Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust

755 F.3d 87, 2014 WL 2576342

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: June 10, 2014
• Docket: 12-4547-cv
• Status: Published

Opinion

12‐4547‐cv Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust

1 In the 2 United States Court of Appeals 3 For the Second Circuit 4 ________ 5 6 August Term, 2013 7 8 No. 12‐4547‐cv 9 10 AUTHORS GUILD, INC., AUSTRALIAN SOCIETY OF AUTHORS LIMITED, 11 UNION DES ECRIVAINES ET DES ECRIVAINS QUEBECOIS, ANGELO 12 LOUKAKIS, ROXANA ROBINSON, ANDRE ROY, JAMES SHAPIRO, DANIELE 13 SIMPSON, T.J. STILES, FAY WELDON, AUTHORS LEAGUE FUND, INC., 14 AUTHORS’ LICENSING AND COLLECTING SOCIETY, SVERIGES 15 FORFATTARFORBUND, NORSK FAGLITTERAER FORFATTER‐OG 16 OVERSETTERFORENING, WRITERS’ UNION OF CANADA, PAT CUMMINGS, 17 ERIK GRUNDSTROM, HELGE RONNING, JACK R. SALAMANCA, 18 Plaintiffs‐Appellants, 19 20 v. 21 22 HATHITRUST, CORNELL UNIVERSITY, MARY SUE COLEMAN, President, 23 University of Michigan, JANET NAPOLITANO, President, University of 24 California, RAYMOND W. CROSS, President, University of Wisconsin 25 System, MICHAEL MCROBBIE, President, Indiana University, 26 Defendants‐Appellees,1 27

1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), we automatically substitute the current president of the University of California, Janet Napolitano, and the current president of the University of Wisconsin System, Raymond W. Cross, in place of their predecessors‐in‐office. 2 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE BLIND, GEORGINA KLEEGE, 2 BLAIR SEIDLITZ, COURTNEY WHEELER, ELLEN HOLLOMAN, 3 Intervenor Defendants‐Appellees.2 4 ________ 5 6 Appeal from the United States District Court 7 for the Southern District of New York. 8 No. 11 CV 6351(HB) ― Harold Baer, Jr., Judge. 9 ________ 10 11 Argued: October 30, 2013 12 Decided: June 10, 2014 13 ________ 14 15 Before: WALKER, CABRANES, and PARKER, Circuit Judges. 16 ________ 17 18 Plaintiff‐appellant authors and authors’ associations appeal a 19 judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern 20 District of New York (Harold Baer, Jr., Judge) granting summary 21 judgment to defendants‐appellees and dismissing claims of 22 copyright infringement. In addition, the court dismissed the claims 23 of certain plaintiffs‐appellants for lack of standing and dismissed 24 other copyright claims as unripe. We hold, as a threshold matter, 25 that certain plaintiffs‐appellants lack associational standing. We also 26 hold that the doctrine of “fair use” allows defendants‐appellees to 27 create a full‐text searchable database of copyrighted works and to 28 provide those works in formats accessible to those with disabilities, 29 and that the claims predicated upon the Orphan Works Project are 30 not ripe for adjudication. We vacate so much of the judgment as is

2 The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above. 3 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 based on the district court’s holding related to the claim of 2 infringement predicated upon defendants‐appellees’ preservation of 3 copyrighted works, and we remand for further proceedings on that 4 issue. Affirmed, in part; vacated, in part.

5 ________

6 EDWARD H. ROSENTHAL (Jeremy S. Goldman, 7 Anna Kadyshevich, on the brief), Frankfurt Kurnit 8 Klein & Selz, P.C., New York, NY, for Plaintiffs‐ 9 Appellants.

10 JOSEPH PETERSEN (Robert Potter, Joseph Beck, 11 Andrew Pequignot, Allison Scott Roach, on the 12 brief), Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, New 13 York, NY, for Defendants‐Appellees.

14 DANIEL F. GOLDSTEIN (Jessica P. Weber, on the 15 brief), Brown Goldstein & Levy, LLP, Baltimore, 16 MD; Robert J. Bernstein, New York, NY, on the 17 brief; Peter Jaszi, Chevy Chase, MD, on the brief, for 18 Intervenor Defendants‐Appellees.

19 Jennifer M. Urban, Pamela Samuelson, David 20 Hansen, Samuelson Law, Technology & Public 21 Policy Clinic, University of California, Berkeley, 22 School of Law, Berkeley, CA, for Amici Curiae 133 23 Academic Authors.

24 Blake E. Reid, Brian Wolfman, Institute for Public 25 Representation, Georgetown University Law 26 Center, Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae 27 American Association of People with Disabilities. 4 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 Jonathan Band, Jonathan Band PLLC, 2 Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae American 3 Library Association.

4 David Leichtman, Hillel I. Parness, Shane D. St. 5 Hill, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi L.L.P., New 6 York, NY, for Amicus Curiae American Society of 7 Journalists and Authors, Inc.

8 Brian G. Joseph, Karyn K. Ablin, Wiley Rein LLP; 9 Ada Meloy, General Counsel, American Council 10 on Education, Washington, DC, for Amici Curiae 11 American Council on Education, Association of 12 American Universities, et al.

13 Elizabeth A. McNamara, Alison B. Schary, Colin 14 J. Peng‐Sue, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, New 15 York, NY, for Amicus Curiae the Associated Press.

16 Mary E. Rasenberger, Nancy E. Wolff, Eleanor M. 17 Lackman, Nicholas J. Tardif, Cowan DeBaets, 18 Abrahams & Sheppard LLP, New York, NY, for 19 Amicus Curiae Association of American Publishers.

20 Jo Anne Simon, Mary J. Goodwin, Amy F. 21 Robertson, Jo Anne Simon, P.C., Brooklyn, NY, for 22 Amici Curiae Association on Higher Education and 23 Disability, Marilyn J. Bartlett, et al.

24 Brandon Butler, Washington, DC, for Amici Curiae 25 Beneficent Technolology, Inc., and Learning Ally, Inc.

26 Susan M. Kornfield, Bodman PLC, Ann Arbor, 27 MI, for Amici Curiae Board of Trustees of the 5 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 University of Illinois, Board of Trustees of Michigan 2 State University, et al.

3 Jason Schultz, Berkeley, CA; Matthew Sag, 4 Chicago, IL, for Amici Curiae Digital Humanities 5 and Law Scholars.

6 Michael Waterstone, Los Angeles, CA; Robert 7 Dinerstein, Washington, DC; Christopher H. 8 Knauf, Knauf Associates, Santa Monica, CA; 9 Michael Stein, Cambridge, MA, for Amici Curiae 10 Disability Law Professors.

