Argued Before BELL, Chief Judge.
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, the petitioner, acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751,
approved the filing by Bar Counsel of a Petition For Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Dimitri G. Daskalopoulos, the respondent. In that petition, pursuant to two complaints filed against him, Bar Counsel charged the respondent with misconduct, as defined by Maryland Rules 16 — 701(i),
and 16-812, and consisting of violations of various of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, as adopted by the latter Maryland Rule, to wit:. Rules 1.4, Communication,
1.15, Safekeeping
Property,
8.1, Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters,
and 8.4, Misconduct,
other Maryland Rules,
ie.
16-603, Duty to
maintain account,
16-604, Trust Account-Required Deposits,
16-606, Name and Designation of Account,
16-607, Commingling of Funds,
16-609, Prohibited
Transactions,
and sections of Maryland Code (1989, 2000 Replacement Volume), of the Business Occupations and Professions Article,
namely, § 10-304, requiring expeditious deposit of trust money into an attorney’s trust account, 10-306, prohibiting the use of trust money “for any purpose other than the purpose for which the trust money is entrusted,” and 10-307, subjecting an attorney who misuses trust money to disciplinary action.
We referred the case to the Honorable Michael E. Loney, of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, for hearing pursuant to Rules 16-752(a)
and 16-757(e).
Although he
accepted service, the respondent neither filed an answer to the petition or appeared at the hearing.
Consequently, an Order of Default was entered. Subsequently, following a hearing, the hearing court found facts, by clear and convincing evidence, and drew conclusions of law with respect to the complaints of David Rushfield and Charles D’Amico, respectively.
The respondent was retained by David Rushfield, a New Jersey petroleum dealer, in connection with a contract dispute with Sunoco. In June 2002, he negotiated a settlement of that dispute, under the terms of which Rushfield agreed to pay Sunoco fourteen thousand ($14,000.00) dollars. To accommodate his client, who wanted to delay paying Sunoco until after he settled on the purchase of property for a new gas station, the respondent promised Rushfield, conditioned on being repaid at a later time, that he would pay Sunoco for him. He did not do so. Two months later, however, the respondent presented Rushfield with a settlement agreement, purportedly between Rushfield and Sunoco, in which a “Joseph D. Zulli” acknowledged receipt of thirteen thousand ($18,000.00) dollars. The respondent signed that name. Subsequently, the respondent gave Rushfield a letter addressed to a Richard Gaines,
Esq. at Sunoco. According to that letter, due to a misunderstanding as to payment, lor which Sunoco was at fault, the respondent enclosed a second check, this one in the amount of fourteen thousand ($14,000.00) dollars, to cover Rushfield’s obligation to Sunoco. A complaint against the respondent having been filed with the petitioner on behalf of Mr. Rush-field, Bar Counsel sent respondent a letter advising him of that complaint. The respondent received and read that letter, but did not respond to it.
Based on the foregoing findings, the hearing court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent violated Rules 1.4, 8.1 and 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility. More particularly, the hearing court concluded, the respondent’s lack of candor with respect to his payment of his client’s obligation, after having represented that he would do so, resulting in failure to inform the client as to the status of settlement payment to Sunoco, or explain to him what actually transpired with respect to it, constituted the communications violation. The violation of Rule 8.1 consisted of the respondent’s failure to respond in writing to Bar Counsel’s request for information. As to Rule 8.4, the hearing court explained:
“Respondent’s conduct of forging a signature of Sunoco’s counsel acknowledging receipt of thirteen thousand ($13,-000.00) dollars involved dishonesty, deceit, and misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(c). Such conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d) and these also violate Rule 8.4(a).”
The respondent negotiated the settlement of the contract dispute between his client, Charles D’Amico, a New Jersey petroleum dealer, and Sunoco. The settlement agreement provided that Mr. D’Amico would pay and Sunoco would accept $71,188.61 for the termination of Mr. D’Amico’s petroleum franchise. Mr. D’Amico authorized the respondent to wire the agreed sum directly to Sunoco, Consistent with that authorization and to facilitate the payment to Sunoco, on June 12, 2002, Mr. D’Amico, as instructed by the respondent, wired the agreed sum to a Bank of America account, “Mary Patricia M. Daskal, POD Dimitri G. Daskal,” which the respondent
represented was his attorney trust account. That account, which before the transfer had a balance of only $211.78, was not the respondent’s trust account. The respondent paid Sunoco only $32,740.00 of the $71, 188.61, by wire from the account on August 12, 2002, leaving a balance of $38,488.61. Nevertheless, the account balance as of October 8, 2002 was $1,554.08, and the respondent has never accounted for those funds. Although Bar Counsel notified the respondent of Mr. D’Amico’s complaint, requesting a written response, none was ever given. In addition, the respondent failed to appear in response to a subpoena to personally appear for a statement under oath, despite having been served and having requested the rescheduling of the proceeding.
