Attorney Grievance Commission v. McCloskey

511 A.2d 56, 306 Md. 677, 1986 Md. LEXIS 256
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland
DecidedJuly 11, 1986
DocketMisc. Docket (Subtitle BV) No. 32, September Term, 1985
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 511 A.2d 56 (Attorney Grievance Commission v. McCloskey) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Attorney Grievance Commission v. McCloskey, 511 A.2d 56, 306 Md. 677, 1986 Md. LEXIS 256 (Md. 1986).

Opinions

SMITH, Judge.

We shall disbar in this case involving “quickie” foreign divorces and misleading attorney advertising.

Bar Counsel, acting pursuant to the provisions of Maryland Rule BV9, filed a petition with us on behalf of the Attorney Grievance Commission seeking disciplinary action against James B. McCloskey, a member of the Maryland Bar since November 10,1954. The petition alleged violation of Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(1), (4), and (5); 2-101(A)(2), (3), and (4); 2-109(1); 6-101(A)(l), and (2); and 7-102(A)(8).1

[679]*679Pursuant to Rule BV9 b we referred the matter for hearing to a judge of the Third Judicial Circuit of Maryland. He has filed a comprehensive report with us. After setting forth the bases of the three complaints, the report states:

“General Findings of Fact
“Prefatory to addressing the three complaints individually, we first note findings of fact that are applicable generally to all the complaints and, therefore, provide a framework for the subsequent discussion. These findings of fact concern:
[680]*680“1. The Respondent’s role in running the business known as ‘Divorce Services,’ and
“2. The applicability of the Disciplinary Rules to the Respondent in his role as ‘Divorce Services.’
“As to the first concern, this Court finds that Respondent is solely responsible for conducting the business known as .‘Divorce Services.’ The Court has also considered Respondent’s work history since his admission to the Maryland Bar in 1954. The evidence clearly indicates that following his ten year partnership in a Baltimore law firm, Respondent gave up the general practice of law in order to pursue the business of appraising and buying antiques. Notwithstanding this, it is uncontroverted that Mr. McCloskey at no time changed his status as an attorney during his fifteen years as an antique dealer.1 The Court further finds that the actions and activities connected with the running of the business known as ‘Divorce Services’ clearly involved Respondent acting as a lawyer. The Respondent himself admitted on the stand that much of the advice given to clients on the telephone did clearly involve knowledge of the law. Mr. McCloskey stated:
‘See, my problem is I did not consider the fact that I was practicing law. I’m starting to realize now, after all of this, that perhaps I was, and I made a terrible, terrible mistake.’ (T.26).
“The Court also notes that even though the actual cases were handled by the foreign attorney, and even though Respondent acted under a trade name, McCloskey further represented himself as a qualified attorney by sending out business cards which read ‘James B. McCloskey, Attorney-at-Law,’ regardless of the fact that such cards may have been sent in some cases after the foreign divorces were procured. (T. 15, 74).
[681]*681“As to the applicability of the Disciplinary Rules to the Respondent in this case, the Court heard argument that in his role as owner of the referral business known as ‘Divorce Services,’ Mr. McCloskey was not subject to these rules. Clearly, the Disciplinary Rules set out what ‘a lawyer’ may or may not do. However, in light of the previous discussion, the Court concludes that Mr. McCloskey was clearly acting as a lawyer, and thus was subject at all times to these rules.
“Findings of Fact: ‘O’Meara Complaint’
“Pursuant to obtaining their respective divorces, Mr. and Mrs. O’Meara responded to an advertisement in the National Enquirer, a nationwide publication, which was placed by Respondent and which read:
‘DIVORCE, QUICKIE, Dominican Republic. From $275.00—“One Day” Qualified Attorney. James McCloskey, 800-638-1862. Validity varies by State.’
Respondent admits responsibility for placing this ad, and for procuring and maintaining an ‘800’ telephone number. Respondent further admits that the phrase ‘validity varies by State’ was required by the Enquirer, and was not included in similar ads he placed in other local and national publications. It is further uncontroverted that Respondent advised Mrs. O’Meara by telephone as to the procedure for obtaining a ‘Dominican divorce,’ sent her a packet of information, and received a fee for his services. Again, this Court rejects the contention that such fee was merely for ‘referral,’ due to the legal nature of the advice given. It is also noted, by Respondent’s own admission on the stand, that proper research was not conducted as to Louisiana law and recognition vel non of foreign divorce decrees.2
“The statutory law of Louisiana in fact provides that divorces obtained in foreign jurisdictions are invalid.3 Louisiana law further illustrates that although one may be estopped from attacking the validity of a subsequent marriage, a prior divorce obtained by a spouse who trav[682]*682eled to a foreign jurisdiction for the sole purpose of obtaining said divorce nevertheless would be deemed a nullity. Super v. Burke, (1979 La.App.) 367 So.2d 93, cert. gr. (La.) 369 So.2d 466.
“In this case, the Court finds that Respondent misrepresented to the O’Mearas his knowledge of the law. As stated previously, Respondent did little or no research in the area of recognition of foreign divorce decrees in the various jurisdictions of the nation. Mr. McCloskey knew these callers were from Louisiana; he invited such out of state inquiries by advertising in national publications and using an ‘800’ number; and he proceeded to give legal advice to these Louisiana residents who were led to believe they were speaking with a ‘qualified’ and ‘competent’ attorney.
“Respondent did testify that he told Mrs. O’Meara on the telephone that the divorce she was to obtain was voidable.4 While there was no evidence presented to dispute this, the Court finds significant the fact that Respondent failed to include this information either in the ad, or in the printed information he sent to his customers (clients). To the contrary, the Court finds that Mr. McCloskey, in writing, led these people to believe that he totally ‘stood behind’ the foreign decrees obtained.5
“The Court finds it curious that if Respondent in fact was so careful to warn all of his customers (clients) that the decrees were voidable, surely such warning should also have been put in writing. The Court finds, notwithstanding the telephone warning, that individuals were misled by Respondent’s recommendation of these divorces, and his statement in writing that ‘... they are legal and binding in the United States.’ (T. 81).
“The Court further finds that the advertisement clearly created the unjustified expectation in the minds of the O’Mearas that they would be getting competent advice based on the law of their own jurisdiction. While Respondent argues that the words ‘Qualified Attorney’ referred to the qualified attorney in the Dominican Republic, it is [683]

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Attorney Grievance Commission v. McCloskey
511 A.2d 56 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1986)

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Bluebook (online)
511 A.2d 56, 306 Md. 677, 1986 Md. LEXIS 256, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/attorney-grievance-commission-v-mccloskey-md-1986.