11 Roderick M. Thompson, Stephanie P. Skaff, 12 Deepak Gupta, Rochelle L. Woods, Farella Braun 13 + Martel LLP, San Francisco, CA; Corynne 14 McSherry, Daniel Nazer, Electronic Frontier 15 Foundation, San Francisco, CA; John Bergmayer, 16 Public Knowledge, Washington, DC; David Sohn, 17 Center for Democracy & Technology, 18 Washington, DC, for Amicus Curiae Electronic 19 Frontier Foundation.

20 Stephen M. Schaetzel, Meunier Carlin & 21 Curfman, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Amicus Curiae 22 Emory Vaccine Center.

23 Frederick A. Brodie, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw 24 Pittman LLP, New York, NY, for Amicus Curiae the 25 Leland Stanford Junior University.

26 Eric J. Grannis, The Law Offices of Eric J. Grannis, 27 New York, NY, for Amici Curiae Medical Historians. 6 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 Steven B. Fabrizio, Kenneth L. Doroshow, Steven 2 R. Englund, Jenner & Block LLP, Washington, 3 DC, for Amicus Curiae Motion Picture Association of 4 America, Inc. 5 ________

6 BARRINGTON D. PARKER, Circuit Judge:

7 Beginning in 2004, several research universities including the 8 University of Michigan, the University of California at Berkeley, 9 Cornell University, and the University of Indiana agreed to allow 10 Google to electronically scan the books in their collections. In 11 October 2008, thirteen universities announced plans to create a 12 repository for the digital copies and founded an organization called 13 HathiTrust to set up and operate the HathiTrust Digital Library (or 14 “HDL”). Colleges, universities, and other nonprofit institutions 15 became members of HathiTrust and made the books in their 16 collections available for inclusion in the HDL. HathiTrust currently 17 has 80 member institutions and the HDL contains digital copies of 18 more than ten million works, published over many centuries, 19 written in a multitude of languages, covering almost every subject 20 imaginable. This appeal requires us to decide whether the HDL’s 21 use of copyrighted material is protected against a claim of copyright 22 infringement under the doctrine of fair use. See 18 U.S.C. § 107.

23 BACKGROUND

24 A. The HathiTrust Digital Library

25 HathiTrust permits three uses of the copyrighted works in the 26 HDL repository. First, HathiTrust allows the general public to search 27 for particular terms across all digital copies in the repository. Unless 28 the copyright holder authorizes broader use, the search results show 29 only the page numbers on which the search term is found within the 7 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 work and the number of times the term appears on each page. The 2 HDL does not display to the user any text from the underlying 3 copyrighted work (either in “snippet” form or otherwise). 4 Consequently, the user is not able to view either the page on which 5 the term appears or any other portion of the book.

6 Below is an example of the results a user might see after 7 running an HDL full‐text search:

8 9 J.A. 681 ¶ 80 (Wilkin Decl.).

10 Second, the HDL allows member libraries to provide patrons 11 with certified print disabilities access to the full text of copyrighted 12 works. A “print disability” is any disability that prevents a person 13 from effectively reading printed material. Blindness is one example, 8 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 but print disabilities also include those that prevent a person from 2 physically holding a book or turning pages. To use this service, a 3 patron must obtain certification of his disability from a qualified 4 expert. Through the HDL, a print‐disabled user can obtain access to 5 the contents of works in the digital library using adaptive 6 technologies such as software that converts the text into spoken 7 words, or that magnifies the text. Currently, the University of 8 Michigan’s library is the only HDL member that permits such 9 access, although other member libraries intend to provide it in the 10 future.

11 Third, by preserving the copyrighted books in digital form, 12 the HDL permits members to create a replacement copy of the work, 13 if the member already owned an original copy, the member’s 14 original copy is lost, destroyed, or stolen, and a replacement copy is 15 unobtainable at a “fair” price elsewhere.

16 The HDL stores digital copies of the works in four different 17 locations. One copy is stored on its primary server in Michigan, one 18 on its secondary server in Indiana, and two on separate backup 19 tapes at the University of Michigan.3 Each copy contains the full text 20 of the work, in a machine readable format, as well as the images of 21 each page in the work as they appear in the print version.

22 B. The Orphan Works Project

23 Separate and apart from the HDL, in May 2011, the University 24 of Michigan developed a project known as the Orphan Works 25 Project (or “OWP”). An “orphan work” is an out‐of‐print work that

3 Separate from the HDL, one copy is also kept by Google. Google’s use of its copy is the subject of a separate lawsuit currently pending in this Court. See Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 721 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2013), on remand, 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), appeal docketed, No. 13‐4829 (2d Cir. Dec. 23, 2013). 9 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 is still in copyright, but whose copyright holder cannot be readily 2 identified or located. See U.S. Copyright Office, Notice of Inquiry, 3 Orphan Works and Mass Digitization, 77 Fed. Reg. 64555 (Oct. 22, 4 2012).

5 The University of Michigan conceived of the OWP in two 6 stages: First, the project would attempt to identify out‐of‐print 7 works, try to find their copyright holders, and, if no copyright 8 holder could be found, publish a list of orphan works candidates to 9 enable the copyright holders to come forward or be otherwise 10 located. If no copyright holder came forward, the work was to be 11 designated as an orphan work. Second, those works identified as 12 orphan works would be made accessible in digital format to the 13 OWP’s library patrons (with simultaneous viewers limited to the 14 number of hard copies owned by the library).

15 The University evidently became concerned that its screening 16 process was not adequately distinguishing between orphan works 17 (which were to be included in the OWP) and in‐print works (which 18 were not). As a result, before the OWP was brought online, but after 19 the complaint was filed in this case, the University indefinitely 20 suspended the project. No copyrighted work has been distributed or 21 displayed through the project and it remains suspended as of this 22 writing.

23 C. Proceedings in the District Court

24 This case began when twenty authors and authors’ 25 associations (collectively, the “Authors”) sued HathiTrust, one of its 26 member universities, and the presidents of four other member 27 universities (collectively, the “Libraries”) for copyright infringement 28 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The National Federation of 29 the Blind and three print‐disabled students (the “Intervenors”) were 10 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 permitted to intervene to defend their ability to continue using the 2 HDL.

