Aviles v. United States

151 Ct. Cl. 1, 1960 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 194, 1960 WL 8530
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedOctober 5, 1960
DocketNo. 278-56; No. 30-57
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 151 Ct. Cl. 1 (Aviles v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Aviles v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl. 1, 1960 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 194, 1960 WL 8530 (cc 1960).

Opinions

Dtjkfee, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

These two actions have been joined because of the similarity of issues. At one time or another during the six years preceding the filing of these suits, each of the 47 plaintiffs was employed as a meat inspector in the Meat Inspection Branch, Agricultural Eesearch Service (formerly the Bureau of Animal Industry, and hereinafter called the “Service”), Department of Agriculture. The claims are for night differential pay under section 301 of the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945, as amended, 59 Stat. 295, 298 and the 1954 Act amending that section, found at 68 Stat. 1110, for hours worked between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m. while in an overtime status.

Plaintiffs worked at various stations throughout the country but the proof at trial was restricted to the situation as it existed in the New York City area which the parties have agreed is representative of plaintiffs’ working conditions everywhere. The Meat Inspection Act of 1906,34 Stat. 674, as amended and implemented by regulations requires federal inspection of every plant which slaughters or processes meat for shipment in interstate commerce. The meat inspectors employed by the Service are assigned to each plant or establishment for the supervision of all operations connected with meat processing and no plant may operate without an inspector on the premises to supervise operations. The inspectors are required to be present throughout the entire [3]*3period during which the plant is operating and to remain at the plant to which assigned until the processing is completed or until relieved.

In general, plaintiff inspectors’ duties consist of overseeing the meat processing and supervising the sanitation of plant facilities, equipment, and personnel throughout the various meat preparation steps which include curing, cutting, blending, and packaging. The brands and inspection stamps which show that the meats are Government approved are within the jurisdiction and custody of the inspectors.

Of approximately 75 establishments operating in the New York City area at the time of trial, 10 were engaged in slaughtering. The balance were processing plants, and of these plants, 10 or 12 were on a 24 hour, or an around the clock, schedule of operations. Inspectors are assigned to the 24 hour plants in two shifts, viz, from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. and from 7 p.m. to 7 a.m. Habitually, that is on most of the days of operation, the plants not on a 24 hour basis operate for more than eight hours. From time to time hours are worked at these plants after 6 p.m. Overtime is worked in the slaughtering plants on about 50 percent of the days on which they operate.

Permission for an establishment to utilize inspection services for more than eight hours in any one day must be obtained. Written requests to operate overtime with inspectors’ services must be filed with the Meat Inspection Branch. At the time of trial, every establishment in the New York City area had filed such a request. The finishing or closing time of the processing plants, and hence the number of overtime hours worked, is controlled by the establishments themselves, and not by the plaintiffs or the Government. The defendant is reimbursed by the processing establishments for the overtime services required of meat inspectors in those plants.

Meat inspectors are rotated from assignments in processing plants every six months and from slaughtering plant assignments every two months. Since there are more than five times as many processing plants as slaughtering plants and since the normal assignment at processing plants is three times as long as the slaughtering assignment, by far the [4]*4major portion of the plaintiffs’ total working time over the long run is spent at processing plants. Plaintiffs occasionally work at import stations or at clerical duties but these types of work occupy such a small percentage of plaintiffs’ overall working time that they are negligible for our present considerations.

Plaintiffs have received overtime pay for all hours worked in excess of eight each working day. They have received night differential pay for hours worked after 6 p.m. which were a part of the first eight hours of work that day but not for any overtime hours worked between 6 p.m. and 6 a.m.

Since the enactment of the Federal Employees Pay Act of 1945, no night differential during overtime hours has been paid except during 1946. The payments were authorized that year by a directive of the then Meat Inspection Division and were canceled the following year by another directive. In 1953, plaintiffs sought to obtain payment of night differential through the office of their union representative, although other efforts in that direction had been made as early as 1950. The administrative chief of the Service advised an official of the Meat Inspection Division that, in his opinion, the night differential could not be paid because the night overtime was not a part of a “regularly scheduled tour of duty,” which he interpreted to be a statutory prerequisite for payment of night differential. This opinion was passed on to plaintiffs’ representative with the comment that the Division considered it impractical to include any overtime in a “regularly scheduled tour of duty.”

The same directive which put a stop to the 1946 practice of paying a differential for night overtime hours also set the tour of duty for meat inspectors at a 40 hour week composed of five eight hour days. Circ. Letter 2959; Chief, Bureau of Animal Industry; June 20,1947.

Before addressing ourselves to the question of the Government’s liability or lack thereof, we must discuss the defense of laches. It is claimed that the plaintiffs are guilty of laches for although the compensation practices of which they complain have been in effect since 1947, they made no attempt to obtain corrective action until 1953 and did not institute [5]*5suit until 1956. The defendant maintains that all this operated to its prejudice.

It is well settled that the equitable doctrine of laches ordinarily has only limited application in a suit at law governed by a statute of limitations. Prejudice to the defendant, as well as a lack of diligence by plaintiff, must exist before a lapse of time will constitute laches. Eegarding the defense of laches in suits which have been filed within the statutory period of limitations, this court has recently said in Obrien v. United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 1, 4:

It is only where some great injustice would be done the defendant by so long a delay by the claimant that the doctrine of laches should be set up to defeat consideration of the claim on the merits. The equities on both sides should be carefully weighed, and it should be clear that they weigh heavily on the side of the defendant before the court refuses to hear a case because of a delay of less than the statutory period.

The prejudice assigned by the Government to the claimed delay is that if it should be required to make additional payments to plaintiffs as a result of this suit, it may no longer have any legal right to demand reimbursement from the processing establishments. We do not feel that a possible prejudice of this nature is sufficient for us to invoke the doctrine of laches especially in view of the evidence that attempts to obtain night differential payments were made as far back as 1950 and that suit was instituted as soon as enough plaintiffs were found to join together to make the action financially feasible.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
151 Ct. Cl. 1, 1960 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 194, 1960 WL 8530, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/aviles-v-united-states-cc-1960.