Attorney General Opinion No.

Kansas Attorney General Reports·Decided December 21, 1998·Published

Opinion

Paul J. Morrison Johnson County District Attorney Johnson County Courthouse P.O. Box 728 Olathe, Kansas 66051

Dear Mr. Morrison:

As District Attorney in the Tenth Judicial District, you request our opinion regarding reports that are to be made by unified school districts pursuant to K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 72-89b03, as amended by L. 1998, Ch. 171, § 4. Specifically, you ask whether the statute allows a unified school district to formulate a procedure whereby school personnel would report an incident to a school resource officer. School personnel and the school resource officer would then review the incident to determine whether a formal police report should be made.

In 1995, the Legislature enacted the School Safety and Security Act, K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 72-89b01 et seq. The Act required unified school districts to compile information regarding certain conduct occurring at schools and school sponsored activities and to make reports to designated officials. Initially, the Act required schools to make reports regarding conduct which involved "a direct or immediate threat to the safety or security of a human life, the possession, use or disposal [of] explosives, firearms or other weapons, or the commission of an inherently dangerous criminal act," defined in the Act to include such actions as murder, kidnapping, arson, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, felony drug offenses, and sexually violent crimes.1 In 1996, the Legislature amended the reporting provisions of the Act. Thereafter, schools were required to report acts that "involved conduct which constitutes the commission of a felony or misdemeanor. . . ."2 The effect of the amendment was to expand the types of incidents which would have to be reported to law enforcement agencies. In its present form, the Act states in part:

"(b) Each board of education shall adopt a policy that will provide for includes:

"(1) A requirement that an immediate report be made to the appropriate state or local law enforcement agency by or on behalf of any school employee who knows or has reason to believe that an act has been committed at school, on school property, or at a school supervised activity and that the act involved conduct which constitutes the commission of a felony or misdemeanor or which involves the possession, use or disposal of explosives, firearms or other weapons,; and

"(2) the procedures for making such a report;."3

Subsection (b) of K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 72-89b04 makes willful and knowing failure of school personnel to make any report required by subsection (a)(1) of K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 72-89b03, as amended, or preventing or interfering with the making of such report, a class B nonperson misdemeanor, subjecting the person to confinement in the county jail for not more than six months4 and/or a fine not exceeding $1,000.5 School administrators and personnel are not subject to subsection (b) of K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 72-89b04 if:

"(1) They follow the procedures of a policy adopted pursuant to the provisions of subsection (b) [of K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 72-89b03, as amended]; or

"(2) their board of education fails to adopt such policy."6

Determining whether the proposed policy complies with the reporting requirements of K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 72-89b03, as amended, requires interpretation of the statutory provisions. "The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and th[e] court's review is unlimited. Under the fundamental rule of statutory construction, the intent of the legislature governs when that intent can be ascertained from the statute."7 "[I]t is fundamental that the intent of the legislature governs and, when construing a statute, a court should give words in common usage their natural and ordinary meaning."8 "When a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed, rather than determine what the law should or should not be."9

Because willful and knowing failure to make reports required under K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 72-89b03, as amended, may subject a person to confinement and/or a fine, rules regarding the proper construction of criminal statutes must be considered.

"The general rule is that a criminal statute must be strictly construed in favor of the accused and any reasonable doubt about the meaning is decided in favor of anyone subjected to the criminal statute. However, this rule is subordinate to the rule that judicial interpretation must be reasonable and sensible to effect legislative design and intent."10

Clearly, K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 72-89b03, as amended, requires that reports required under the statute be made to a law enforcement agency. In order to determine whether the proposed procedure meets the requirements of subsection (b)(1) of 1997 Supp. 72-89b03, as amended, it must be determined whether a school resource officer is an "appropriate state or local law enforcement agency."

The School Safety and Security Act does not include a definition for "law enforcement agency." Following the rules of statutory construction, the natural and ordinary meaning of the term is applicable. Law enforcement agencies are those agencies charged with a duty to make arrests for violations of law.11 Two cases have, without discussion, included the police, county attorney, Attorney General12, and the Kansas Highway Patrol13 as law enforcement agencies. It was determined in Attorney General Opinion No. 97-7 that the Kansas National Guard was a law enforcement agency for a limited purpose. The natural and ordinary meaning of the term, however, does not include entities which constitute law enforcement agencies for only limited purposes. Unified school districts are required by subsection (b) of K.S.A. 1997 Supp.

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