[739]*739DURHAM, J.
Employer appeals from a Workers’ Compensation Board order affirming a permanent partial disability (PPD) award to claimant. Employer contends that the Board erred in applying pre-July 1, 1990, law to this case, because a hearing was not convened before that date, as required by Or Laws 1990 (Spec Sess), ch 2, § 54(2). Employer also contends that the Board’s conclusion that claimant’s back condition is compensable is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
On May 2, 1987, claimant compensably injured his knee. Employer accepted thé claim, which was closed by a January 11, 1988, determination order. On March 21, 1988, claimant compensably injured his back. Employer accepted the claim, which was closed on July 13,1988, with an award for time loss. In April, 1989, claimant’s knee symptoms worsened, and he filed an aggravation claim. That claim was resolved by a stipulation on February 1,1990. On August 19, 1989, he walked down stairs, felt pain in his right knee, fell and again injured his back. On January 2, 1990, employer denied compensability of the back condition. On February 26, 1990, claimant requested a hearing on the denial. The Board scheduled a hearing for July 12, . 1990.
On May 7, 1990, the legislature passed a statute revising the Workers’ Compensation Law but excepted certain claims in litigation. Or Laws 1990 (Spec Sess), ch 2, § 54(2) provides:
“Any matter regarding a claim which is in litigation before the Hearings Division, the board, the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court under this chapter and regarding which a request for hearing was filed before May 1, 1990, and a hearing was convened before July 1, 1990, shall be determined pursuant to the law in effect before July 1, 1990.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The Board did not conduct a hearing in this case on July 12, 1990. Instead, it issued a notice to the parties and conducted a proceeding on June 25, 1990, before a referee. The transcript1 indicates that the referee announced that he [740]*740officially convened the hearing on the merits, acknowledged the appearance of claimants’ counsel, admitted an exhibit, obtained counsel’s waiver of a notice of the rights of the parties in workers’ compensation cases, preserved objections or motions by any party to the convening of the hearing before July 1,1990, and recessed the hearing to a later date. Employer made no appearance. The proceeding occurred at a [741]*741Salem hotel and was one of many proceedings conducted in a similar manner that day.
The record does not explain the reason for the procedure, but we can intuit it. The Board’s backlog prevented it from scheduling many cases within the 90-day deadline set by ORS 656.283(4).2 For example, the original July 12, 1990, hearing in this case was set 136 days after the request for hearing was filed. The problem was further complicated by the May 7, 1990, amendment, which declared that a claim would be governed by the new law if a hearing was not convened prior to July 1,1990. A party who had requested a hearing on or before April 1,1990, would be legally entitled to a hearing before July 1,1990, but, due to the backlog, it would not be set by that date and the new law would govern the claim. The Board convened the abbreviated proceedings so that its backlog, a problem not within the control of any party, would not deprive parties who had requested a hearing by April 1, 1990, of the right to have the pre-July 1, 1990, law govern their proceedings.
Employer contends that the referee did not “convene a hearing” within the meaning of the 1990 amendment, that the Board had no authority to schedule a hearing on June 25, 1990, and that the proceeding on that date was a sham, because “[i]ts sole purpose was to force hundreds of cases to be decided under the old law.”
The 1990 amendment does not specially define the terms “convene” or “hearing.” Accordingly, we discern the legislature’s intention by giving them their natural, plain and obvious meaning, if there is one. Perez v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 289 Or 295, 299, 613 P2d 32 (1980); see City of Portland v. Smith, 314 Or 178, 186, 838 P2d 568 (1992). A common definition of “convene”, is:
“1. to come together or assemble, usually for some public purpose; 2. to cause to assemble; convoke; 3. to summon to appear, as before a judicial officer.” Random House [742]*742Dictionary of the English Language 443 (unabridged 2d ed 1987).
A common definition of “hearing” is:
“3. opportunity to be heard * * * 4. an instance or a session in which testimony and arguments are presented, esp. before an official, as a judge in a lawsuit.” Random House Dictionary of the English Language 882 (unabridged 2d ed 1987).
Another common meaning for “hearing” is “a trial before an administrative tribunal.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1044 (unabridged 1976).
The legislative history of the 1990 amendment is instructive. On May 4, 1990, Representative Mannix explained the “litigation” exception to the Interim Special Committee on Workers’ Compensation:
“There’s literally at least 20,000 cases in litigation right now, and without some special exemption with the operative dates here, technically any of those cases going to hearing or going through the appellate process would have to be revisited as to the language of this Act, and as the lawyers on this committee know, that would be a nightmare. So it would allow those cases where there’s been a request for hearing filed before May 1 and the hearing is held by July 1 of this year, to continue through the system under the standards in effect at the time that the cases were filed and not apply this law to them.” Tape Recording, Interim Special Committee on Workers’ Compensation, May 4, 1990, Tape 21, Side B at 230-44.
