1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 AYAN ABDUL WAKIL, Case No. 1:25-cv-01098-CDB (HC)
12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 13 v. 14 (Doc. 20) WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE 15 ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY, et al.,
16 Respondents. 17 18 I. Relevant Background1 19 Petitioner Ayan Abdul Wakil (“Petitioner”), a federal detainee, proceeds pro se and in forma 20 pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). On 21 August 29, 2025, Petitioner filed the instant petition while in custody of the Immigration and 22 Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Golden State Annex, located in McFarland, California. Id. 23 Petitioner alleges that his continued detention in an immigration jail pending resolution of removal 24 proceedings without first being provided a due process hearing violates his constitutional and 25 statutory rights. Id. ¶¶ 1–3. 26 27
1 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. magistrate judge for all 1 After the Court preliminarily concluded that Petitioner’s petition may be cognizable under 2 § 2241, on September 4, 2025, the Court set a briefing schedule on the petition. (Doc. 7). On 3 October 17, 2025, Respondents filed a response to the petition. (Doc. 14). Petitioner filed a brief 4 in support of his petition on October 14, 2025, and a supplemental brief on November 10, 2025. 5 (Docs. 13, 16). On December 30, 2025, Respondents filed a notice indicating that the Ninth Circuit 6 Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner’s petition for review of an order issued in expedited removal 7 proceedings for lack of jurisdiction, denied his motion for stay of removal, and lifted the temporary 8 stay of removal. (Doc. 18). 9 II. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 10 Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order (“TRO”), 11 filed on January 5, 2026. (Doc. 20). In his motion, Petitioner asserts that “his petition does not 12 challenge the order of removal that was entered against him or [ICE’s] authority to remove him. 13 Instead, he challenges the process ICE has employed and continues to employ in its effectuation of 14 the removal … order and removal [of Petitioner] from the United [States] while he has a pending 15 petition.” Id. at 4. Petitioner seeks the Court issue an order restraining Respondents “from further 16 action at the present time” in proceeding with its “removal plans” of Petitioner pending the Court’s 17 “adjudication of his [p]etition[.]” Id. at 4, 17 (“Here, tempor[arily] restraining the Respondents 18 from effectuating Petitioner’s removal would not be detrimental to the government’s interests 19 because the requested relief is temporary, narrowly tailored, and will only last pending the instant 20 motion. Rather, an order for the maintenance of the status quo may simply ‘enable Respondents[] 21 to fully brief the [p]etition without the pressure of a looming removal date.’”). 22 III. Governing Authority 23 The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is “substantially identical” to the 24 standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Intern. Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & 25 Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy 26 never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citing 27 Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689–90 (2008)). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 1 absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is 2 in the public interest.” Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 876 (2015) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20); 3 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–12 (1982)). “Under Winter, plaintiffs must 4 establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in order to obtain a preliminary 5 injunction.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). 6 Likelihood of success on the merits is a threshold inquiry and is the most important factor.” Simon 7 v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 135 F.4th 784, 797 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Env’t Prot. Info. Ctr. 8 v. Carlson, 968 F.3d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 2020)). “[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are serious 9 questions going to the merits—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits—then a 10 preliminary injunction may still issue if the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor, 11 and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 12 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 13 Preliminary injunctions are intended “merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties 14 until a trial on the merits can be held, and to balance the equities at the litigation moves forward.” 