3 The Libraries initially moved for partial judgment on the 4 pleadings on the ground that the authors’ associations lacked 5 standing to assert claims on behalf of their members and that the 6 claims related to the OWP were not ripe. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). 7 The Libraries then moved for summary judgment on the remaining 8 claims on the ground that their uses of copyrighted material were 9 protected by the doctrine of fair use, see 17 U.S.C. § 107, and also by 10 the Chafee Amendment, see id. § 121. The Intervenors moved for 11 summary judgment on substantially the same grounds as the 12 Libraries and, finally, the Authors cross‐moved for summary 13 judgment.

14 D. The District Court’s Opinion

15 The district court granted the Libraries’ and Intervenors’ 16 motions for summary judgment on the infringement claims on the 17 basis that the three uses permitted by the HDL were fair uses. In this 18 assessment, the district court gave considerable weight to what it 19 found to be the “transformative” nature of the three uses and to 20 what it described as the HDL’s “invaluable” contribution to the 21 advancement of knowledge, Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 902 F. 22 Supp. 2d 445, 460‐64 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The district court explained:

23 Although I recognize that the facts here may on some 24 levels be without precedent, I am convinced that they 25 fall safely within the protection of fair use such that 26 there is no genuine issue of material fact. I cannot 27 imagine a definition of fair use that would not 28 encompass the transformative uses made by [the HDL] 29 and would require that I terminate this invaluable 30 contribution to the progress of science and cultivation of 11 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 the arts that at the same time effectuates the ideals 2 espoused by the [Americans With Disabilities Act of 3 1990, Pub. L. No. 101‐336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as 4 amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq.)].

5 Id. at 464.

6 Next, the district court addressed the Libraries’ Chafee 7 Amendment defense. Under the Amendment, “authorized entities” 8 are permitted to reproduce or distribute copies of a previously 9 published, nondramatic literary work in specialized formats 10 exclusively for use by the blind or other persons with disabilities. See 11 17 U.S.C. § 121; HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 465. Under § 121, an 12 “‘authorized entity’ means a nonprofit organization or a 13 governmental agency that has a primary mission to provide 14 specialized services relating to training, education, or adaptive 15 reading or information access needs of blind or other persons with 16 disabilities.” 17 U.S.C. § 121(d)(1).

17 The district court stated that the ADA requires that libraries of 18 educational institutions, such as the Libraries in this case, “have a 19 primary mission to reproduce and distribute their collections to 20 print‐disabled individuals,” which, according to Judge Baer, made 21 “each library a potential ‘authorized entity’ under the Chafee 22 Amendment.” HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 465. As a result, the 23 district court concluded that “[t]he provision of access to previously 24 published non‐dramatic literary works within the HDL fits squarely 25 within the Chafee Amendment, although Defendants may certainly 26 rely on fair use . . . to justify copies made outside of these categories 27 or in the event that they are not authorized entities.” Id.

28 The district court held that certain associational plaintiffs 29 lacked standing under the Copyright Act and dismissed them from 30 the suit. Id. at 450‐55. The district court also held that the OWP 12 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 claims were unripe for judicial review in the absence of crucial 2 information about what the program would look like and whom it 3 would affect should it be implemented, and because the Authors 4 would suffer no hardship by deferring litigation until such time as 5 the Libraries released the details of a new OWP and a revised list of 6 orphan work candidates. Id. at 455‐56. The court entered judgment 7 against the Authors, and this appeal followed.

8 DISCUSSION

9 We review de novo under well‐established standards the 10 district court’s decisions granting summary judgment and judgment 11 on the pleadings. See Maraschiello v. City of Buffalo Police Dep’t, 709 12 F.3d 87, 92 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary judgment); LaFaro v. N.Y. 13 Cardiothoracic Grp., PLLC, 570 F. 3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2009) (judgment 14 on the pleadings).

15 As a threshold matter, we consider whether the authors’ 16 associations have standing to assert infringement claims on behalf of 17 their members. 18 Three of these authors’ associations—Authors Guild, Inc., 19 Australian Society of Authors Limited, and Writers’ Union of 20 Canada—claim to have standing, solely as a matter of U.S. law, to 21 seek an injunction for copyright infringement on their members’ 22 behalf. But, as we have previously explained, § 501 of “the 23 Copyright Act does not permit copyright holders to choose third 24 parties to bring suits on their behalf.” ABKCO Music, Inc. v. 25 Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 944 F.2d 971, 980 (2d Cir. 1991); see also Itar‐ 26 Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 153 F.3d 82, 92 (2d 27 Cir. 1998) (“United States law permits suit only by owners of ‘an 28 exclusive right under a copyright’ . . . .” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 501(b))). 29 Accordingly, we agree with the district court that these associations 13 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 lack standing to bring suit on behalf of their members, and they 2 were properly dismissed from the suit. 3 The remaining four authors’ associations—Union des 4 Écrivaines et des Écrivains Québécois, Authors’ Licensing and 5 Collecting Society, Sveriges Författarförbund, and Norsk faglitterær 6 forfattero og oversetterforening—assert that foreign law confers 7 upon them certain exclusive rights to enforce the copyrights of their 8 foreign members (an assertion that the Libraries do not contest on 9 this appeal). These four associations do have standing to bring suit 10 on behalf of their members. See Itar‐Tass, 153 F.3d at 93‐94 11 (recognizing that an association authorized by foreign law to 12 administer its foreign members’ copyrights has standing to seek 13 injunctive relief on behalf of those members in U.S. court).

14 I. Fair Use4

15 A.

16 As the Supreme Court has explained, the overriding purpose 17 of copyright is “‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts 18 . . . .’” Campbell v. Acuff‐Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574 (1994) 19 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8); see also Twentieth Century Music 20 Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). This goal has animated 21 copyright law in Anglo‐American history, beginning with the first 22 copyright statute, the Statute of Anne of 1709, which declared itself 23 to be “[a]n Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the

4 Plaintiffs argue that the fair use defense is inapplicable to the activities at issue here, because the Copyright Act includes another section, 108, which governs “Reproduction [of copyrighted works] by Libraries . . .” 17 U.S.C. § 108. However, section 108 also includes a “savings clause,” which states, “Nothing in this section in any way affects the right of fair use as provided by section 107 . . . .” § 108(f)(4). Thus, we do not construe § 108 as foreclosing our analysis of the Libraries’ activities under fair use, and we proceed with that analysis. 14 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 Copies of Printed Books in the Authors . . . during the Times therein 2 mentioned.” Act for the Encouragement of Learning, 8 Anne, ch. 19. 3 In short, our law recognizes that copyright is “not an inevitable, 4 divine, or natural right that confers on authors the absolute 5 ownership of their creations. It is designed rather to stimulate 6 activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual enrichment of the 7 public.” Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. 8 REV. 1105, 1107 (1990).

