ORDER
BEAM, Chief Judge.
These matters arise out of adversary proceedings brought in the United States Bankruptcy Court by Associated Grocers of Nebraska Cooperative, Inc., the debtor-in-possession, against American Home Products Corporation and several other defendants (hereinafter referred to collectively as the “Trade Creditors”).
In those actions, Associated Grocers sought in its first cause of action to set aside (1) certain preferential transfers pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), and in its second cause of action to set aside (2) unauthorized post-petition transfers pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) (Record on Appeal, filing 1 — hereinafter R-l). In response, the Trade Creditors filed motions to dismiss alleging that the Bankruptcy Court could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over the claims of Associated Grocers without violating Article III of the United States Constitution. The Bankruptcy Court sustained the motions to dismiss, holding that 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(F) unconstitutionally vests Article III powers in judges lacking the commensurate protections.
Associated Grocers of Nebraska Cooperative, Inc. v. Nabisco,
46 B.R. 173, 175 (Bankr.D.Neb.1985).
Associated Grocers filed motions to vacate and to reconsider. After argument, the Bankruptcy Court reinstated Associated Grocers’ second claim for the recovery of alleged unauthorized post-petition transfers (R-33). The Bankruptcy Court, in finding that it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear and determine a post-petition transfer case, held that by accepting a post-petition transfer, a creditor sufficiently subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court so as to constitute consent to the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction (R-33, at 10-11).
This Court granted leave for Associated Grocers to appeal the dismissal of its first cause of action concerning the preferential transfers, and leave for the Trade Creditors to cross-appeal the reinstatement of the second cause of action concerning alleged unauthorized post-petition transfers, In addition, the United States and the Official Creditors’ Committee were granted leave to intervene to support the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(F). For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(F),
on the facts presented here, does not violate Article III of the constitution, and that the cases should be remanded to the Bankruptcy
Court for consideration of the merits of the causes of action.
DISCUSSION
The Trade Creditors contend that Congress, by awarding bankruptcy judges jurisdiction to enter final judgments in cases involving claims of preferential transfers, has unconstitutionally vested such judges with inherently judicial powers reserved for Article III judges.
Article III is designed to provide judicial impartiality and is “an inseparable element of the constitutional system of checks and balances....”
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 58, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 2865, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982). “[It] both defines the power and protects the independence of the Judicial Branch.”
Id.
Article III provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. Const, art. III, § 1. The difficulty inherent in the interpretation of this language is illustrated by the statement of the Supreme Court when it said that “[a]n absolute construction of Article III is not possible in this area of ‘frequently arcane distinctions and confusing precedents.’ ”
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products, Co.,
— U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 3334, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985),
quoting Marathon,
458 U.S. at 90, 102 S.Ct. at 2881. “Neither this Court nor Congress has read the Constitution as requiring every federal question arising under the federal law ... to be tried in an Art. Ill court before a judge enjoying life tenure and protection against salary reduction.” [Citations omitted.]
Thomas,
105 S.Ct. at 3334.
In
Marathon,
a divided Supreme Court was “unable to agree on the precise scope and nature of Article Ill’s limitations. The Court’s holding in that case establishes only that Congress may not vest in a non-Article III court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under state law, without consent of the litigants, and subject only to ordinary appellate review.”
Thomas,
105 S.Ct. at 3335,
citing Marathon,
458 U.S. at 84, 102 S.Ct. at 2878 (plurality opinion),
id.,
at 90-92, 102 S.Ct. at 2881-2882 (opinion concurring in judgment),
id.,
at 92, 102 S.Ct. at 2882 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Marathon
did not “implicate the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts in other matters within the ‘traditional’ bankruptcy jurisdiction.”
In re Kaiser,
722 F.2d 1574, 1580 (2d Cir.1983). As the Court pointed out in Kaiser:
[Marathon
] stated that “the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power, ... may well be a ‘public right’ ” and thus subject to adjudication in an Article I court. 458 U.S. at 71 [102 S.Ct. at 2871].
See also
458 U.S. at 92 [102 S.Ct. at 2882] (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“I write separately to emphasize that, notwithstanding the plurality opinion, the Court does
not
hold today that
Congress’ broad grant of jurisdiction to the new bankruptcy courts is generally inconsistent with Article III_ Rather, the Court’s holding is limited to the proposition stated by Justice Rehnquist in his concurrence in the judgment — that a ‘traditional’ state common-law action, not made subject to a federal rule of decision, and related only peripherally to an adjudication of bankruptcy under federal law, must, absent consent of the litigants, be heard by an ‘Article III court’ if it is to be heard by any court or agency of the United States.
