HODGES, J.
T1 The facts are not disputed. Charles Thomas Autry (Claimant) sustained a com-pensable injury to his lower back on March 8, 1994. On January 2, 1995, he suffered a second injury, this one to his right foot. Both injuries occurred while he was working for Lance, Inc. (Employer). A workers' compensation claim was filed for each injury.
T2 Permanent partial disability was awarded on September 1, 1999, for the first injury and on September 14, 1999 for the second injury. Claimant challenged the trial tribunal's calculation of benefits for the first injury before an en bane panel of the Workers' Compensation Court. On November 1, 1999, while that decision was pending, the 1999 amendment to section 172(A) of the Workers' Compensation Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 85, §§ 1-211 (1991 & Supp.2000), went into effect. On December 16, 1999, the en bane panel issued an order correcting the trial tribunal's calculation of benefits.
1 3 Claimant filed a claim for benefits from the Multiple Injury Trust Fund (Fund) on January 26, 2000. The Workers' Compensation Court adopted the argument of the Fund and held that Claimant could not recover benefits from the Fund under the 1999 amendment. The Court of Civil Appeals vacated the order adopting Claimant's argument that the pre 1999 version of section 172(A) applied as the law in effect at the time of the subsequent injury.
T 4 The legal issue arises from the Legislature's amendment of § 172(A) of the Workers' Compensation Act effective November 1, 1999. Prior to that date, certain permanent partial disability claimants were entitled to receive benefits from the Fund. After the 1999 amendment, however, section 172(A)(2)(b) provides that "for actions filed after October 31, 1999" the claimant shall receive permanent partial disability from the employer only. - Thus additional benefits were no longer available from the Fund.
115 Claimant argues that the Court of Civil Appeals was correct in applying the pre-1999 version of section 172(A) as the law in effect at the time of the most recent injury. The Fund argues that the express language of the 1999 amendment demonstrates the legislative intent that the statute should be applied retroactively to all claims filed for benefits from the Fund after October 31, 1999, without regard to the date of the most recent injury.
T6 The dispositive threshold question is not which version of section 172(A) applies. On November 1, 1999, the 1999 amendment became effective, contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Civil Appeals. Rather, it is the meaning of the phrase "for actions filed after October 31, 1999" which controls. Does the phrase refer to an "action" for permanent partial disability benefits for the second injury or an "action" for benefits from the Fund following an adjudication of the second injury? This Court determines that the Legislature was referring to an action on the second injury when it drew the distinction between actions filed before November 1, 1999, and those filed after that date.
The Creation and Dissolution of the Fund
T7 The Fund, formerly the Special Indemnity Fund, was first established in 1948 to relieve employer hesitation to hire workers who suffered previous impairment by assuring employers that they would not be responsible for the combination of old and new disabilities. See Special Indem. Fund v. Archer, 847 P.2d 791, 794 (Okla.1993). An employer was responsible only for the permanent partial disability resulting from the subsequent injury as if there were no previ
ous impairment. Any material increase in disability caused by the combination of the previous impairment and the subsequent injury was borne by the Fund.
Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 172(A) (Supp.1995)
18 In 1994, a joint legislative committee was created to study the Fund including "[a] determination of the impact that dissolution of the [Fund] would have on businesses located in this state." Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 182 (Supp.1995). In 1999, dissolution of the Fund began with the amendment of section 172(A)
T9 Under the amendment, "[flor actions filed after October 31, 1999," a combination of disabilities resulting in permanent partial disability would result in employer responsibility only for the disability caused by the subsequent injury. Id. at § 172(A)(2)(b). Nor would the employee receive any additional compensation for the combined disability from the Fund. Id. Thus, the disabled
worker now bore the responsibility for any material increase in permanent partial disability resulting from the combination of disabilities. Inexplicably, the Legislature made the filing of an "action", rather than the date of injury, the event which triggered operation of the new rule for calculating benefits.
T10 At the end of the 2000 legislative session, the dissolution was completed when the Legislature discontinued benefits from the Fund for a material increase in combined disability resulting in permanent total disability. 2000 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 248, § 12, emerg. eff, May 26, 2000. Curiously, the controlling event in the 2000 amendment
was not a filing, but rather whether the injury occurred on or after June 1, 2000. The 2000 amendment also shifted Hability for a material increase in disability caused by a combination of injuries resulting in permanent total disability to the subsequent employer. See Andrew D. Downing, Oklahoma Employers Beware: The Rock and a Hard Place Dilemma, 72 Okla. B.J.2055 (2001) (discussion of dissolution of Fund and interplay of 2000 amendment with Americans with Disabilities Act).
