Ayala v. Arias

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedMarch 26, 2026
Docket24-854
StatusUnpublished

This text of Ayala v. Arias (Ayala v. Arias) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ayala v. Arias, (9th Cir. 2026).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 26 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE LUIS AYALA, No. 24-854 D.C. No. Petitioner - Appellant, 2:22-cv-06206-ODW-ADS v. MEMORANDUM* ROBERTO A. ARIAS, Warden,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Otis D. Wright, II, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 6, 2026 Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW, DESAI, and DE ALBA, Circuit Judges.

Jose Luis Ayala, a California state prisoner, appeals the district court’s

denial of his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We review a district court’s

denial of a § 2254 petition de novo. Carter v. Davis, 946 F.3d 489, 501 (9th Cir.

2019) (per curiam). Ayala’s petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and

Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), which bars relief unless the state

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. court’s decision “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an

unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the

Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on

an unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Here, the

California Court of Appeal’s decision on direct appeal is the last reasoned state

court decision and thus the operative decision for AEDPA purposes. See Wilson v.

Sellers, 584 U.S. 122, 125 (2018). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291

and 2253, and we affirm.

The California Court of Appeal reasonably concluded that Ayala was not

improperly denied the right of self-representation under Faretta v. California, 422

U.S. 806 (1975). A Faretta request must be “unequivocal, timely, and not for

purposes of delay.” Stenson v. Lambert, 504 F.3d 873, 882 (9th Cir. 2007).

In Faretta, the Supreme Court held that a request made “weeks before trial” was

timely, though the Supreme Court did not define exactly what was necessary to

constitute a Faretta request. 422 U.S. at 835; see also Marshall v. Taylor, 395

F.3d 1058, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that Faretta “indirectly incorporated a

timing element”). Because Faretta “does not define when [] a request would

become untimely,” we have held that “other courts are free to do so as long as their

standards comport with the Supreme Court’s holding that a request weeks before

trial is timely.” Marshall, 395 F.3d at 1061 (citation modified).

2 24-854 The California Court of Appeal did not contradict clearly established federal

law in concluding that Ayala’s request to represent himself was untimely. In

Faretta, the Supreme Court stated that “weeks before trial, Faretta clearly and

unequivocally declared to the trial judge that he wanted to represent himself and

did not want counsel.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (emphasis added). Here, the

record supports the conclusion that Ayala’s self-representation request was not

presented to the trial judge until February 19, 2019, the day trial was to begin. See

Clark v. Broomfield, 83 F.4th 1141, 1151–52 (9th Cir. 2023) (concluding that the

California Supreme Court reasonably held a Faretta request made “on the eve of

trial” was untimely). Moreover, Ayala raised his Faretta request with the court

bailiff off the record on January 29, 2019, which was originally scheduled as the

trial date, so the California Court of Appeal could have reasonably concluded that

Ayala’s Faretta request to the bailiff was also made on the “eve of trial,” even

though trial was ultimately continued to a later date. See id. at 1152 (“[T]he

Supreme Court has not held that the actual start date of a trial is the lynchpin for

the analysis, or ‘squarely addressed’ whether and in what circumstance the

prospect of a continuance affects the timing of a Faretta request.” (quoting Wright

v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 125 (2008) (per curiam))).

AFFIRMED.

3 24-854

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Related

Faretta v. California
422 U.S. 806 (Supreme Court, 1975)
Wright v. Van Patten
552 U.S. 120 (Supreme Court, 2008)
Stenson v. Lambert
504 F.3d 873 (Ninth Circuit, 2007)
Wilson v. Sellers
584 U.S. 122 (Supreme Court, 2018)
Dean Carter v. Kevin Chappell
946 F.3d 489 (Ninth Circuit, 2019)
Douglas Clark v. Ron Broomfield
83 F.4th 1141 (Ninth Circuit, 2023)

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