. Fry, 306 Ill. App. 3d 735, 737 (1999). Their purpose is “to

require parties before a reviewing court to present clear and orderly arguments so that the court

can properly ascertain and dispose of the issues.” Hall v. Naper Gold Hospitality LLC, 2012 IL

App (2d) 111151, ¶ 7.

¶ 34 Here, plaintiff provides no citations or argument to explain how the statute is

garbled. Rather, plaintiff asks this court, “What other inference can be drawn” from the record of

his conviction then that he was convicted of indecent solicitation with intent to commit predatory

criminal sexual assault and indecent solicitation with intent to commit aggravated criminal

sexual assault?

¶ 35 Plaintiff’s forfeiture aside, because plaintiff has a single conviction for Class 1

indecent solicitation, the inference is clear he was convicted of indecent solicitation with intent

to commit predatory criminal sexual assault or aggravated criminal sexual assault. As such, we

need not entertain plaintiff’s forfeited and conclusory due-process claim.

¶ 36 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 37 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 38 Affirmed.

- 10 -