A.U.B. v. E.L.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: May 7, 2024
• Docket: A-0063-22
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0063-22

A.U.B.,1

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

E.L.,

Defendant-Appellant. _______________________

Submitted April 17, 2024 – Decided May 7, 2024

Before Judges Currier, Firko, and Susswein.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, Docket No. FM-04-1307-20.

Weinberg Kaplan & Smith, PA, attorneys for appellant (David M. Lipshutz, on the briefs).

Zucker Steinberg & Wixted, PA, attorneys for respondent (David Warren Sufrin, on the brief).

1 We utilize the initials of the parties involved in this matter to protect their privacy and their child. R. 1:38-3(d)(3) and (13). PER CURIAM

Defendant E.L. appeals from the Family Part's June 27, 2022 judgment of

divorce (JOD) awarding her former husband, plaintiff A.U.B., sole legal and

physical custody of the parties' child, S.B., born in April 2016. The judge

awarded defendant parenting time on alternate weekends; prohibited the

maternal grandparents from having contact with the child; and ordered

defendant to engage in therapy to address various issues, including her inability

to resist her parents' influence.

The judge found defendant and her parents had attempted to alienate the

child from plaintiff, repeatedly made decisions that were not in the child's best

interests, and orchestrated a false weapons charge against plaintiff. In addition,

defendant appeals from the August 12, 2022 order denying her motion for

reconsideration insofar as it restricted the maternal grandparents' access to the

child.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm the decision in the JOD granting

plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of S.B. However, we remand to the

Family Part to modify its August 12, 2022 order to clarify the prohibition against

the maternal grandparents' contact with S.B. restricts defendant from allowing

A-0063-22 2 her parents to visit the child until her therapist provides the requisite opinion on

her ability to resist their influence.

I.

We summarize the facts developed in the record. The parties married in

2014 in Virginia. They met in 2008 at an out-of-state drug recovery facility.

Both parties have a history of serious substance abuse; plaintiff's sobriety dates

back to 2001, and defendant's dates back to 2008. In addition to struggling with

addiction, defendant has a history of traumatic events, which included being

molested in kindergarten, raped while at boarding school, and being drugged

and gang raped as an adult. When the parties met, defendant worked as a

secretary at a university and obtained a bachelor's degree in corporate

communications.

In 2013, plaintiff, who has a bachelor's degree in psychology, founded a

substance use disorder treatment center. Defendant worked at the center as a

therapist and later as plaintiff's executive assistant. After they got married, the

parties lived out of state.

In August 2016, the parties and their infant child moved to New Jersey

where plaintiff opened a treatment facility, which he sold two years later. In

2019 plaintiff began working for a substance abuse policy group, which required

A-0063-22 3 him to travel once or twice a week. Defendant was the child's primary caregiver

during the parties' marriage.

Domestic Violence

The last week of January 2020, plaintiff left home for a business trip. He

was scheduled to return on February 3, 2020. On January 28, 2020, defendant

went to the police station seeking to obtain a temporary restraining order (TRO)

against plaintiff. For reasons that are not entirely clear in the record, defendant

did not initially intend to report that plaintiff sexually assaulted her, but to report

there was a rifle and a gun box in the attic before, it turns out, she knew it was

there. Three days later, defendant and her sister searched the attic and actually

found the rifle. They videotaped the search. Defendant and her sister left the

rifle in the attic, and defendant went away on vacation.

On February 3, 2020, defendant returned to the police station,

accompanied by her sister and her mother, C.L., and sought a TRO, alleging

plaintiff had sexually, physically, and emotionally abused her. Defendant stated

during her police interview that she "faked" all her orgasms "100% of the time"

during the parties' sexual relations, which plaintiff later countered negated her

claims of rape. As a result of those disclosures, plaintiff was also charged

criminally with a weapons offense and multiple sexual assault charges. That

A-0063-22 4 day, defendant obtained a TRO against plaintiff, which prohibited him from

having any contact with her or the child, and barred plaintiff from the parties'

home and the child's school. Defendant and her Florida treatment associates,

who were also some of plaintiff's former colleagues, publicly posted the charges

on social media.

At the final restraining order (FRO) hearing conducted three weeks later,

defendant, who was the sole witness, testified about two incidents of rape and

detailed episodes of physical and emotional abuse inflicted on her by plaintiff.

After the close of the evidence, the judge awarded defendant an FRO against

plaintiff and continued the restraints in the TRO. Plaintiff's motion for

reconsideration was denied. We affirmed E.B. v. A.B., No. A-3241-20 (App.

Div. Feb. 6, 2023).

In March 2020, a grand jury charged plaintiff with first-degree aggravated

sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a). He was incarcerated pending his criminal

trial. The next month, plaintiff pled guilty to a reduced charge of fourth -degree

criminal coercion, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-5. He was sentenced to a three-year term of

probation in accordance with the plea agreement and was released on the day of

A-0063-22 5 his sentencing.2 Plaintiff was never charged or convicted of any firearms

violations, and the prosecutor ultimately returned the rifle to him.

Zoom Calls

While plaintiff was incarcerated, defendant and the child moved out of

state to where the maternal grandparents resided. After he was released from

incarceration in April 2020, plaintiff wanted to move back to the marital

residence, but defendant refused his request, claiming she was only visiting her

parents and would return to New Jersey. Consequently, defendant moved into

a hotel and later to an apartment where he was residing at the time of the divorce

trial.

Following his release from incarceration, plaintiff began having daily

Zoom calls with the child, who was not yet four years old. Defendant initiated

the Zoom calls due to the child's young age. Many of the Zoom calls were

2 On September 24, 2020, plaintiff moved to vacate his guilty plea, claiming he was "forced" to accept this plea because "[his] house was stolen, [his] child was kidnapped," the COVID-19 pandemic had begun, and a guilty plea would result in his immediate release. The trial court denied the motion. Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of that order was also denied. Plaintiff appealed from both decisions, and we affirmed. State v. A.U.B., No. A-1942-20 (App. Div. Feb. 6, 2023).

A-0063-22 6 recorded by both parties. Conversations were also recorded between the parties

and played at the divorce trial.

The Divorce Litigation

On June 23, 2020, plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce, and defendant

filed a counterclaim. Plaintiff sought sole custody. The judge conducted a non-

consecutive fourteen-day trial from February 22 to May 17, 2022. The parties,

one custody expert, and C.L.—who is a lawyer—testified during the trial.