Construction of the 1999 Amendment
$11 The dispute in this matter is the effect of the 1999 amendment on workers' claims for subsequent injuries filed but pending before the Workers' Compensation Court on November 1, 1999. Claimant persuaded the Court of Civil Appeals to apply the well-settled rule that the law in effect at the time of the subsequent injury controls in determining the Hability of the Fund. See Archer, 847 P.2d at 794-795. The Fund argues that the Legislature intended to retroactively disallow any claim against the Fund not commenced by the filing of a valid form 3-f
before November 1, 1999. This Court's de novo review of the question of law presented reveals that neither argument is entirely correct as neither addresses the patent ambiguity contained in the 1999 amendment. Namely, that the term "action" in the phrase "for actions filed after October 31, 1999" could refer to an "action" for benefits for a subsequent injury. It could also refer to an "action" for benefits from the Fund following an adjudication of the degree of disability resulting from the subsequent injury. The issue is one of statutory construction.
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HODGES, J.
T1 The facts are not disputed. Charles Thomas Autry (Claimant) sustained a com-pensable injury to his lower back on March 8, 1994. On January 2, 1995, he suffered a second injury, this one to his right foot. Both injuries occurred while he was working for Lance, Inc. (Employer). A workers' compensation claim was filed for each injury.
T2 Permanent partial disability was awarded on September 1, 1999, for the first injury and on September 14, 1999 for the second injury. Claimant challenged the trial tribunal's calculation of benefits for the first injury before an en bane panel of the Workers' Compensation Court. On November 1, 1999, while that decision was pending, the 1999 amendment to section 172(A) of the Workers' Compensation Act, Okla. Stat. tit. 85, §§ 1-211 (1991 & Supp.2000), went into effect. On December 16, 1999, the en bane panel issued an order correcting the trial tribunal's calculation of benefits.
1 3 Claimant filed a claim for benefits from the Multiple Injury Trust Fund (Fund) on January 26, 2000. The Workers' Compensation Court adopted the argument of the Fund and held that Claimant could not recover benefits from the Fund under the 1999 amendment. The Court of Civil Appeals vacated the order adopting Claimant's argument that the pre 1999 version of section 172(A) applied as the law in effect at the time of the subsequent injury.
T 4 The legal issue arises from the Legislature's amendment of § 172(A) of the Workers' Compensation Act effective November 1, 1999. Prior to that date, certain permanent partial disability claimants were entitled to receive benefits from the Fund. After the 1999 amendment, however, section 172(A)(2)(b) provides that "for actions filed after October 31, 1999" the claimant shall receive permanent partial disability from the employer only. - Thus additional benefits were no longer available from the Fund.
115 Claimant argues that the Court of Civil Appeals was correct in applying the pre-1999 version of section 172(A) as the law in effect at the time of the most recent injury. The Fund argues that the express language of the 1999 amendment demonstrates the legislative intent that the statute should be applied retroactively to all claims filed for benefits from the Fund after October 31, 1999, without regard to the date of the most recent injury.
T6 The dispositive threshold question is not which version of section 172(A) applies. On November 1, 1999, the 1999 amendment became effective, contrary to the conclusion of the Court of Civil Appeals. Rather, it is the meaning of the phrase "for actions filed after October 31, 1999" which controls. Does the phrase refer to an "action" for permanent partial disability benefits for the second injury or an "action" for benefits from the Fund following an adjudication of the second injury? This Court determines that the Legislature was referring to an action on the second injury when it drew the distinction between actions filed before November 1, 1999, and those filed after that date.
The Creation and Dissolution of the Fund
T7 The Fund, formerly the Special Indemnity Fund, was first established in 1948 to relieve employer hesitation to hire workers who suffered previous impairment by assuring employers that they would not be responsible for the combination of old and new disabilities. See Special Indem. Fund v. Archer, 847 P.2d 791, 794 (Okla.1993). An employer was responsible only for the permanent partial disability resulting from the subsequent injury as if there were no previ
ous impairment. Any material increase in disability caused by the combination of the previous impairment and the subsequent injury was borne by the Fund.
Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 172(A) (Supp.1995)
18 In 1994, a joint legislative committee was created to study the Fund including "[a] determination of the impact that dissolution of the [Fund] would have on businesses located in this state." Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 182 (Supp.1995). In 1999, dissolution of the Fund began with the amendment of section 172(A)
T9 Under the amendment, "[flor actions filed after October 31, 1999," a combination of disabilities resulting in permanent partial disability would result in employer responsibility only for the disability caused by the subsequent injury. Id. at § 172(A)(2)(b). Nor would the employee receive any additional compensation for the combined disability from the Fund. Id. Thus, the disabled
worker now bore the responsibility for any material increase in permanent partial disability resulting from the combination of disabilities. Inexplicably, the Legislature made the filing of an "action", rather than the date of injury, the event which triggered operation of the new rule for calculating benefits.