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ORDER
BEAM, Chief Judge.
These matters arise out of adversary proceedings brought in the United States Bankruptcy Court by Associated Grocers of Nebraska Cooperative, Inc., the debtor-in-possession, against American Home Products Corporation and several other defendants (hereinafter referred to collectively as the “Trade Creditors”).
In those actions, Associated Grocers sought in its first cause of action to set aside (1) certain preferential transfers pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), and in its second cause of action to set aside (2) unauthorized post-petition transfers pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) (Record on Appeal, filing 1 — hereinafter R-l). In response, the Trade Creditors filed motions to dismiss alleging that the Bankruptcy Court could not constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over the claims of Associated Grocers without violating Article III of the United States Constitution. The Bankruptcy Court sustained the motions to dismiss, holding that 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(F) unconstitutionally vests Article III powers in judges lacking the commensurate protections.
Associated Grocers of Nebraska Cooperative, Inc. v. Nabisco,
46 B.R. 173, 175 (Bankr.D.Neb.1985).
Associated Grocers filed motions to vacate and to reconsider. After argument, the Bankruptcy Court reinstated Associated Grocers’ second claim for the recovery of alleged unauthorized post-petition transfers (R-33). The Bankruptcy Court, in finding that it had subject matter jurisdiction to hear and determine a post-petition transfer case, held that by accepting a post-petition transfer, a creditor sufficiently subjects himself to the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court so as to constitute consent to the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction (R-33, at 10-11).
This Court granted leave for Associated Grocers to appeal the dismissal of its first cause of action concerning the preferential transfers, and leave for the Trade Creditors to cross-appeal the reinstatement of the second cause of action concerning alleged unauthorized post-petition transfers, In addition, the United States and the Official Creditors’ Committee were granted leave to intervene to support the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(F). For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(F),
on the facts presented here, does not violate Article III of the constitution, and that the cases should be remanded to the Bankruptcy
Court for consideration of the merits of the causes of action.
DISCUSSION
The Trade Creditors contend that Congress, by awarding bankruptcy judges jurisdiction to enter final judgments in cases involving claims of preferential transfers, has unconstitutionally vested such judges with inherently judicial powers reserved for Article III judges.
Article III is designed to provide judicial impartiality and is “an inseparable element of the constitutional system of checks and balances....”
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50, 58, 102 S.Ct. 2858, 2865, 73 L.Ed.2d 598 (1982). “[It] both defines the power and protects the independence of the Judicial Branch.”
Id.
Article III provides:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
U.S. Const, art. III, § 1. The difficulty inherent in the interpretation of this language is illustrated by the statement of the Supreme Court when it said that “[a]n absolute construction of Article III is not possible in this area of ‘frequently arcane distinctions and confusing precedents.’ ”
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products, Co.,
— U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 3325, 3334, 87 L.Ed.2d 409 (1985),
quoting Marathon,
458 U.S. at 90, 102 S.Ct. at 2881. “Neither this Court nor Congress has read the Constitution as requiring every federal question arising under the federal law ... to be tried in an Art. Ill court before a judge enjoying life tenure and protection against salary reduction.” [Citations omitted.]
Thomas,
105 S.Ct. at 3334.
In
Marathon,
a divided Supreme Court was “unable to agree on the precise scope and nature of Article Ill’s limitations. The Court’s holding in that case establishes only that Congress may not vest in a non-Article III court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment, and issue binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under state law, without consent of the litigants, and subject only to ordinary appellate review.”
Thomas,
105 S.Ct. at 3335,
citing Marathon,
458 U.S. at 84, 102 S.Ct. at 2878 (plurality opinion),
id.,
at 90-92, 102 S.Ct. at 2881-2882 (opinion concurring in judgment),
id.,
at 92, 102 S.Ct. at 2882 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Marathon
did not “implicate the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts in other matters within the ‘traditional’ bankruptcy jurisdiction.”
In re Kaiser,
722 F.2d 1574, 1580 (2d Cir.1983). As the Court pointed out in Kaiser:
[Marathon
] stated that “the restructuring of the debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power, ... may well be a ‘public right’ ” and thus subject to adjudication in an Article I court. 458 U.S. at 71 [102 S.Ct. at 2871].