Plaintiff acknowledged his extensive stints in rehabilitation during his youth and

his twenty-one years of sobriety. He stated he was successful in recovery after

previous failures in high schools and programs, and explained his criminal

record for check fraud and assaulting his drug dealer were related to his

substance abuse issue.

At the time of trial, plaintiff was unemployed, which he attributed to

defendant's publicizing her allegations against him and his role as a

whistleblower against the "treatment industry" where he previously worked.

Plaintiff testified that initially he was amenable to shared custody of the child,

but he now sought sole custody because of defendant's false accusations against

him and her interference with his visitation. In terms of false allegations of

abuse, plaintiff stated defendant had filed "[eleven] . . . false [Division of Child

A-0063-22 7 Protection and Permanency (Division)] complaints" against him, which always

arose just before the next court date.

Plaintiff testified that in 2018, his father was moving out of the country

and brought "an old .22 caliber hunting rifle" for safekeeping to the parties' New

Jersey home. According to plaintiff, he did not want the gun, but accepted the

rifle from his father in a locked box and never opened it. Plaintiff testified that

since their child was a baby at the time, the parties agreed to send the rifle to

defendant's parents, who had firearms. Plaintiff "assumed" defendant brought

the rifle to her parents because he never saw it again.

Plaintiff denied the sexual assault allegations at the divorce trial, stating

the parties' sexual relationship was consensual. He testified that defendant was

"a trained sex worker" who clearly conveyed when she wanted to have sex.

Plaintiff stated they only had anal sex if defendant initiated it, and it always

stopped when she expressed any pain. Plaintiff acknowledged using profane

language against defendant, but denied doing so in the child's presence.

Plaintiff presented portions of the parties' recorded conversations. In one

clip from a June 20, 2020 Zoom call, plaintiff accused defendant of

"orchestrat[ing] this whole thing" against him, including the weapons charge.

Plaintiff presented another clip to support his assertion that the parties' sex was

A-0063-22 8 consensual. In response to plaintiff's questions, in one clip defendant said, "a

lot of it started off that way"—meaning consensual sex—but that it was "very

complicated" due to their "power dynamics," which caused her to feel

"subservient" and as if she "had to comply." While plaintiff acknowledged the

"pressure" and "power dynamics," he denied it constituted rape.

In the other clip, the parties discussed the alleged January 28, 2020 rape

incident. Defendant claimed she had pneumonia at the time, and the sex was

not consensual. However, defendant also conceded she had told the police the

incident was consensual. But defendant added that the police had asked her if

she "wanted to," and she responded "no."

Plaintiff testified that in a recorded May 29, 2020 Zoom call, defendant

pressured him to sell the marital residence and then "forced" the child to tell him

that the child wanted a new home. In another recording, plaintiff told the child

they were going to be "stuck" in New Jersey "forever," and the child echoed

plaintiff's comments.

Plaintiff introduced several clips to demonstrate his claim of parental

alienation. In a July 16, 2020 clip, plaintiff asked the child for a "virtual hug"

at the end of their Zoom call, and defendant interrupted, explaining that child

psychologists recommend that children not be forced to hug goodbye. Plaintiff

A-0063-22 9 testified the child was not resisting giving him a virtual hug and did not want to

end the call. In an August 6, 2020 clip, the child told plaintiff that he did not

want plaintiff to "take [him] away," and plaintiff "need[ed] to stop taking our

money."

Plaintiff also presented two recordings of defendant talking about

circumcising the child, which plaintiff claimed was a "blackmail tactic" by her

to obtain an "endless supply of money" from him. In one of these recordings,

defendant made a "snip, snip" gesture with her hands after she reminded plaintiff

that she had full medical "consent." In the recording, defendant then said she

would not circumcise the child, but that plaintiff would have to explain this

decision to the child when he became a teenager. Plaintiff testified defendant

then sought a court order authorizing circumcision, which was denied.

In the second clip dated August 30, 2020, defendant stated that her

therapist recommended she avoid making "any big choices"—including about

circumcision—even if she had legal decision-making authority. The clip also

reveals plaintiff stated defendant sought custody because of her "malignant

narcissism" and that she engaged in a "cancel culture campaign against [him]."

Plaintiff testified that he was also granted supervised visits in addition to

the Zoom calls. Despite being released from incarceration in April 2020,

A-0063-22 10 plaintiff stated his in-person visits did not commence until January 2021, and

lasted until April 2021, at which time he began having unsupervised parenting

time.

Plaintiff testified that he attributed the delay in supervised visits to the

maternal family's interference, stating he had proposed four visitation

supervisors, which had to be mutually agreed upon, but the maternal family

rejected them all. Plaintiff stated defendant proposed E.T. as a visitation

supervisor. Plaintiff initially agreed to E.T., but withdrew his consent after he

learned that defendant was romantically involved with E.T. and E.T. knew

defendant's attorney.

The record shows the parties finally agreed to two visitation supervisors—

R.O. and L.J. When R.O. could not supervise a visit, plaintiff unilaterally

substituted him with N.D., who was not approved. Plaintiff claimed he notified

defendant and C.L. of the substitution, but they objected. Plaintiff construed

defendant's response as further evidence that she and C.L. "shame[d]" and

"attack[ed]" anyone who "trie[d] to support [him]."

Plaintiff testified a confrontation ensued between himself and the maternal

grandparents at the next visitation exchange when they demanded to know more

about N.D. before allowing visitation to continue. The exchange was recorded

A-0063-22 11 by both plaintiff and defendant's father, R.L., and played at trial. The recordings

were lengthy and acrimonious. Plaintiff stated the visit was thwarted by

defendant's parents even though he brought L.J., who was approved, along with

N.D. to supervise.

Plaintiff testified that L.J. supervised approximately twenty visits. During

one visit, L.J. found a pocket in the child's overalls that was sewn shut. Plaintiff

explained that he ripped the stitching out and found a USB recording device in

the pocket. Plaintiff testified that during their next visit, the child searched for

the recording device in plaintiff's room so he could return it to C.L. Plaintiff

stated the child was "freaking out about it for probably an hour," and submitted

two clips verifying the child trying to get the recording device back from

plaintiff, resulting in the child having a tantrum.

After recovering the device, plaintiff testified that he discovered it

contained inadvertently recorded conversations between defendant and C.L.,

which he described as capturing their "campaign" against him. In one clip,

plaintiff testified defendant and C.L. discussed who should take responsibility

for planting the recording device if they got caught, with defendant offering to

take the blame. In a second clip between defendant, C.L., and the child, after

he brought home the book, "The Lorax," C.L. told the child the book was boring

A-0063-22 12 and "made [her] eyes bleed, it's so bad," and the child mimicked her and said he

wanted to "throw [the book] away" because it would make his "brain bleed."

