Attorney General Opinion No.

Kansas Attorney General Reports·Decided August 29, 2002·Published

Opinion

Robert D. Hecht, District Attorney Shawnee County Courthouse, Suite 214 200 S.E. 7th Street Topeka, Kansas 66603

Dear Mr. Hecht:

As District Attorney for the Third Judicial District, you request our opinion regarding whether a person employed by a unified school district as a school law enforcement officer has the authority to engage in certain law enforcement activities. Specifically, you ask the following:

"1) May a `school law enforcement officer' under the authority of K.S.A. 72-8222 or any other relevant statute conduct radar or other methods of speed control or `speed traps' for the purposes of determining speed violations and the stopping of vehicles and issuing citations to the drivers thereof for speeding on public streets not owned by the School District but owned by other governmental entities and not bordering school property?

"2) Would the answer to number one (1) above be different if the public street owned by a governmental entity other than the School District was a street which bordered school property?

"3) May `school law enforcement officers' exercise general law enforcement powers, rights, privileges, protections and immunities in, at or on public streets not adjacent to school property which are school bus stops and/or school bus loading zones where students are regularly picked up or dropped off in regards to the transportation of students to and from public school attendance centers?

"4) Are public streets owned by the State, or County, or City, which border school properties, considered `areas adjacent thereto' as contemplated by K.S.A. 72-8222 for the purpose of school law enforcement officers exercising general law enforcement authority thereon?

"5) May school law enforcement officers stop pedestrians who appear of such an age that their not being in school would make them a truant under the provisions of K.S.A. 38-1502(a)[(6)]1 when they are not on school property or areas adjacent thereto? [and]

"6) May school law enforcement officers stop vehicles that are not on school property or areas adjacent thereto which vehicles are on public streets owned by the State, County, or City when the occupants reasonably appear of such an age that their not being at school would make them truant under the provisions of K.S.A.38-1502(a)[(6)]?"2

Prior to determining the issues you present, we believe it is important to clarify our understanding of terminology regarding classifications of school security officers. Based on information provided to us, it appears there are three categories of officers involved in performing the protective function of school property, personnel, and pupils: "school resource officer," "school security officer," and "school law enforcement officer." A "school resource officer" is a law enforcement officer employed by a local law enforcement agency who is assigned to a unified school district through an agreement between the local law enforcement agency and the school district. A "school security officer" is a person who is employed by a unified school district for the purpose of aiding and supplementing state and local law enforcement agencies, regardless whether the person is a law enforcement officer or has any connection with local law enforcement agencies. Any school security officer may be designated by a board of education as being a "school law enforcement officer,"3 permitting such officer to receive instruction at the Law Enforcement Training Center.4 Initially, we are asked to review the authority of a person appointed as a school law enforcement officer. As a follow-up, you ask us whether the authority of a school law enforcement officer is modified if the person serving in such capacity "is granted some kind of special commission or otherwise `deputized' by a sheriff or police department."5 We, therefore, are not reviewing the authority of a school resource officer in this opinion.

"A school district has only such power and authority as is granted by the legislature and its power to contract, including contracts for employment, is only such as is conferred either expressly or by necessary implication."6

"The board of education of any school district . . . may employ school security officers, and may designate any one or more of such school security officers as a school law enforcement officer, to aid and supplement law enforcement agencies of this state and of the community in which the school district . . . is located. The protective function of school security officers and school law enforcement officers shall extend to all school district property and the protection of students, teachers and other employees together with the property of such persons on or in any school . . . property or areas adjacent thereto, or while attending or located at the site of any school . . . sponsored function. While engaged in the protective functions specified in this section, each school security officer and each school law enforcement officer shall possess and exercise all general law enforcement powers, rights, privileges, protections and immunities in every county in which there is located any part of the territory of the school district. . . ."7

JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction in which an officer may perform the protective functions for which the officer is employed is established by State statute.8 The Legislature, "[p]resumably . . . recogniz[ing] that the safety and security of school personnel, teachers and students were not in all instances adequately protected by school security officers whose protective function stopped at the edge of the school site,"9 chose in 1976 to expand the area in which a school law enforcement officer exercises authority.10 The Legislature has determined that the jurisdiction of a school law enforcement officer "extend[s] to all school district property and the protection of students, teachers and other employees together with the property of such persons on or in any school . . . property or areas adjacent thereto, or while attending or locatedat the site of any school . . . sponsored function."11

"It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. (Citation omitted.) The legislature is presumed to have expressed its intent through the language of the statutory scheme it enacted. When a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed, rather than determine what the law should or should not be. (Citation omitted.) Stated another way, when a statute is plain and unambiguous, the appellate courts will not speculate as to the legislative intent behind it and will not read such a statute so as to add something not readily found in the statute."12

Through the plain language of the statute, jurisdiction of a school law enforcement officer is based on location, as well as control or ownership, of property.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Attorney General Opinion No., (kanag 2002).

Attorney General Opinion No. (Attorney General Opinion No.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Munguia v. Unified School District No. 328
125 F.3d 1353 (Tenth Circuit, 1997)
Gragg v. Unified School District No. 287
627 P.2d 335 (Court of Appeals of Kansas, 1981)
State v. Hennessee
658 P.2d 1034 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1983)
State v. Hargis
620 P.2d 1181 (Court of Appeals of Kansas, 1980)
In Re the Marriage of Killman
955 P.2d 1228 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1998)
National Education Ass'n v. Unified School District No. 259
674 P.2d 478 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1983)
State v. Miller
896 P.2d 1069 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1995)
Miller v. Board of Education
744 P.2d 865 (Court of Appeals of Kansas, 1987)
City of Junction City v. Riley
731 P.2d 310 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 1987)
In re L.A.
21 P.3d 952 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 2001)
In re Meyer
327 P.3d 407 (Supreme Court of Kansas, 2014)