See also
458 U.S. at 92 [102 S.Ct. at 2882] (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“I write separately to emphasize that, notwithstanding the plurality opinion, the Court does
not
hold today that
Congress’ broad grant of jurisdiction to the new bankruptcy courts is generally inconsistent with Article III_ Rather, the Court’s holding is limited to the proposition stated by Justice Rehnquist in his concurrence in the judgment — that a ‘traditional’ state common-law action, not made subject to a federal rule of decision, and related only peripherally to an adjudication of bankruptcy under federal law, must, absent consent of the litigants, be heard by an ‘Article III court’ if it is to be heard by any court or agency of the United States. This limited holding, of course, does not suggest that there is something inherently unconstitutional about the new bankruptcy courts; nor does it preclude such courts from adjudicating all but a relatively narrow category of claims ‘arising under’ or ‘arising in or related to cases under’ the Bankruptcy Act.”).
In re Kaiser,
722 F.2d at 1580, n. 2. The Supreme Court invalidated the jurisdictional grant on separability grounds, not on the grounds the bankruptcy courts could not adjudicate traditional bankruptcy matters.
Id.
at 1580.
The Trade Creditors’ claim that giving bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction to make final determinations in claims of preferential transfers pursuant to Section 547(b) and Section 549(a) is unconstitutional because (a) an action to recover a preference is a private right not a public right; (b) the right to recover a preference is not a con-gressionally created right; and (c) the powers granted bankruptcy judges are greater than those which may be permissibly granted adjuncts.
The first argument focuses on the distinction made by Justice Brennan in
Marathon
between “public rights” and “private rights.”
Marathon,
458 U.S. at 62-76, 102 S.Ct. at 2866-2874. In
Marathon
the United States argued that Congress could, pursuant to its Article I powers, create a legislative court (a non-Article III court) in “ ‘specialized areas having particularized needs and warranting distinctive’ treatment such as the area of bankruptcy law.”
Marathon,
458 U.S. at 62-63, 102 S.Ct. at 2867. Justice Brennan identified three situations in which Congress could create legislative courts without violating Article III.
Id.
at 65-69, 102 S.Ct. at 2868-2870. The three categories identified were territorial courts, courts-martial, and courts to adjudicate public rights.
Id.
at 71, 102 S.Ct. at 2871. Justice Brennan states that:
The distinction between public rights and private rights has not been definitively explained in our precedents. Nor is it necessary to do so in the present cases, for it suffices to observe that a matter of public rights must at a minimum arise “between the government and others.”
Ex parte Bakelite Corp.,
279 U.S. 438, 451 [49 S.Ct. 411, 413, 73 L.Ed. 789] (1929). In contrast, “the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined,”
Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 51 [52 S.Ct. 285, 292, 76 L.Ed. 598] (1932), is a matter of private rights. Our precedents clearly establish that only controversies in the former category may be removed from Art. Ill courts and delegated to legislative courts or administrative agencies for their determination. See
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm’n,
430 U.S. 442, 450, n. 7, [97 S.Ct. 1261, 1266 n. 7, 51 L.Ed.2d 464] (1977);
Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. at 50-51 [52 S.Ct. at 292-293]. See also Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 Harv.L.Rev. 894, 917-918 (1930). Private-rights disputes, on the other hand, lie at the core of the historically recognized judicial power.
Marathon,
458 U.S. at 69-70, 102 S.Ct. at 2870-2871. In
Marathon
the Court determined that:
We discern no such exceptional grant of power applicable in the cases before us. The courts created by the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 do not lie exclusively outside the States of the Federal Union, like those in the District of Columbia and the Territories. Nor do the Bankruptcy Courts bear any resemblance to courts-martial, which are founded upon the Constitution’s grant of plenary authority
over the Nation’s military forces to the Legislative and Executive Branches. Finally,
the substantive legal rights at issue in the present action cannot be deemed “public rights.
”
Appellants argue that a discharge in bankruptcy is indeed a “public right,
” similar to such congressionally created benefits as “radio station licenses, pilot licenses, or certificates for common carriers” granted by administrative agencies. See Brief for United States 34.
But the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations, which is at the core of the federal bankruptcy power, must be distinguished from the adjudication of state-created private rights, such as the right to recover contract damages that is at issue in this case. The former may well be a “public right,” but the latter .obviously is not.
Appellant Northern’s right to recover contract damages to augment its estate is “one of private right, that is, of the liability of one individual to another under the law as defined.”
Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. at 51, 52 S.Ct. at 292.
Marathon,
458 U.S. at 70-71, 102 S.Ct. at 2870-2871 (emphasis added).
The Trade Creditors contend that since the United States is not a party that preferences are not public rights nor congressionally created rights. In
Thomas
the Supreme Court specifically refuted any bright line distinction within the public rights versus private rights controversy.
Thomas,
105 S.Ct. at 3342.
This theory that the public rights/private rights dichotomy of
Crowell
and
Murray’s Lessee,
[v. Hobaken Land & Improvement Co., 18 Haw. 272, 15 L.Ed. 372 (1856) ]
supra,
provides a bright line test for determining the requirements of Article III did not command a majority of the Court in
Northern Pipeline.
Insofar as appellees interpret that case and
Cro-well
as establishing that the right to an Article III forum is absolute unless the federal government is a party of record, we cannot agree.
Cf. Northern Pipeline Co., supra,
at 71 [102 S.Ct. at 2871], (plurality) (noting that discharge in bankruptcy, which adjusts liabilities between individuals, is arguably a public right). But see
id.,
at 69, n. 23 [102 S.Ct. at 2870 n. 23]. Nor did a majority of the Court endorse the implication of the private right/public right dichotomy that Article III has no force simply because a dispute is between the Government and an individual. Compare
id.,
at 68, n. 20 [102 S.Ct. at 2870 n. 20].
Thomas,
105 S.Ct. at 3336.
The Court in
Thomas
reiterated that “[t]he enduring lesson of
Crowell
[285 U.S. 22, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1931)] is that practical attention to substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform application of Article III.”
Thomas,
105 S.Ct. at 3336,
citing Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U.S. 530, 547-
548, 82 S.Ct. 1459, 1471, 8 L.Ed.2d 671 (1962);
see also Crowell,
285 U.S. at 53, 52 S.Ct. at 293. “The extent of judicial review afforded by the legislation reviewed in
Cro-well
does not constitute a minimal requirement of Article III without regard to the origin of the right at issue or the concerns guiding the selection by Congress of a particular method for resolving dispute.”
Thomas,
105 S.Ct. at 3336. In
Crowell
the statute “displaced a traditional cause of action and affected a pre-existing relationship based on a common-law contract for hire.”
Id.
In
Thomas,
the majority held that “Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under Article I, may create a seemingly ‘private’ right that is so closely integrated to a public regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article III judiciary.”
Thomas,
105 S.Ct. at 3340.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court analyzed the substance of the statute at issue. A similar analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(F) as applied to an 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) or 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) preference action results in this Court holding that Article III does not preclude the bankruptcy judge from entering final orders in an 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) or 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) preference action subject to traditional appellate review by an Article III Court. Like the arbitration statute under FIFRA that the Court analyzed in
Thomas,
the scheme created under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(F) and 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) or 11 U.S.C. § 549(a) does not depend on state law for the rule of decision, or replace a cause of action cognizable under state law.
Thomas,
105 S.Ct. at 3335.
Cf. Marathon,
458 U.S. at 84-85, 102 S.Ct. at 2878-79 (plurality opinion) (contract claims at issue were matter of state law);
Crowell,
285 U.S. at 39-40, 52 S.Ct. at 287-288 (replacing traditional admiralty negligence action with administrative scheme of strict liability).
Historically, under the common law a debtor may lawfully prefer anyone or more of his creditors over other creditors as long as the object of the transaction is to secure the payment of the debt. 4
Collier on Bankruptcy,
¶ 547.01 (15th ed. 1986). The treatise said:
It is only where such a transfer is related to a subsequent bankruptcy or insolvency statute that it runs afoul of prohibitory legislation and becomes invalid. As stated in
Johnson-Baillie Shoe Co. v. Bardsley, Elmer & Nichols,
237 F. 763, 767 (8th Cir.1916),
“Until the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings a debtor has the right to dispose of his property, the right to secure and pay his debts with it, and the right to secure and pay one of his creditors in preference to others, provided the payment or security is not violative of any act of Congress or law of the state.”
Accordingly, the entire invalidity of a transaction as a preference, when considered in the light of the debtor’s subsequent bankruptcy, must come from the Bankruptcy Code itself.