On May 7,1990, Mannix again explained that provision during the House floor debate:
“And the other exception is the litigation exception. For once, our legislature has recognized that there are actually tens of thousands of cases in litigation and we’re not going to reinvent the wheel on those cases. We will let those cases proceed under the standards in which they were tried, so that you, again, will not be creating more work for lawyers.” Tape Recording, House Special Session, Floor Debate, May 7, 1990, Tape 2, Side A at 260.
Mannix’s language was imprecise. On May 4, he used the phrase “hearing is held,” and on May 7 referred to the standards in effect on the date the case is “tried.” However, he was describing a bill that used the phrase “hearing was [743]*743convened.” Mannix’s statements do not suggest that he understood the words “convene” and “hearing” to have a definition different from the ordinary definitions that we have discussed. These are instances in which, “although Mannix’s language was inaccurate, it is possible for us to glean his meaning.” SAIF v. Herron, 114 Or App 64, 70, 836 P2d 131 (1992). The legislature’s overriding concern was to avoid the cost and frustration of applying the new law to cases that had progressed to a hearing convened before July 1, 1990.
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[739]*739DURHAM, J.
Employer appeals from a Workers’ Compensation Board order affirming a permanent partial disability (PPD) award to claimant. Employer contends that the Board erred in applying pre-July 1, 1990, law to this case, because a hearing was not convened before that date, as required by Or Laws 1990 (Spec Sess), ch 2, § 54(2). Employer also contends that the Board’s conclusion that claimant’s back condition is compensable is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.
On May 2, 1987, claimant compensably injured his knee. Employer accepted thé claim, which was closed by a January 11, 1988, determination order. On March 21, 1988, claimant compensably injured his back. Employer accepted the claim, which was closed on July 13,1988, with an award for time loss. In April, 1989, claimant’s knee symptoms worsened, and he filed an aggravation claim. That claim was resolved by a stipulation on February 1,1990. On August 19, 1989, he walked down stairs, felt pain in his right knee, fell and again injured his back. On January 2, 1990, employer denied compensability of the back condition. On February 26, 1990, claimant requested a hearing on the denial. The Board scheduled a hearing for July 12, . 1990.
On May 7, 1990, the legislature passed a statute revising the Workers’ Compensation Law but excepted certain claims in litigation. Or Laws 1990 (Spec Sess), ch 2, § 54(2) provides:
“Any matter regarding a claim which is in litigation before the Hearings Division, the board, the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court under this chapter and regarding which a request for hearing was filed before May 1, 1990, and a hearing was convened before July 1, 1990, shall be determined pursuant to the law in effect before July 1, 1990.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The Board did not conduct a hearing in this case on July 12, 1990. Instead, it issued a notice to the parties and conducted a proceeding on June 25, 1990, before a referee. The transcript1 indicates that the referee announced that he [740]*740officially convened the hearing on the merits, acknowledged the appearance of claimants’ counsel, admitted an exhibit, obtained counsel’s waiver of a notice of the rights of the parties in workers’ compensation cases, preserved objections or motions by any party to the convening of the hearing before July 1,1990, and recessed the hearing to a later date. Employer made no appearance. The proceeding occurred at a [741]*741Salem hotel and was one of many proceedings conducted in a similar manner that day.
The record does not explain the reason for the procedure, but we can intuit it. The Board’s backlog prevented it from scheduling many cases within the 90-day deadline set by ORS 656.283(4).2 For example, the original July 12, 1990, hearing in this case was set 136 days after the request for hearing was filed. The problem was further complicated by the May 7, 1990, amendment, which declared that a claim would be governed by the new law if a hearing was not convened prior to July 1,1990. A party who had requested a hearing on or before April 1,1990, would be legally entitled to a hearing before July 1,1990, but, due to the backlog, it would not be set by that date and the new law would govern the claim. The Board convened the abbreviated proceedings so that its backlog, a problem not within the control of any party, would not deprive parties who had requested a hearing by April 1, 1990, of the right to have the pre-July 1, 1990, law govern their proceedings.
Employer contends that the referee did not “convene a hearing” within the meaning of the 1990 amendment, that the Board had no authority to schedule a hearing on June 25, 1990, and that the proceeding on that date was a sham, because “[i]ts sole purpose was to force hundreds of cases to be decided under the old law.”
