In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
__________________
NO. 09-24-00346-CR NO. 09-24-00347-CR NO. 09-24-00348-CR __________________
AUDEL VILLAFUERTE-MORA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
__________________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 252nd District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause Nos. 23DCCR0052, 23DCCR0053 and 23DCCR0054 __________________________________________________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A grand jury indicted Appellant Audel Villafuerte-Mora (“Appellant” or
“Mora”) in three trial causes: in 23DCCR0052, for evading arrest or detention; in
23DCCR0053, for tampering with or fabricating physical evidence; and in
23DCCR0054, for possession of a controlled substance, namely cocaine. The cases
1 were consolidated for trial.1 Appellant pleaded not guilty to all three charges, but the
jury found him guilty as charged in the indictments. After a hearing on punishment,
the jury assessed punishment at ten years in each case, with the sentences to run
concurrently. On appeal, Appellant raises three issues, arguing that the trial court
erred by admitting certain evidence. We affirm.
Evidence at Trial
Testimony of Officer Ethan Kahla
Officer Ethan Kahla testified that he worked for the Port Arthur Police
Department at the time of trial, he previously worked for the Baytown Police
Department, and on January 6, 2022, he was working for the Chambers County
Sheriff’s Department. Kahla recalled that on January 6, 2022, he was on duty and
driving a marked patrol unit, when about noon on that day, he was conducting traffic
enforcement on IH-10 eastbound near the Trinity River bridge in Wallisville, Texas,
in Chambers County. Kahla testified that he saw a gray Chevy Trax drive by that
had no license plate, which is a violation of the Transportation Code, and Kahla tried
to catch the vehicle. According to Kahla, once he got near the Chevy, Kahla turned
on his overhead lights, and the Chevy pulled over. Kahla testified that the driver of
1 Appellant was also charged with a fourth offense—aggravated assault on a peace officer—that was tried along with the other three charges, and the jury found Appellant not guilty of the fourth offense. We discuss the fourth charge only as necessary herein. 2 the Chevy did not use a turn signal when pulling over. Kahla recalled that after the
Chevy pulled over and stopped, Kahla got out of his vehicle and began walking up
to the Chevy, but the Chevy “took off.” At that point, Kahla went back to his vehicle
and pursued the Chevy.
Kahla identified State’s Exhibit 1 as a Google map with notations on it that
depicted the area “[t]owards the end of the pursuit,” and he agreed it would assist
the jury in understanding his testimony. The defense objected because “there’s
writing on it. It’s not a true Google map. There’s personal writing on it and also
explanations,” and said it would be fine to write on the map after Kahla’s testimony.
The State told the trial court that it would have Kahla testify first, and the trial court
sustained the defendant’s objection.
Kahla testified that the chase of the Chevy went through Chambers County,
the Chevy exited IH-10 multiple times to the feeder road, and the Chevy eventually
exited at Hamshire Road going southeast. Kahla described Hamshire Road as a road
with “multiple turns[.]” According to Kahla, the Chevy driven by the defendant
made a U-turn near the Hamshire volunteer fire department, it crossed back over the
interstate, and shots were fired from the vehicle. Kahla agreed that at some point, a
firearm and an extended magazine of ammunition were tossed from the Chevy.
According to Kahla, the chase ended when Kahla used his patrol vehicle to crash
into and disable the Chevy.
3 Kahla agreed that the route of the chase, the location where things were
thrown from the Chevy, and the location where the Chevy ultimately stopped were
shown on State’s Exhibit 1 and there was writing on the exhibit. The defense
objected and took Kahla on voir dire. On voir dire by the defense, Kahla testified
that the writing on State’s Exhibit 1 was not his own but rather was the prosecutor’s
writing, and Kahla had gone over the exhibit together with the prosecutor. The
defense objected to Exhibit 1 because Kahla was not the author. The prosecutor
stated, “that’s not the predicate. It just needs to be fair and accurate and will assist
as a diagram will assist the jury to understand his testimony.” The trial court
overruled the objection and admitted State’s Exhibit 1. Below is a copy of Exhibit
1.