On these facts, the hearing court concluded that the respondent violated all of the rules and statutes charged. His failure to keep Mr. D’Amico informed concerning the settlement proceeds and, in fact, misleading him by falsely advising him that the funds would be placed in his attorney trust account and then forwarded to Sunoco, was a violation of Rule 1.4. Rule 1.15 was violated, the hearing court determined, when: the respondent placed Mr.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Argued Before BELL, Chief Judge.
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, the petitioner, acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751,
approved the filing by Bar Counsel of a Petition For Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Dimitri G. Daskalopoulos, the respondent. In that petition, pursuant to two complaints filed against him, Bar Counsel charged the respondent with misconduct, as defined by Maryland Rules 16 — 701(i),
and 16-812, and consisting of violations of various of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, as adopted by the latter Maryland Rule, to wit:. Rules 1.4, Communication,
1.15, Safekeeping
Property,
8.1, Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters,
and 8.4, Misconduct,
other Maryland Rules,
ie.
16-603, Duty to
maintain account,
16-604, Trust Account-Required Deposits,
16-606, Name and Designation of Account,
16-607, Commingling of Funds,
16-609, Prohibited
Transactions,
and sections of Maryland Code (1989, 2000 Replacement Volume), of the Business Occupations and Professions Article,
namely, § 10-304, requiring expeditious deposit of trust money into an attorney’s trust account, 10-306, prohibiting the use of trust money “for any purpose other than the purpose for which the trust money is entrusted,” and 10-307, subjecting an attorney who misuses trust money to disciplinary action.
We referred the case to the Honorable Michael E. Loney, of the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, for hearing pursuant to Rules 16-752(a)
and 16-757(e).
Although he
accepted service, the respondent neither filed an answer to the petition or appeared at the hearing.
Consequently, an Order of Default was entered. Subsequently, following a hearing, the hearing court found facts, by clear and convincing evidence, and drew conclusions of law with respect to the complaints of David Rushfield and Charles D’Amico, respectively.
The respondent was retained by David Rushfield, a New Jersey petroleum dealer, in connection with a contract dispute with Sunoco. In June 2002, he negotiated a settlement of that dispute, under the terms of which Rushfield agreed to pay Sunoco fourteen thousand ($14,000.00) dollars. To accommodate his client, who wanted to delay paying Sunoco until after he settled on the purchase of property for a new gas station, the respondent promised Rushfield, conditioned on being repaid at a later time, that he would pay Sunoco for him. He did not do so. Two months later, however, the respondent presented Rushfield with a settlement agreement, purportedly between Rushfield and Sunoco, in which a “Joseph D. Zulli” acknowledged receipt of thirteen thousand ($18,000.00) dollars. The respondent signed that name. Subsequently, the respondent gave Rushfield a letter addressed to a Richard Gaines,
Esq. at Sunoco. According to that letter, due to a misunderstanding as to payment, lor which Sunoco was at fault, the respondent enclosed a second check, this one in the amount of fourteen thousand ($14,000.00) dollars, to cover Rushfield’s obligation to Sunoco. A complaint against the respondent having been filed with the petitioner on behalf of Mr. Rush-field, Bar Counsel sent respondent a letter advising him of that complaint. The respondent received and read that letter, but did not respond to it.
Based on the foregoing findings, the hearing court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent violated Rules 1.4, 8.1 and 8.4 of the Rules of Professional Responsibility. More particularly, the hearing court concluded, the respondent’s lack of candor with respect to his payment of his client’s obligation, after having represented that he would do so, resulting in failure to inform the client as to the status of settlement payment to Sunoco, or explain to him what actually transpired with respect to it, constituted the communications violation. The violation of Rule 8.1 consisted of the respondent’s failure to respond in writing to Bar Counsel’s request for information. As to Rule 8.4, the hearing court explained:
“Respondent’s conduct of forging a signature of Sunoco’s counsel acknowledging receipt of thirteen thousand ($13,-000.00) dollars involved dishonesty, deceit, and misrepresentation in violation of Rule 8.4(c). Such conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d) and these also violate Rule 8.4(a).”
The respondent negotiated the settlement of the contract dispute between his client, Charles D’Amico, a New Jersey petroleum dealer, and Sunoco. The settlement agreement provided that Mr. D’Amico would pay and Sunoco would accept $71,188.61 for the termination of Mr. D’Amico’s petroleum franchise. Mr. D’Amico authorized the respondent to wire the agreed sum directly to Sunoco, Consistent with that authorization and to facilitate the payment to Sunoco, on June 12, 2002, Mr. D’Amico, as instructed by the respondent, wired the agreed sum to a Bank of America account, “Mary Patricia M. Daskal, POD Dimitri G. Daskal,” which the respondent
represented was his attorney trust account. That account, which before the transfer had a balance of only $211.78, was not the respondent’s trust account. The respondent paid Sunoco only $32,740.00 of the $71, 188.61, by wire from the account on August 12, 2002, leaving a balance of $38,488.61. Nevertheless, the account balance as of October 8, 2002 was $1,554.08, and the respondent has never accounted for those funds. Although Bar Counsel notified the respondent of Mr. D’Amico’s complaint, requesting a written response, none was ever given. In addition, the respondent failed to appear in response to a subpoena to personally appear for a statement under oath, despite having been served and having requested the rescheduling of the proceeding.
