Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores v. United States

22 Ct. Int'l Trade 631, 6 F. Supp. 2d 865
Procedural entryThis page is a short order in Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores v. United States. Read the opinion of the Court — 6 F. Supp. 2d 865
United States Court of International Trade·Decided July 2, 1998·No. Consolidated Court No. 96-09-02209·Published

Opinion

Memorandum Opinion and Order

Pogue, Judge:

On April 22, 1998, pursuant to U.S. CIT Rule 59(a), Plaintiff, Equiflor Corporation (“Equiflor”), filed amotion for reconsideration of the Court’s judgment in Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores v. United States, 22 CIT 173, slip op. 98-33 (Mar. 25, 1998)(“Asociacion Colombiana”). Plaintiff argues that in Asociación Colombiana the Court overlooked the critical argument presented by Equiflor that a company whose assets have been sold and that was dissolved is not capable in law or in fact of receiving delivery of an anti-dumping questionnaire. Equiflor Mem. E & A. Supp. Mot. Recons, at 4 (“Equiflor Mot.”).

Background

The background to this case is set forth in the Court’s prior opinion. There, the Court sustained the application by the Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) of the first-tier 76.60 percent best information available (“BIA”) rate to the flower grower El Majui (“Majui”) because of the company’s failure to respond to the Department’s questionnaire. [632]*632Asociacion Colombiana, 22 CIT at 215, slip op. 98-33, at 49-51. Thereby, the Court denied the motion for judgment on the agency record filed by Equiflor, the importer of Majui’s flowers. Id.

Discussion

A motion for reconsideration under U.S. CIT Rule 59 is within the sound discretion of the court. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. United States, 16 CIT 984, 984, 807 F. Supp. 792, 793 (1992), aff'd, 16 F.3d 420 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. United States, 14 CIT 1, 2, 729 F. Supp. 1354, 1355 (1990). The purpose of a rehearing is not to relitigate the case but, rather, to rectify a fundamental or significant flaw in the original proceeding. Arthur J. Humphrey’s, Inc. v. United States, 15 CIT 427, 427, 771 F. Supp. 1239, 1241 (1991), aff'd and adopted, 973 F.2d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1992). If the moving party fails to “establish that there was a fundamental or significant flaw in the conduct of the original proceedings,” this will result in the motion being denied. Brookside Veneers, Ltd. v. United States, 11 CIT 197, 199, 661 F. Supp. 620, 622 (1987), rev’d on other grounds, 6 Fed. Cir. (T) 121, 847 F.2d 786, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 943 (1988).

Equiflor claims that the Court overlooked the critical issue in finding that Majui received service of Commerce’s questionnaire because the company had gone out of business prior to the questionnaire being sent out. Equiflor supports its contention by (1) citing to Title Co. v. Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120, 124-25 (1937)(notingthat the dissolution of a corporation puts an end to its existence, the result of which may be likened to the death of a natural person), and (2) alleging that, under Colombian law, commercial entities lose all legal status upon dissolution and liquidation and are therefore incapable of receiving service of documents, and can only be the subject of legal proceedings that were initiated prior to the act of dissolution. Equiflor Mot. at 4.

The issue in Title Co. was whether a dissolved corporation itself could initiate legal proceedings after the two year post-dissolution period provided by Illinois law. 302 U.S. at 123-27. In contrast, here the administrative review was initiated by Commerce against the company eight months after it was dissolved. The Title Co. court expressed no opinion as to whether proceedings could be instituted against a dissolved corporation. Id. Thus, Title Co. is inapposite.

Equiflor’s citations to the Colombian law are also not persuasive.1 The fact that Majui had “legally dissolved” under Colombian law is not dispositive with respect to Commerce’s determination that the company received the questionnaire.2 Rather, the question presented is whether Commerce’s conclusion that Majui received its questionnaire [633]*633and subsequent application of BIA to the company was supported by substantial evidence.

When examining Commerce’s factual determinations to decide whether they are supported by substantial evidence, the court must determine whether the record contains “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [Commerce’s] conclusion.” Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951)(quoted in Matsuhita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. United States, 3 Fed. Cir. (T) 44, 51, 750 F.2d 927, 933 (1984). Substantial evidence “is something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence. ” Consolo v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966)(citations omitted).

Section 776(c) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(c)(1988), states that Commerce “shall, whenever a party or any other person refuses or is unable to produce information requested in a timely manner and in the form required, or otherwise significantly impedes an investigation, use the best information otherwise available.” Under Commerce’s regulations, BIA is used whenever the Department (1) Does not receive a complete, accurate, and timely response to Commerce’s request for factual information; or (2) Is unable to verity, within the time specified, the accuracy and completeness of the factual information submitted. 19 C.F.R. § 353.37(a).

In Allied-Signal Aerospace Co. v. United States, 996 F.2d 1185, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993), the Federal Circuit approved a BIA scheme in which Commerce selects first-tier BIA when a respondent refuses to cooperate with its requests for information or significantly impedes the administrative review, and second-tier BIA, which is less adverse, when a respondent substantially cooperates but still fails to provide requested information in a timely manner or in the required form. Id. at 1190-91.

In the final results, Commerce stated that Majui had not provided evidence that the Department’s service of its questionnaire was defective. Certain Fresh Cut Flowers From Colombia, 61 Fed. Reg. 42,833,42,862 (Dep’t Commerce 1996)(final results admin, reviews). If Commerce found service to be defective then it would have applied the “all others” 3.10 percent rate to the company.

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Asociacion Colombiana de Exportadores de Flores v. United States, 22 Ct. Int'l Trade 631, 6 F. Supp. 2d 865 (cit 1998).

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