9 The Copyright Act furthers this core purpose by granting 10 authors a limited monopoly over (and thus the opportunity to profit 11 from) the dissemination of their original works of authorship. See 17 12 U.S.C. §§ 102, 106, 302‐305. The Copyright Act confers upon authors 13 certain enumerated exclusive rights over their works during the 14 term of the copyright, including the rights to reproduce the 15 copyrighted work and to distribute those copies to the public. Id. 16 § 106(1), (3). The Act also gives authors the exclusive right to prepare 17 certain new works—called “derivative works”—that are based upon 18 the copyrighted work. Id. § 106(2). Paradigmatic examples of 19 derivative works include the translation of a novel into another 20 language, the adaptation of a novel into a movie or a play, or the 21 recasting of a novel as an e‐book or an audiobook. See id. § 101. As a 22 general rule, for works created after January 1, 1978, copyright 23 protection lasts for the life of the author plus an additional 70 years. 24 Id. § 302.

25 At the same time, there are important limits to an author’s 26 rights to control original and derivative works. One such limit is the 27 doctrine of “fair use,” which allows the public to draw upon 28 copyrighted materials without the permission of the copyright 29 holder in certain circumstances. See id. § 107 (“[T]he fair use of a 30 copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of copyright.”). “From 31 the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of 15 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill 2 copyright’s very purpose, ‘[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 3 useful Arts . . . .’” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 574.

4 Under the fair‐use doctrine, a book reviewer may, for 5 example, quote from an original work in order to illustrate a point 6 and substantiate criticisms, see Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 7 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901), and a biographer may quote from 8 unpublished journals and letters for similar purposes, see Wright v. 9 Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991). An artist may employ 10 copyrighted photographs in a new work that uses a fundamentally 11 different artistic approach, aesthetic, and character from the original. 12 See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir. 2013). An internet 13 search engine can display low‐resolution versions of copyrighted 14 images in order to direct the user to the website where the original 15 could be found. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 16 1165 (9th Cir. 2007); Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818‐22 17 (9th Cir. 2002). A newspaper can publish a copyrighted photograph 18 (taken for a modeling portfolio) in order to inform and entertain the 19 newspaper’s readership about a news story. See Nunez v. Caribbean 20 Intʹl News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 2000). A viewer can create a 21 recording of a broadcast television show in order to view it at a later 22 time. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 23 447‐450 (1984). And a competitor may create copies of copyrighted 24 software for the purpose of analyzing that software and discovering 25 how it functions (a process called “reverse engineering”). See Sony 26 Comp. Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 599‐601 27 (9th Cir. 2000).

28 The doctrine is generally subject to an important proviso: A 29 fair use must not excessively damage the market for the original by 30 providing the public with a substitute for that original work. Thus, a 31 book review may fairly quote a copyrighted book “for the purposes 16 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 of fair and reasonable criticism,” Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 344, but the 2 review may not quote extensively from the “heart” of a forthcoming 3 memoir in a manner that usurps the right of first publication and 4 serves as a substitute for purchasing the memoir, Harper & Row, 5 Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).

6 In 1976, as part of a wholesale revision of the Copyright Act, 7 Congress codified the judicially created fair‐use doctrine at 17 U.S.C. 8 § 107. See Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94‐553, § 107, 90 Stat. 9 2541, 2546 (1976) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 107). Section 10 107 requires a court to consider four nonexclusive factors which are 11 to be weighed together to assess whether a particular use is fair:

12 (1) the purpose and character of the use, including 13 whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for 14 nonprofit educational purposes;

15 (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;

16 (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 17 relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and

18 (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 19 value of the copyrighted work.

20 17 U.S.C. § 107.

21 An important focus of the first factor is whether the use is 22 “transformative.” A use is transformative if it does something more 23 than repackage or republish the original copyrighted work. The 24 inquiry is whether the work “adds something new, with a further 25 purpose or different character, altering the first with new 26 expression, meaning or message . . . .” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 27 (citing Leval, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1111). “[T]he more transformative 28 the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors . . . 17 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 that may weigh against a finding of fair use.” Id. Contrary to what 2 the district court implied, a use does not become transformative by 3 making an “invaluable contribution to the progress of science and 4 cultivation of the arts.” HathiTrust, 902 F. Supp. 2d at 464. Added 5 value or utility is not the test: a transformative work is one that 6 serves a new and different function from the original work and is 7 not a substitute for it.

8 The second factor considers whether the copyrighted work is 9 “of the creative or instructive type that the copyright laws value and 10 seek to foster.” Leval, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1117; see also Folsom, 9 F. 11 Cas. at 348 (“[W]e must often . . . look to the nature and objects of 12 the selections made . . . .”). For example, the law of fair use 13 “recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works 14 of fiction or fantasy.” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563.

15 The third factor asks whether the secondary use employs 16 more of the copyrighted work than is necessary, and whether the 17 copying was excessive in relation to any valid purposes asserted 18 under the first factor. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586‐87. In weighing this 19 factor, we assess the quantity and value of the materials used and 20 whether the amount copied is reasonable in relation to the 21 purported justifications for the use under the first factor. Leval, 103 22 HARV. L. REV. at 1123.

23 Finally, the fourth factor requires us to assess the impact of the 24 use on the traditional market for the copyrighted work. This is the 25 “single most important element of fair use.” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 26 at 566. To defeat a claim of fair use, the copyright holder must point 27 to market harm that results because the secondary use serves as a 28 substitute for the original work. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 29 (“cognizable market harm” is limited to “market substitution”); see 30 also NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 481‐82 (2d Cir. 2004). 18 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 B.

2 As discussed above, the Libraries permit three uses of the 3 digital copies deposited in the HDL. We now consider whether these 4 uses are “fair” within the meaning of our copyright law.

5 1. Full‐Text Search

6 It is not disputed that, in order to perform a full‐text search of 7 books, the Libraries must first create digital copies of the entire 8 books. Importantly, as we have seen, the HDL does not allow users 9 to view any portion of the books they are searching. Consequently, 10 in providing this service, the HDL does not add into circulation any 11 new, human‐readable copies of any books. Instead, the HDL simply 12 permits users to “word search”—that is, to locate where specific 13 words or phrases appear in the digitized books. Applying the 14 relevant factors, we conclude that this use is a fair use.