4 Kahla identified State’s Exhibit 2 as a “blown up” copy of Exhibit 1, and he
agreed it would assist the jury in understanding his testimony. The defense objected
that it was not a Google map but rather “a map made by somebody that is not
superimposed over the Google” map offered as Exhibit 1. The State responded that
Exhibit 2 was a diagram, and the trial court overruled the objection.
Referring to Exhibit 2, Kahla testified that the arrows on the map indicated
the direction of travel during the chase. According to Kahla, the map indicated that
the chase started going eastbound on IH-10 from Chambers County into Jefferson
County, then the Chevy exited IH-10 to Hamshire Road going southeast, then took
a U-turn and doubled back on Hamshire Road, crossed over IH-10, and the chase of 5 the Chevy ended in Chambers County. Kahla testified that after the driver of the
Chevy made the U-turn, spike strips were used, but the spike strips were
unsuccessful. Kahla also testified that shots were heard coming from the Chevy, and
he indicated on the map about where a magazine was thrown from the car. Based on
the distance of the pursuit and the failure to stop despite multiple opportunities to do
so, Kahla thought that the driver of the Chevy was intentionally trying to evade arrest
or apprehension. Kahla recalled that the chase lasted “[o]ver 16 minutes[]” and at
times the speed reached “approximately 120, 130 miles an hour.”
Kahla also testified that a bag and a digital scale were tossed out of the Chevy
“around the middle of the pursuit.” According to Kahla, most of the time, digital
scales are used to weigh narcotics or drugs. Kahla recalled that he was directly
behind the Chevy during the chase, and he saw shots fired from the Chevy, he
thought the gunfire was aimed directly at him, and he felt in fear for his life. Kahla
testified that he fired back through the windshield of his patrol vehicle. According
to Kahla, his gunfire did not end the pursuit, and he had to use his vehicle in a “pit
maneuver[]” to crash into the Chevy and disable it. At one point, Kahla saw the
driver of the Chevy laughing, and after disabling the Chevy, Kahla saw “furtive
movement from the front area of the vehicle[,]” as though the driver was reaching
for something. According to Kahla, after the chase ended, the driver of the Chevy
6 had blood coming from his nose. Kahla identified the defendant as the person driving
the Chevy that day.
Kahla recalled that multiple other officers and EMS assisted in taking custody
of the defendant. Kahla identified State’s Exhibit 3 as a video recorded from his dash
camera and his body camera on the day of the chase and the recordings were
admitted into evidence and published to the jury. Kahla testified that based on what
he experienced during the chase, he concluded that the defendant was trying to take
Kahla’s life or someone else’s to help evade or escape from law enforcement. Kahla
also believed that when the defendant threw the firearm or magazine out of the car
window that he was trying to prevent law enforcement from finding it. Based on his
experience and training, Kahla testified that someone might drive a vehicle without
a license plate so that the driver’s “criminal activity can’t be linked back to him.”
Kahla also testified that a person might use a firearm with a filed-off serial number
so “it can’t be linked back to him if it’s used in some type of criminal activity.”
Testimony of Officer Jordan Kalis
Officer Jordan Kalis testified that at the time of trial, he was working for the
Mont Belvieu Police Department, and he previously worked for the Chambers
County Sheriff’s Department. Kalis recalled receiving a radio transmission on
January 6, 2022, at about 12:18 p.m. that Officer Kahla was involved in the pursuit
of a vehicle. Kalis testified that he joined Kahla in pursuing the vehicle after he heard
7 shots fired on the radio. Kalis testified that he arrived at the location where the
pursuit ended after the suspect was in custody, and he was assigned to go look for
the handgun that was thrown from the vehicle on Hamshire Road, east of IH-10.
According to Kalis, he found a silver firearm with a black handle in a ditch. Kalis
identified State’s Exhibits 5 through 8 as photographs of the area where he found the
firearm and photographs of the firearm. Kalis testified that the firearm pictured in
Exhibit 8 was a Colt 1911 Gold Cup Trophy, and he could not read a serial number
because it “look[ed] like it was attempted to be removed.” Kalis further testified that
he and other officers located a scale used in weighing drugs and narcotics near IH-10.
