Ayala v. United States Postal Service

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: March 22, 2018
• Docket: 17-1218
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

17‐1218 Ayala v. United States Postal Service

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 22nd day of March, two thousand eighteen.

PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, RICHARD C. WESLEY, Circuit Judges, EDWARD R. KORMAN,* District Judge. _____________________________________

Miledys Ayala,

Plaintiff‐Appellant, v. 17‐1218

United States Postal Service, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees. _____________________________________

* Judge Edward R. Korman, District Court Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.

FOR APPELLANT: Miledys Ayala, pro se, Bronx, NY.

FOR APPELLEE UNITED Talia Kraemer (Benjamin H. Torrance,on STATES POSTAL SERVICE AND the brief) Assistant United States MEGAN J. BRENNAN: Attorneys, for Geoffrey S. Berman, United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, New York, NY.

FOR NATIONAL ASSSOCIATION Peter D. DeChiara, Cohen, Weiss and OF LETTER CARRIERS, AFL‐CIO: Simon LLP, New York, NY.

Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Broderick, J.).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,

AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

Plaintiff‐appellant Miledys Ayala, pro se, appeals from a judgment in favor of the

United States Postal Service (“USPS”) and the National Association of Letter Carriers,

AFL‐CIO (“NALC”) in her employment discrimination action. Ayala alleged national

origin and age discrimination, as well as retaliation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. She also asserted a claim against NALC

for breach of its duty of fair representation (“DFR”). The district court granted the

defendants’ motions to dismiss, finding that: Ayala had failed to exhaust her

administrative remedies with respect to her Title VII and ADEA claims against NALC; the Title VII and ADEA claims against both defendants were time barred; and her DFR

claim was both time barred and inadequately pleaded. This appeal followed. We

assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the

case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6), accepting all factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable

inferences in plaintiff’s favor. Biro v. Condé Nast, 807 F.3d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 2015). The

complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although a court must accept as

true all the factual allegations in the complaint, that requirement is “inapplicable to legal

conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Ayala contends that she complied with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) process, and that her filings were timely. Ayala was required to

file her complaint within 90 days of receiving a right‐to‐sue letter from the EEOC. See

42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐16(d) (incorporating, among other things, Title VII’s general timing

requirements for suits by federal employees); id. § 2000e‐5(f)(1) (90 days to file suit); Long

v. Frank, 22 F.3d 54, 56–58 (2d Cir. 1994) (incorporating Title VII’s timing requirements

for ADEA claims brought under 29 U.S.C. § 633a). Ayala alleged that she received her

3 right‐to‐sue letter on March 23, 2015. She therefore had until Monday, June 22, 2015, to

file her complaint, but did not file until June 23, 2015. Accordingly, her claims against

USPS are time barred. See Ellul v. Congregation of Christian Bros., 774 F.3d 791, 798

n.12 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[A] statute of limitations defense may be decided on a Rule 12(b)(6)

motion if the defense appears on the face of the complaint.”).

The district court’s conclusion that there was no basis for applying equitable

tolling was also correct. In opposing dismissal, Ayala contended that she been dealing

with emotional issues. She also asserted that she had gone to the court on the last day

in which she could timely file, but did not file because of an error in her complaint.

These allegations, taken as true, are insufficient to demonstrate the “rare and exceptional

circumstance[s]” warranting equitable tolling. Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d

Cir. 2000) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Zerilli‐Edelglass v.

N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80 (2d Cir. 2003) (observing that, for equitable tolling

to apply, a plaintiff must show that she was “prevented in some extraordinary way from

exercising [her] rights” (internal citation omitted)).

With respect to NALC, the district court concluded that Ayala had failed to

exhaust her administrative remedies, and further, that any discrimination or retaliation

claims were time barred. While a plaintiff need not plead exhaustion, Hardaway v.

4 Hartford Pub. Works Dep’t, 879 F.3d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 2018), and NALC did not move to

dismiss Ayala’s discrimination and retaliation claims as time barred, we affirm because

Ayala’s complaint is devoid of any allegations giving rise to an inference of

discrimination, and her retaliation claims fail because she did not allege that her

participation in any protected activity led to retaliation.

Finally, Ayala challenges the district court’s ruling that her DFR claim against

NALC was untimely, contending that she did not become aware of her claim until

reading an internet article in November 2015. The statute of limitations on a DFR claim

is six months. See Buttry v. Gen. Signal Corp., 68 F.3d 1488, 1492 (2d Cir. 1995). The

limitations period “begins to run when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that

the union has breached its duty of fair representation,” and “the union’s subsequent

failure to actually represent the plaintiff[] cannot be treated as a continuing violation that

preclude[s] the running of the limitation period.” Buttry, 68 F.3d at 1492 (internal

citation and quotation marks omitted, alteration in original). The most recent event

alleged concerning NALC is that it failed to adequately represent her in connection with

her April 2013 firing. Therefore, her DFR claim accrued at latest in November 2013, and

is consequently time barred.

5 We have considered Ayala’s remaining arguments and find them to be without

merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court