15 i.

16 Turning to the first factor, we conclude that the creation of a 17 full‐text searchable database is a quintessentially transformative use. 18 As the example on page 7, supra, demonstrates, the result of a word 19 search is different in purpose, character, expression, meaning, and 20 message from the page (and the book) from which it is drawn. 21 Indeed, we can discern little or no resemblance between the original 22 text and the results of the HDL full‐text search.

23 There is no evidence that the Authors write with the purpose 24 of enabling text searches of their books. Consequently, the full‐text 25 search function does not “supersede[] the objects [or purposes] of 26 the original creation,” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (internal quotation 27 marks omitted). The HDL does not “merely repackage[] or 28 republish[] the original[s],” Leval, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1111, or 19 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 merely recast “an original work into a new mode of presentation,” 2 Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 143 (2d 3 Cir. 1998). Instead, by enabling full‐text search, the HDL adds to the 4 original something new with a different purpose and a different 5 character.

6 Full‐text search adds a great deal more to the copyrighted 7 works at issue than did the transformative uses we approved in 8 several other cases. For example, in Cariou v. Prince, we found that 9 certain photograph collages were transformative, even though the 10 collages were cast in the same medium as the copyrighted 11 photographs. 714 F.3d at 706. Similarly, in Bill Graham Archives v. 12 Dorling Kindersley Ltd., we held that it was a transformative use to 13 include in a biography copyrighted concert photos, even though the 14 photos were unaltered (except for being reduced in size). 448 F.3d 15 605, 609‐11 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 252‐ 16 53 (2d Cir. 2006) (transformative use of copyrighted photographs in 17 collage painting); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 18 114 (2d Cir. 1998) (transformative use of copyrighted photograph in 19 advertisement).

20 Cases from other Circuits reinforce this conclusion. In Perfect 21 10, Inc., the Ninth Circuit held that the use of copyrighted thumbnail 22 images in internet search results was transformative because the 23 thumbnail copies served a different function from the original 24 copyrighted images. 508 F.3d at 1165; accord Arriba Soft Corp., 336 25 F.3d at 819. And in A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC, a 26 company created electronic copies of unaltered student papers for 27 use in connection with a computer program that detects plagiarism. 28 Even though the electronic copies made no “substantive alteration 29 to” the copyrighted student essays, the Fourth Circuit held that 30 plagiarism detection constituted a transformative use of the 31 copyrighted works. 562 F.3d 630, 639‐40. 20 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 ii.

2 The second fair‐use factor—the nature of the copyrighted 3 work—is not dispositive. The HDL permits the full‐text search of 4 every type of work imaginable. Consequently, there is no dispute 5 that the works at issue are of the type that the copyright laws value 6 and seek to protect. However, “this factor ‘may be of limited 7 usefulness where,’ as here, ‘the creative work . . . is being used for a 8 transformative purpose.” Cariou, 714 F.3d at 710 (quoting Bill 9 Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 612). Accordingly, our fair‐use analysis 10 hinges on the other three factors.

11 iii.

12 The third factor asks whether the copying used more of the 13 copyrighted work than necessary and whether the copying was 14 excessive. As we have noted, “[t]here are no absolute rules as to how 15 much of a copyrighted work may be copied and still be considered a 16 fair use.” Maxtone‐Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 17 1986). “[T]he extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose 18 and character of the use.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586‐87. The crux of 19 the inquiry is whether “no more was taken than necessary.” Id. at 20 589. For some purposes, it may be necessary to copy the entire 21 copyrighted work, in which case Factor Three does not weigh 22 against a finding of fair use. See Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 613 23 (entire image copied); Arriba Soft, 336 F.3d at 821 (“If Arriba only 24 copied part of the image, it would be more difficult to identify it, 25 thereby reducing the usefulness of the visual search engine.”).

26 In order to enable the full‐text search function, the Libraries, 27 as we have seen, created digital copies of all the books in their 21 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 collections.5 Because it was reasonably necessary for the HDL to 2 make use of the entirety of the works in order to enable the full‐text 3 search function, we do not believe the copying was excessive.

4 The Authors also contend that the copying is excessive 5 because the HDL creates and maintains copies of the works at four 6 different locations Appellants’ Br. 27‐28. But the record 7 demonstrates that these copies are also reasonably necessary in 8 order to facilitate the HDL’s legitimate uses. In particular, the HDL’s 9 services are offered to patrons through two servers, one at the 10 University of Michigan (the primary server) and an identical one at 11 the University of Indiana (the “mirror” server). Both servers contain 12 copies of the digital works at issue. According to the HDL executive 13 director, the “existence of a[n] [identical] mirror site allows for 14 balancing the load of user web traffic to avoid overburdening a 15 single site, and each site acts as a back‐up of the HDL collection in 16 the event that one site were to cease operation (for example, due to 17 failure caused by a disaster, or even as a result of routine 18 maintenance).” J.A. 682‐83 ¶ 88‐89 (Wilkin Decl.). To further guard 19 against the risk of data loss, the HDL stores copies of the works on 20 two encrypted backup tapes, which are disconnected from the 21 internet and are placed in separate secure locations on the 22 University of Michigan campus. Id. at 683 ¶ 90. The HDL creates 23 these backup tapes so that the data could be restored in “the event of 24 a disaster causing large‐scale data loss” to the primary and mirror 25 servers. Id.

5 The HDL also creates digital copies of the images of each page of the books. As the Libraries acknowledge, the HDL does not need to retain these copies to enable the full‐ text search use. We discuss the fair‐use justification for these copies in the context of the disability‐access use, see infra pp. 29‐30. 22 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 We have no reason to think that these copies are excessive or 2 unreasonable in relation to the purposes identified by the Libraries 3 and permitted by the law of copyright. In sum, even viewing the 4 evidence in the light most favorable to the Authors, the record 5 demonstrates that these copies are reasonably necessary to facilitate 6 the services HDL provides to the public and to mitigate the risk of 7 disaster or data loss. Accordingly, we conclude that this factor 8 favors the Libraries.

9 iv.

10 The fourth factor requires us to consider “the effect of the use 11 upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” 17 12 U.S.C. § 107(4), and, in particular, whether the secondary use 13 “usurps the market of the original work,” NXIVM Corp., 364 F.3d at 14 482.