On the issue of alienation, plaintiff also testified that towards the end of

the trial, defendant's parents instructed the child's school not to allow plaintiff's

parents to pick him up. Plaintiff added that defendant had "perjured" herself

repeatedly when she: accused him of rape and domestic violence; described the

weapon found in the home as an "assault rifle," as opposed to a hunting rifle;

misrepresented that he and the child had dual citizenship in Switzerland; and

denied that she had moved to her parents' home out of state.

Plaintiff initially wanted to share joint custody of the child, but at trial

opposed joint custody due to defendant's actions and testified that he has not had

access to the child's school, teachers, or medical records since his arrest , but

admittedly never specifically asked to access this information. Plaintiff also

stated that he wanted to participate in the child's therapy, but defendant had

"lied" to his therapists and told them that he was not interested.

In addition to seeking sole custody, plaintiff testified he objected to C.L.

having any contact with the child. Plaintiff referred to C.L. as a "racist," a

"f****** monster," and a "deplorable pathetic excuse for a mother." He stated

A-0063-22 13 C.L. should "go kidnap another grandchild" and "should rot in prison in this life

and burn in hell in the next."

During cross-examination, defense counsel played two recorded

conversations between the parties, where defendant expressed her fear and

mistrust of plaintiff. Plaintiff answered he had been "sick," was facing pressure,

and thus "acted out sexually." Plaintiff denied engaging in assaultive or violent

behavior, but agreed he was manipulative. He also agreed with defendant's

description that she was his "outlet for [his] rage and anger." Plaintiff testified

he made these comments to take "accountability" for his behavior—referring to

his frequent absences from the home and his addiction to video games and

pornography—but denied that his apologies were an admission to rape.

Defendant testified that plaintiff regularly used profane and disparaging

language against her in the child's presence, such as "[s]tupid bitch, whore,

worthless c***, ungrateful bitch, and piece of s***." She claimed that he did

not want her to work outside the home and isolated her. Defendant recounted

an argument between the parties when the child was young and claimed she tried

to walk away with the child. But plaintiff grabbed the child's car seat from her,

pressed her against a wall, and put his hand around her throat.

A-0063-22 14 Describing another incident when the parties resided in Florida, defendant

testified that plaintiff choked her, causing her to vomit. Defendant also stated

that when she was pregnant, she had an ear infection and plaintiff had yelled at

her so loudly that her ear drum "ruptured and blood came out," resulting in

permanent hearing loss.

Defendant reiterated portions of the testimony she gave at the FRO

hearing. In particular, defendant testified that plaintiff had raped her for

"[s]everal years" during their marriage. She conceded they sometimes had

consensual sex, but testified plaintiff forced her to have anal sex against her will

once or twice a month, and estimated that he raped her "a significant number of

times."

In one instance, defendant recalled plaintiff chased her and forced himself

into the bathroom where she was hiding and raped her. Defendant stated the

child walked into the bathroom and saw her crying. Defendant explained she

had forgotten about this incident, but was recalling incidents of abuse through

her "therapeutic process." According to defendant, the last occurrence of sexual

assault took place on January 28, 2020, when plaintiff left for a business trip.

Defendant stated she believed plaintiff's abusive behavior adversely

impacted their child and described him as "a functional mute" because he rarely

A-0063-22 15 spoke after the parties separated. Defendant also testified the child "used to

wake up every morning screaming crying" and a few weeks after plaintiff's

arrest, this behavior stopped. Defendant claimed that the child sometimes

imitated plaintiff by grabbing her throat.

On cross-examination, defendant acknowledged she had worked as a

stripper and had engaged in sex acts for money with her employer. Defendant

admitted she started to "remember" the rape because her friends triggered her

memory after she spoke to them because she had "blocked it out."

Regarding the rifle, defendant testified on cross-examination that she and

her sister "searched for hours" before they found it in a "green box" in the attic.

Defendant claimed she knew nothing about the rifle or the green box, which, for

all she knew, "could have been Christmas ornaments." Defendant denied ever

having a conversation with plaintiff about the rifle and denied her father -in-law

dropped it off at their prior home two years earlier. At the divorce trial,

defendant testified that she "ha[d] a feeling" plaintiff obtained the rifle when

patrolling on the back of a truck with the "Sandinistas."

Defendant testified that the child often presented with unexplained

injuries after visits with plaintiff, but denied making any allegations to the

Division or asking others to report on her behalf. While defendant stated she

A-0063-22 16 did not think plaintiff was physically abusing the child, she thought that plaintiff

"yell[ed] at him a lot" to get the child to be quiet. Plaintiff did not dispute that

the child had bruises, but suggested defendant or C.L. "bruis[ed] him up

themselves."

Defendant requested a joint custody award and feared that sole legal

custody to plaintiff would "eliminate [her] from [the child's] life." Defendant

stated she agreed to engage in parallel parenting, as suggested by the custody

evaluator, Dr. Gregory M. Joseph, where each parent maintains separate

parenting lanes and does not interfere in the other's parenting choices.

Defendant countered plaintiff's testimony and claimed that she shared the

child's medical, dental, and educational records with him in the past. In addition,

defendant testified that she had given plaintiff's contact information to the

child's therapist, but plaintiff was "anti-therapist," and never returned the

therapist's phone call. Defendant admitted she did not notify plaintiff that the

child might have to repeat kindergarten, but claimed plaintiff was already aware

of this.

Defendant acknowledged that C.L. was too involved in the litigation, but

said "her intentions were good." Defendant felt she made a lot of mistakes and

testified that she had brought "shame to the family," whereas C.L. was an

A-0063-22 17 intelligent lawyer who "made a lot of good decisions in her lifetime." Defendant

explained that her past mistakes harmed her relationship with C.L., and she

thought following her mother's lead now would help to mend their relationship.

The record shows that a heated exchange took place between counsel for

the parties during defendant's cross-examination. The judge paused the

proceedings and inquired about defendant's mental health. In response,

defendant listed information she had gathered on plaintiff, his family, and his

attorney.

