Associated School Boards of South Dakota, Inc. v. Hughes County

2002 SD 41, 643 N.W.2d 417, 2002 S.D. LEXIS 43
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedApril 3, 2002
DocketNone
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 2002 SD 41 (Associated School Boards of South Dakota, Inc. v. Hughes County) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering South Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Associated School Boards of South Dakota, Inc. v. Hughes County, 2002 SD 41, 643 N.W.2d 417, 2002 S.D. LEXIS 43 (S.D. 2002).

Opinion

GILBERTSON, Chief Justice.

[¶ 1.] The Associated School Boards of South Dakota, Inc., (ASBSD) appeals the tax assessed by Hughes County (County) on ASBSD’s new building at 306 East Capitol Avenue, Pierre, South Dakota. ASBSD claims that it is entitled to exempt status for more than 42.5 percent of the value of its property because the entities renting ASBSD’s property are, themselves, benevolent organizations using the property for benevolent purposes. The circuit court upheld the tax for 57.5 percent of the property. We reverse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

[¶ 2.] ASBSD is an educational organization that provides assistance for 176 member school boards across South Dakota. As a not-for-profit, § 501(c)(3) corporation, ASBSD is exempt from federal income tax. The organization has also been exempt from real property tax since 1987, when it acquired the original building at 306 East Capitol Avenue in Pierre.

[¶ 3.] In 1998, ASBSD obtained additional adjoining land, removed the old buildings, and constructed a larger building at the same location. ASBSD executed a condominium agreement whereby it retained and now owns those portions of the basement and the first two floors (designated Unit. B) that are not “common elements,” plus 72.96 percent of the “common elements” located throughout the entire building. “TDK & E, Inc.,” (a private corporation not party to this action), purchased and currently owns the third floor of the building (designated Unit A) and the remaining associated “common elements.” This dispute is over the taxability of the portions owned, but not occupied by ASBSD.

[¶ 4.] ASBSD occupies 47.7 percent of Unit B, or 6,786 square feet. 1 The value of this portion, as well as the value of the *419 “common elements” attributable to ASBSD, is $569,375. The value of ASBSD’s portion of the lot upon which the building rests, also 47.7 percent, is $103,418. 2 Accordingly, the total value of the building attributable to ASBSD is $672,793, or 42.5 percent of the total value of the property owned by ASBSD. 3

[¶ 5.] ASBSD leased out its remaining property to either governmental entities or entities that would, on their own, normally qualify for the benevolent exemption from real estate tax found in SDCL 10-4-9.2. These entities include: (1) the School Administrators of South Dakota (SASD), renting 1,097 square feet under a 15-year lease; (2) the South Dakota Board of Regents (Regents), renting 5,243 square feet under a 5-year lease; and (3) the South Dakota Association of County Commissioners and the South Dakota Association of County Officials (Associations), renting 1,086 square feet under a 10-year lease. All of these entities are essentially nonprofit, tax exempt organizations. 4

[¶ 6.] Following ASBSD’s application for exemption and a subsequent investigation, County’s Board of Equalization gave a preliminary determination that the property would be 64 percent taxable, leaving only 36 percent exempt. Following notice and a hearing, the Board determined that the property was actually 66.5 percent taxable. ASBSD appealed this decision to the circuit court pursuant to SDCL 10-4-18 and 10-11-44.

[¶ 7.] The circuit court reviewed the Board’s decision and found that only 57.5 percent of Unit B, that property owned but not occupied by ASBSD, was taxable. The court held that ASBSD was exempt from real estate tax for the remaining 42.5 percent of the property. ASBSD now appeals to this Court, contending that it is entitled to an exemption greater than 42.5 percent because the property is owned by a benevolent organization, occupied by benevolent organizations, and used exclusively for benevolent purposes. Thus, ASBSD raises the following issue:

Whether ASBSD qualifies for a real estate tax exemption greater than 42.5 percent.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 8.] On an appeal from an administrative agency decision, this Court reviews the agency findings in the same manner required of the circuit court. See Alpha Gamma Zeta House Ass’n v. Clay County Bd. of Equalization, 1998 SD 101, ¶ 7, 583 N.W.2d 167, 168. This standard is set forth in SDCL 1-26-36:

The court shall give great weight to the findings made and inferences drawn by an agency on questions of fact. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;
*420 (4) Affected by other error of law;
(5) Clearly erroneous in light of the entire evidence in the record; or
(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
A court shall enter its own findings of fact and conclusions of law or may affirm the findings and conclusions entered by the agency as part of its judgment. The circuit court may award costs in the amount and manner specified in chapter 15-17.

For reversal on questions of fact, the administrative agency must be determined to have been clearly erroneous. Butte County v. Vallery, 1999 SD 142, ¶ 8, 602 N.W.2d 284, 286-87 (citations omitted). When, however, the issue is a question of law, we review the decisions of both the administrative agency and the circuit court de novo. Id.

[¶ 9.] This case also involves statutory interpretation, which is reviewed de novo. Steinberg v. S.D. Dep’t of Military and Veterans Affairs, 2000 SD 36, ¶ 6, 607 N.W.2d 596, 599; Zoss v. Schaefers, 1999 SD 105, ¶ 6, 598 N.W.2d 550, 552. Our rules of statutory construction are as follows: .

The purpose of statutory construction is to discover the true intention of the law, which is to be ascertained primarily from the language expressed in the statute. The intent of a statute is determined from what the Legislature said, rather than what the courts think it should have said, and the court must confine itself to the language used. Words and phrases in a statute must be given their plain meaning and effect. When the language in a statute is clear, certain and unambiguous, there is no reason for construction, and [this] Court’s only function is to declare the meaning of the statute as clearly expressed.

Martinmaas v.

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Bluebook (online)
2002 SD 41, 643 N.W.2d 417, 2002 S.D. LEXIS 43, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/associated-school-boards-of-south-dakota-inc-v-hughes-county-sd-2002.