Fee Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Snyder

930 P.2d 1054, 261 Kan. 414, 1997 Kan. LEXIS 6
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedJanuary 24, 1997
Docket74,709
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 930 P.2d 1054 (Fee Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Snyder) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Fee Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Snyder, 930 P.2d 1054, 261 Kan. 414, 1997 Kan. LEXIS 6 (kan 1997).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Davis, J.:

The district court held an incorporator personally liable for a corporate debt because a duplicate copy of the articles of incorporation had not been recorded with tire local register of deeds. K.S.A. 17-6003(c)(5). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a 1987 amendment to 17-6003 no longer required the register of deeds recordation to effect corporate existence. On petition for review, we conclude that recordation with the register of deeds remains a requirement for corporate existence under Kansas corporation law.

Fee Insurance Agency, Inc., (Fee Insurance) filed a petition in Reno County District Court against codefendants E.A. Epperly, Inc., (E.A. Epperly), Elizabeth Epperly, and James Snyder for. an unpaid debt of $2,351.87. Snyder answered that as he was a stockholder in E.A. Epperly, he should be shielded from any personal liability for the corporate debt. E.A. Epperly had never recorded its articles of incorporation with the local register of deeds. The district court held that the claim of corporate shield was invalid because under K.S.A. 17-6003(c)(5), recordation of the articles of incorporation with the Reno County Register of Deeds was a prerequisite for corporate existence. Snyder was therefore held personally hable for the debt of $2,351.87.

Snyder appealed the district court’s decision to the Court of Appeals. The case was placed on summary calendar and was decided without oral argument and upon stipulated facts. The stipulated facts included: (1) the petition filed by Fee Insurance; (2) Snyder’s answer; (3) the district court’s memorandum decision; and (4) an affidavit of Maty Trock, Register of Deeds for Reno County, stating that the articles of incorporation for E.A. Epperly had not been recorded.

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that prior to the 1987 amendment to 17-6003(d), Kansas law required, as a prerequisite to corporate existence, recordation of the duplicate copy of the articles of incorporation with the register of deeds. This precise *416 issue was resolved in the case of State ex. rel. McCain v. Construction Enterprises, Inc., 6 Kan. App. 2d 627, 631 P.2d 1240 (1981). McCain raised the question whether the operators of a defectively formed corporation were personally liable for the company’s unemployment taxes. Not unlike the case we now consider, the corporation had failed to record a certified copy of the articles of incorporation in the office of the register of deeds of the county in which the corporation’s registered office was located. McCain held that the old version of 17-6003(c)(5) required such recordation and that K.S.A. 17-6006 provided that the corporate existence began upon the incorporators’ compliance with 17-6003. Thus, the law in Kansas was well settled by McCain:

“No de jure or de facto corporation can exist until the articles of incorporation are both filed with the secretary of state and recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county in which the corporation’s registered office is located.” 6 Kan. App. 2d 627, Syl.

The Court of Appeals rejected McCain on the basis of a legislative amendment to 17-6003 occurring in 1987. L. 1987, ch. 89, § 1. Prior to July 1, 1987, K.S.A. 1986 Supp. 17-6003(d) provided:

“Any instrument filed in accordance with subsection (c) of this section shall be effective upon its filing date except that if the instrument is not recorded in accordance with paragraph (5) of subsection (c) within 20 days after its filing date, the instrument shall not take effect until it is so recorded and the recording fee to be collected by the register of deeds shall be increased by 25%.” (Emphasis added.)

After the 1987 amendment, K.S.A. 17-6003(d) states:

“Any instrument filed in accordance with subsection (c) shall be effective upon its filing date except that if the instrument is not recorded in accordance with paragraph (5) of subsection (c) within 20 days after its filing date, the recording fee to be collected by the register of deeds shall be increased by 25%.”

Notably absent from the 1987 legislation is the language that “the instrument shall not take effect until it is so recorded.” Yet, the late filing fee increase of 25% remained.

Upon examining this amendment, the Court of Appeals held:

“ The statutes now provide that upon properly filing the articles of incorporation with the Secretary of State, they are effective upon such date regardless of whether they are recorded with the register of deeds. However, if articles of incorporation *417 are not recorded within 20 days of filing, the recording fee increases.” Fee Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Snyder, 22 Kan. App. 2d at 408.

The specific question we are faced with is whether, as a prerequisite to coiporate existence, a duplicate copy of the instrument so certified by the Secretary of State must be recorded in the office of the register of deeds of the county in which the corporation’s registered office in this state is, or is to be, located under the provisions of K.S.A. 17-6003(c)(5). Resolution of the issue in this case involves the interpretation of K.S.A. 17-6003. Interpretation of a statute is a question of law. An appellate court’s review of a question of law is unlimited. See State v. Donlay, 253 Kan. 132, 133-34, 853 P.2d 680 (1993).

“ Tt is a fundamental rule of statutory construction, to which all other rules are subordinate, that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained.’ ” City of Wichita v. 200 South Broadway, 253 Kan. 434, 436, 855 P.2d 956 (1993) (quoting West v. Collins, 251 Kan. 657, Syl. ¶¶ 3, 4, 840 P.2d 435 [1992]). Legislative intent

“ ‘is to be determined from a general consideration of the entire act. Effect must be given, if possible, to the entire act and every part thereof. To this end, it is the duty of the court, as far as practicable, to reconcile the different provisions so as to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible.’ ” Todd v. Kelly, 251 Kan.

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Bluebook (online)
930 P.2d 1054, 261 Kan. 414, 1997 Kan. LEXIS 6, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/fee-ins-agency-inc-v-snyder-kan-1997.