15 Lackey v Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192, 200 (2025) (citations and quotations omitted). “The status quo 16 refers to ‘the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.’” E.A.P.C. v. 17 Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01546-JLT-CDB, 2025 WL 3289185, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) 18 (quoting Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1963)). 19 IV. Discussion 20 The Court has reviewed Petitioner’s motion for TRO (Doc. 20) and the papers filed thus far 21 in this matter, including the petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), Respondents’ response to 22 the petition (Doc. 14), and Petitioner’s supplemental briefs in support of his petition (Docs. 13, 16). 23 The record shows that Petitioner entered the United States on January 4, 2025, and was detained 24 shortly thereafter until he was released from a “Georgia detention center on one year parole” on 25 January 28, 2025. (Doc. 20 at 4, 9 ¶ 5). On March 26, 2025, Petitioner was re-detained and has 26 since been “in immigration custody for over [six] months[.]” (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1, 19); see id. ¶ 39 (“As 27 noted, Petitioner has been detained for a substantial length of time[.]”); (Doc. 20 ¶ 5). Petitioner 1 after ICE obtained travel documents thereto, Petitioner was arranged to be removed to his home 2 country of Afghanistan via a commercial flight in June 2025 that was not effectuated after Petitioner 3 refused to board the plane. (Doc. 14 at 2). As noted above, on December 29, 2025, the Ninth 4 Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for review for lack of jurisdiction, denied his motion for stay 5 of removal, and lifted the temporary stay of removal. (Doc. 18). 6 The Court notes that Petitioner did not file his motion for TRO or seek any other emergency 7 relief until approximately nine months after he was re-detained and more three months after he filed 8 his petition.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 AYAN ABDUL WAKIL, Case No. 1:25-cv-01098-CDB (HC)
12 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 13 v. 14 (Doc. 20) WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE 15 ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY, et al.,
16 Respondents. 17 18 I. Relevant Background1 19 Petitioner Ayan Abdul Wakil (“Petitioner”), a federal detainee, proceeds pro se and in forma 20 pauperis with a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). On 21 August 29, 2025, Petitioner filed the instant petition while in custody of the Immigration and 22 Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) at the Golden State Annex, located in McFarland, California. Id. 23 Petitioner alleges that his continued detention in an immigration jail pending resolution of removal 24 proceedings without first being provided a due process hearing violates his constitutional and 25 statutory rights. Id. ¶¶ 1–3. 26 27
1 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. magistrate judge for all 1 After the Court preliminarily concluded that Petitioner’s petition may be cognizable under 2 § 2241, on September 4, 2025, the Court set a briefing schedule on the petition. (Doc. 7). On 3 October 17, 2025, Respondents filed a response to the petition. (Doc. 14). Petitioner filed a brief 4 in support of his petition on October 14, 2025, and a supplemental brief on November 10, 2025. 5 (Docs. 13, 16). On December 30, 2025, Respondents filed a notice indicating that the Ninth Circuit 6 Court of Appeals dismissed Petitioner’s petition for review of an order issued in expedited removal 7 proceedings for lack of jurisdiction, denied his motion for stay of removal, and lifted the temporary 8 stay of removal. (Doc. 18). 9 II. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order 10 Pending before the Court is Petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order (“TRO”), 11 filed on January 5, 2026. (Doc. 20). In his motion, Petitioner asserts that “his petition does not 12 challenge the order of removal that was entered against him or [ICE’s] authority to remove him. 13 Instead, he challenges the process ICE has employed and continues to employ in its effectuation of 14 the removal … order and removal [of Petitioner] from the United [States] while he has a pending 15 petition.” Id. at 4. Petitioner seeks the Court issue an order restraining Respondents “from further 16 action at the present time” in proceeding with its “removal plans” of Petitioner pending the Court’s 17 “adjudication of his [p]etition[.]” Id. at 4, 17 (“Here, tempor[arily] restraining the Respondents 18 from effectuating Petitioner’s removal would not be detrimental to the government’s interests 19 because the requested relief is temporary, narrowly tailored, and will only last pending the instant 20 motion. Rather, an order for the maintenance of the status quo may simply ‘enable Respondents[] 21 to fully brief the [p]etition without the pressure of a looming removal date.’”). 