Attebery v. Henwood

177 S.W.2d 95, 1943 Tex. App. LEXIS 724
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedNovember 25, 1943
DocketNo. 6080.
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 177 S.W.2d 95 (Attebery v. Henwood) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Attebery v. Henwood, 177 S.W.2d 95, 1943 Tex. App. LEXIS 724 (Tex. Ct. App. 1943).

Opinions

JOHNSON, Chief Justice.

This suit was brought by R. J. Attebery and wife, Susan, against Berryman Hen-wood, trustee, St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company of Texas, debtor, to recover damages alleged to have been sustained by plaintiffs on account of the death of their son Wesley Attebery who was killed about 5:45 o’clock on the morning of November 8, 1941, when a gravel truck, driven by C. C. Ward, on which the deceased was riding as a passenger or guest, was struck by one of defendant’s pas- *96 sender trains, about 10 miles west of Texarkana in Bowie County, Texas, at the intersection of a public road and defendant’s railroad, known as the Trexler crossing. Judgment was entered in favor of defendant upon a jury verdict. Plaintiffs have appealed.

Appellants-’ Points 1, 2,'3 and 4 raise the contention that there is an irreconcilable conflict in answers of the jury to special issues, rendering the verdict insufficient as the basis for judgment. The jury found, in substance, that defendant was negligent ■ in failing to' sound the-whistle and in failing to ring the bell at a distance of 80 rods from the crossing, and in failing . to keep the bell ringing from said distance until the train' reached the crossing; and that the defendant was negligent in operating the train'at a speed of 60 miles 'per, hour immediately before the collision. The jury found further that C. C. Ward, .driver of the. truck, was negligent in failing to look and in failing to listen for a train before driving upon the crossing; and that the deceased was negligent in failing to look and in failing to listen for a train before Ward drove the truck upon the crossing. But the jury further found that none of said acts of negligence on the part of defendant or Ward or the deceased was a proximate cause of the collision. The' jury further found that it was not an unavoidable accident.' The contention is made that the finding, 'that it was not ‘'an unavoidable accident, is in conflict with the findings that the accident was not caused by the negligence of the defendant or of Ward or of the deceased, in the acts inquired about in the issues submitted.

The record shows that not all the issues of negligence raised by the testimony were submitted to the jury. Appellant pleaded, and, in our opinion, the testimony was sufficient to raise the issues as to whether it was an extra-hazardous crossing, at which appellee had negligently failed to provide a flagman, or some mechanical warning device. Such issues were not submitted to the jury. The jury may have concluded that such was a proximate cause of the accident. So, the fact that the jury found that it was not an unavoidable accident and failed to find that the accident was caused by any of the acts inquired about in the issues submitted, does not in the facts of this record present an irreconcilable conflict in the findings of the jury. ' The assignment is overruled.

Appellants’ fifth and sixth .points raise the contention that the court erred in refusing to submit their requested special issues 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, inquiring whether appellee had failed to place a flagman at the crossing or to.equip.it with a bell, gong, or other mechanical device to warn persons about to use the crossing of the approach of trains; and was such failure, negligence, and a proximate cause of the collision.- Appellee makes the counter-contention that refusal to submit said requested special issues was not error: (1) Because there was no evidence tending to show that it was an extra-hazardous crossing; and (2) because there was no issue sub-, mitted, or requested, inquiring whether the crossing was extra hazardous.

Appellants’’ witnesses testified, in sub-' stance, that the Tfexler crossing where: the accident occurred is located about Í0 miles west of Texarkana, in Bowie County, Texas, at a point where appellee’s- railroad runs east and west; that the Shipley Gravel Pit is located immediately south' of the railroad about ¼ mile east of the Trexler crossing; that from the Shipley Gravel Pit west the public road closely parallels the railroad to the approach of the crossing, where it makes - a sharp right-hand turn to the north, and- thence passes over the railroad track; that at the point of turning from west to north, at the approach of the crossing, the public road is located a distance estimated from 45 to 65 feet south of the rails; and that the public road at said point is about 20 feet lower than the railroad track and continues to become lower back east to, or near to, the gravel pit; that the gravel truck in which deceased was riding at the time he was killed had traveled, from the Shipley Gravel Pit, west to the approach of the crossing, where it stopped or nearly stopped, turned to the north and was passing over the crossing, when hit by one of appellee’s passenger trains traveling west. At the crossing there is nothing to obstruct a. person’s view of a train approaching from the east for approximately 80 rods, unless it be the height of the railroad embankment above the public road, and a “cut”, as indicated by the following testimony: “A man in a truck or vehicle traveling west down the Shipley road from the Shipley pit to this crossing and turning *97 north over the crossing can cast his eyes to the right or east, and see plumb down to the Shipley house. You can see to the Shipley house, but you might not see a train plumb down there because it comes out of a cut down there. It is approximately less than a quarter of a mile to that cut. I can see that cut in this photograph, and I can see where the train would come, and it might be just as straight as a crow can fly plumb on through. From the intersection south of the railroad or from the turn south of the railroad to the crossing, this distance of 45 to 65 feet, the view of the track to the right is plain plumb on down there, but not plumb on down to the Shipley house, because you are down longer than the railroad track at that time, and that is why you can’t see it.”

The testimony further shows that at the time and for a month or more prior to the accident about 50 trucks were engaged in hauling gravel from the Shipley Pit to two large War Plants being constructed north of the Trexler crossing where the accident occurred; that each truck made an average of 14 loads (the 50 trucks making a total of approximately 1400 single trips) per day over this crossing, beginning about 4 or 4:30 o’clock each morning; that in addition to said gravel trucks the travel over this crossing by other motor vehicles was “heavy”; that said War Plants employed “thousands” of people, many of whom passed over this crossing in going to and from their work; that for several weeks prior to the accident the traffic over this crossing was in a “congested” condition. Appellee’s engineer operating the train involved in the accident testified that four passenger trains, making eight passages, and “lots” of freight trains, passed over this crossing each day. The engineer and fireman further testified to the effect that they had been passing this point twice each day at approximately 5 o’clock a. m. and Í0 o’clock p. m. and that they had never seen a truck pass over this crossing or any character of traffic using it.

No flagman was stationed at the Trexler crossing, nor was it equipped with any mechanical device to give warning of the approach of trains. No issue was submitted, and none requested, inquiring whether it was an extra-hazardous crossing.

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Bluebook (online)
177 S.W.2d 95, 1943 Tex. App. LEXIS 724, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/attebery-v-henwood-texapp-1943.