On these facts, the hearing court concluded that the respondent violated all of the rules and statutes charged. His failure to keep Mr. D’Amico informed concerning the settlement proceeds and, in fact, misleading him by falsely advising him that the funds would be placed in his attorney trust account and then forwarded to Sunoco, was a violation of Rule 1.4. Rule 1.15 was violated, the hearing court determined, when: the respondent placed Mr. D’Amico’s funds in a personal account, rather than in his attorney trust account; did not promptly forward those funds to the third party to whom they were due; and failed to account for $38, 448.61 of those funds.
The Rule 8.1 violation consisted of the respondent’s failure to respond to the petitioner’s request for information. His failure to appear, after service, in response to a subpoena to personally appear for a statement under oath, also constituted a violation of that rule.
The hearing court found by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent misappropriated $38,448.61 of Mr. D’Amico’s money. Because misappropriation is criminal conduct which adversely reflects on the respondent’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness to practice law, it constitutes, the court concluded, a violation of Rule 8.4(b).
Such conduct, the
hearing court also concluded, is prejudicial to the administration of justice in violation of Rule 8.4(d) and constitutes a violation of the rules of professional conduct.
Violations of Maryland Rules 16-603, 16-604, 16-606, 16-607 and 16-609 were found by the hearing court based upon the respondent’s failure to: maintain an attorney trust account; deposit client funds in such an account; and name or designate such an account in a manner that clearly identifies it as such. The respondent also used funds for an unauthorized purpose, the hearing court concluded.
With respect to the charged violations of § § 10-304 and 10-307 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article, the hearing court was of the view that they were shown by the respondent’s deposit of Mr. D’Amico’s funds in an account that was not an attorney trust account and by the respondent’s failure to account for that portion of the D’Amico funds that were not paid as authorized and, therefore, did not belong to him.
The petitioner has taken exception to the hearing court’s failure to find in connection with the D’Amico complaint, a violation of Rule 8.4(c), proscribing conduct “involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misappropriation,” and § 10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article, prohibiting a lawyer’s use of trust money for a purpose other than that for which it was entrusted. It submits:
“The facts found by Judge Loney and his specific finding that Respondent knowingly misappropriated approximately half of the funds entrusted to him by [Mr.] D’Amico and that the funds were clearly disbursed for unauthorized and unintended purposes provide clear and convincing evidence of a violation of BOP § 10-306 and MRPC 8.4(c).” (Footnote omitted)
We agree. The petitioner’s exceptions, accordingly, are sustained.
Turning to the sanction, the petitioner recommends that the respondent be disbarred. It points out, in support of the recommendation, that, in addition to a myriad of violations of varying severity, the hearing court found that in the course of representing two clients, the respondent forged the signature of another attorney in one case and misappropriated more than $38,000.00, or more than half of the funds entrusted to him for the purpose of discharging the client’s contractual obligation, the amount of which the respondent negotiated, presumably for the client’s benefit. Such conduct, the petitioner contends, of itself, warrants the ultimate sanction. Indeed, the petitioner reminds us of what we have said quite often, that “misappropriation “is an act infected with deceit and dishonesty, and, in the absence of compelling extenuating circumstances justifying a lesser sanction, will result in disbarment.”
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Post,
379 Md. 60, 68, 839 A.2d 718, 723 (2003);
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Spery,
371 Md. 560, 568, 810 A.2d 487, 491-92 (2002). Thus, the general rule is, “disbarment will inevitably follow any unmitigated misappropriation of client, or any third party’s funds.”
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hayes,
367 Md. 504, 512-13, 789 A.2d 119, 124 (2002), and the cases therein cited. The same rule applies, moreover, it continues, when intentional dishonest conduct other than misappropriation is involved.
See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gallagher,
371 Md. 673, 715, 810 A.2d 996, 1021(2002);
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Vanderlinde,
364 Md. 376, 410, 773 A.2d 463, 483 (2001).
As we have seen, the respondent has not responded to the petitioner’s charges. He did not appear at the hearing and has not presented anything by way of mitigation for the Court to consider. There simply is nothing in this record that could, or would, mitigate the respondent’s conduct; there are no compelling extenuating circumstances that would justify a lesser sanction than disbarment. Consequently, we adopt the petitioner’s recommendation and order the respondent disbarred.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST DIMITRI G. DASKALOPOULOS.