Testimony of Deputy Robert Betar
Deputy Robert Betar testified that he works for the Chambers County
Sheriff’s Department and that on January 6, 2022, he was asked to search for an item
with his K9 partner, Stark. Betar recalled that the search was on Hamshire Road, and
it was thought that a magazine or a firearm had been thrown out on the side of the
road. According to Betar, Stark alerted to the scent of something in the ditch, and
“[h]e found the spring[] that goes inside the magazine.” Betar identified State’s
Exhibits 9 through 12 as photos of the area where he and Stark searched that day.
Betar agreed that one of the photos depicted a magazine with the bottom gone, it was
empty, and Betar agreed the magazine was an extended magazine or round that was
a bit larger than normal.
8 Testimony of Sergeant Robert Hemmenway
Sergeant Robert Hemmenway testified that he worked for the Mont Belvieu
Police Department at the time of trial, and he was working with the Chambers
County Sheriff’s Department on January 6, 2022, as a Lieutenant over the Covert
Investigations Unit. Hemmenway recalled that shortly after noon on that day, he was
notified that two officers in his unit were involved in a pursuit on IH-10.
Hemmenway testified that he followed the pursuit to Hamshire Road, and he set up
“stop sticks” or spikes in the road at a curve in the road, but the suspect went around
the stop sticks. According to Hemmenway, before he could remove the stop sticks
so other officers would not be hurt, the suspect started shooting. Hemmenway
identified State’s Exhibit 7 as a photo of him holding a pistol that the suspect tossed
from his vehicle. Hemmenway testified that the serial number of the firearm had
been filed off. According to Hemmenway, one reason a serial number would be filed
off is if the “[s]uspect doesn’t want the gun to be able to be traced back to him if it’s
[] used in a crime.”
Testimony of Detective Donald Webster
Detective Donald Webster testified that he worked for the Chambers County
Sheriff’s Office, and on January 6, 2022, he received a notification shortly after noon
about a high-speed chase. According to Webster, he helped collect evidence after
the high-speed chase ended. He agreed he searched the suspect’s vehicle, where he
9 found suspected narcotics and about $5,000 in cash. Webster testified that $5,000 in
cash, a digital scale, and narcotics was “indicative of drug trafficking.” Webster also
testified that “Interstate Highway 10 is a drug trafficking corridor[.]”
Webster identified State’s Exhibits 13 through 19 as photos taken of the
defendant’s vehicle on January 6, 2022, and some of the photos depicted “a clear
plastic baggy containing a white powdery substance[]” that Webster believed was
cocaine. Webster identified State’s Exhibit 4 as a Texas Department of Public Safety
(“DPS”) lab report for the suspected cocaine, and he testified that the report reflected
that the substance found in Mora’s vehicle “tested positive for cocaine, 1.06 grams.”
On cross-examination, Webster testified that the video of the pursuit of Mora
depicted a plastic baggy thrown out while Mora was driving on the interstate, but
that baggy was not recovered.
Ranger Joshua Benson
Ranger Joshua Benson testified that he had been a State Trooper and was a
Ranger at the time of trial. He agreed that on January 7, 2022, he assisted in
processing a vehicle that was connected to a high-speed chase. Benson testified
about what he found:
During the processing of that vehicle, we discovered unfired cartridge cases or live -- what we call live rounds, .45 caliber. We also discovered .45 caliber cartridge cases that had been fired, as well. We found a -- we believe to be a marijuana joint inside the vehicle, as well. And then we found three projectiles from [] the officer’s firearm.
10 Benson recalled that the items that were found were released to Rangers Joe
Haralson and Joseph Dreaden to submit to the DPS Crime Lab for analysis. Benson
identified State’s Exhibits 20 through 24 as photos of the inside of Mora’s vehicle
and the items found. He also testified that two sets of Illinois license plates were
found inside Mora’s vehicle, which Benson testified could be due to the owner
getting new plates or because “someone’s involved in nefarious activity[.]” Benson
recalled that there was a backpack in the vehicle but no luggage.
Ranger Joseph Dreaden
Ranger Joseph Dreaden testified that on January 7, 2022, he was involved in
collecting or consolidating evidence in this case and submitting it to the lab, which
included a Gold Cup firearm case, a “plantlike substance” and seeds, three .45
caliber cartridges, three bullets, swabs from various locations on the vehicle, a
Samsung phone, an iPhone, and cartridges and casings from Deputy Burk’s vehicle
and Officer Kahla’s patrol car. Dreaden agreed he took these items to the Chambers
County Sheriff’s Office.