... It was conceded under former Section 60a, the precursor of section 547, however, that a preference which may be avoided in bankruptcy is defined exclusively by that statute, except insofar as section 544(b) (former Section 70e) adopts any nonbankruptcy federal or state law making preferential transfers voidable. Consequently, as a general rule, any transaction sought to be avoided as preferential by a bankruptcy trustee preliminarily should be tested by the requirements of section 547(b). If these requirements are met, then the matter of recovery itself is governed generally by section 550. Nevertheless, merely because a preference cannot be established and avoided under section 547 does not thereby eliminate all recourse to action that the bankruptcy trustee may have with respect to preferences. An appropriate federal or state law may invalidate “preferences,” and the trustee, using the powers given him under section 544(b), may thus attempt to set aside a transfer as preferential and invalid under such a
law. In that case, the elements of a preference as outlined by the federal or state (usually State) statute will be controlling rather than the provisions of section 547.
4
Collier,
at ¶ 547.01. Likewise, Section 549(a) that allows the trustee to set aside non-authorized post-petition transfers made on account of antecedent debts do not rely on state law or replace a state law cause of action.
See
4
Collier,
at ¶ 549
et seq.
These particular rights under 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b) and 549(a) are congressionally created rights.
After recognizing the necessity of effective adjudication of rights under 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b) and 549(a) and analyzing the origin and nature of these rights, this Court does not believe the independent role of the judiciary in our constitutional scheme is threatened by a bankruptcy judge entering final orders in such matters under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(F). “To hold otherwise would be to defeat the obvious purpose of the legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by a [non-article III officer] specially assigned to that task.”
Thomas,
105 S.Ct. at 3338,
quoting Crowell,
285 U.S. at 46, 52 S.Ct. at 290.
In addition, the chance of unwarranted encroachment on the Article III judicial power is further minimized since the total scheme enacted by Congress for the adjudication of 11 U.S.C §§ 547(b) and 549(a) rights provides for both intervention and review by an Article III Court. The district court retains primary jurisdiction over bankruptcy proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 1334. Bankruptcy judges are a “unit” of the district court, and their exercise of adjudicatory authority is subject to the “rule or order of the district court.” 28 U.S.C. § 151. Bankruptcy judges are appointed by Article III courts of appeals and are removable by the judicial council of the Circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) and (3). 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) provides that the district court upon its own motion or the timely motion of a party may withdraw for cause shown any case or proceeding in whole or part from the bankruptcy court. This gives the district court control over the fact finding function of the bankruptcy court in these matters since the district court could choose to hear the matters in the first instance.
If the matter is not withdrawn, the district court exercises traditional appellate review over the proceedings. 28 U.S.C. § 158.
Bankr. Rule
8013 provides:
On an appeal the district court or bankruptcy appellate panel may affirm, modify, or reverse a bankruptcy court’s judgment, order, or decree or remand with instructions for further proceedings. Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the bankruptcy court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
Bankr.Rule
8013.
See also Proposed Court Rules
8013, reprinted in 107 F.R.D. 403, 556 (1985). While the district court is bound by the clearly erroneous standard for review of facts, such restriction does not limit the review of the law or of any fundamental or jurisdictional facts.
These
latter are subject to de novo review by the district court.
Crowell,
285 U.S. at 53-55, 52 S.Ct. at 293-294.
See also First National Bank in Sioux Falls v. National Bank of South Dakota,
667 F.2d 708 (8th Cir.1981). In addition, any mixed questions of law and fact that primarily involve legal questions would be subject to de novo review.
See U.S.A. v. Maull,
773 F.2d 1479 (8th Cir.1985).
In conclusion, this Court holds that Article III is not violated by the scheme Congress enacted granting the Bankruptcy Court the power under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(F) to avoid preference transfers under 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b) and 549(a), and enter final orders therein subject to traditional appellate review by an Article III court.
See In re Tom Carter,
44 B.R. 605 (C.D.Cal.1984);
In re TWI, Inc.,
51 B.R. 470 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1985). These cases, therefore, shall be remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for determination on the merits.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the orders of the Bankruptcy Court in CV 85-0-341 through CV 85-0-347 and CV 85-0-349 through CV 85-0-359 and CV 85-0-361 through CV 85-0-362 sustaining the motions to dismiss the first causes of action for preferences and holding that 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(F) is unconstitutional should be and hereby are reversed. The cases are remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for determination on the merits.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the orders of the Bankruptcy Court in CV 85-0-383 through CV 85-0-402 denying the motions to dismiss the second causes of action for post-petition transfers should be and hereby are affirmed. The cases are remanded to the Bankruptcy Court for a determination on the merits.