LYNNE, District Judge.
This suit was filed by the plaintiff to recover certain income and excess profit taxes paid 'by the plaintiff corporation under protest for the tax years 1941 and 1942, upon deficiency assessments made by the defendant. The taxes sought to be recovered are as follows: For the tax year 1941 — income and declared value excess profits tax and interest in the amount of $1,607.48; and for the tax year 1942 — income and declared value excess profits tax and interest in the amount of $982.41 and excess profits tax of $7,622.58.
The controversy grows out of the dis-allowance of deductions claimed by the plaintiff corporation on its income and excess profits tax for the years referred to for so-called “patronage dividends” or refunds of profits paid by the company to its membership certificate holders, in proportion to their trading operations with the company and without regard to the amount of stock held by the distributees of such
refunds. Plaintiff, corporation has met the requirements of all laws and formalities to enable it to recover the payments involved if it is legally entitled to do so. The sole question for the decision of the court is whether or not the “patronage dividend” deductions should have been disallowed by the Commissioner as deductions upon income and excess profits tax returns for the two years here in question. Except for the amounts involved, the same facts and circumstances apply substantially to the taxes for both years, with the exception that the corporation’s by-laws were amended on April 8, 1941, and its articles of incorporation were amended on April 15, 1941, both as set out in the stipulation of facts. The by-laws and articles of incorporation as amended remained unchanged throughout the year 1942.
The plaintiff does not claim that it is exempt from taxation, but contends that the amounts distributed to stockholder patrons and member patrons are not properly includable in its taxable income, because of the nature of its organization and the operation of its business, in that the refunds distributed were allowable as proper business expenses.
For the plaintiff to recover, it must be established that there was an obligation by the corporation to make refunds or rebates to member patrons when the incomes for the respective years were received by the corporation. Peoples Gin Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 5 Cir., 118 F.2d 72.
Such an obligation must arise from the association’s articles of incorporation, its by-laws, or some other contract, and must not depend upon some corporate action taken after its receipt of the money later distributed, such as the action of the corporation’s officers or directors.
The facts, as stipulated by the parties and found by the court, are set out in the margin.
Exhibit C to the stipulation of facts, consisting of the report of the Revenue Agent, upon which the disallowance is based, is not included because it was not considered by the court to be of any probative value.
Consideration is first given as to whether there was an obligation arising under the by-laws or charter of the corporation. The amendment of the corporation’s bylaws on April 8, 1941, was mandatory in its requirement to credit to the outstanding certificates of membership, based upon the trade operations of the corporation with the owner and holder of the certificate, any profits after deducting therefrom any amount necessary for improvements, expansions or operating capital. The amendment to the corporation’s certificate of incorporation on April 15, 1941, was not mandatory in its provisions but, to the contrary, left it within the discretion of the Board of Directors to return to the owners and holders of certificates of membership any profits earned by the corporation during the preceding fiscal year, such refunds being evidenced by patronage dividend certificates or preferred stock, in the discretion of the certificate holder, or in cash in the sole discretion of the Board of Directors. The returns of such profits thereby authorized were to be based upon the trading operations for that year.
The amendment of the by-laws on April 8, 1941, was valid under the powers to enact such by-laws as prescribed in subsection 5 of Section 7015 of the Code of Alabama of 1928, carried forward in Title 10, Section 70 of the Code of Alabama of 1940. The amendment to the articles of incorporation on April 15, 1941, was valid under sub-section 10 of Section 6965 of the Code of Alabama of 1928, carried forward as Title 10, Section 2 of the Code of Alabama of 1940. The question becomes,
therefore, one of decision as to whether the provisions in the amendment to the charter superseded the amendment of the by-laws. It is my opinion that the provisions of the charter are controlling, and that thereunder not only the' time and
manner but also the obligation of returning profits to the holders of membership certificates were reserved to the discretion of the Board of Directors. By-laws are valid only when consistent with the charter and those by-laws which are not consistent
with the charter hut are in conflict with and repugnant to it are void.
Where the management and control of the corporation is vested by the charter not in the stockholders or members, but in a board of directors, their action in regard to the affairs of the corporation is controlling and exclusive, and the stockholders or members cannot control the directors in the exercise of the judgment vested in them by the charter. Their function is to exercise judgment and discretion which the courts cannot do in their stead.
Since there was no enforceable obligation on the part of plaintiff corpora^ tion under its charter and valid by-laws to refund profits to its membership certificate holders at the time the income was received, it follows that plaintiff is not entitled to a deduction on the basis of profits eventually refunded.
This situation existed for the entire year of 1941, except, possibly, for the period from April 8, 1941, to April 15, 1941. The amount of earnings, if any, for this period does not appear from the evidence and in its absence, the court cannot find that there was any income from which the right to rebates accrued and in the absence of such evidence, under the burden of proof assumed by the plaintiff, it becomes unnecessary for the court to determine whether there was any valid obligation to make refund from the profits realized during this period.
