Avis Briggs v. Ricardo Scott

Opinion

Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 364 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I

No. CV-25-277

AVIS BRIGGS Opinion Delivered: August 19, 2026

APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE HEMPSTEAD COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT

V. [NO. 29CV-24-184]

RICARDO SCOTT HONORABLE JOE C. SHORT, JUDGE APPELLEE

AFFIRMED

CINDY GRACE THYER, Judge

Avis Briggs appeals from an order of the Hempstead County Circuit Court that granted specific performance of a real estate contract in favor of appellee Ricardo Scott. Avis argues that the court erred in awarding specific performance when Ricardo failed to close under the terms of the contract.

Avis is Ricardo’s stepmother. On September 25, 2023, Avis and Lee Briggs, Ricardo’s father, signed a contract to sell a house and land on Highway 67 in Hope, Arkansas, to Ricardo for $140,000. Ricardo was living in a mobile home on the property at the time. The contract also provided that Avis and Lee Briggs would “gift” the equity in the house to Ricardo such that the actual purchase price was $115,000. The contract specified that the property was being sold “as is” and “where is” and that closing was to take place on or before October 19, 2023. Closing did not occur on that date, however.

Lee Briggs passed away in June 2024. On September 30, 2024, Avis filed an unlawful-

detainer action against Ricardo asking that he be ordered to vacate the property. Ricardo answered, denying that Avis was entitled to possession of the property, and he filed a counterclaim seeking specific performance of the real estate contract.

The circuit court held a trial in the matter on January 22, 2025. Avis testified that although Ricardo had lived on the property since 2017, he never had any lease agreement with her or her late husband. He showed an interest in purchasing the property in 2023, and the three of them signed the contract in September 2023. Avis agreed that she and Lee were “going to do a gift equity to Ricardo” that would reduce the purchase price from $140,000 to $115,000. She conceded, however, that she had other interested buyers who were willing to pay the full $140,000 price.

Despite the closing date of October 19, 2023, the sale did not close on that date, nor did Ricardo proffer the purchase price. According to Avis, Ricardo did not close because he wanted Lee to put a new roof on the house, but Lee did not want to. Avis acknowledged that she had spoken to the loan officer, Ryan Beck, who said that the condition of the roof was not an obstacle to closing and that they could close on October 27. She claimed, however, that Ricardo insisted that she and Lee file an insurance claim to have the roof repaired and that the sale did not close because of the problems with the roof.

On cross-examination, Avis reiterated that closing did not occur on October 19, 2023, the date specified in the contract. She nonetheless acknowledged that she was notified by loan officer Ryan Beck that Ricardo had successfully obtained the financing to purchase

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the property by October 27. She testified that despite knowing that Ricardo was able to go through with the closing, she and Lee decided to keep the property instead of going through with the sale.

Ricardo also testified at trial. He agreed that the contract provided for a closing date of October 19, 2023, and that the property was to be sold “as is.” He said he never paid Avis and Lee anything “because they never went through with” the closing. He reached out to them after hearing from the loan officer that the bank had agreed to the financing despite the state of the roof, but Avis told him that his father said that he wanted to keep the place. (He added that his father never told him that.) Ricardo testified that the roof was leaking, which was what held up the closing.

On cross-examination, Ricardo said that he had had a mobile home on the property since 2011. After his father told him he would sell him the property for $115,000 and they signed the contract, Ricardo sought financing for the purchase. Regarding the problems with the roof, Ricardo said that he suggested to his father and Avis that they file an insurance claim to repair the roof while they still had the policy on it; however, they did not want to. Despite this, Ricardo said he was still willing to purchase the property, had gotten his loan approved, and was going to fix the roof himself. He said that he did not think Avis’s refusal to go through with the sale had anything to do with the roof; rather, he said he thought “she saw the value of the place was way more than what they were selling it to me for and I feel like that’s when . . . she kind of backed out of the deal or whatever.” Ricardo had recently

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checked with the mortgage company, and it was still prepared to approve the loan and proceed with the sale.

On redirect, Ricardo conceded that he had testified that the roof was the only thing that prevented the closing from happening. On recross-examination, however, he clarified that “the only thing that stopped the closing [was that Avis] wouldn’t come to the closing . . . [and] wouldn’t agree with the mortgage company that . . . she knew they were ready to do it and she decided she would take another avenue[.]” Under questioning by the court, Ricardo added that he had attempted to get Avis to close the deal, but she would not answer his calls.

Neither party offered closing argument, and the circuit court issued its ruling from the bench. After summarizing the testimony, the court found that there was a valid contract to sell the property that was executed by the parties and that Ricardo was entitled to specific performance. A written order was entered on January 23, 2025. In its order, the court wrote as follows:

Based upon the pleadings filed herein and the evidence presented at the hearing, the Court finds that the Contract of Sale between the Plaintiff and her husband and the Defendant, dated September 25, 2023 is a valid and enforceable contract. The court finds that the Contract of Sale stated the closing was to be on or before October 19, 2023. The Contract of Sale does not provide for what occurs after the October 19, 2023 closing date, if not closed. The Court finds that the Contract of Sale did not become invalid after the closing date. Evidence presented establishes that the Defendant had made application for a loan to purchase the property on September 21, 2023, that the Defendant was notified of the loan approval on September 27, 2023.[1] The Plaintiff, Avis Briggs, testified that she and her husband had decided to keep the property and not [sell] to the Defendant after the written

1 It is clear from the context that the court intended to write October 27, 2023, here.

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Contract of Sale was executed by all parties. The Court further finds that the Defendant had the ability to complete the contract, in that he had his financing to fund the purchase price of the property, and he remained ready and able to comply with the Contract.