Detective Christopher Detorre
Detective Christopher Detorre testified that he worked for the Chambers
County Sheriff’s Office, and he was also assigned to the DEA as a task force officer.
He recalled that on January 6, 2022, he received a call shortly after noon that Officer
Kahla was in pursuit of a vehicle. Detorre testified that he, Lieutenant Hemmenway,
11 and Detective Webster joined the pursuit and laid spike strips down. Detorre recalled
hearing gunshots during the incident. According to Detorre, after the pursuit ended,
he was assigned to try to find a firearm the officers believed Mora had thrown from
his car during the pursuit, and a firearm was found in a ditch. He also recalled that
he found a scale in the area where Mora had been seen throwing things out of his
car, and Detorre testified the scale was a type “commonly used to weigh narcotics.”
Detorre also recalled that other officers found a baggy of suspected cocaine, a key
fob, and $5,000. According to Detorre, two phones—a Samsung and iPhone—were
also taken into evidence. Detorre testified that the evidence collected that day was
indicative of narcotics trafficking.
Testimony of Nicole Groshon
Nicole Groshon testified that she is a forensic scientist in the firearm and tool
mark section of the DPS Crime Laboratory in Houston. Groshon testified that bullets
and cartridge cases have tool marks made by a firearm that can be used to tie them
to that firearm. She agreed it is possible to restore a serial number of a firearm that
has been obliterated by using certain reagents and magnets to re-etch the surface.
Groshon identified State’s Exhibit 27 as a 45ACP caliber Colt model Gold Cup
pistol with a restored serial number of GCT44507. Groshon testified that she test-
fired the firearm, and she concluded that the six cartridge cases provided to her for
12 analysis were fired from the Colt pistol. On cross-examination, she agreed that the
serial number of the pistol matched a case that was confiscated at the scene.
Testimony of Bryan Strong
Bryan Strong testified that he works for the DPS Crime Laboratory in Austin
as a supervisor for the friction ridge section and as a forensic scientist in the friction
ridge field. He explained that “friction ridge” refers to latent prints and the skin on
the underside of fingers, hands, toes, and feet. He agreed that it is possible to make
an identification of a latent print by comparing it to a known inked print from a
person. Strong identified State’s Exhibit 32 as a copy of a latent print found on a
magazine that was submitted to his lab and Exhibit 31 was a copy of fingerprints
obtained from Mora and obtained from the DPS database. After examining the ridge
features of the prints in Exhibits 31 and 32, Strong concluded that Mora was the
source of the print in Exhibit 32.
Testimony of Ranger Joe Haralson
Joe Haralson testified that he is a Texas Ranger employed with DPS, where
he has worked for forty-three years. He agreed that he responded to the scene of a
shooting on January 6, 2022, in Chambers County, west of Hamshire Road and north
of IH-10. Haralson recalled that when he arrived, the suspect had been taken to the
hospital, and he consolidated evidence that was collected at the scene by other
Rangers. Haralson agreed that the evidence collected included a magazine spring, an
13 extended magazine, and a Colt 1911 Gold Cup Trophy handgun. Haralson recalled
that the firearm’s serial number had been obliterated. Haralson agreed that he
interviewed the defendant four days after the incident, and Haralson did not believe
that Mora looked like his nose had been shot. Haralson testified that his interview
with Mora was recorded, he identified State’s Exhibit 34 as a recording of the
interview, and the exhibit was admitted and published to the jury. Haralson testified
that, after interviewing Mora, Haralson formed the opinion that Mora had committed
the offense of evading arrest and aggravated assault on a police officer. He also
believed that if Mora threw the gun or magazine out of the vehicle to prevent officers
from finding them, then Mora would have committed the offense of tampering with
evidence.