15 The Libraries contend that the full‐text‐search use poses no 16 harm to any existing or potential traditional market and point to the 17 fact that, in discovery, the Authors admitted that they were unable 18 to identify “any specific, quantifiable past harm, or any documents 19 relating to any such past harm,” resulting from any of the Libraries’ 20 uses of their works (including full‐text search). Defs.‐Appellees’ 21 Br. 38 (citing Pls.’ Resps. to Interrogs.). The district court agreed with 22 this contention, as do we.

23 At the outset, it is important to recall that the Factor Four 24 analysis is concerned with only one type of economic injury to a 25 copyright holder: the harm that results because the secondary use 26 serves as a substitute for the original work. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 27 591 (“cognizable market harm” is limited to “market substitution”). 28 In other words, under Factor Four, any economic “harm” caused by 29 transformative uses does not count because such uses, by definition, 23 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 do not serve as substitutes for the original work. See Bill Graham 2 Archives, 448 F.3d at 614.

3 To illustrate why this is so, consider how copyright law treats 4 book reviews. Book reviews often contain quotations of copyrighted 5 material to illustrate the reviewer’s points and substantiate his 6 criticisms; this is a paradigmatic fair use. And a negative book 7 review can cause a degree of economic injury to the author by 8 dissuading readers from purchasing copies of her book, even when 9 the review does not serve as a substitute for the original. But, 10 obviously, in that case, the author has no cause for complaint under 11 Factor Four: The only market harms that count are the ones that are 12 caused because the secondary use serves as a substitute for the 13 original, not when the secondary use is transformative (as in 14 quotations in a book review). See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591‐92 15 (“[W]hen a lethal parody, like a scathing theater review, kills 16 demand for the original, it does not produce a harm cognizable 17 under the Copyright Act.”).

18 The Authors assert two reasons why the full‐text‐search 19 function harms their traditional markets. The first is a “lost sale” 20 theory which posits that a market for licensing books for digital 21 search could possibly develop in the future, and the HDL impairs 22 the emergence of such a market because it allows patrons to search 23 books without any need for a license. Thus, according to the 24 Authors, every copy employed by the HDL in generating full‐text 25 searches represents a lost opportunity to license the book for search. 26 Appellants’ Br. 43.

27 This theory of market harm does not work under Factor Four, 28 because the full‐text search function does not serve as a substitute 29 for the books that are being searched. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591‐ 30 92; Bill Graham Archives, 448 F.3d at 614. Thus, it is irrelevant that the 24 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 Libraries might be willing to purchase licenses in order to engage in 2 this transformative use (if the use were deemed unfair). Lost 3 licensing revenue counts under Factor Four only when the use 4 serves as a substitute for the original and the full‐text‐search use 5 does not.

6 Next, the Authors assert that the HDL creates the risk of a 7 security breach which might impose irreparable damage on the 8 Authors and their works. In particular, the Authors speculate that, if 9 hackers were able to obtain unauthorized access to the books stored 10 at the HDL, the full text of these tens of millions of books might be 11 distributed worldwide without restriction, “decimat[ing]” the 12 traditional market for those works. Appellants’ Br. 40.

13 The record before us documents the extensive security 14 measures the Libraries have undertaken to safeguard against the 15 risk of a data breach. Some of those measures were described by the 16 HDL executive director as follows:

17 First, [HDL] maintains . . . rigorous physical 18 security controls. HDL servers, storage, and networking 19 equipment at Michigan and Indiana University are 20 mounted in locked racks, and only six individuals at 21 Michigan and three at Indiana University have keys. 22 The data centers housing HDL servers, storage, and 23 networking equipment at each site location are 24 monitored by video surveillance, and entry requires use 25 of both a keycard and a biometric sensor.

26 Second, network access to the HDL corpus is 27 highly restricted, even for the staff of the data centers 28 housing HDL equipment at Michigan and Indiana 29 University. For example, two levels of network firewalls 30 are in place at each site, and Indiana University data 25 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 center staff do not have network access to the HDL 2 corpus, only access to the physical equipment. For the 3 backup tapes, network access is limited to the 4 administrators of the backup system, and these 5 individuals are not provided the encryption key that 6 would be required to access the encrypted files on the 7 backup tapes.

8 Web access to the HDL corpus is also highly 9 restricted. Access by users of the HDL service is 10 governed by primarily by [sic] the HDL rights database, 11 which classifies each work by presumed copyright 12 status, and also by a user’s authentication to the system 13 (e.g., as an individual certified to have a print disability 14 by Michigan’s Office of Services for Students with 15 Disabilities).

16 . . .

17 Even where we do permit a work to be read 18 online, such as a work in the public domain, we make 19 efforts to ensure that inappropriate levels of access do 20 not take place. For example, a mass download 21 prevention system called “choke” is used to measure 22 the rate of activity (such as the rate a user is reading 23 pages) by each individual user. If a user’s rate of 24 activity exceeds certain thresholds, the system assumes 25 that the user is mechanized (e.g., a web robot) and 26 blocks that user’s access for a set period of time.

27 J.A. 683‐85 ¶¶ 94‐96, 98 (Wilkins Decl.).

28 This showing of the security measures taken by the Libraries 29 is essentially unrebutted. Consequently, we see no basis in the 26 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 record on which to conclude that a security breach is likely to occur, 2 much less one that would result in the public release of the specific 3 copyrighted works belonging to any of the plaintiffs in this case. Cf. 4 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, ‐‐‐ U.S. ‐‐‐, ‐‐‐, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143, 5 1149 (2013) (risk of future harm must be “certainly impending,” 6 rather than merely “conjectural” or “hypothetical,” to constitute a 7 cognizable injury‐in‐fact); Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 453‐54 (concluding 8 that time‐shifting using a Betamax is fair use because the copyright 9 owners’ “prediction that live television or movie audiences will 10 decrease” was merely “speculative”). Factor Four thus favors a 11 finding of fair use.

12 Without foreclosing a future claim based on circumstances not 13 now predictable, and based on a different record, we hold that the 14 balance of relevant factors in this case favors the Libraries. In sum, 15 we conclude that the doctrine of fair use allows the Libraries to 16 digitize copyrighted works for the purpose of permitting full‐text 17 searches.

18 2. Access to the Print‐Disabled

19 The HDL also provides print‐disabled patrons with versions 20 of all of the works contained in its digital archive in formats 21 accessible to them. In order to obtain access to the works, a patron 22 must submit documentation from a qualified expert verifying that 23 the disability prevents him or her from reading printed materials, 24 and the patron must be affiliated with an HDL member that has 25 opted‐into the program. Currently, the University of Michigan is the 26 only HDL member institution that has opted‐in. We conclude that 27 this use is also protected by the doctrine of fair use. 27 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 i.

