Avery v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

111 F.2d 19, 24 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 856, 1940 U.S. App. LEXIS 3562
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedApril 12, 1940
Docket9107
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 111 F.2d 19 (Avery v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Avery v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 111 F.2d 19, 24 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 856, 1940 U.S. App. LEXIS 3562 (9th Cir. 1940).

Opinion

DENMAN, Circuit Judge.

Petitioner seeks review of a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals redetermining a deficiency in income tax for the year 1935 in the amount of $1,375.68.

The Board held (1) that the difference between the single premium payment and the sum of the amounts received by the petitioner prior to and upon maturity ,of an insurance policy was not capital gain but ordinary income, and (2) that interest received upon certain street improvement bonds was not exempt but taxable.

The insurance policy, taken out in 1925 upon payment of a single premium of $23,-069.75, carried both endowment and death provisions, the insurer agreeing to pay $25,-000 on April 27, 1935, to petitioner (described as “the Insured”) if then living, or to certain named persons or the survivor, or to pay $25,000 “upon receipt of due proof of the death of the Insured before the maturity of the Endowment.” 1

It is stipulated that between the date of issuance and April 27, 1935, the insurer “paid to petitioner as ‘dividends’ on account of said policy of insurance * * * ” the *21 total sum of $5,634, this total being made up of payments occurring at least once in each of the years subsequent to 1925 and including 1935, and that prior to the year 1935 the petitioner reported no part of this sum in his federal income tax return.

The amount received on maturity, $25,-000, plus the intervening payments of $5,-634, made a total of $30,634. The difference between this total and the single premium payment of $23,069.75 was $7,564.25. This difference the petitioner treated in his 1935 income tax return as capital gain taxable under Section 117 of the Revenue Act of 1934, and reported thirty per cent thereof, or $2,269.27, as the amount to be “taken into account in computing net income.” 2 The Commissioner determined that none of the $7,564.25 was capital gain but that all was ordinary income. The Board agreed with the Commissioner.

Section 117(a) of the Revenue Act of 1934 provides that if a capital asset has been held for more than 10 years only 30 per cent of the gain “recognized upon the sale or exchange” thereof “shall be taken into account in computing net income.” 48 Stats. 680, 714. (Emphasis supplied.)

The $25,000 payment was not received upon a “sale or exchange” of the endowment contract unless Section 117(f) of the Revenue Act of 1934 is applicable. Fairbanks v. United States, 306 U.S. 436, 437, 59 S.Ct. 607, 83 L.Ed. 855; Bodine v. Commissioner, 3 Cir., 103 F.2d 982, 987.

Petitioner contends that Section 117(f) is applicable and that, consequently, under Section 117(a) only thirty per cent of the $7,564.25 is to be “taken into account in computing net income.”

Section 117(f) provides that “* * * amounts received by the holder upon the retirement of bonds, debentures, notes, or certificates or other evidences of indebtedness issued by any corporation * * *, with interest coupons or in registered form, shall be considered as amounts received in exchange therefor.”

The report of the Ways and Means Committee (73d Cong., 2d Sess. H. Rept. 704) states (p. 31) with reference to the provision enacted as Section 117(f^*: “Subsection (f) provides that amounts received upon the retirement of corporate bonds and similar evidences of indebtedness shall be considered as amounts received in exchange therefor.” (Emphasis supplied.)

The gross income provisions of Section 22 of the Revenue Act of 1932 included specific and separate provisions for the treatment of amounts received under life insurance, endowment and annuity contracts and prescribed a specific formula for the computation of the portion thereof to be included in gross income. 3 Specific and separate treatment was continued in the *22 gross income provisions of Section 22 of the Revenue Act of 1934, 4 in which Act there appeared for the first time the provisions of Section 117(f). It is apparent that at least for purposes of the gross income provisions of Section 22, Congress did not regard endowment contracts as “similar” to corporate bonds, but as so dissimilar as to warrant independent treatment.

Petitioner’s contention would require us to hold that the formula provided in the first sentence of Section 22(b) (2) either is not applicable or is superfluous in instances of payment at maturity of endowment contracts. The superfluous or useless character is illustrated by the fact that the act of computing gross income under Section 22(b) (2) would be without significance because the gain of which the percentage is taken under Section 117(a) is computed by a different formula. The difference in formula is illustrated by the fact that under the first sentence of Section 22(b) (2) the minuend is the total of the amounts received in the tax year and prior years or, here, $30,634, whereas in computing capital gain the minuend could not exceed $25,000 because under Section 117(f) it is provided that “amounts received * * * upon the retirement' of * * * shall be considered as amounts received in exchange therefor,” and the most that could be considered as “received * * * upon the retirement * * * ” would be the $25,000 payment. (Emphasis supplied.)

We are of the view that Congress did not intend that the specific formula for computation of the gain under an endowment contract to be included in gross income, provided by Section 22(b) (2), should be either inápplicable or superfluous in the instant case.

Petitioner contends that Section 117(f) was enacted for the purpose of overcoming the principle announced in John H. Watson, Jr. v. Com’r, 27 B. T. A. 463, 465, that the loss sustained from the retirement at maturity of a corporate bond was not a capital loss because no sale or exchange was involved; that at the time of the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1934 there also was in effect I. T. 2661, XI — 2 Cum. Bull. 39(1932), which provided: “The gain realized from the surrender of a combined annuity and life insurance contract held for more than two years may not be treated as capital gain and taxed under section 101 of the Revenue Act of 1932, but must be treated as ordinary income.” and that the intent of Congress must have been to overcome this ruling as well as the principle announced in the Watson -case. We noté that in enacting Section 117(f) Congress expressly used the word “bond”. If it had intended that Section 117(f) should apply to endowment contracts we are entitled to assume that it also would have referred in *23 express terms to them or the class into which they had been segregated, particularly in view of the peculiar treatment Congress had accorded them in the past.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
111 F.2d 19, 24 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 856, 1940 U.S. App. LEXIS 3562, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/avery-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-ca9-1940.