AYESHA ALEKSOV v. KRIS ALEKSOV & Another.

• Court: Massachusetts Appeals Court
• Decided: October 28, 2025
• Docket: 24-P-0848
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

24-P-848

AYESHA ALEKSOV

vs.

KRIS ALEKSOV & another.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The plaintiff, Ayesha Aleksov, appeals from a judgment

entered on a jury verdict on special questions dismissing all

claims and counterclaims and an order denying her postjudgment

motions. In pertinent part, the plaintiff claims the judge

erred by finding that the answers to special questions were

internally and fatally inconsistent and recalling the jury. We

agree, and vacate the judgment of dismissal.

Background. This case, at its core, is a dispute over the

disposition of certain parcels of real property. The plaintiff

alleged that the defendants unlawfully obtained title to two

properties owned by Ronald Khan (decedent). The plaintiff was

1 28 Bradford Street LLC. the decedent's daughter and defendant Kris Aleksov (Kris) was

his grandson. The plaintiff is Kris's mother. Before his

passing, the decedent deeded to Kris a property at 224 West

Plain Street (Plain Street); a property at 28-30 Bradford

Street, (Bradford Street) was deeded to defendant 28 Bradford

Street LLC (LLC).

The plaintiff claimed that the defendants obtained title to

the properties through undue influence and fraud. She also

claimed that Kris had a fiduciary duty to the decedent, and

therefore it was his burden to prove the absence of undue

influence and fraud at trial.2 The defendants denied all of the

plaintiff's claims, and filed several counterclaims.3

After an eight-day trial, the jury returned a verdict with

answers to special questions. The jury found that Kris did not

exert undue influence over the decedent or commit fraud when

acquiring the properties.4 The jury additionally found that Kris

2 The plaintiff also alleged that the defendants committed tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance and conversion, but these claims are not at issue in this appeal.

3 The defendants claimed that the plaintiff committed tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance, conversion, and alleged that they rightfully had title to the properties because of a contract between Kris and the decedent created by promissory estoppel. These claims are not at issue in this appeal.

4 The jury found no unnatural disposition, so they did not proceed to the further questions on undue influence. The jury

2 had a fiduciary duty to the decedent and the defendants did not

prove that the decedent's transfer of the properties was fair

and fully informed, nor did they disprove undue influence and

fraud. The jury did not award either party damages.5 Once the

verdict was recorded, the jury was discharged.6

Thereafter, the judge sua sponte determined that certain

answers to the special questions were inconsistent. He reasoned

that the verdict was inconsistent because the jury found no

undue influence and no fraud but found that Kris had a fiduciary

duty to the decedent and the defendants did not meet their

burden of proving an absence of undue influence and fraud. The

plaintiff argued that the verdict was not inconsistent because

the answers on undue influence and fraud assumed that the

plaintiff had the burden of proof, whereas the burden shifted on

the remaining questions. The judge disagreed and reconvened the

also found that Kris did not make false statements or omit material information to the decedent regarding the transfer of the properties, so they did not proceed to the further questions on fraud.

5 The jury's answers to the special questions on the counts for tortious interference with expectancy of inheritance, conversion, and promissory estoppel are not at issue in this appeal.

6 After the jury was discharged, some jurors did an Internet search and discovered previous cases involving the parties. The judge questioned each juror and determined that they all could remain fair and impartial.

3 jury. He then asked the jury to further consider their answers

to the questions that he believed were inconsistent.

During their deliberations, the jury asked whether the

nature of the inconsistency could be clarified because they had

originally decided that neither party met their burden of proof.

The judge responded that the confusion was about the burden

shifting, and directed the jury to the fiduciary duty section of

the jury instructions. The judge also amended the jury verdict

slip to be "more consistent and clear," by moving the fiduciary

duty questions on the verdict slip. The defendants objected to

this change.

The jury returned a second verdict with answers to the

special questions. The jury found that Kris did not have a

fiduciary duty to the decedent, and he did not commit undue

influence or fraud. The jury again did not award damages to

either party. Judgment entered dismissing the plaintiff's

claims and the defendants' counterclaims. The plaintiff moved

for reconsideration of the trial judge's finding that the first

jury verdict was inconsistent and moved for an entry of judgment

notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, a new trial.

The judge denied both motions. This appeal followed.

Discussion. The plaintiff argues that it was error for the

judge to find the jury's first verdict "irreconcilably

4 inconsistent." We are guided by the principle that "[i]f the

jury's answers can be harmonized, they must be resolved so as to

harmonize them." Solimene v. B. Grauel & Co., 399 Mass. 790,

800 (1987). Only if the evidence cannot be harmonized, may the

judge instruct the jury to reconsider their answers or, if the

jury cannot be reconvened, order a new trial. See id. at 800-

801. "In determining whether there is an inconsistency in the

jury's answers, the answers are to be viewed in the light of the

attendant circumstances, including the pleadings, issues

submitted, and the judge's instructions." Id. at 800.

The plaintiff argues that the first verdict can be

reconciled under the "shifting-burden framework," and it is

consistent in light of the evidence presented at trial. The

plaintiff explains that because the jury instructions state

which party has the burden of proof for each claim, it is

possible for the jury to conclude that neither party met their

burden. We agree that the jury could have "remained unconvinced

on both sides," and therefore the verdict can be harmonized.

Where a jury "followed instructions in answering questions

and 'there is a very reasonable view of the evidence which

harmonizes the answers,' special verdicts are not inconsistent."

Palriwala v. Palriwala Corp., 64 Mass. App. Ct. 663, 671 (2005)

quoting Technical Facilities of Am., Inc. v. Joseph T. Ryerson &

5 Son Inc., 24 Mass. App. Ct. 601, 605 (1987). Because "[j]uries

are presumed to have followed a judge's instructions," Roberts

v. Southwick, 415 Mass. 465, 473 (1993), and the evidence may

reasonably be viewed to determine that neither party met their

burden, we conclude the verdict was not inconsistent.

Because it is the "jurors' constitutional responsibility to

resolve the facts," a trial judge must make a reasonable effort

to harmonize the jury's verdict. Solimene, 399 Mass. at 801.

See Palriwala, 64 Mass. App. Ct. at 670. Here, the trial judge

abused his discretion in failing to do so. Given our

conclusion, we need not reach the plaintiff's remaining claims.

Conclusion. The judgment is vacated, and the case is

remanded to the Superior Court for entry of a new judgment

consistent with the first set of answers to the special

questions.

So ordered.

By the Court (Blake, C.J., Desmond & Singh, JJ.7),

Clerk

Entered: October 28, 2025.

7 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.