This leaves for consideration the question as to whether or not there was any other binding contract, written or oral, between the stockholder members and the corporation.
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LYNNE, District Judge.
This suit was filed by the plaintiff to recover certain income and excess profit taxes paid 'by the plaintiff corporation under protest for the tax years 1941 and 1942, upon deficiency assessments made by the defendant. The taxes sought to be recovered are as follows: For the tax year 1941 — income and declared value excess profits tax and interest in the amount of $1,607.48; and for the tax year 1942 — income and declared value excess profits tax and interest in the amount of $982.41 and excess profits tax of $7,622.58.
The controversy grows out of the dis-allowance of deductions claimed by the plaintiff corporation on its income and excess profits tax for the years referred to for so-called “patronage dividends” or refunds of profits paid by the company to its membership certificate holders, in proportion to their trading operations with the company and without regard to the amount of stock held by the distributees of such
refunds. Plaintiff, corporation has met the requirements of all laws and formalities to enable it to recover the payments involved if it is legally entitled to do so. The sole question for the decision of the court is whether or not the “patronage dividend” deductions should have been disallowed by the Commissioner as deductions upon income and excess profits tax returns for the two years here in question. Except for the amounts involved, the same facts and circumstances apply substantially to the taxes for both years, with the exception that the corporation’s by-laws were amended on April 8, 1941, and its articles of incorporation were amended on April 15, 1941, both as set out in the stipulation of facts. The by-laws and articles of incorporation as amended remained unchanged throughout the year 1942.
The plaintiff does not claim that it is exempt from taxation, but contends that the amounts distributed to stockholder patrons and member patrons are not properly includable in its taxable income, because of the nature of its organization and the operation of its business, in that the refunds distributed were allowable as proper business expenses.
For the plaintiff to recover, it must be established that there was an obligation by the corporation to make refunds or rebates to member patrons when the incomes for the respective years were received by the corporation. Peoples Gin Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 5 Cir., 118 F.2d 72.
Such an obligation must arise from the association’s articles of incorporation, its by-laws, or some other contract, and must not depend upon some corporate action taken after its receipt of the money later distributed, such as the action of the corporation’s officers or directors.
The facts, as stipulated by the parties and found by the court, are set out in the margin.
Exhibit C to the stipulation of facts, consisting of the report of the Revenue Agent, upon which the disallowance is based, is not included because it was not considered by the court to be of any probative value.
Consideration is first given as to whether there was an obligation arising under the by-laws or charter of the corporation. The amendment of the corporation’s bylaws on April 8, 1941, was mandatory in its requirement to credit to the outstanding certificates of membership, based upon the trade operations of the corporation with the owner and holder of the certificate, any profits after deducting therefrom any amount necessary for improvements, expansions or operating capital. The amendment to the corporation’s certificate of incorporation on April 15, 1941, was not mandatory in its provisions but, to the contrary, left it within the discretion of the Board of Directors to return to the owners and holders of certificates of membership any profits earned by the corporation during the preceding fiscal year, such refunds being evidenced by patronage dividend certificates or preferred stock, in the discretion of the certificate holder, or in cash in the sole discretion of the Board of Directors. The returns of such profits thereby authorized were to be based upon the trading operations for that year.
The amendment of the by-laws on April 8, 1941, was valid under the powers to enact such by-laws as prescribed in subsection 5 of Section 7015 of the Code of Alabama of 1928, carried forward in Title 10, Section 70 of the Code of Alabama of 1940. The amendment to the articles of incorporation on April 15, 1941, was valid under sub-section 10 of Section 6965 of the Code of Alabama of 1928, carried forward as Title 10, Section 2 of the Code of Alabama of 1940. The question becomes,
therefore, one of decision as to whether the provisions in the amendment to the charter superseded the amendment of the by-laws. It is my opinion that the provisions of the charter are controlling, and that thereunder not only the' time and
manner but also the obligation of returning profits to the holders of membership certificates were reserved to the discretion of the Board of Directors. By-laws are valid only when consistent with the charter and those by-laws which are not consistent
with the charter hut are in conflict with and repugnant to it are void.
Where the management and control of the corporation is vested by the charter not in the stockholders or members, but in a board of directors, their action in regard to the affairs of the corporation is controlling and exclusive, and the stockholders or members cannot control the directors in the exercise of the judgment vested in them by the charter. Their function is to exercise judgment and discretion which the courts cannot do in their stead.
Since there was no enforceable obligation on the part of plaintiff corpora^ tion under its charter and valid by-laws to refund profits to its membership certificate holders at the time the income was received, it follows that plaintiff is not entitled to a deduction on the basis of profits eventually refunded.
This situation existed for the entire year of 1941, except, possibly, for the period from April 8, 1941, to April 15, 1941. The amount of earnings, if any, for this period does not appear from the evidence and in its absence, the court cannot find that there was any income from which the right to rebates accrued and in the absence of such evidence, under the burden of proof assumed by the plaintiff, it becomes unnecessary for the court to determine whether there was any valid obligation to make refund from the profits realized during this period.