The 1990 amendment does not specially define the terms “convene” or “hearing.” Accordingly, we discern the legislature’s intention by giving them their natural, plain and obvious meaning, if there is one. Perez v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 289 Or 295, 299, 613 P2d 32 (1980); see City of Portland v. Smith, 314 Or 178, 186, 838 P2d 568 (1992). A common definition of “convene”, is:
“1. to come together or assemble, usually for some public purpose; 2. to cause to assemble; convoke; 3. to summon to appear, as before a judicial officer.” Random House [742]*742Dictionary of the English Language 443 (unabridged 2d ed 1987).
A common definition of “hearing” is:
“3. opportunity to be heard * * * 4. an instance or a session in which testimony and arguments are presented, esp. before an official, as a judge in a lawsuit.” Random House Dictionary of the English Language 882 (unabridged 2d ed 1987).
Another common meaning for “hearing” is “a trial before an administrative tribunal.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1044 (unabridged 1976).
The legislative history of the 1990 amendment is instructive. On May 4, 1990, Representative Mannix explained the “litigation” exception to the Interim Special Committee on Workers’ Compensation:
“There’s literally at least 20,000 cases in litigation right now, and without some special exemption with the operative dates here, technically any of those cases going to hearing or going through the appellate process would have to be revisited as to the language of this Act, and as the lawyers on this committee know, that would be a nightmare. So it would allow those cases where there’s been a request for hearing filed before May 1 and the hearing is held by July 1 of this year, to continue through the system under the standards in effect at the time that the cases were filed and not apply this law to them.” Tape Recording, Interim Special Committee on Workers’ Compensation, May 4, 1990, Tape 21, Side B at 230-44.
On May 7,1990, Mannix again explained that provision during the House floor debate:
“And the other exception is the litigation exception. For once, our legislature has recognized that there are actually tens of thousands of cases in litigation and we’re not going to reinvent the wheel on those cases. We will let those cases proceed under the standards in which they were tried, so that you, again, will not be creating more work for lawyers.” Tape Recording, House Special Session, Floor Debate, May 7, 1990, Tape 2, Side A at 260.
Mannix’s language was imprecise. On May 4, he used the phrase “hearing is held,” and on May 7 referred to the standards in effect on the date the case is “tried.” However, he was describing a bill that used the phrase “hearing was [743]*743convened.” Mannix’s statements do not suggest that he understood the words “convene” and “hearing” to have a definition different from the ordinary definitions that we have discussed. These are instances in which, “although Mannix’s language was inaccurate, it is possible for us to glean his meaning.” SAIF v. Herron, 114 Or App 64, 70, 836 P2d 131 (1992). The legislature’s overriding concern was to avoid the cost and frustration of applying the new law to cases that had progressed to a hearing convened before July 1, 1990. The legislature could have excepted only those hearings that had reached an advanced stage, such as the taking of testimony or argument, but did not do so.
The continuance of the June 25,1990, proceeding, a common event in any adjudication, does not determine whether the hearing was convened. The Board’s motive also does not decide the issue. The proceeding involved no testimony or argument, but it did involve several procedures common to administrative hearings. The referee summoned the parties, opened the hearing record, acknowledged the presence or absence of the parties, admitted an exhibit, obtained claimants’ acknowledgement that the proceeding was a contested case under ORS ch 656 and a waiver of claimants’ rights under ORS 183.413 to a notice of hearing procedures, and afforded the parties an opportunity to be heard, at least with respect to those procedures. He conducted an initial part of the hearing. Because he convened the parties and commenced the hearing before July 1, 1990, the Board did not err in applying pre-July 1, 1990, law to this case.
We reject the employer’s argument that the Board had no authority to schedule the June 25, 1990, proceeding after it had initially set a hearing on July 12, 1990. The Board may conduct a hearing on 10 days’ notice to the parties. ORS 656.283(5). Nothing prevents it from accelerating a requested hearing, so long as it complies with the notice requirement. Employer does not argue that it did not receive a timely notice of the hearing.
Finally, employer assigns error to the Board’s determination that claimant had established the compensability of his back condition. We review for substantial evidence and errors of law. ORS 656.298(6); ORS 183.482(7), (8). Several doctors gave different opinions of the cause of claimant’s [744]*744injury. The referee found that claimant was credible. He also accepted the opinion of Dr. Young, who believed that meniscal tears caused claimant to fall and hurt his back. In Armstrong v. Asten-Hill Co., 90 Or App 200, 206, 752 P2d 312 (1988), says:
“[I]f there are doctors on both sides of a medical issue, whichever way the Board finds the facts will probably have substantial evidentiary support.”
This is such a case.
Affirmed.