22 III. Governing Authority 23 The standard for issuing a temporary restraining order is “substantially identical” to the 24 standard for issuing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Intern. Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & 25 Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). “A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy 26 never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008) (citing 27 Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689–90 (2008)). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must 1 absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is 2 in the public interest.” Glossip v. Gross, 576 U.S. 863, 876 (2015) (quoting Winter, 555 U.S. at 20); 3 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311–12 (1982)). “Under Winter, plaintiffs must 4 establish that irreparable harm is likely, not just possible, in order to obtain a preliminary 5 injunction.” Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 2011). 6 Likelihood of success on the merits is a threshold inquiry and is the most important factor.” Simon 7 v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 135 F.4th 784, 797 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Env’t Prot. Info. Ctr. 8 v. Carlson, 968 F.3d 985, 989 (9th Cir. 2020)). “[I]f a plaintiff can only show that there are serious 9 questions going to the merits—a lesser showing than likelihood of success on the merits—then a 10 preliminary injunction may still issue if the balance of hardships tips sharply in the plaintiff's favor, 11 and the other two Winter factors are satisfied.” Friends of the Wild Swan v. Weber, 767 F.3d 936, 12 942 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 13 Preliminary injunctions are intended “merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties 14 until a trial on the merits can be held, and to balance the equities at the litigation moves forward.” 15 Lackey v Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192, 200 (2025) (citations and quotations omitted). “The status quo 16 refers to ‘the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.’” E.A.P.C. v. 17 Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01546-JLT-CDB, 2025 WL 3289185, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) 18 (quoting Tanner Motor Livery, Ltd. v. Avis, Inc., 316 F.2d 804, 809 (9th Cir. 1963)). 19 IV. Discussion 20 The Court has reviewed Petitioner’s motion for TRO (Doc. 20) and the papers filed thus far 21 in this matter, including the petition for writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1), Respondents’ response to 22 the petition (Doc. 14), and Petitioner’s supplemental briefs in support of his petition (Docs. 13, 16). 23 The record shows that Petitioner entered the United States on January 4, 2025, and was detained 24 shortly thereafter until he was released from a “Georgia detention center on one year parole” on 25 January 28, 2025. (Doc. 20 at 4, 9 ¶ 5). On March 26, 2025, Petitioner was re-detained and has 26 since been “in immigration custody for over [six] months[.]” (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 1, 19); see id. ¶ 39 (“As 27 noted, Petitioner has been detained for a substantial length of time[.]”); (Doc. 20 ¶ 5). Petitioner 1 after ICE obtained travel documents thereto, Petitioner was arranged to be removed to his home 2 country of Afghanistan via a commercial flight in June 2025 that was not effectuated after Petitioner 3 refused to board the plane. (Doc. 14 at 2). As noted above, on December 29, 2025, the Ninth 4 Circuit dismissed Petitioner’s petition for review for lack of jurisdiction, denied his motion for stay 5 of removal, and lifted the temporary stay of removal. (Doc. 18). 6 The Court notes that Petitioner did not file his motion for TRO or seek any other emergency 7 relief until approximately nine months after he was re-detained and more three months after he filed 8 his petition. Petitioner’s long delay in seeking emergency injunctive relief “implies a lack of 9 urgency and irreparable harm.” Oakland Tribune, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 762 F.2d 1374, 10 1377 (9th Cir. 1985); see Lydo Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Las Vegas, 745 F.2d 1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 11 1984) (“A preliminary injunction is sought upon the theory that there is an urgent need for speedy 12 action to protect the [petitioner’s] rights. By sleeping on its rights a [petitioner] demonstrates the 13 lack of need for speedy action[.]”) (quoting Gillette Co. v. Ed Pinaud, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 618, 622 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)); e.g., Lee v. Haj, No. 1:16–cv–00008–DAD–SAB, 2016 WL 8738428, at *2 (E.D. 15 Cal. Feb. 