The Court finds that the Contract of Sale dated between the parties remains an enforceable contract and the Defendant is entitled to specific performance of the terms of the Contract. It is further found and ordered that the parties are to consummate the sale and transfer of the property no later than 45 days from January 22, 2025.

On January 31, 2025, Avis filed a motion for reconsideration. In this motion, she argued that the court erred in finding the contract valid and enforceable “even though [Ricardo’s] actions were the sole reason the contract did not close and even though such failure was due to an invalid reason.” Specifically, she argued that the contract provided that the property was being sold “as is, where is,” but Ricardo testified that the reason the sale did not close was because he wanted the roof repaired. She asserted that a party cannot seek enforcement of a contract if they were the party who failed to perform their obligations or enforce a contract that they materially breached. Because Ricardo “refused to close on the date of closing for a legally invalid reason,” his “material breach” and “failure to materially perform” barred him from seeking to enforce the contract.

Ricardo responded, arguing that Avis had misstated the testimony at trial and asserting that it was Avis, not he, who had unclean hands and who had failed to perform her obligations under the contract. The circuit court entered an order denying Avis’s motion for reconsideration on February 7, 2025, and Avis filed her timely notice of appeal on February 14.

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In civil bench trials, the standard of review on appeal is not whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the court but whether the court’s findings were clearly erroneous or clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. BCR Contractors of Ark., LLC v. Hall, 2026 Ark. App. 241. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Ko v. Wills, 2025 Ark. App. 564, 728 S.W.3d 383. In reviewing a circuit court’s findings of fact, we give due deference to the circuit court’s superior position to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded the testimony. Id.

On appeal, Avis argues that the circuit court erred in granting specific performance to Ricardo when he failed to either tender performance or timely seek enforcement of the contract. Specific performance is an equitable remedy that compels performance of a contract on the precise terms agreed upon by the parties. Dossey v. Hanover, Inc., 48 Ark. App. 108, 891 S.W.2d 67 (1995). A party seeking specific performance must be at all times ready, able, and willing to perform his part of the contract. Vaughn v. Morris, 12 Ark. App. 106, 671 S.W.2d 195 (1984). Moreover, one seeking specific performance must act with diligence. Sossamon v. Davis, 271 Ark. 156, 607 S.W.2d 405 (Ark. App. 1980). Whether specific performance should be awarded in a particular case is a question of fact for the circuit court. Elder Constr. Co. v. Ivey Lane, LLC, 2010 Ark. App. 10, 370 S.W.3d 861.

In this appeal, Avis does not challenge the circuit court’s determination that there was a valid, enforceable contract for the sale of the property. Instead, she argues that the

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circuit court erred in granting the relief of specific performance to Ricardo because he “neither tendered performance nor timely sought enforcement of the contract.” She raises three primary points in support of her arguments: (1) Ricardo was not ready, willing, and able to perform his duties under the contract; (2) he took no steps to enforce the contract after the closing date and thus unreasonably delayed seeking equitable relief; and (3) because he was the party in material breach of the contract, he cannot enforce the breach against the nonbreaching party.

We address and quickly dispose of Avis’s “unreasonable delay” argument first. Simply put, she did not present this argument at any point before the circuit court, and it is therefore not preserved for appeal. See Vaughn, 12 Ark. App. at 110, 671 S.W.2d at 198 (declining to address an argument that appellee’s behavior was inconsistent with a party seeking specific performance because the argument “was never raised in the trial court and cannot be considered on appeal”).

Avis also contends that the circuit court erred in awarding specific performance because Ricardo was, as of the date of closing, not ready, willing, and able to perform under the terms of the contract. She asserts that at trial, Ricardo “clearly stated and specifically admitted that his objection as to the condition of the roof was the sole reason for not closing on the property.” Avis contends that because the contract declared that the sale was “as is,” Ricardo was not ready or willing to go through with the sale.

Ricardo did testify at trial that the “roof issue” “held up the closing.” He also testified, however, that although his attempt to persuade his father to fix the roof was unsuccessful,

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he was nonetheless ready to proceed with purchasing the property, the loan had been approved, and he was going to be responsible for repairing the roof himself. On this evidence, which the circuit court clearly found credible, the court found that Ricardo “had the ability to complete the contract, in that he had his financing to fund the purchase price of the property, and he remained ready and able to comply with the contract.” This factual finding is supported by the trial testimony and is not clearly erroneous. Avis’s argument to the contrary is therefore unavailing.

Finally, Avis argues that a party cannot seek enforcement of a contract if that party is the one who failed to perform his or her obligation. See, e.g., Reynolds Forestry Consulting & Real Est., PLLC v. Colbey, 2019 Ark. App. 209, at 13, 575 S.W.3d 170, 184 (noting that a “‘first breach’ by one contracting party may release the other party from its contractual duties if the first breach is material and sufficiently serious.”). She argues that Ricardo was the breaching party, again referencing his testimony that the sole reason the contract did not close on the closing date was the problems with the roof.

Whether a breach of contract occurred is generally a question of fact. Spann v. Lovett & Co., Ltd., 2012 Ark. App. 107, at 21, 389 S.W.3d 77, 93. As with Avis’s previous argument, the circuit court here made a factual finding, which was supported by the evidence, that Ricardo stood ready and willing to comply with the terms of the contract. Accordingly, we find no error and affirm.

Affirmed.

ABRAMSON and HIXSON, JJ., agree.

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Warden Law Firm, by: Harry Warden, for appellant.

Jeremy B. Lowrey; and Edmondson & Shackelford, PLLC, by: Brittnee Edmondson, for appellee.