2 In applying the Factor One analysis, the district court 3 concluded that “[t]he use of digital copies to facilitate access for 4 print‐disabled persons is [a] transformative” use. HathiTrust, 902 F. 5 Supp. 2d at 461. This is a misapprehension; providing expanded 6 access to the print disabled is not “transformative.”

7 As discussed above, a transformative use adds something new 8 to the copyrighted work and does not merely supersede the 9 purposes of the original creation. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. The 10 Authors state that they “write books to be read (or listened to).” 11 Appellants’ Br. 34‐35. By making copyrighted works available in 12 formats accessible to the disabled, the HDL enables a larger 13 audience to read those works, but the underlying purpose of the 14 HDL’s use is the same as the author’s original purpose.

15 Indeed, when the HDL recasts copyrighted works into new 16 formats to be read by the disabled, it appears, at first glance, to be 17 creating derivative works over which the author ordinarily 18 maintains control. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2). As previously noted, 19 paradigmatic examples of derivative works include translations of 20 the original into a different language, or adaptations of the original 21 into different forms or media. See id. § 101 (defining “derivative 22 work”). The Authors contend that by converting their works into a 23 different, accessible format, the HDL is simply creating a derivative 24 work.

25 It is true that, oftentimes, the print‐disabled audience has no 26 means of obtaining access to the copyrighted works included in the 27 HDL. But, similarly, the non‐English‐speaking audience cannot gain 28 access to untranslated books written in English and an unauthorized 29 translation is not transformative simply because it enables a new 30 audience to read a work. 28 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 This observation does not end the analysis. “While a 2 transformative use generally is more likely to qualify as fair use, 3 ‘transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a finding of fair 4 use.’” Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., ‐‐‐ F.3d ‐‐‐, ‐‐‐, 5 2014 WL 2219162, at *7 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Campbell, 510 U.S. at 6 579). We conclude that providing access to the print‐disabled is still 7 a valid purpose under Factor One even though it is not 8 transformative. We reach that conclusion for several reasons.

9 First, the Supreme Court has already said so. As Justice 10 Stevens wrote for the Court: “Making a copy of a copyrighted work 11 for the convenience of a blind person is expressly identified by the 12 House Committee Report as an example of fair use, with no 13 suggestion that anything more than a purpose to entertain or to 14 inform need motivate the copying.” Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 15 455 n.40.

16 Our conclusion is reinforced by the legislative history on 17 which he relied. The House Committee Report that accompanied 18 codification of the fair use doctrine in the Copyright Act of 1976 19 expressly stated that making copies accessible “for the use of blind 20 persons” posed a “special instance illustrating the application of the 21 fair use doctrine . . . .” H.R. REP. NO. 94‐1476, at 73 (1976), reprinted in 22 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5686. The Committee noted that “special 23 [blind‐accessible formats] . . . are not usually made by the publishers 24 for commercial distribution.” Id. In light of its understanding of the 25 market (or lack thereof) for books accessible to the blind, the 26 Committee explained that “the making of a single copy or 27 phonorecord by an individual as a free service for a blind persons 28 [sic] would properly be considered a fair use under section 107.” Id. 29 We believe this guidance supports a finding of fair use in the unique 30 circumstances presented by print‐disabled readers. 29 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 Since the passage of the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress has 2 reaffirmed its commitment to ameliorating the hardships faced by 3 the blind and the print disabled. In the Americans with Disabilities 4 Act, Congress declared that our “Nation’s proper goals regarding 5 individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, 6 full participation, independent living, and economic self‐sufficiency 7 for such individuals.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(7). Similarly, the Chafee 8 Amendment illustrates Congress’s intent that copyright law make 9 appropriate accommodations for the blind and print disabled. See 17 10 U.S.C. § 121.

11 ii.

12 Through the HDL, the disabled can obtain access to 13 copyrighted works of all kinds, and there is no dispute that those 14 works are of the sort that merit protection under the Copyright Act. 15 As a result, Factor Two weighs against fair use. This does not 16 preclude a finding of fair use, however, given our analysis of the 17 other factors. Cf. Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 175 (2d Cir. 2001) 18 (“The second statutory factor, the nature of the copyrighted 19 work . . . , is rarely found to be determinative.”).

20 iii.

21 Regarding Factor Three, as previously noted, the HDL retains 22 copies as digital image files and as text‐only files, which are then 23 stored in four separate locations. The Authors contend that this 24 amount of copying is excessive because the Libraries have not 25 demonstrated their need to retain the digital image files in addition 26 to the text files.

27 We are unconvinced. The text files are required for text 28 searching and to create text–to‐speech capabilities for the blind and 29 disabled. But the image files will provide an additional and often 30 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 more useful method by which many disabled patrons, especially 2 students and scholars, can obtain access to these works. These image 3 files contain information, such as pictures, charts, diagrams, and the 4 layout of the text on the printed page that cannot be converted to 5 text or speech. None of this is captured by the HDL’s text‐only 6 copies. Many legally blind patrons are capable of viewing these 7 images if they are sufficiently magnified or if the color contrasts are 8 increased. And other disabled patrons, whose physical impairments 9 prevent them from turning pages or from holding books, may also 10 be able to use assistive devices to view all of the content contained in 11 the image files for a book. For those individuals, gaining access to 12 the HDL’s image files—in addition to the text‐only files—is 13 necessary to perceive the books fully. Consequently, it is reasonable 14 for the Libraries to retain both the text and image copies.6

15 iv.

16 The fourth factor also weighs in favor of a finding of fair use. 17 It is undisputed that the present‐day market for books accessible to 18 the handicapped is so insignificant that “it is common practice in the 19 publishing industry for authors to forgo royalties that are generated 20 through the sale of books manufactured in specialized formats for 21 the blind . . . .” Appellants’ Br. 34. “[T]he number of accessible books 22 currently available to the blind for borrowing is a mere few hundred 23 thousand titles, a minute percentage of the world’s books. In 24 contrast, the HDL contains more than ten million accessible 25 volumes.” J.A. 173 ¶ 10 (Maurer Decl.). When considering the 1976 26 Act, Congress was well aware of this problem. The House

6 The Authors also complain that the HDL creates and maintains four separate copies of the copyrighted works at issue. Appellants’ Br. 27‐28. For reasons discussed in the full‐ text search section, this does not preclude a finding of fair use. See supra pp. 20‐22. 31 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 Committee Report observed that publishers did not “usually 2 ma[ke]” their books available in specialized formats for the blind. 3 H.R. REP. NO. 94‐1476, at 73, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5686. That 4 observation remains true today.