In the interview, 2 Mora states he is from Aurora, Illinois. Mora told Haralson
that he shot out of the car window during the chase to see if the weapon worked, and
he did not shoot at anything or anyone in particular. Mora also said it was “stupid”
and “not smart” for him not to stop when the police were chasing him, and he did
not stop because he did not have a driver’s license. Mora said he was not under the
influence of alcohol or narcotics at the time. According to Mora, he did not have any
2 For part of the interview, Mora spoke directly to Haralson in English, but part of the interview was conducted with the assistance of another Ranger who spoke Spanish. The defense did not object to the admission of the recording of the interview. 14 illegal narcotics in his car. Mora told Haralson that he threw the magazine out of the
car because it did not work. Mora said that he started shooting because he felt in fear
for his life. According to Mora, there were no license plates on his car because he
forgot to put them on.
Mora’s Testimony
Mora testified at trial. He stated that he grew up in Texas, but at the time of
the incident, he lived in Aurora, Illinois. Mora testified that he had spent the night in
Fort Worth or Dallas the night before, and he drove through Houston as he headed
east towards Louisiana. At trial Mora told the jury he did not know why the license
plates were not on his car. According to Mora, he drove off when the officer
approached his vehicle because he thought the officer had “dismissed” him, although
Mora agreed that the officer never talked to him. Mora testified that after the
incident, when he was in the hospital, “they said the bullet fragment hit my nose,
and that was a cause for [] neurosurgical treatment [which] means they’re controlling
my brain[.]” Mora testified that, even with numerous police vehicles following him,
he did not stop because he did not “have control over [his] body. Nowadays with
this new technology, you don’t know who’s controlling [you]. . . . They set me up.
[] [T]he hospital is putting [] injections on people and trying to control them.”
According to Mora, he did not throw anything out of the car window. Mora testified
that it was not him in the video, he did not shoot at a police officer nor attempt to
15 assault an officer, and he did not own the vehicle that he was driving. Mora also
testified that he did not have drugs in the car.
The jury found Mora guilty of evading arrest or detention with a motor
vehicle, tampering with physical evidence, and possession of a controlled substance.
No additional evidence was admitted during the punishment phase. After closing
arguments, the jury assessed punishment at ten years on each of the three charges,
and the trial court determined that the sentences run concurrently. Mora timely filed
a notice of appeal.
Issues
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by admitting State’s
Exhibit 1 because it was an unauthenticated diagram and an out-of-court statement.
In his second issue, Appellant challenges the admission of State’s Exhibit 2—an
enlargement of Exhibit 1—for the same reasons. In his third issue, Appellant argues
that the trial court erred by admitting the testimony of Officer Kahla about what was
on Mora’s mind at the beginning of the incident because such testimony was mere
speculation.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence under an abuse
of discretion standard of review. See Beham v. State, 559 S.W.3d 474, 478 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2018). “Under this standard, the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude
16 evidence will be upheld as long as it was within the ‘zone of reasonable
disagreement.’” Id. (citing McGee v. State, 233 S.W.3d 315, 318 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007)). “We may not substitute our own decision for that of the trial court.” Gonzalez
v. State, 544 S.W.3d 363, 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). We uphold the trial court’s
ruling if it is correct under any applicable legal theory, even if the trial court gave
the wrong reason for its correct ruling. See Irsan v. State, 708 S.W.3d 584, 616 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2025) (citing De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App.
2009)).
If evidence is admitted in error, such error is nonconstitutional error and only
requires reversal if the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights. Gonzalez, 544
S.W.3d at 373. Nonconstitutional errors that do not affect an appellant’s substantial
rights must be disregarded. See Tex. R. Evid. 103(a); Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b);
Morales v. State, 32 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Error affects
substantial rights only if the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence
in determining the jury’s verdict. Gonzalez, 544 S.W.3d at 373.
State’s Exhibits 1 and 2
Appellant’s first and second issues challenge the admission of State’s Exhibits
1 and 2. Appellant describes Exhibit 1 as
a chart prepared out of court that related to the allegations contained in the indictment and extraneous offenses [and that] contained directional arrows, locations relative to the alleged chase, locations of inculpatory
17 evidence that was alleged to have been thrown out of the vehicle by appellant, and testimonial evidence such as “shots fired.”
Appellant describes Exhibit 2 as “an enlargement of the same inadmissible
evidence[.]” According to Appellant, both exhibits were inadmissible because they
were “unauthenticated hearsay[.]” Appellant contends that the handwritten notes on
the map rendered the exhibits inadmissible. Appellant argues that the officer (Officer
Kahla) through whom the State offered the exhibits testified that he did not make
any of the handwritten notations on the two map exhibits but rather that the
prosecutor had put the writing on the exhibits.