C.L. testified about a phone call between plaintiff and the child where

plaintiff talked about the child being kidnapped and commented that C.L. was

"bad." C.L. testified that plaintiff repeatedly accused her and her husband of

kidnapping the child. C.L. acknowledged she had sewn the recording device in

the child's clothing, but testified she did so out of concern for him. C.L. denied

asking the child to retrieve the device from plaintiff.

Dr. Joseph, a psychologist, prepared an evaluation, interviewed the

parties, the child, the maternal grandparents, and defendant's therapists. In his

report, Dr. Joseph opined that defendant was a nurturing and communicative

parent, but noted she "struggled to effectively assert appropriate authority" and

A-0063-22 18 appeared stressed by the child's anger and defiance, choosing to negotiate and

compromise rather than set firm limits.

At trial, Dr. Joseph concluded that defendant presented with "ongoing

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder symptoms" and persecutory ideation. Dr.

Joseph opined that defendant's past traumatic experiences—unrelated to

plaintiff—impaired her "perceptions, emotional regulation, and impulse

control," resulting in a tendency to "overperceive" and "overreact to" danger and

harm, both in terms of her and the child's safety.

Dr. Joseph explained that defendant's therapists felt pressured by her to

call the Division on three occasions to report: (1) emotional abuse because

plaintiff had discussed the litigation with the child; (2) red marks on the child's

legs, which the child said could be bug bites; and (3) the child's comments that

plaintiff had "squished" him, which the Division concluded was a tight hug.

None of these allegations were substantiated by the Division.

Dr. Joseph concluded that the abuse allegations were unsupported by any

evidence, and reflected defendant's negative perception of plaintiff. Dr. Joseph

observed that defendant was "virtually incapable" of viewing any interaction

between plaintiff and the child as safe or positive. Based upon a conversation

Dr. Joseph reviewed between defendant and C.L. from the recording device, he

A-0063-22 19 found it was "their conviction that [plaintiff] is this dangerous person that's

going to harm the child" and their "find[ing] ways to take him out of [the child's]

life."

Dr. Joseph testified that defendant and her family are so "entrenched in

their way of seeing things" and "on the lookout for" abuse. In support of his

opinion, Dr. Joseph testified about a visitation journal that the maternal family

had provided him summarizing the child's visits and calls with plaintiff. After

comparing the entries to the parties' recordings, Dr. Joseph noted that the journal

did not accurately reflect the recorded visits, and overly emphasized any

negative aspects.

Dr. Joseph agreed that the child sometimes refused or was reluctant to

speak to plaintiff, but opined this is "fairly typical" for a child his age. When

the child became upset about an upcoming visit, Dr. Joseph found the maternal

family made "little effort to console or encourage him," and instead, watched

him have a tantrum or made comments about how it was "really sad" he had to

speak to plaintiff.

Dr. Joseph reviewed the Zoom calls and interpreted them as defendant's

admission that she had falsified the allegations and "orchestrated the gun

charge" "to gain the upper hand in this litigation" by obtaining a TRO against

A-0063-22 20 plaintiff. The expert also interpreted defendant's responses about the parties'

sexual relationship as an admission it was consensual and viewed defendant's

behavior in the Zoom calls as contradictory of her claim that she was a victim

of sexual abuse and feared plaintiff.

Dr. Joseph opined defendant lacked confidence and was "very influenced"

by C.L., who was "overzealous" and "calling the shots," with defendant

"following rather than leading." He viewed C.L.'s comments about "The Lorax"

as "damaging," noting the child "cherished" the book and wanted to share it with

plaintiff, but C.L.'s actions "interfered with their connection on that level." Dr.

Joseph noted the recording device—and the child's attempt to retrieve it—as

another example of the child being "bandied about in the case."

Regarding plaintiff's parenting style, Dr. Joseph described it as having

"high nurturance, communication, and control." Dr. Joseph observed plaintiff

was "attentive to [the child's] needs," but gave him "greater latitude to explore

and express himself" than defendant. According to Dr. Joseph, plaintiff was

"more demonstrative and authoritative" with the child when he struggled with

frustration and defiant behaviors.

Dr. Joseph found plaintiff was "surprisingly hopeful and determined"

about the litigation, with "good control of his emotions and solid frustration

A-0063-22 21 tolerance." He criticized plaintiff for sharing too much information about the

litigation with the child, but noted plaintiff did so in response to the child's

questions. Dr. Joseph opined that some of plaintiff's comments were

"unhealthy" and "inappropriate," specifically referencing a recording about

killing defendant's attorney, but explained that plaintiff's "motivation [was]

different" because he was frustrated and attempting to explain the litigation.

Dr. Joseph noted plaintiff's psychological testing profile revealed

"persecutory ideation" about his belief that he had been "framed," and it was not

"unreasonable" for plaintiff to fear defendant would continue to make false child

abuse allegations against him.

Dr. Joseph spoke with the child separately and in bonding sessions with

both parties. The expert described the child as very aware of the parties' conflict

evidenced by his repeated references to lawyers and jail. During the bonding

sessions, Dr. Joseph noted the child gave lengthy, robotic monologues about the

litigation, which "appeared to have been coached," and echoed defendant's own

complaints. The coached statements were inconsistent with "the steady comfort,

love, and affection" that he otherwise displayed for plaintiff.

Dr. Joseph recommended that the parties share legal and physical custody

of the child notwithstanding his concerns of alienation by defendant and her

A-0063-22 22 family. However, Dr. Joseph cautioned that if defendant or her family continued

interfering in the child's relationship with plaintiff, then the judge should

consider "requiring supervision." Because of the parties' behaviors, Dr. Joseph

opined there was a "high risk" of the child "becoming alienated from [plaintiff]"

since the child was still young and unable to separate his positive interactions

with plaintiff from the negative comments he received from defendant and her

family. Dr. Joseph expressed concern that the child presented with such

"polarized perception" that he could, in the future, "resist or reject contact with

[plaintiff]."

Defense counsel played a few clips from the child's Zoom calls with

plaintiff during Dr. Joseph's testimony. In one call, plaintiff spoke to the child

about "monsters," allegedly referring to defendant's family. In another call,

plaintiff blamed "a very bad man"—meaning defendant's attorney—for his legal

problems using child-friendly and legal terms to describe his complaints. In

response, the child said, "I will get rid of that boy," referring to defendant's

attorney, and plaintiff added, "I hope he dies." When the child threatened to

"kill him with guns," plaintiff interrupted and told him not to say that, but

continued with his complaints against defense counsel.