This leaves for consideration the question as to whether or not there was any other binding contract, written or oral, between the stockholder members and the corporation. Exhibit A to the stipulation of facts consists of a specimen copy of a letter sent to the company stockholders and prospective stockholders, setting out the corporation’s plans to give rebates to its stockholding members on all profits that the corporation had made on purchases less the cost of operation. Under the further facts set down in the stipulation that the “certificate holders and stockholders relied on the representations and promises made in said letters and undertakings in said by-laws to distribute patronage dividends in accordance with the said by-laws and were induced thereby to increase their trading operations with the company,” I would be constrained to hold that there was a binding obligation, as between the corporation, and the stockholders of the corporation and those who were induced to become stockholders, thereby to pay such rebates were it not for the amendment to the articles of incorporation effective April 15, 1941. Certainly the stockholders who adopted this resolution were charged with notice of the change in provisions and authority as set forth in the amendment to the articles of incorporation, which amendment was duly recorded, and there would attach to and become incorporated in any such agreement those pertinent provisions of the amendment to the articles of incorporation which left the refund of profits within the discretion of the Board of Directors.
Even if the notice of the plan of the corporation to make refund of profits to the stockholders on the basis of the trading operations of each stockholder became in effect a contract as a result of increased trading operations of the stockholders in reliance on such promise, this agreement would necessarily include statutory provisions under which the initial articles of incorporation were granted, which statutory provisions provided for amendment to the charter and the right to include in the charter special provisions for the regulation of the business and the conduct of the affairs of the corporation. Bernstein et al. v. Kaplan, et al., 150 Ala. 222, 43 So. 581.
There was inherent in any contract between the stockholders and the corporation the provisions referred to above, and they were charged with notice that amendment was possible thereunder, and when they, by their own resolution, so amended the articles of incorporation to include provisions inconsistent with the amendment to the by-laws of April 8, 1941, the plaintiff cannot be heard to object that the provisions of the amended articles of incorporation are not controlling or do not supersede the provisions of the by-laws. Clearly, in my mind, there was no obligation to make a refund of profits based on trading operations or patronage dividends, by whatever name they may be called, that would have been enforceable in a court of law had the Board of Directors declined to declare the refund of profits or patronage dividends. Under such circumstances, the corporation was not entitled to deduct the refund of profits either for the year 1941 or 1942. American Box Shook Export Ass’n v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra.
I have given serious consideration to the case of Uniform Printing & Supply Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 7 Cir., 88 F.2d 75, 76, 109 A.L.R. 966, cited and relied on by the plaintiff. The pertinent bylaw in the Uniform Printing and Supply Company case provided: “The decision of the Board of Directors as to the percentage and/or amount to be returned to each customer shall be conclusive.” This provision was made in connection with the first portion of the by-law providing that all of the surplus earnings not, in the opinion of the Board of Directors, required in the conduct and/or expansion of the business of the corporation should be returned to the customers. In that case, however, there was an obligation to make refunds under the by-laws but the amount payable was contingent on the decision of the Board of Directors as to the amount of reserves required in the conduct of the corporation’s business. In this case, the very obligation itself to make such refunds depends upon the discretion of the Board of Directors.
In addition to the cases previously cited, I have considered the following cases
and find that they are either reconcilable with or distinguishable from the case at bar on the critical point as to whether there was an obligation arising from the corporation’s articles of incorporation, its by-laws, or some other contract, to pay patronage dividends by rebate at the time the income concerned was received by the corporation.
The court is satisfied that the plaintiff deliberately set out in the early part of 1941 to avail itself of the “patronage dividend” plan. The following steps on the part of the company to that end are disclosed by the stipulation of facts: (1) A by-law enacted April 8, 1941, requiring the directors to refund at the end of the fiscal year any profits (after certain authorized deductions) upon trade operations with the corporation of the owner or holder of the certificate. (2) The approval on April 15, 1941, of an amended Certificate of Incorporation, giving the Board of Directors discretion to “return” to the owners and holders of certificates of membership any profits earned by the corporation during the preceding fiscal year, such refunds being evidenced by the patronage dividend certificates, or preferred stock in the discretion of the stockholder, or in cash in the sole discretion of the Board of Directors. (3) The circularization by letter of all of the stockholders, 'both before and after the by-law enactment and charter amendment, setting forth the declared purpose of the company to distribute patronage dividends.
(4) The consummation of the distribution of the patronage dividends by actually crediting the same to the account of the member certificate holders at the end of the year.
But for the ineptitude of the draftsman of the amended certificate of incorporation (who was not plaintiff’s distinguished counsel), the plan would have achieved its objective. However, it is not the function of the courts to compensate for such mistakes or to declare that what was done, though through ignorance, was a substantial injustice. The language of Judge Hutcheson in Jeffries v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 5 Cir., 158 F.2d 225,
226, is peculiarly appropriate to the situation obtaining here.
An appropriate judgment will be entered in favor of the defendant dismissing plaintiff’s action with prejudice.