5 Weighing the factors together, we conclude that the doctrine 6 of fair use allows the Libraries to provide full digital access to 7 copyrighted works to their print‐disabled patrons.7

8 3. Preservation

9 By storing digital copies of the books, the HDL preserves 10 them for generations to come, and ensures that they will still exist 11 when their copyright terms lapse. Under certain circumstances, the 12 HDL also proposes to make one additional use of the digitized 13 works while they remain under copyright: The HDL will permit 14 member libraries to create a replacement copy of a book, to be read 15 and consumed by patrons, if (1) the member already owned an 16 original copy, (2) the member’s original copy is lost, destroyed, or 17 stolen, and (3) a replacement copy is unobtainable at a fair price. The 18 Authors claim that this use infringes their copyrights.

19 Even though the parties assume that this issue is appropriate 20 for our determination, we are not convinced that this is so. The 21 record before the district court does not reflect whether the plaintiffs 22 own copyrights in any works that would be effectively irreplaceable 23 at a fair price by the Libraries and, thus, would be potentially subject 24 to being copied by the Libraries in case of the loss or destruction of 25 an original. The Authors are not entitled to make this argument on 26 behalf of others, because § 501 of “the Copyright Act does not 27 permit copyright holders to choose third parties to bring suits on

7 In light of our holding, we need not consider whether the disability‐access use is protected under the Chafee Amendment, 17 U.S.C. § 121. 32 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 their behalf.” ABKCO Music, 944 F.2d at 980; see also our discussion 2 of standing, supra pp. 12‐13.

3 Because the record before us does not reflect the existence of a 4 non‐speculative risk that the HDL might create replacement copies 5 of the plaintiffs’ copyrighted work, we do not believe plaintiffs have 6 standing to bring this claim, and this concern does not present a live 7 controversy for adjudication. See Clapper, ‐‐‐ U.S. at ‐‐‐, 133 S. Ct. at 8 1147; Jennifer Matthew Nursing & Rehab. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 9 Human Servs., 607 F.3d 951, 955 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that we have 10 an “independent obligation” to evaluate subject matter jurisdiction, 11 including whether there is “a live controversy”). Accordingly, we 12 vacate the district court’s judgment insofar as it adjudicated this 13 issue without first considering whether plaintiffs have standing to 14 challenge the preservation use of the HDL, and we remand for the 15 district court to so determine.

16 II. Ripeness of Claims Relating to the Orphan Works Project

17 The district court also held that the infringement claims 18 asserted in connection with the OWP were not ripe for adjudication 19 because the project has been abandoned and the record contained no 20 information about whether the program will be revived and, if so, 21 what it would look like or whom it would affect. HathiTrust, 902 F. 22 Supp. 2d at 455‐56. We agree.

23 In considering whether a claim is ripe, we consider (1) “the 24 fitness of the issues for judicial decision” and (2) “the hardship to 25 the parties of withholding court consideration.” Murphy v. New 26 Milford Zoning Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 347 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting 27 Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)).

28 The fitness analysis is concerned with whether the issues 29 sought to be adjudicated are contingent on unknowable future 33 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 events. N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. Grandeau, 528 F. 3d 122, 132 (2d 2 Cir. 2008). The Authors assert that their OWP claim is fit for judicial 3 decision because it “will not change based upon the particular 4 procedures that [the University of Michigan] ultimately employs to 5 identify orphan works.” Appellants’ Br. 13. According to the 6 Authors, the legality of the OWP does not depend upon the specific 7 means the Libraries ultimately employ to identify orphan candidates 8 or the time the Libraries wait before making works available. Rather, 9 the Authors believe that any iteration of the OWP that results in the 10 publication of complete copyrighted works is an infringement of 11 copyright.

12 We are not persuaded that these concerns create a ripe 13 dispute. Even assuming, arguendo, that “[a]ny iteration of the OWP 14 under which copyrighted works are made available for public view 15 and download” would infringe someone’s copyright, id., it does not 16 follow that the OWP will inevitably infringe the copyrights held by 17 the remaining plaintiffs in this case.8 It is conceivable that, should 18 the University of Michigan ever revive the OWP, the procedures it 19 ultimately implements to identify orphan works would successfully 20 identify and exclude works to which a plaintiff in this suit holds a 21 copyright. Consequently, we cannot say that any of the plaintiffs 22 face a “certainly impending” harm under our ripeness analysis, 23 Clapper, ‐‐‐ U.S. at ‐‐‐, 133 S. Ct. at 1147; see also Grandeau, 528 F.3d at 24 130 n.8.

25 Nor do we perceive any hardship if decision is withheld. See 26 Grandeau, 528 F.3d at 134. The Authors argue that they would suffer 27 hardship because “there is nothing to stop the Libraries from

8 We note that, in addition to our conclusion about ripeness, the same reasoning leads us to conclude that the remaining plaintiffs lack standing to bring this claim, see our discussion of standing, supra pp. 12‐13. 34 No. 12‐4547‐cv

1 reinstituting the OWP and then, if owners of the listed works come 2 forward, suspending it again.” Appellants’ Br. 16.

3 We disagree. As indicated above, it is far from clear that the 4 University of Michigan or HathiTrust will reinstitute the OWP in a 5 manner that would infringe the copyrights of any proper plaintiffs. 6 If that occurs, the Authors may always return to court. Suffice it to 7 say that “[t]he mere possibility of future injury, unless it is the cause 8 of some present detriment, does not constitute hardship.” Grandeau, 9 528 F.3d at 134 (internal quotation marks omitted). For these 10 reasons, we conclude that the OWP claims are not ripe for 11 adjudication.

12 CONCLUSION

13 The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED, in part, 14 insofar as the district court concluded that certain plaintiffs‐ 15 appellants lack associational standing; that the doctrine of “fair use” 16 allows defendants‐appellees to create a full‐text searchable database 17 of copyrighted works and to provide those works in formats 18 accessible to those with disabilities; and that claims predicated upon 19 the Orphan Works Project are not ripe for adjudication. We 20 VACATE the judgment, in part, insofar as it rests on the district 21 court’s holding related to the claim of infringement predicated upon 22 defendants‐appellees’ preservation of copyrighted works, and we 23 REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.