A-0063-22 23 The Judge's Decision

The judge rendered an oral decision on the record, which was incorporated

into the JOD, granting plaintiff sole legal and physical custody of the child. The

judge awarded defendant parenting time on alternate weekends. In her decision,

the judge determined defendant's testimony was inconsistent and peppered with

irrelevant and unrelated negative statements about plaintiff. The judge

emphasized that defendant's inappropriate behavior had prompted [the judge] to

interrupt the proceedings, "to see if [defendant] needed counseling or

something."

In addition, the judge referred to plaintiff as a "bully" who "was in control

of the litigation," highlighting his disregard for court orders to stop talking and

his effort to control the presentation of the evidence. The judge described

plaintiff as an "obnoxious difficult individual," who "was a jerk" to defendant

and was "not a good guy," yet noted she chose to marry him and have a child

with him.

The judge summarized the events that precipitated the parties' separation.

The judge found that, following a dispute between the parties, defendant and her

family "plotted" "to get rid of" plaintiff, "orchestrated the whole thing," and

criticized defendant for failing to consider how these tactics impacted the child.

A-0063-22 24 The judge found that defendant had "[c]learly made up" the weapons charge to

"set [plaintiff] up," and rejected her testimony on this issue as "literally ma[king]

no sense." The judge concluded that after defendant reported the rifle to the

police, "one lie [begot] another," and it just kept snowballing," resulting in the

sexual assault disclosure.

The judge said she did not "know . . . what the situation was with the sex

with them" noting that defendant first said, "it was consensual, then it wasn't

consensual, then it was consensual, then it wasn't consensual." Defendant

"couldn't keep track of what it was," or when it happened. The judge

acknowledged that defendant's allegations may have been true, but did not know

this "to be a fact" because "[n]one of it was shown to [the court]." The judge

also was not convinced that defendant was afraid of plaintiff, based on her

demeanor in the recorded conversations.

The judge credited plaintiff's testimony that, after his release from

incarceration, defendant intentionally barred plaintiff's access to the marital

home and prevented his visitation with the child. The judge viewed defendant's

family as "blocking [plaintiff] at every turn," including with the selection of the

visitation supervisor.

A-0063-22 25 The judge chastised both parties for recording one another and the child,

and for posting their private disputes on social media. While the judge criticized

plaintiff for dragging the child into the litigation and his "cross-examin[ation]

of defendant and the child in the recordings, the judge gave plaintiff "the benefit

of the doubt" because he was trying to defend himself against defendant's

allegations. Most disturbing in the judge's view was defendant and C.L.'s

decision to sew a recording device into the child's clothing, which the judge

concluded was "inexcusable." The judge found "on balance" that defendant's

behavior was "the worst," reasoning she and C.L. and the rest of her family had

alienated the child from plaintiff.

The judge questioned Dr. Joseph's recommendation of joint custody and

said she "had to do something now" due to the parties' inability to agree on

anything and the judge's fear that an award of joint custody would "tear this

child apart." In terms of who should be granted sole custody, the judge reviewed

the fourteen statutory factors identified in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c), namely:

the parents' ability to agree, communicate and cooperate in matters relating to the child; the parents' willingness to accept custody and any history of unwillingness to allow parenting time not based on substantiated abuse; the interaction and relationship of the child with its parents and siblings; the history of domestic violence, if any; the safety of the child and the safety of either parent from physical abuse by the other

A-0063-22 26 parent; the preference of the child when of sufficient age and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent decision; the needs of the child; the stability of the home environment offered; the quality and continuity of the child's education; the fitness of the parents; the geographical proximity of the parents' homes; the extent and quality of the time spent with the child prior to or subsequent to the separation; the parents' employment responsibilities; and the age and number of the children.

[Ibid.]

Reviewing the parties' past behaviors, the judge concluded that plaintiff

was better suited to communicate and cooperate in matters relating to the child

(factor one). Similarly, highlighting defendant's deficiencies as a co-parent, the

judge found that plaintiff would better accept the custodial arrangement and

facilitate parenting time (factor two). The judge noted that defendant lacked

"the proper judgment to parent" because "she allowed other people to push her

around," prioritized her disputes with plaintiff over [the child's] relationship

with him, and "destroyed any chance of cooperation between the parties." The

judge noted defendant's fear that plaintiff would harm the child, but found no

evidence supported this fear. Instead, defendant "hurt" plaintiff's relationship

with the child "every chance she got," including by making false allegation to

the Division and interfering with the parental grandparents' access to the child.

A-0063-22 27 With respect to the parties' interactions with the child's "parents and

siblings" (factor three), the judge focused on defendant's negative behavior

towards plaintiff. While defendant was child's primary caregiver, the judge

stated she "systemically" took plaintiff "out of the picture" and disparaged him

both publicly and privately, including in the child's presence.

The judge next considered the parties' history of domestic violence (factor

four). The judge noted that defendant never alleged that plaintiff hit her or the

child, and thus viewed the FRO as "a neutral restraining order situation" with

respect to domestic violence and added that the FRO would protect defendant

from any future harm.

While reiterating that there was no threat of physical harm to the child

(factor five), the judge found that defendant's family's actions in sewing a

recording device into his clothing was "completely abusive," as were their

attempts to have the child retrieve the device from plaintiff. In terms of stability

of the home environment (factor eight), the judge said the parent who receives

sole custody of the child would also receive the marital home to ensure "the

quality and continuity of his education" (factor nine).

The judge held that both parents were "minimally fit," but weighed this

factor in favor of plaintiff (factor ten). Although both parties had launched

A-0063-22 28 social media "campaign[s]" against one another, the court noted that defendant

"started it," adding that she had "destroyed his life" with her false allegations

and "reveled in it."

The judge weighed in defendant's favor the "extent and quality of time

spent with the child prior to the separation" (factor twelve), as she was the child's

primary caregiver. The judge also considered the parties' employment

responsibilities (factor thirteen), stating that neither of them worked , thus this

was "really pretty neutral on both ends." Because they had support from their

respective families, the judge found that both parties were able to meet the

child's needs.3

The judge concluded that the factors weighed in plaintiff's favor and

awarded him sole legal and physical custody. The judge also ordered plaintiff

to engage in anger management courses and ordered defendant to continue

therapeutic counseling to help her "understand what it means to be a co-parent."