22, 2016); Estrada v. Blythe Street Apartments, L.P., No. CV 16-6823 PA (AFMx), 2016 16 WL 11521545, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2016); Oracle Am., Inc. v. Myriad Grp. AG, No: C 10- 17 05604 SBA, 2011 WL 13154031, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2021). Moreover, Petitioner offers no 18 explanation justifying his long delay in seeking a TRO and does not otherwise address how his 19 refusal to board his removal flight in June 2025 contributed to the delay of his removal proceedings 20 in immigration court and before the Ninth Circuit and the seeking of his motion. See, e.g., Ross 21 Stores, Inc. v. Kim, No.: 2:25–cv–08701–AB–MAA, 2025 WL 3036485, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 22 2025) (finding claim of irreparable harm undermined where plaintiff’s delay in “flagging the 23 alleged misappropriation of trade secrets” contributed “to nearly [a] four month delay in filing [the 24 instant] application [for TRO].”). Therefore, Petitioner’s TRO request is untimely such as to weigh 25 against a finding of irreparable harm and against the issuance of a TRO. See also Local Rule 26 231(b). 27 Separately, Petitioner’s motion for TRO is improper as it seeks relief other than what is 1 the same nature as that to be finally granted.” Pacific Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Medical 2 Ctr., 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 2015) (citing DeBeers Consol. Mines v. United States, 325 U.S. 3 212, 220 (1945)). In the Ninth Circuit, “there must be a relationship between the injury claimed in 4 the motion for injunctive relief and the conduct asserted in the underlying complaint itself.” Id. 5 “The relationship between the [request for injunctive relief] and the underlying complaint is 6 sufficiently strong where the [request] would grant ‘relief of the same character as that which may 7 be granted finally.” Id. (citing De Beers Consol. Mines, 325 U.S. at 220). “Absent that relationship 8 or nexus, [a court] lacks authority to grant the relief requested.” Id.; e.g., Sibomana v. Larose, No. 9 22-cv-933-LL-NLS, 2022 WL 2918911, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 25, 2022) (“[T]he allegations 10 presented in [p]etitioner’s motion for a TRO bear no relationship to the ground for relief stated in 11 his petition. … Since [his] motion … deals with medical claims that are a matter wholly outside his 12 habeas petition, the Court does not have the authority to grant [the] motion.”); Olsen v. Perkins, 13 No. C25-0638-KKE-MLP, 2025 WL 2689035, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 19, 2025) (denying TRO 14 where petitioner “seeks relief with respect to his prison housing conditions that is not of the same 15 character as the relief he seeks in his habeas petition.”). 16 Here, Petitioner’s motion for TRO asks the Court to restrain Respondents from proceeding 17 in, and effectuating, ongoing removal proceedings of Petitioner while his petition is pending before 18 the Court. In seeking to prevent his removal to allow the merits of his petition to be adjudicated 19 “without the pressure of a looming removal date[,]” Petitioner functionally requests a stay of his 20 removal proceedings proceeding in immigration court. (Doc. 20 at 17). In contrast, the relief 21 Petitioner seeks in his underlying petition is premised upon his detention rather than his ongoing 22 removal proceedings. Thus, in his petition, Petitioner seeks the Court require the government hold 23 a custody determination hearing to consider whether his re-detention is justified. See (Doc. 1 at 24 16-17). Because Petitioner’s motion for TRO seeks relief as to removal matters that are outside of 25 his habeas petition premised upon his detention, he is not entitled to a TRO. See Pacific Radiation, 26 810 F.3d at 638 (affirming denial of TRO motion because motion sought “injunctive relief 27 unrelated to the claims set forth in the underlying suit.”); Sibomana, 2022 WL 2918911 at *2; e.g., 1 } 25, 2025) (recommending denial of motion for injunctive relief where plaintiff failed to explain 2 | how the relief sought in his motion bears “a relationship between the injury claimed in the 3 | motion ... and the conduct asserted in the underlying complaint[.]”), report and recommendation 4 | adopted, 2025 WL 3068902, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2025). 5 Therefore, the Court denies Petitioner’s motion for TRO as untimely and improper in 6 | seeking relief outside the relief sought in the petition. 7 Petitioner’s petition is fully briefed and the Court will decide the merits of the petition in 8 | due course. 9] V. Conclusion and Order 10 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for a temporary 11 | restraining order (Doc. 20) is DENIED. 12 | ITIS SO ORDERED. | Dated: _ January 12, 2026 | hwnd Pr 14 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28