In response, the State argues that (1) Appellant failed to properly preserve his
arguments for appeal, and (2) Exhibits 1 and 2 were admitted as demonstrative
evidence, which courts do not typically regard as inadmissible hearsay.
To preserve error for appeal, a party must make a timely and specific objection
with the trial court that is specific enough to inform the trial court of the complaint,
and the party must obtain a ruling on the objection (or object to a trial court’s refusal
to rule). See Crawford v. State, 710 S.W.3d 774, 685-86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025)
(citing Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A), (2); Ex parte Nuncio, 662 S.W.3d 903, 914
(Tex. Crim. App. 2022)). To be sufficiently specific, an objection does not have to
be “hyper-technical” or use specific, formalistic language, but the objection must be
clear enough for the trial court to understand what the party wants and why the party
thinks he is entitled to it. See Ex parte Nuncio, 662 S.W.3d at 914. A general or 18 imprecise objection may be sufficient to preserve error only if the legal basis is
obvious to the trial court and to opposing counsel, which generally requires that
statements or actions are documented in the record that clearly indicate what the trial
court and opposing counsel understood the objection to be. See id. (citing Clark v.
State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Buchanan v. State, 207 S.W.3d
772, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). In addition, the point of error raised on appeal
must comport with the objection he made in the trial court. See Clark, 365 S.W.3d
at 339 (citing Thomas v. State, 723 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)). If the
objection on appeal differs from that made in the trial court, the appellant has failed
to preserve error. See Wilson v. State, 71 S.W.3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
When the State first referred to Exhibit 1 at trial, Officer Kahla agreed it was
a Google map with some notes on it, that the exhibit was a fair and accurate
representation of the area it purports to represent, and that the exhibit would assist
the jury to understand his testimony. The State tendered Exhibit 1 to the defense for
inspection, and defense counsel stated, “the only thing I’m going to object to is
there’s writing on it. It’s not a true Google map. There’s personal writing on it and
also explanations, and, so, I object.” The trial court sustained the objection and
responded that it would be appropriate after the deputy testified about the exhibit.
Then, on direct examination by the State, Officer Kahla described his chase of
Mora’s vehicle and the route the chase took. Kahla agreed that the exits, turns,
19 approximate locations where items were thrown from Mora’s car, and where Mora’s
car ultimately wrecked were noted on Exhibit 1. The State then offered Exhibit 1
into evidence. At that point, defense counsel took the witness on voir dire, during
which Kahla agreed that the prosecutor had made the notations on the exhibit based
on Kahla’s description of what happened and where it happened. After the voir dire,
the defense objected to Exhibit 1 because Kahla was “not the author” of the exhibit.
The trial court overruled the objection and admitted Exhibit 1.
The prosecutor then asked Officer Kahla about Exhibit 2, and Kahla agreed
that Exhibit 2 was a fair and accurate “blown up” version of Exhibit 1 and that
Exhibit 2 would assist the jury in understanding his testimony. When the prosecutor
tendered Exhibit 2, defense counsel objected as follows: “The only objection I have,
Judge, is it’s not a Google map. It is a [] map made by somebody that is not
superimposed over the Google that he tendered as State’s Exhibit No. 1 in front of
the jury. That’s my only objection.” The trial court overruled the objection and
admitted Exhibit 2. Later in the trial, the prosecutor told the trial court that the State
wanted to withdraw State’s Exhibit 2 from evidence, the defense had no objection,
and the trial court withdrew the exhibit.
On this record, we conclude that Appellant did not raise a hearsay objection
in the trial court as to Exhibits 1 or 2, and he did not preserve error as to that
20 challenge. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Wilson, 71 S.W.3d at 349. Therefore, we restrict
any further analysis to whether Exhibits 1 and 2 were sufficiently authenticated.
For evidence to be admissible, the offering party “must produce evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the [party] claims it is.” Tex. R.
Evid. 901(a); see also Tienda v. State, 358 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
The authentication requirement is a liberal standard of admissibility. See Fowler v.