The judge also completely barred the maternal grandparents' from any

contact with the child, explaining that until defendant's counselor reported "that

she's able to withstand their control of her," they could not have contact with the

3 The judge did not address factors six, seven, eleven, or fourteen, as they are not relevant to this case. A-0063-22 29 child. The judge viewed the defendant's family's "manipulat[ion]" of this case

as the biggest concern and viewed C.L. as the instigator, saying she

"orchestrated the gun" with defendant, encouraged defendant to keep plaintiff

in jail, and when the weapons charge proved to be insufficient, defendant's

family "started with the other stuff."

Defendant moved for reconsideration of the JOD and to join C.L. as a

party in the dissolution action. Plaintiff cross-moved seeking to clarify

possession of the former marital home and the right of first refusal to purchase

it. On August 17, 2022, the judge denied most of the relief sought in the

motions. However, the judge modified the JOD to clarify visitation and phone

contact and permitted plaintiff to relocate outside of the child's school district.

A memorializing order was entered.

On September 8, 2022, defendant filed an emergent order to show cause

seeking primary custody of the child, contending that plaintiff was relocating

outside the geographic limits set forth in the August 17, 2022 order to a lesser

quality school district. The application was denied, with the judge finding

plaintiff had moved to an apartment in a town less than ten miles from the former

marital home whose school system was ranked higher than the child's prior

school. This appeal followed.

A-0063-22 30 On appeal, defendant argues the judge erred:

(1) by awarding sole custody to plaintiff contrary to this State's legislative preference for shared custody and against the recommendation of Dr. Joseph, who recommended shared custody;

(2) in failing to consider defendant's allegations of domestic violence and sexual abuse in the best interests analysis;

(3) by not accepting as true all of the allegations set forth in the TRO based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel; and

(4) in restricting the maternal grandparents' contact with the child, arguing such a prohibition exceeded the judge's authority.

II.

Our review of a family court order is limited. See Cesare v. Cesare, 154

N.J. 394, 411 (1998). Generally, the family court's factual findings "are binding

on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Id. at

412 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv's, Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484

(1974)). The scope of appellate review of a Family Part judge's findings

following a bench trial is limited. N.T.V. v. D.D.B., 442 N.J. Super. 205, 215

(App. Div. 2015) (citing Cesare, 154 N.J. at 411).

The conclusions of Family Part judges regarding child custody "are

entitled to great weight and will not be lightly disturbed on appeal." DeVita v.

A-0063-22 31 DeVita, 145 N.J. Super. 120, 123 (App. Div. 1976) (citing Sheehan v. Sheehan,

51 N.J. Super. 276, 295 (App. Div. 1958)). Because this court recognizes "the

special expertise of judges hearing matters in the Family Part," Parish v. Parish,

412 N.J. Super. 39, 48 (App. Div. 2010) (citing Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412), we will

only disturb the Family Part's factual findings if "they are 'so wholly

insupportable as to result in a denial of justice.'" In re Guardianship of J.T., 269

N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App. Div. 1993) (quoting Rova Farms, 65 N.J. at 483-84).

An appellate court, in consequence, will only reverse the family court's

conclusions if those conclusions are so "'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark'"

that they result in the denial of justice. Parish, 412 N.J. Super. at 48 (quoting

N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)). The Family

Part's legal conclusions, however, are reviewed de novo. See N.J. Div. of Youth

& Fam. Servs. v. I.S., 202 N.J. 145, 183 (2010).

"Discretionary determinations, supported by the record, are examined to

discern whether an abuse of reasoned discretion has occurred." Ricci v. Ricci,

448 N.J. Super. 546, 564 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Gac v. Gac, 186 N.J. 535, 547

(2006)). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's decision "rested on

an impermissible basis, considered irrelevant or inappropriate factors, failed to

consider controlling legal principles or made findings inconsistent with or

A-0063-22 32 unsupported by competent evidence." Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 434

(App. Div. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Challenges

to legal conclusions, as well as the trial court's interpretation of the law, are

subject to de novo review. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super. at 565 (citing Reese v. Weis,

430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)).

III.

In claiming the judge erred in awarding plaintiff sole legal and physical

custody of the child, defendant asks us to conduct a de novo review of the

decision, contending that the judge's findings were insufficient and unsupported

by the record. We disagree. As stated above, our review of a court's factual

findings is for an abuse of discretion.

"In custody cases, it is well settled that the court's primary consideration

is the best interests of the children." Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105

(App. Div. 2007). The focus is on the "safety, happiness, physical, mental and

moral welfare" of the children. Fantony v. Fantony, 21 N.J. 525, 536 (1956).

New Jersey carries a "legislative preference for custody decrees that allow both

parents full and genuine involvement in the lives of their children following a

divorce." Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. at 485. To that end, N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 provides

that:

A-0063-22 33 [I]t is in the public policy of this State to assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage and that it is in the public interest to encourage parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this policy.

Notwithstanding the preference for joint custody, "the decision

concerning the type of custody arrangement [is left] to the sound discretion of

the trial court[.]" Nufrio v. Nufrio, 341 N.J. Super. 548, 555 (App. Div. 2001)

(quoting Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 611 (1995)) (alterations in original).

Thus, a court may award joint custody, sole custody with a provision for

"appropriate parenting time for the noncustodial parent," or another arrangement

that "the court may determine to be in the best interests of the child." N.J.S.A.

9:2-4(a) to (c). The court must also "identify on the record the specific factors

that justify the arrangement." See J.G. v. J.H., 457 N.J. Super. 365, 374 (App.

Div. 2019) (quoting Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309, 322 (2017)).

Here, it is readily apparent the judge was cognizant of her charge to review

the fourteen statutory factors under N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) when assessing custody.

In rejecting joint custody, the judge expressed concern about the parties'

acrimony and their inability to shield the child from their disputes. The judge's

A-0063-22 34 finding is supported by the dozens of recordings, which demonstrate the parties'

inability to protect the child from their adult conversations.

"[A] successful joint custody arrangement" can exist even where the

parents disagree, so long as they are "able to isolate their personal conflicts from

their roles as parents," "spar[ing]" the child from "whatever resentments and

rancor the parents may harbor." Beck, 86 N.J. at 498-99. Here, the record

clearly establishes that the parties were unable to exercise such restraint. As the

judge appropriately found, the parties had a distrust of one another, and they

repeatedly resorted to airing their disputes on social media, even after she

instructed them to not do so.

The judge was well within her discretion to deviate from Dr. Joseph's

recommendation of shared legal and physical custody. A factfinder is free to

accept or reject, in full or in part, the opinions of qualified experts. Brown v.

