Automatic Fire Alarm Co. v. Commissioner

13 B.T.A. 1195, 1928 BTA LEXIS 3099
CourtUnited States Board of Tax Appeals
DecidedOctober 23, 1928
DocketDocket No. 10292.
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 13 B.T.A. 1195 (Automatic Fire Alarm Co. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Board of Tax Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Automatic Fire Alarm Co. v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 1195, 1928 BTA LEXIS 3099 (bta 1928).

Opinion

Phillips:

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, under date of October 26, 1925, notified the petitioner, Automatic Fire Alarm Co. of New York (hereinafter referred to as the New York company) that he had determined deficiencies in income and profits taxes against it of $3,907.23 for the period from January 1 to December 14, 1920, and of $4,517.67 for the calendar year 1921. On the same date he notified the petitioner, Automatic Fire Alarm Co. of Delaware (hereinafter referred to as the Delaware company) that he had de[1196]*1196termined a deficiency in income and profits tax against it of $4,517.67 for the calendar year 1921. It would appear from the statements attached to such notices that there was only one deficiency of $4,517.67 for 1921, based on a consolidated return, but that such deficiency was asserted against both companies. Petitioners instituted this proceeding for a redetermination of such deficiencies.

The’New York company was in existence prior to January 1, 1920. On December 15, 1920, the Delaware company was organized as a holding company to take over the stock and securities of other companies held by the New York company and also to hold the stock of the New York company. The stock of the Delaware company was distributed to the stockholders of the New York company in exchange for their stock in the latter company, share for share. From the period from December 15, 1920, to December 31, 1920, the New York company had a net loss of $7,664.94 and the Delaware company had a net loss of $65.20. The Commissioner ruled that the New York company should file a return of its income from January 1, to December 14, 1920, and that the two companies should file a consolidated return for the period from December 15, to December 31, 1920. The petitioners claim the privilege of filing a consolidated return for the full calendar year 1920. The result of the Commissioner’s ruling has been that a tax is asserted against the New York company on its income to December 14, 1920, without regard to its loss during the last 15 days of the year and its invested capital is reduced by prorating it over a period less than a year.

The Commissioner’s counsel, in his brief, relies upon our decision in American LaDentelle, Inc., 1 B. T. A. 575. In that case two corporations which had theretofore maintained separate existences became affiliated during the year. We held that a separate return was required from each corporation to the date of affiliation and a consolidated return for the period thereafter. That the corporations became affiliated for a part of the year did not, we held, permit or require them to file a consolidated return for that part of the year when they were not affiliated. Here we have a different situation. There was no period in 1920 for which the Delaware company was liable to file a return of its separate income. At all times during its existence in 1920 it was affiliated with the New York company. For the purposes of the computation of net income, it had no separate existence but was merged with the New York company into an affiliated group. There is no such necessity for requiring several returns as existed in the case cited above or in the case of B. T. Couch Glue Co., 12 B. T. A. 1321, where one of the corporations concerned had a short separate existence. We are of the opinion that the income o;' these two companies for 1920 must be computed on the basis of a [1197]*1197consolidated return of tlieir income for the full year. See Carroll Chain, Co., 1 B. T. A. 38; United States v. Carroll Chain Co., 8 Fed. (2d) 529. It may be noted that this conclusion is in accord with article 634 of Regulations 69.

Although all of the stockholders of the New York company had agreed in writing that on demand they would exchange their stock for that of the Delaware company, on December 15,1920, 5,093 shares of the par value of $25 each and the fair market value of $70 each had not been exchanged. These were presented for exchange on the dates and in the amounts following:

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It is alleged by the petitioners that the right to receive this stock was an account receivable which was erroneously excluded from the computation of admissible assets in computing allowable invested capital.

Section 326 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1921 defines invested capital. Subdivision (c) of that section then provides:

There shall be deducted from invested capital as above defined a percentage thereof equal to the percentage which the amount of inadmissible assets is of the amount of admissible and inadmissible assets held during the year.

Inadmissible assets are defined in section 325 (a) to mean stocks, bonds and other obligations, the dividends or interest from which are not included in computing net income (with certain exceptions not here pertinent) and admissible assets as all other assets.

The Delaware company appears to have set up on its books, as an asset, the par value of the stock of the New York company which had not been surrendered for exchange. The Commissioner, in computing the consolidated invested capital of the affiliated group (section 240) eliminated the amount so set up. It is the contention of the petitioners that the Delaware company owned accounts receivable consisting of the obligations of certain stockholders of the New York company to transfer that stock to the Delaware company in exchange for its stock, that such accounts receivable constituted an asset and [1198]*1198are to be classified as admissibles. While it might be doubtful whether the agreements with the stockholders of the New York company constituted an admissible asset if the invested capital of the Delaware company were to be computed separately, it seems clear that as to the affiliated group there was no asset.

That with which we are concerned here is not the invested capital of either company but the consolidated invested capital. The identity of the two corporations is merged into that of an affiliation for the purpose of computing consolidated invested capital. (Section 240.) One of the constituent companies has the right to receive stock of the other in exchange for its own. Viewed, however, from the viewpoint of the affiliated group, there is only the right to receive a part of its issued stock in exchange for the issuance of other stock. In such circumstances it is difficult to conceive of this exchange of stock for stock upon this reorganization as constituting an asset in the consolidated accounts to the extent of either the par value or the fair market value of the stock unexchanged. The assets of the group are unaffected by the agreement for a reorganization and for the exchange of stock. It is only the assets of the individual companies which .are affected, and in considering the affiliated group for the purpose of determining consolidated invested capital these companies temporarily lose their separate identity. The action of the respondent in this respect was correct.

The New York company, as owner of capital stock of General Fire Extinguisher Co., received on August 16, 1920, the right to subscribe at par for 980 shares of additional stock of that company and acquired the right to subscribe for an additional share at a cost of $40. Such rights were to be exercised by September 1, 1920, and payment made as follows: 25 per cent at time of subscription, 25 per cent by December 1, 1920, 25 per cent by March 1, 1921, and 25 pej cent by June 1, 1921. The General Fire Extinguisher Co.

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Automatic Fire Alarm Co. v. Commissioner
13 B.T.A. 1195 (Board of Tax Appeals, 1928)

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Bluebook (online)
13 B.T.A. 1195, 1928 BTA LEXIS 3099, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/automatic-fire-alarm-co-v-commissioner-bta-1928.