State, 544 S.W.3d 844, 848-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (citing Butler v. State, 459
S.W.3d 595, 600 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015)). Conclusive proof of authenticity is not
required. See id. at 848. Evidence may be authenticated by direct testimony from a
witness with personal knowledge, by comparison with other authenticated evidence,
or by circumstantial evidence. See Tienda, 358 S.W.3d at 638. The trial court need
only make a preliminary determination that the proponent of the evidence has
supplied facts sufficient to support a reasonable jury determination that the proffered
evidence is authentic. See Fowler, 544 S.W.3d at 849. It is up to the jury to make the
final determination of whether the evidence is what the proponent claims it to be.
See Butler, 459 S.W.3d at 600.
In the State’s brief on appeal, the State suggests that the maps in Exhibits 1
and 2 were demonstrative exhibits. “Demonstrative evidence is evidence admitted
for use as a visual aid or to illustrate a point, but it must meet the relevancy and
materiality requirements imposed by Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence.”
21 Allen v. State, No. 09-23-00316-CR, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 8142, at *57 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont Nov. 6, 2024, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). “Visual, real, or demonstrative evidence, regardless of which term is
applied, is admissible upon the trial of a criminal case if it tends to solve some issue
in the case and is relevant to the cause that is, if it has evidentiary value, i.e., if it
sheds light on the subject at hand.” Simmons v. State, 622 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1981) (panel op.); see also Pugh v. State, 639 S.W.3d 72, 84 n.12 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2022). The proponent of a demonstrative exhibit must show that it is a
fair and accurate portrayal of what its proponent claims it to be, and it may be
authenticated by a witness’s testimony because “the authentication of demonstrative
evidence derives from its status as a ‘fair and accurate representation of relevant
testimony or documentary evidence otherwise admitted in the case.’” Pugh, 629
S.W.3d at 85 (quoting McCormick on Evidence § 214 (8th ed. 2020)). The accuracy
of a demonstrative exhibit is not considered as a matter of authentication but as part
of a trial court’s weighing of the probative value of the exhibit against the danger of
unfair prejudice. Id. at 85-86. The proponent must demonstrate that the evidence is
relevant because it would assist the jury in understanding other real, testimonial, or
documentary evidence. Id. at 86.
We have previously explained that “[i]t is proper and legitimate to introduce
diagrams to explain and clarify the testimony of a witness.” Pitre v. State, No. 09-
22 95-140 CR, 1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 3883, at *5 (Tex. App.—Beaumont July 23,
1997, no writ) (mem. op., not designated for publication). “Texas courts have not
generally treated demonstrative evidence, such as a diagram, as inadmissible
hearsay.” See Boudreaux v. State, 631 S.W.3d 319, 336 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d) (citing Pierce v. State, 777 S.W.2d 399, 413 (Tex. Crim. App.
1989); Clay v. State, 592 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Vollbaum v.
State, 833 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex. App.—Waco 1992, pet. ref’d)).
Here, Officer Kahla testified that Exhibit 1 was a fair and accurate
representation of the area that it purported to represent, especially “the end of the
pursuit[.]” Kahla testified about the locations and direction that he drove while
chasing Mora’s car. Kahla agreed that the location of the pursuit and where he
believed Mora threw things from the car were noted on Exhibit 1 and that the
prosecutor had written the notations on the map or exhibit. Kahla also testified that
Exhibits 1 and 2 would assist the jury in understanding his testimony. The jury
subsequently watched the video of Kahla’s pursuit of Mora that was admitted as
Exhibit 3. Appellant did not object in the trial court, nor does he object on appeal
that Exhibits 1 and 2 were more prejudicial than probative under Rule 403. See Tex.
R. Evid. 403. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that the exhibits were properly authenticated. Officer Kahla’s testimony
established that Exhibits 1 and 2 were what the State claimed that they were and that
23 the exhibits would be helpful to the jury in understanding Kahla’s testimony. See
Tex. R. Evid. 901; Pugh, 639 S.W.3d at 85-86; Simmons, 622 S.W.2d at 113; Pitre,
1997 Tex. App. LEXIS 3883, at *5. To the extent that Appellant challenges the
accuracy of the exhibits, a complaint that an exhibit is inaccurate goes to the weight
of the evidence and not to its admissibility. See Hanks v. State, No. 09-23-00132-
CR, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 6748, at *43 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Sept. 11, 2024,
pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Robinson v. State, 739
S.W.2d 795, 802 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc); Hasley v. State, 786 S.W.2d
733, 735 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1989, pet. ref’d)). Finding no error, we overrule
Appellant’s first and second issues.
