Automotive Performance Technologies LLC v. The University of Memphis

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
• Decided: February 13, 2026
• Docket: 25-13129
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-13129 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 02/13/2026 Page: 1 of 3

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 25-13129 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

AUTOMOTIVE PERFORMANCE TECHNOLOGIES LLC, Plaintiff-Appellant, versus

THE UNIVERSITY OF MEMPHIS, Defendant-Appellee. ____________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia D.C. Docket No. 1:24-cv-04848-SCJ ____________________

Before LUCK, LAGOA, and WILSON, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Plaintiff-Appellant Automotive Performance Technologies LLC (APT) appeals the district court’s dismissal of its claim, which USCA11 Case: 25-13129 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 02/13/2026 Page: 2 of 3

2 Opinion of the Court 25-13129

was decided on sovereign immunity grounds. APT sued Defend- ant-Appellee University of Memphis (Memphis) for breach of con- tract in the Northern District of Georgia, 1 to which Memphis moved to dismiss because, among other reasons, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). APT responded to the motion but did not challenge this argument. On appeal, APT argues that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits alleging ongoing constitutional violations by state of- ficials under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). In response, Memphis argues the claim should not be considered as it was not raised in the district court and that the claim was abandoned on appeal due to the perfunctory nature of the argument. Memphis alternatively contends that Ex parte Young does not apply since APT’s suit is merely to right an alleged past wrong. We agree with Memphis. “[A]ppellate courts generally will not consider an issue or theory that was not raised in the district court.” Narey v. Dean, 32 F.3d 1521, 1526 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting F.D.I.C. v. Verex Assurance, Inc., 3 F.3d 391, 395 (11th Cir. 1993)). Here, APT provides no supporting authority or argument that we should now consider its cursory claim under Ex parte Young,

1 APT styled its complaint to the Northern District of Georgia as an appeal

from the Tennessee Supreme Court. This is APT’s fourth filing of a notice to appeal after the Tennessee Claims Commission rendered a decision against APT’s original breach of contract claim in 2023. USCA11 Case: 25-13129 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 02/13/2026 Page: 3 of 3

25-13129 Opinion of the Court 3

nor did it raise any arguments as to Memphis’s sovereign immunity in the district court. A legal claim or argument not briefed on appeal is aban- doned. Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2004). A claim is abandoned on appeal when it is made in pass- ing or raised in a perfunctory manner without supporting argu- ments or authority. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). APT abandoned its argument as to the Ex parte Young excep- tion to sovereign immunity because it provides no reasons as to why it would apply here. APT merely states that the district court’s dismissal “ignored this foundational principle.” Thus, APT aban- doned this argument. 2 None of APT’s other arguments are properly before this court. Thus, we affirm the district court’s proper dismissal. AFFIRMED.

2 Memphis further argues that Eleventh Amendment immunity is appropriate

because they did not consent to the jurisdiction of this court. Even if APT’s argument was not abandoned, the district court correctly found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case. The University of Memphis, as a board of regents state university, holds Eleventh Amendment immunity as an arm of Tennessee. And the Ex Parte Young exception does not apply to APT’s breach of contract claim for damages. See Tenn. Code. § 49-8-101(a)(2)(A); see Long v. Richardson, 525 F.2d 74, 79 (6th Cir. 1975); see also Watkins v. Univ. of Memphis Campus Police Servs., No. 15-5285, 2016 WL 11784932 (6th Cir. Oct. 27, 2016) (“The University [of Memphis] is, in turn, an arm of the State of Ten- nessee.”).