Atlantic Coast Life Ins. Co. v. United States

76 F. Supp. 627, 36 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1396, 1948 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2879
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. South Carolina
DecidedJanuary 16, 1948
Docket1712
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 76 F. Supp. 627 (Atlantic Coast Life Ins. Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. South Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Atlantic Coast Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 627, 36 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1396, 1948 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2879 (southcarolinaed 1948).

Opinion

WARING, District Judge.

Opinion

The most recent controlling decision of the Supreme Court expounding and explaining the proper application of taxes under the social security act is in the case of United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 67 S.Ct. 1463. In that case, together with a companion case (Harrison v. Greyvan Lines, Inc.,) passed upon in the same opinion, the Court gives a full and complete discussion of the impact of the social.security act upon the relationship of employer and employee and the opinion sheds considerable new light upon the proper approach to and consideration of this act and its effect.

The parties have cited and strongly rely upon certain cases decided before the recent decision in United States v. Silk, supra. In view of that decision, most of the cited cases are of little help but reference to a few of those more strongly stressed may be advisable.

The plaintiff argues at length that this case is similar to and should be governed by Magruder v. Yellow Cab Co., 141 F.2d 324, 152 A.L.R. 516, decided in 1944 by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. There it was held that taxi cab drivers were not employees. But an examination of the facts in that case, as set forth in the court’s opinion (and more fully set forth in the opinion of the District Court, 49 F.Supp. 605) shows a very different situation from the one at bar. There the taxi cab drivers paid rental for the cabs furnished by the company and retained all fares collected. While of course the company had a general control over the method of operation of their cabs, it is quite clear that the drivers did not get any wages or remuneration from the company and they were independent contractors operating a business of their own. A case involving practically the same facts was decided in similar fashion by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, United States v. Davis, 154 F.2d 314.

In Johnson v. Altmeyer, 63 F.Supp. 796, the District Court for the Western District, of Kentucky held that a life insurance agent who operated entirely on a commission basis was an employee. Whereas, in the more recent case of Gause-Ware Service Insurance Company v. Thomas, 76 F. Supp. 626, the District Court for the Northern District of Texas decided that *629 an agent for an industrial insurance company was not an employee. The District Court did not write an opinion hut merely filed conclusions without giving any reasons therefor. It appears that the case was appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for. the Fifth Grcuit but was there dismissed on motion of the appellant without opinion; so that we do not know whether some settlement was arrived at or what the views of the court might have been. See Thomas, Community Survivor, v. Gause-Ware Service Insurance Company, 5 Cir., 159 F.2d 1018.

Many other cases which may be persuasive have been called to my attention and particularly a very large number of various state decisions. These latter have not been of great help because of the reason that they almost invariably are governed by the particular form of the statute involved.

The South Carolina case of Carter’s Dependents v. Palmetto State Life Insurance Co., 209 S.C. 67, 38 S.E.2d 905, is cited as showing the views of the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina as to the status of an industrial insurance agent under the South Carolina Workmen’s Compensation Act. But that case is not in any way controlling in a discussion of the status of an agent under the Federal Social Security Act and is decided entirely within the purview of the State Compensation Act, 39 S.C. Statutes at Large, page 1231 et seq., and the test announced by the court is wholly that of control of the employee. The court there decides that the question of whether the employer has the right of control is to be determined from, the contract and holds that the contracts with the agents did not give the requisite control. But the decision is not at all in accord, and is in fact in conflict, with the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Silk case, supra.

Among many other cases cited by the plaintiff is that of Schwing v. United States, 65 F.Supp. 227, where the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that certain tailors employed in making garments were independent contractors rather than employees under the social security laws. The court held that it did not appear that the employers (plaintiffs) had “such control over how the tailors were to produce the desired product * * * as to lead to the conclusion that these journeyman tailors were plaintiffs’ employees.” (Page 230 of 65 F.Supp.). It will thus be seen that the element of control was the deciding factor m that case in the District Court. However, this case went to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and on January 7, 1948, that court handed down a decision reversing the District Court. 165 F.2d 518. The opinion is extremely interesting, mainly from the standpoint that it approaches the question from a new viewpoint as a result of the case of United States v. Silk, supra. I have been furnished with a copy of the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals which has not yet appeared in the official reports. The court says: “In determining whether the individual tailors were employees or not under these facts, it is clear that the District Court in both cases applied the restricted common law definition of ‘employee’, under which the findings that the taxpayers did not control the details and means by which a satisfactory garment was to be produced and the taxpayers did not supply equipment and a place to work were crucial. However, in the companion decisions of United States v. Silk and Harrison v. Greyvan Lines, Inc., 331 U.S. 704, 67 S.Ct. 1463, 1468, the Supreme Court has recently indicated that the technical common law concepts are not necessarily controlling in cases of this sort and that ‘the primary consideration in the determination of the applicability of the statutory definition is whether effectuation of the declared policy and purposes of the Act comprehend securing to the individual the rights guaranteed and protection afforded by the Act.’ See United States v. Silk, supra, 331 U.S. 704, at page 713, 67 S.Ct. 1463, at page 1468.”

While the facts in regard to the employment of tailors have many differences from the case at bar, nevertheless, the reasoning of the court and the adoption of the new point of view brought about by the Silk case decision is significant and very persuasive.

*630 And so I am of the opinion that this matter must be considered by me as a case of novel impression, due to be considered in the broad light shed by the opinion in the Silk case.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Colvin v. Comm'r
2007 T.C. Memo. 157 (U.S. Tax Court, 2007)
Kraus v. Comm'r
2003 T.C. Memo. 10 (U.S. Tax Court, 2003)
MORRIS v. COMMISSIONER
2001 T.C. Summary Opinion 2 (U.S. Tax Court, 2001)
Day v. Commissioner
2000 T.C. Memo. 375 (U.S. Tax Court, 2000)
Weber v. Commissioner
103 T.C. No. 19 (U.S. Tax Court, 1994)
Gierek v. Commissioner
1993 T.C. Memo. 642 (U.S. Tax Court, 1993)
Johnson v. Commissioner
1993 T.C. Memo. 530 (U.S. Tax Court, 1993)
Professional & Executive Leasing v. Commissioner
89 T.C. No. 19 (U.S. Tax Court, 1987)
Simpson v. Commissioner
64 T.C. 974 (U.S. Tax Court, 1975)
Ellison v. Commissioner
55 T.C. 142 (U.S. Tax Court, 1970)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
76 F. Supp. 627, 36 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 1396, 1948 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2879, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/atlantic-coast-life-ins-co-v-united-states-southcarolinaed-1948.