Askanase v. United States (In Re Guyana Development Corp.)

189 B.R. 393, 9 Tex.Bankr.Ct.Rep. 228, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 1770, 78 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5933, 1995 WL 728258
CourtUnited States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas
DecidedNovember 29, 1995
Docket14-31689
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 189 B.R. 393 (Askanase v. United States (In Re Guyana Development Corp.)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Askanase v. United States (In Re Guyana Development Corp.), 189 B.R. 393, 9 Tex.Bankr.Ct.Rep. 228, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 1770, 78 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5933, 1995 WL 728258 (Tex. 1995).

Opinion

AMENDED ORDER

KAREN KENNEDY BROWN, Bankruptcy Judge.

Before the Court is the combined contested matter and adversary proceeding commenced by David Askanase, Chapter 11 Trustee (the “Trustee”) of Guyana Development Corporation (“GDC”) to determine the extent, vaKdity, and priority of the claims of the United States. This Court has jurisdiction of this proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157. This is a core proceeding.

It is undisputed that the United States properly filed its statutory prepetition notices of tax Ken with respect to the assets of GDC. The trustee urges, however, that the Kens and levies of the United States are avoidable or inappKcable for the following reasons:

1. Non-Existent Foreign Asset Liens. The trustee urges that the United States’ Kens based on 26 U.S.C. § 6321 cannot apply to assets located outside of the United States. The trustee urges that neither the Constitution, nor principles of international sovereignty permit the assertion of Ken rights over foreign assets.
2. AvoidabiKty of Foreign Asset Liens. The trustee urges that even if section 6321 imposed foreign asset Kens, such Kens are unenforceable, and therefore, avoidable under 11 U.S.C. § 545.
3. AvoidabiKty of Domestic Liens. The trustee asserts that under 26 U.S.C. § 6323, Kens against stock or money are avoidable.
4. AvoidabiKty of Domestic Levies. The trustee urges that the IRS levies are voidable preferences under 11 U.S.C. § 547 because they attached within a few days of the commencement of the GDC bankruptcy and, if allowed to stand, would entitle *395 the United States to receive more than it would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation.

The trustee also contends that a chapter 11 liquidating plan can: (i) require the subordination of an unsecured penalty claim for taxes; and (ii) direct the application of liened and levied proceeds to the payment of taxes prior to payment of penalties. No dispute exists that penalty claims would be subordinated in a chapter 7 bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4). It is also undisputed that a chapter 11 reorganization plan can direct the application of liened or levied assets. United States v. Energy Resources, Inc., 495 U.S. 545, 110 S.Ct. 2139, 109 L.Ed.2d 580 (1990). The trustee believes that rational bankruptcy policy precludes an exception for tax penalty claims in a chapter 11 liquidating plan.

I. LIEN ON FOREIGN ASSETS

Approximately 118,000,00o 1 in assets now held by the trustee were located outside U.S. borders on the petition date. The bulk of these assets were bank deposits located in London 2 , the Isle of Man, and Switzerland.

The trustee urges that, absent evidence to the contrary, it is presumed Congress intends legislation to apply only domestically and not internationally. Seville v. Martin Marietta Corp., 638 F.Supp. 590 (D.Md.1986). The trustee contends the “Act of State” doctrine is the only rational course available; otherwise, Congress would assert its authority with no ability to control the outcome. Bandes v. Harlow & Jones, Inc., 826 F.Supp. 700 (S.D.N.Y.1993).

The only apparent case on point to any degree is United States v. First Nat’l City Bank, 321 F.2d 14, 23 (2nd Cir.1963), rehearing en banc, 325 F.2d 1020 (2nd Cir.1964), rev’d on other grounds, 377 U.S. 951, 84 S.Ct. 1629, 12 L.Ed.2d 496 (1965). In First National the United States sought to impose a tax lien on taxpayer’s foreign assets held by respondent’s subsidiary bank in Uruguay. The district court enjoined transfer of the foreign assets pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7402(a), despite the absence of personal service on the taxpayer. Both the Second Circuit panel and en banc court held that a lien under 26 U.S.C. § 6321 did not attach to overseas assets. Since the plaintiff had not obtained jurisdiction over the taxpayer, the court of appeals concluded that the injunction should be denied.

Bypassing the in rem lien issue entirely, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the United States might eventually achieve personal service over the taxpayer under New York state law. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that injunctive relief was appropriate against the respondent/domestic bank over which the court had jurisdiction in order to preserve the foreign assets for possible collection after judgment.

In analyzing the relevance of First National for the case at bar, the United States argues that both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court opinions assume that once personal jurisdiction exists over a taxpayer, the government is entitled to enforce its hens against a taxpayer’s assets, domestic or foreign. The government notes that undisputed personal jurisdiction over the debtor should entitle it to enforcement of its statutory hen.

While the trustee does not dispute that personal jurisdiction over the taxpayer absent bankruptcy entitles the United States to enforce its hens by injunctive relief against the taxpayer personally, the trustee urges that in the First National case the Supreme Court carefully avoided extending hens derived from 26 U.S.C. § 6321 to foreign assets. Since the Supreme Court reversed on other grounds, the trustee relies on the anal *396 ysis of the court of appeals which concluded that absent evidence of contrary Congressional intent, section 6321 applies only within the territorial limits of the United States and that the revenue rule precludes the enforcement of a tax claim in a foreign country. Since there is no evidence in the language of section 6321 suggesting foreign application and since the tax claim could not have been enforced in any European country which held debtor’s assets on the date of filing, any tax hen of the United States was not a “charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation” as required by 11 U.S.C.

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189 B.R. 393, 9 Tex.Bankr.Ct.Rep. 228, 1995 Bankr. LEXIS 1770, 78 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 5933, 1995 WL 728258, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/askanase-v-united-states-in-re-guyana-development-corp-txsb-1995.