T10 At the end of the 2000 legislative session, the dissolution was completed when the Legislature discontinued benefits from the Fund for a material increase in combined disability resulting in permanent total disability. 2000 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 248, § 12, emerg. eff, May 26, 2000. Curiously, the controlling event in the 2000 amendment
was not a filing, but rather whether the injury occurred on or after June 1, 2000. The 2000 amendment also shifted Hability for a material increase in disability caused by a combination of injuries resulting in permanent total disability to the subsequent employer. See Andrew D. Downing, Oklahoma Employers Beware: The Rock and a Hard Place Dilemma, 72 Okla. B.J.2055 (2001) (discussion of dissolution of Fund and interplay of 2000 amendment with Americans with Disabilities Act).
Construction of the 1999 Amendment
$11 The dispute in this matter is the effect of the 1999 amendment on workers' claims for subsequent injuries filed but pending before the Workers' Compensation Court on November 1, 1999. Claimant persuaded the Court of Civil Appeals to apply the well-settled rule that the law in effect at the time of the subsequent injury controls in determining the Hability of the Fund. See Archer, 847 P.2d at 794-795. The Fund argues that the Legislature intended to retroactively disallow any claim against the Fund not commenced by the filing of a valid form 3-f
before November 1, 1999. This Court's de novo review of the question of law presented reveals that neither argument is entirely correct as neither addresses the patent ambiguity contained in the 1999 amendment. Namely, that the term "action" in the phrase "for actions filed after October 31, 1999" could refer to an "action" for benefits for a subsequent injury. It could also refer to an "action" for benefits from the Fund following an adjudication of the degree of disability resulting from the subsequent injury. The issue is one of statutory construction.
- T12 "The primary goal of statutory construction is to ascertain and follow the intention of the Legislature.... [Wlhere a statute is ambiguous or its meaning is uncertain it is to be given a reasonable construc
tion, one that will avoid absurd consequences if this can be done without violating legislative intent." TRW/Reda Pump v. Brewington 829 P.2d 15, 20 (Okla.1992). Poor draftsmanship will not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the provision. Id.
113 Guided by these rules of construction, this Court concludes that the Legislature intended the term "action" to refer to a form 3 claim for benefits for the subsequent injury, not a form 3-f claim for benefits from the Fund. The 1999 amendment established an "action" to be the operative event in determining whether a claimant could receive benefits from the Fund for permanent partial disability. If the term "action" referred to the filing of a form 3-f there would be no reason to file one on or after November 1, 1999, as no compensation from the Fund would be recoverable. Yet, the statute unequivocably contemplates "actions" filed after that date. It is unlikely that the Legislature would have intended to tie the operative event in the statute to the filing of a form which, after October 31, 1999, would be ineffectual. Thus, the Legislature must have intended the term "action" to refer to the filing of a form 8 claim for benefits for the subsequent injury.
T14 In addition, the Fund's proposed construction of the statute would apply the provision retroactively to claims for permanent partial disability pending on November 1, 1999. "Statutes are generally presumed to be prospective in application. This presumption is rebutted when there is legislative intent 'expressly declared' or necessarily implied from the language used." Doubt must be resolved against retrospective application." FOP Lodge No. 165 v. City of Choctaw, 933 P.2d 261, 271 (Okla.1996) (citations omitted).
115 This Court's construction of the term "action" as a claim on the subsequent injury is consistent with the general rule that statutes apply prospectively. No expression of legislative intent to do otherwise appears in the statute, nor is it necessarily implied by its terms. Thus, the 1999 amendment to section 172(A) applies prospectively
to deny benefits from the Fund when a form 3 claim for permanent partial disability was not filed before November 1, 1999. Claimant's form 8 was filed before that date and he is therefore entitled to benefits from the Fund.
1 16 The Court of Civil Appeals erred by applying the date of subsequent injury to this claim. That holding ignored the Legislature's express intent that the date of the filing of an "action" controls the application of the changes enacted by the 1999 amendment. The patent ambiguity presented by the term "action" required statutory construction. The opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals is therefore vacated. The Workers' Compensation Court's denial of benefits from the Fund, was also based on an erroneous interpretation of the applicable law. It is therefore vacated and the cause is remanded to the Workers' Compensation Court.
[ 17 HARGRAVE, C.J., WATT, V.C.J., HODGES, LAVENDER, BOUDREAU, and WINCHESTER, JJ., concur.
18 OPALA, KAUGER, and SUMMERS, JJ., concur in result.