Avirgan v. Hull

705 F. Supp. 1544, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1293, 1988 WL 147650
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Florida
DecidedFebruary 2, 1989
Docket86-1146-CIV
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 705 F. Supp. 1544 (Avirgan v. Hull) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Avirgan v. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1293, 1988 WL 147650 (S.D. Fla. 1989).

Opinion

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS FOR COSTS AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES

JAMES LAWRENCE KING, Chief Judge.

Tony Avirgan was injured by the explosion of a bomb in the jungle at La Penca, *1545 Nicaragua. He accused the defendants of exploding the bomb in an attempt to assassinate Eden Pastora, a contra leader. After two years of protracted and extensive discovery of scores of witnesses across the United States, Costa Rica, and elsewhere, the plaintiffs were unable to produce a single witness who could state that the defendants exploded the bomb or were responsible for the assassination attempt. See Avirgan v. Hull, 691 F.Supp. 1357 (S.D.Fla.1988).

The attorneys for the plaintiffs, The Christie Institute, must have known prior to suing that they had no competent evidence to substantiate the theories alleged in their complaint. Plaintiffs’ lead counsel, Daniel Sheehan, supplemented the complaint with a detailed affidavit outlining the purported testimony of seventy-nine witnesses who Mr. Sheehan stated had factual knowledge that these defendants set and exploded the bomb that caused plaintiffs injuries.

The seventy-nine witnesses were identified only by number. Plaintiffs’ counsel refused to identify the names and addresses of the vast majority of the seventy-nine witnesses until ordered to do so by the court. Plaintiffs appealed the order requiring them to disclose the identities of the witnesses. These actions by plaintiffs and their counsel prevented the defendants from taking depositions of these witnesses, and delayed orderly discovery for many months.

After all the appeals were exhausted and plaintiffs complied with the order to reveal the names of their witnesses, the reason for the plaintiffs’ adamant refusal became apparent. Specifically, the names and identities of approximately twenty of the seventy-nine witnesses were totally unknown to Mr. Sheehan or the plaintiffs. Several of the disclosed witnesses later stated under oath that they did not know Mr. Sheehan, had never spoken to him, or flatly denied the statements he had attributed to them in his affidavit. The remaining witnesses did not furnish any statements that would be admissible. Much of the testimony of these witnesses involved conversations they allegedly had with other people, which is the hearsay testimony inadmissible at a trial.

Based upon the affidavit of plaintiffs’ counsel, the plaintiffs were permitted to conduct two years of discovery. This discovery failed to produce any admissible evidence regarding causation. See Avir-gan, 691 F.Supp. 1357. The Christie Institute’s allegations, essentially maintaining that the plaintiffs were victims of a wide-ranging conspiracy spanning thirty years and involving the activities of former United States Government officials, CIA operatives, Colombian druglords and arms merchants in Cuba, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Central America, were based upon unsubstantiated rumor and speculation from unidentified sources with no first hand knowledge. These actions establish that plaintiffs “had every reason to know they stood no chance of proving” that the defendants were responsible for the injuries to Tony Avirgan. Collins v. Walden, 834 F.2d 961, 964 (11th Cir.1987). This abuse of the judicial process requires that the plaintiffs make the defendants whole by paying the fees the defendants have been forced to expend for attorneys in this action. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975); Collins, 834 F.2d at 964; Gordon v. Heimann, 715 F.2d 531 (11th Cir.1983); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1986).

DISCUSSION

The motions for costs and attorney’s fees filed by the prevailing defendants are the last remnants of this case. The court now addresses the questions raised by these motions.

A. COSTS

Normally, an award of costs is relatively straight forward. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) provides that a court may tax costs in favor of the prevailing party. The particular costs that can be taxed are detailed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. This section expressly provides that the following items may be taxed as costs:

*1546 1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
2) Fees of the court reporter for all or any part of the stenographic transcript necessarily obtained for use in the case;
3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case;
5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title.

Some of the successful defendants have filed Bills of Costs. Although the plaintiffs have failed to make specific objections to requested costs, the court will analyze the requests and determine the appropriate amounts based on the statutory guidelines. Specifically, the court will disallow “costs” that are not set out in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See Crawford Fitting Company v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 96 L.Ed.2d 385 (1987).

1.ADOLFO CALERO

Defendant Calero filed an affidavit listing costs totalling $1,935.64. The affidavit states that the following costs have been expended in connection with the defense of this case:

DISBURSEMENTS AMOUNT
Messenger Service $ 80.00
Postage 102.94
Photocopies 1,225.65
Parking 10.10
Mileage 1.20
Telefax Transmissions 34.00
Word processing costs 280.00
Depositions 201.75
TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS: $1,935.64

The statutory provision does not provide for the taxation of messenger service, postage, parking, mileage, telefax and word processing costs, so the court disallows the requested costs. Id.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
705 F. Supp. 1544, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1293, 1988 WL 147650, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/avirgan-v-hull-flsd-1989.