Autosales Corporation v. Commissioner of Int. Rev.

43 F.2d 931, 5 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1572, 9 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 200, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 3975
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedJuly 28, 1930
Docket243
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 43 F.2d 931 (Autosales Corporation v. Commissioner of Int. Rev.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Autosales Corporation v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 43 F.2d 931, 5 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1572, 9 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 200, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 3975 (2d Cir. 1930).

Opinion

MACK, Circuit Judge.

This appeal from an order of redetermi-nation of the Board of Tax Appeals involves assessments of income and profits taxes for the years 1917, 1918, and 1919, the validity of which depends upon whether or not respondent and the Board have correctly determined the “invested capital” of a large business enterprise which prior to those years had gone through a series of mutations in its corporate and financial structure.

The present petitioner, Auto Sales Corporation, was organized November 5, 1917, and Immediately took over all the assets of the Autosales Gum & Chocolate Company in consideration of the issue of its stock of the par value of some $6,500,000. The chocolate company theretofore, and petitioner thereafter, operated public weighing and vending machines in railroad terminals and other public places, on annual, automatically renew *932 able franchises. The chocolate company, however, was not a simple corporate unit; upon its organization in 1911, it had acquired the properties and/or stock of some thirty companies, among which was the entire capital stock of the Weighing & Sales Company, hereinafter called the weighing company. This latter company was in itself an affiliated gronp through stoek ownership of five preexisting companies; it was engaged in the manufacture of vending machines which it caused to be operated under similar yearly franchises. A detailed analysis of the financial structure of the weighing company is deferred; it suffices here to state that, because of an outstanding- mortgage trust deed, its corporate existence was continued after its entire capital stoek had been acquired by the chocolate company. That company took over the contracts and assumed the obligations of the weighing company. It included the latter’s property among its own assets, and, on its hooks, carried all of the weighing company stoek at $1.

Section 208 of the Revenue Act of 1917 (40 Stat. 306) and section 331 of the Revenue Act of 1918 (40 Stat. 1095) both provide that if, on a reorganization or change of ownership after March 3, 1917, the control of the business remains in the hands of the same parties, partnerships, or companies, the invested capital of the new company, as to the assets transferred (with certain exceptions' here immaterial), shall be computed as though in effect such reorganization or change in ownership had not been effected. Both petitioner and respondent concede the applicability of these two sections; we therefore proceed with the consideration of the case as though petitioner had never been organized and the stock of the weighing company were still owned by petitioner’s predecessor, the chocolate company.

In computing its invested capital for the years in question, petitioner included the sum of $1,348,557.50 as the value of the weighing company stock held by it. This sum was disallowed by respondent, who treated the companies as affiliated, refused to include the value of the alleged intangible assets of the weighing company, and allowed, as an addition to the invested capital of the affiliated gronp, on account of the weighing company,-$160,661.67, which was the admitted value of the weighing company’s machines. On appeal to the board, petitioner contended that it was entitled to have included in its invested capital, as tangible property, the cash value of the shares of stoek of the weighing company. The board, however, affirmed respondent’s determination on the theory that the companies were affiliated and that therefore the value of the stoek could not as such be included; further that, from the evidence before it, it was impossible to determine the invested capital actually contributed by the weighing company to the affiliated group. The applicable sections of the Revenue Acts of 1917 and 1918 are set forth in a footnote, 1 *933 and the many Treasury Regulations involved will be duly considered.

Petitioner now contends: (1) That the chocolate company and the weighing company were not affiliated corporations, because tbe latter company was not actively engaged in business, all of its machines and franchises being then operated by the chocolate company; (2) that therefore petitioner is entitled to have included in its invested capital the weighing company stock valued as tangible property; (3) that tbe value of such stock is to be determined by tbe value of tbe assets of tbe company; and (4) that, even if tbe companies be considered as affiliated, tbe share contributed by tbe weighing company to tbe consolidated invested capital may be determined from tbe present record to be at least $1,409,300. Respondent contends: (1) That tbe companies were affiliated corporations during tbe taxable years in question; (2) that therefore the invested capital is tbe consolidated invested capital of tbe affiliated group to be computed by ascertaining tbe invested capital of tbe constituent corporations and deducting any duplications or intercom-pany items, including stock held inter sese; and (3) that, since there is nothing in the record from which a determination of the invested’capital of the weighing company may be made, respondent’s determination must be accepted.

1. The primary, question of affiliation may be readily decided. The sole basis for arguing against a statutory affiliation is that the weighing company, all of whose stock was owned and all of whose property and franchises controlled and/or operated by tbe chocolate company, was not active. The logical basis for, and tbe legislative history of, tbe requirement of consolidated returns by “affiliated corporations,” has only recently been quite fully examined in United States v. Cleveland, Painesville & Eastern R. R., 42 F.(2d) 413 (C. C. A. 6th) it is clear from that opinion that within section 240(a) of tbe Revenue Act of 1918 and section 1331 of tbe Revenue Act of 1921 (retroactively made a part of tbe act of 1917), any subsidiary corporation, substantially all of whose stock is owned by another corporation, must be deemed to be affiliated with tbe latter. That tbe subsidiary is wholly inactive and but a bookkeeping department of tbe parent company is immaterial, 'even under tbe act of 1917, wbieb alone specifies that tbe corporations must be “engaged in tbe same or a closely related business.” Indeed, this is tbe very situation in wbieb tbe economic unity of tbe two corporate entities is most apparent and tbe arbitrary apportionment of income, against wbieb tbe statute is directed, most easily effectuated. See United States v. Cleveland, etc., R. R., supra. Nor does tbe fact that legal continuance of tbe inactive subsidiary was dictated by tbe requirements of an. outstanding security obligation take tbe enterprise out of tbe statutory definition. See Lavenstein Corp. v. Commissioner, 25 F.(2d) 375 (C. C. A. 4th); Utica Knitting Co. v. United States, Ct. Cl. decided May 6, 1929. We are entirely clear that within the taxable years in question tbe chocolate company and tbe weighing company were affiliated corporations ; a consolidated return was required, and tbe invested capital of tbe affiliated group must be determined therefrom.

2. Tbe consolidated taxable net income of affiliated corporations may be ascertained without great difficulty; tbe gross incomes are pooled, tbe various items classified for deduction purposes, profit from intercompa-ny transactions eliminated, and various inventory adjustments, simple in theory but intricate in application, are made.

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43 F.2d 931, 5 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1572, 9 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 200, 1930 U.S. App. LEXIS 3975, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/autosales-corporation-v-commissioner-of-int-rev-ca2-1930.