Kahla’s “Speculative Testimony”
In his third issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by admitting the
“speculative testimony” of Officer Kahla about what was in Appellant’s mind at the
beginning of the incident—specifically, testimony that Appellant may have been
driving a vehicle without a license plate to prevent his alleged criminal activity from
being traced to him. According to Appellant, Kahla’s testimony allowed the State
“to set the stage for its theory of an alleged crime spree[.]” Appellant argues that
Officer Kahla could not possibly have known what was in Appellant’s mind in
failing to have a proper license plate on his car.
Specifically, Appellant challenges the following questioning at trial:
24 [Prosecutor]: . . . In your training and experience, why would someone travel down the interstate without a license plate or what is one of the reasons why they do so?
[Defense counsel]: Objection, Your Honor. It calls for speculation in reference to driving without a license plate.
[Prosecutor]: I’m asking about in his training and experience, Judge.
The Court: Overruled.
[Prosecutor]: In your training and experience.
[Kahla]: To attempt to make it to where his criminal activity can’t be linked back to him.
[Prosecutor]: What is an LPR, or license plate reader for the benefit of the jury?
[Kahla]: It’s a tool used by law enforcement to track the movement of vehicles along major highways.
[Prosecutor]: Any idea if there are license plate readers or LPRs along Interstate 10?
[Kahla]: He would have passed one approximately ten miles before he passed me.
A witness may only testify to matters about which they have personal
knowledge. Tex. R. Evid. 602. A witness who is not testifying as an expert may
testify about matters that are “rationally based on the witness’s perception; and []
helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to determining a fact in
issue.” Tex. R. Evid. 701. The Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that police
officers have specialized knowledge and may generally testify based on their
25 experience and personal knowledge, sometimes as lay witnesses and sometimes as
experts, if qualified. See Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 536-37 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002); see also Romano v. State, No. 01-18-00538-CR, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS
3986, at **15-17 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May 20, 2021, pet. ref’d) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (no error to allow police officer as a lay witness
to testify about his perception of appellant’s conduct at the scene of the crime);
Gonzalez v. State, No. 04-19-00083-CR, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 7669, at **13-15
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Sept. 23, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (no error to allow police officer as a lay witness to testify about how
appellant might have committed the crime charged). “Texas law recognizes that
police officers may testify concerning knowledge acquired through experience.”
Salazar v. State, No. 01-13-00209-CR, 2014 Tex. App. LEXIS 3983, at *13 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 10, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for
publication). Specifically, police officers may testify, based on their experience and
training, that a defendant’s actions are consistent with the acts of someone
committing the crime charged. See Reece v. State, 878 S.W.2d 320, 325 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no pet.) (no error to admit officer’s lay opinion
testimony that defendant’s conduct was consistent with that of someone selling
cocaine); Williams v. State, 760 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1988, pet.
ref’d) (officer’s testimony about a common way to steal cars was admissible as a lay
26 opinion based on the officer’s personal observations and experience as a police
officer).
In addition, Detective Detorre testified without objection that, in his opinion,
if someone was trying to avoid detection by a license plate reader, then removing
the license plate completely would serve that purpose. Ranger Benson also testified
without objection that, based on his experience and training, license plates might be
found in the trunk of a vehicle if the driver was involved in nefarious activity. “It is
well established that questions regarding the admission of evidence are rendered
moot if the same evidence is elsewhere introduced without objection; any error in
admitting evidence over a proper objection is harmless if the same evidence is
subsequently admitted without objection.” Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230,
235 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999); see also Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253, 282 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010) (explaining that erroneously admitted evidence will not result in
reversal when the same evidence was received elsewhere without objection). We
find no error, and we overrule Appellant’s third issue.
Having overruled all of Appellant’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgments of conviction.
27 AFFIRMED.
LEANNE JOHNSON Justice
Submitted on May 19, 2025 Opinion Delivered June 18, 2025 Do Not Publish
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.