Brown, 348 N.J. Super. 466, 478 (App. Div. 2002). While a custody expert's

opinion "should be carefully considered by a judge when appropriate, such

opinions do not relieve the trial judge from the ultimate responsibility of

determining what type of custody arrangement is in the best interest of the

child." D.A. v. R.C., 438 N.J. Super. 431, 454 (App. Div. 2014). This

determination remains "the exclusive obligation of the trial judge." Ibid.

A-0063-22 35 Moreover, Dr. Joseph recognized the difficulties shared custody would

create and was "pessimistic" about its likelihood of success, particularly noting

defendant's "entrenched" negative view of plaintiff. Referring to N.J.S.A. 9:2-

4(c), the judge concluded that plaintiff was better suited as the primary custodial

parent, and an award of sole custody was in the child's best interests. The record

supports that determination, including the judge's extensive credibility findings,

which are entitled to "great deference." D.A., 438 N.J. Super. at 451.

Defendant challenges the judge's overall assessment of the custody

factors, contending the judge did not afford proper weight to her domestic

violence and sexual assault allegations. Defendant interprets the judge's finding

as contrary to the legislature's presumption that custody should be awarded to

the non-abusive spouse.

However, domestic violence is just "one of several factors requiring

consideration" when determining custody in a divorce proceeding. R.K. v. F.K.,

437 N.J. Super. 58, 65 (App. Div. 2014). See also Terry v. Terry, 270 N.J.

Super. 105, 119 (App. Div. 1994) (reversing custody award to the mother where

"the only differentiating factor" was the father's concession to one act of

physical abuse and his "lack of credibility in his denial of non-physical abuse").

Thus, in custody disputes within a divorce proceeding—as compared to when a

A-0063-22 36 custody determination is part of a domestic violence hearing, which is governed

by N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)(11)—there is no "mechanical presumption" in favor of

the non-offending spouse. R.K., 437 N.J. Super. at 66. The expectation is that

the Family Part judge will "weigh the seriousness of the history of domestic

violence against the other N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 factors." Ibid.

Here, the judge did not explicitly determine whether plaintiff raped

defendant. The judge found defendant's allegations were contradictory and

inconsistent, but observed there may be some truth to her claims. And, the judge

did not reference the findings made by the judge who presided over the FRO

hearing, but acknowledged the existence of the FRO and construed it as "a

neutral restraining order situation." Saliently, the judge found the domestic

violence allegations did not involve the child. Moreover, the judge considered

how the domestic violence related to the child's best interests. Dr. Joseph's

evaluation did not reveal the child was exposed to or aware of any domestic

violence. Thus, even if defendant's allegations were true, the judge properly

considered the impact of any domestic violence on the child's best interests.

A court's failure to consider a child's exposure to domestic violence may

undermine its best interests analysis. See, e.g., J.D. v. M.A.D., 429 N.J. Super.

34, 45 (App. Div. 2012) (in the context of a FRO proceeding, the trial court erred

A-0063-22 37 in giving temporary custody to the parent accused of the abuse, where the

children witnessed the abuse and had "an inappropriate awareness of the

problems between their parents"). Domestic violence is but one factor to

consider. R.K., 437 N.J. Super. at 65. We are satisfied weighing this factor

more heavily in defendant's favor would not have changed the outcome.

The judge highlighted that plaintiff was the parent better able to

communicate, cooperate, and facilitate parenting time in considering factors one

and two. N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c). In contrast, the judge found that defendant's

alienating behaviors undermined her ability to foster a relationship between

plaintiff and the child.

A parent's repeated inability to co-parent and interfere with the other

parent can support an award of sole legal custody to the other parent. Nufrio,

241 N.J. Super. at 555. See also Beck, 86 N.J. at 499 ("[W]hen the actions of

[an uncooperative] parent deprive the child of the kind of relationship with the

other parent that is deemed to be in the child's best interests, removing the child

from the custody of the uncooperative parent may well be appropriate as a

remedy of last resort.").

As Dr. Joseph explained, defendant was incapable of finding any positive

element in plaintiff's relationship with the child, and her inability resulted in her

A-0063-22 38 alienating behavior and interference with parenting time. And, defendant did

very little to promote plaintiff's relationship with the child. According to Dr.

Joseph, while the child's young age allowed him to separate his positive

experiences from defendant's negative descriptions of plaintiff, there was a

genuine threat that the child eventually would reject plaintiff if defendant's

behavior persisted. The record supports this determination.

Referencing plaintiff's shortcomings in co-parenting and communicating,

the judge ultimately concluded that defendant's deficiencies far outweighed

those of plaintiff. Thus, the judge did not err in weighing factors one and two

in plaintiff's favor.

When assessing whether either party posed a risk of physical harm to the

child under factor five, the judge aptly concluded neither party did. However,

the judge found defendant's family placed the child at risk of emotional harm.

There was also support in the record for the judge's conclusion that while both

parties were "minimally fit," defendant was less fit due to her purported false

allegations against plaintiff, alienating behaviors, and lack of awareness of how

this impacted the child under factor ten. The record supports the judge's findings

and conclusions as to factors five and ten.

A-0063-22 39 Factor twelve was the only factor the judge weighed in defendant's favor

because she was the child's primary caregiver throughout his life. However, Dr.

Joseph noted—and the judge found—both parties had a warm, loving

relationship with the child.

The judge performed the required best interests analysis under N.J.S.A.

9:2-4(c) and addressed all the relevant factors. Contrary to defendant's

contention, the judge did not make an erroneous decision in granting sole

custody to plaintiff. The judge aptly concluded, based upon the substantial

credible evidence in the record, it would be in the best interests of the child for

plaintiff to have sole custody. The record supports the judge's findings and

conclusions, and we discern no basis to disturb the judge's decision on custody

and parenting time.

IV.

Next, for the first time on appeal, defendant argues the judge misapplied

the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Defendant claims the judge allowed plaintiff

to re-litigate the rape allegations underlying the FRO even though the issues

were formerly adjudicated and proven by a preponderance of the evidence.

Collateral estoppel prevents the re-litigation of issues formerly

adjudicated and fully disposed of. Barker v. Brinegar, 346 N.J. Super. 558, 565-

A-0063-22 40 66 (App. Div. 2002). The notion of judicial efficiency prevents the duplication

of lawsuits with the same issues, the same parties, and the same witnesses.

Cogdell v. Hosp. Ctr. at Orange, 116 N.J. 7, 26 (1989); see also State v.

Gonzalez, 75 N.J. 181, 186 (1977) (explaining that collateral estoppel bars re -

litigation of any issue decided in prior action).

For collateral estoppel to apply, the issues must be identical to the ones

presented in the prior proceedings, the issues must have been actually litigated

in the prior proceeding, the court must have entered a final judgment, the issues

raised in the new complaint must have been essential to the prior judgment, and

the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted must have been a party in

the earlier proceeding. Olivieri v. YMF Carpet, Inc., 186 N.J. 511, 521 (2006).

Here, collateral estoppel did not prevent the judge from re-hearing

testimony and re-deciding issues that were discussed in the FRO hearing. In

L.T. v. F.M., 438 N.J. Super. 76, 86-89 (App. Div. 2014), we declined to give

preclusive effect to an FRO hearing in a civil action based on the same

allegations because of the procedural differences between the two proceedings.

In L.T., the plaintiff alleged assault in a Law Division tort case after

successfully obtaining an FRO against the defendant. Id. at 81-82. The trial

court applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel and barred the defendant from

A-0063-22 41 defending against the plaintiff's allegations of assault. Id. at 83-84. Noting the

summary nature of an FRO trial as compared to the procedure in the Law

Division, and the higher standard of proof for the punitive damages sought by

the plaintiff in the intentional tort action, we reversed.

Unlike the situation in L.T., here plaintiff did not testify at the FRO

hearing. Thus, the judge issuing the FRO could only make factual findings and

credibility determinations based on the testimony and evidence adduced during

the FRO hearing. Here, the trial judge heard from and was able to observe both

parties during the divorce trial.

In the matter under review, the evidence at the FRO hearing was largely

limited to defendant's testimony against plaintiff, most likely because of the

criminal case pending against him at the time. There was no discovery or expert

reports or opinions. Therefore, plaintiff's ability to defend against defendant's

allegations in the TRO was severely limited. L.T., 438 N.J. Super. at 87-88. In

contrast, both parties testified at the dissolution hearing, presented numerous

video and audio recordings to support their positions—which were made after

the FRO hearing—and retained Dr. Joseph as a joint custody expert. Our review

of the record de novo convinces us the judge did not err because collateral

estoppel is inapplicable here.

A-0063-22 42 V.

Finally, defendant asserts the judge erred in restricting the maternal

grandparents' contact with the child on the basis it was contrary to his best

interests. The JOD provides:

"[C.L.] and [R.L.] shall have no contact with the minor child at all until

the [c]ourt receives a report from defendant's counselor indicating that

[defendant] is capable of making decisions independent from the [maternal

grandparents'] influence."

Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration, (1) arguing that the judge

did not have the authority to limit the maternal grandparents access to the child

because they were not parties to the litigation, and (2) asking to join the maternal

grandparents to the litigation.

The judge denied her application, agreeing that the maternal grandparents

were not parties to the divorce proceeding. The judge stated that the maternal

"grandparents don't have any rights" except through defendant.4 The judge also

expanded on her findings for restricting the maternal grandparents' access to the

child, stating "they conspired to destroy" the child's relationship with plaintiff

4 The judge also mistakenly stated that "grandparents don't have any visitation rights in the State of New Jersey." See N.J.S.A. 9:72-7.1 (the grandparent visitation statute). A-0063-22 43 and defendant "was too weak" to stop them. While the judge attributed this

primarily to C.L., she implicated R.L. as well, finding that the maternal

grandparents "operate[d] as a unit," R.L. was present in various recordings, he

was married to C.L., and he was unable to "speak up to" her. The judge found

that their actions were detrimental to the child's best interests.

On appeal, defendant argues there was no evidence that the maternal

grandparents conspired to destroy the child. Defendant argues any misbehavior

was warranted because plaintiff had raped defendant. Defendant also questions

the restriction on R.L.'s contact, given his limited role.

The Family Part has the authority "to make judgments or orders

concerning care, custody, education and maintenance" of a minor child who is

the subject of a custody dispute. N.J.S.A. 9:2-3. The focus of every custody

and parenting time determination is "on the 'safety, happiness, physical, mental

and moral welfare' of the children." Hand, 391 N.J. Super. at 105 (quoting

Fantony, 21 N.J. at 536).

As articulated by our Supreme Court in Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276,

317-18 (1997):

The "best-interest[s]-of-the-child" standard is more than a statement of the primary criterion for decision or the factors to be considered; it is an expression of the court's special responsibility to safeguard the interests

A-0063-22 44 of the child at the center of a custody dispute because the child cannot be presumed to be protected by the adversarial process.

Our courts have relied on the above cited language as authority to restrict a

parent from exposing the child to a third party, if such exposure is contrary to

the child's best interests. This authority is viewed as an extension of the court's

parens patriae authority. DeVita v. DeVita, 145 N.J. Super. 120, 127-28 (App.

Div. 1976) (citing Clemens v. Clemens, 20 N.J. Super. 383, 389 (App. Div.

1952)). Implicit in these holdings is the Family Part's authority to craft custody

and parenting time in a manner that furthers the child's best interests.

While R.L.'s conduct certainly did not rise to the level of C.L.'s, the judge

found both of them had assisted defendant in "orchestrating" charges against

plaintiff, and both interfered with visitation, as evidenced in the recordings.

Moreover, Dr. Josephs' report included an interview with R.L., who echoed

defendant's and C.L.'s complaints about plaintiff as an abuser.

When reviewing a denial for reconsideration, the appellate court will

affirm the trial court's decision "unless it represents a clear abuse of discretion."

Kornbleuth v. Westover, 241 N.J. 289, 301 (2020) (quoting Hous. Auth. of

Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 283 (1994)). However, to the extent the trial

A-0063-22 45 court's decision implicates questions of law, those legal rulings are reviewed de

novo. Amzler v. Amzler, 463 N.J. Super. 187, 197 (App. Div. 2020).

Because the maternal grandparents' interfering behaviors were well

documented, and Dr. Joseph expressed similar concerns about their interactions

with the child, the judge's determination was supported by substantial credible

evidence in the record. Thus, there was no abuse of discretion in denying

defendant's motion for reconsideration.

We affirm the judge's determination to restrict C.L.'s and R.L.'s access to

the child until further order of the court. However, we remand to the Family

Part to enter an amended JOD to place the obligation on defendant to restrict the

maternal grandparents from having access to the child until further order of the

court because the maternal grandparents are not parties to this action.

To the extent we have not specifically addressed defendant's remaining

claims, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed in part, remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.

A-0063-22 46