NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION File Name: 25a0434n.06
No. 24-1763
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT Sep 24, 2025 KELLY L. STEPHENS, Clerk ) ) ASHRAF MUSTAFA, ) ON APPEAL FROM THE Plaintiff-Appellant, ) UNITED STATES DISTRICT ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN v. ) DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN ) FORD MOTOR COMPANY, ) OPINION Defendant-Appellee. ) )
Before: STRANCH, BUSH, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. After he was fired for alleged poor performance, Ashraf
Mustafa sued his employer, Ford Motor Company, asserting claims of discrimination and
retaliation under Title VII. The district court dismissed Mustafa’s amended complaint for failure
to state a claim. Mustafa appeals, arguing that the district court prematurely dismissed both claims.
We agree and REVERSE.
I.
This appeal arises from a motion to dismiss, so we accept as true the facts from the
operative complaint. Heyward v. Cooper, 88 F.4th 648, 653 (6th Cir. 2023). Mustafa, a Middle
Eastern man who practices Islam, worked for Ford from 2014 until his termination in 2021.
During his first five years working as a manufacturing engineer, his supervisors gave him positive
yearly performance reviews. But that all changed in 2019, when he was transferred to a new team
in Kansas City, Missouri, that was tasked with managing the launch of the 2022 Ford F-150 pickup
truck. In Kansas City, Mustafa reported to two new supervisors (Gordon Richei and Victoria No. 24-1763, Mustafa v. Ford Motor Co.
Wilson) and a new manager (Daniel Schluentz). His new bosses were hard on him. For example,
Mustafa says they gave him a poor performance review at the end of his first year, despite his
excellent work on “temporary” or “outside” projects that he completed for Ford on top of his
normal duties.
Mustafa recounts several other instances that he believes reflect his supervisors’ bias
against him. In one instance occurring in 2020, Richei reprimanded him for wearing shorts to
work, even though many of Mustafa’s white, non-Muslim colleagues had done so without
consequence. Mustafa says that he was troubled by the incident and mentioned it to a colleague.
However, that colleague was terminated shortly after discussing the matter with others. Around
this same time, another engineer on Mustafa’s team quit, and much of that engineer’s workload
was reassigned to Mustafa. Although Mustafa generally agreed to take on the extra responsibility,
he asserts that the additional work eventually became more than he could handle by himself. So
naturally, he asked for help. Ford initially agreed and arranged for a junior engineer to be assigned
to help Mustafa. But when the junior engineer arrived on site, Richei reassigned the individual to
help a different employee, leaving Mustafa with no support. Despite being unable to complete all
the work on his own, Mustafa was never assigned any help.
These events led Mustafa to file a formal complaint with Ford’s human resources (HR)
department in October 2020, alleging that his supervisors had subjected him to harassment and
discrimination. About two weeks later, Richei accused Mustafa of falsifying his timecard, but a
subsequent investigation found no support for that allegation. Then, in December 2020, Mustafa
received his second annual performance review. Although the review acknowledged that he had
met and completed all his deliverables for the year, Mustafa’s supervisors still characterized his
2 No. 24-1763, Mustafa v. Ford Motor Co.
performance as substandard, attributing the completion of his work primarily to assistance from
other team members.
Mustafa took medical leave in early January 2021, following a workplace injury he
sustained on the job in October 2020. He remained on medical leave until July 2021, when he was
cleared to return to work by both his personal physician and Ford’s medical team. But his return
was short-lived. Just three days later, Wilson and Schluentz fired Mustafa, citing poor
performance as the basis for his discharge. Mustafa also alleges that Richei played a part in the
decision to terminate him. He disputes Ford’s firing rationale, claiming that he met all his
deadlines and deliverables, despite taking on additional work outside the scope of his regular job
duties and being “actively sabotaged” by his managers. R. 16, Am. Compl. ¶ 43, PageID 113.
About ten months—299 days—passed before Mustafa filed a Charge of Discrimination
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Following the EEOC’s issuance
of a Dismissal and Notice of Right to Sue, Mustafa filed this lawsuit. His complaint alleged two
violations of Title VII: discrimination and retaliation. The district court concluded that Mustafa’s
complaint could not survive Ford’s motion to dismiss and granted Mustafa leave to amend. His
effort proved ineffective, however, and the court again found that Mustafa’s amended complaint
lacked sufficient factual allegations to support either claim. The court dismissed the case with
prejudice. Mustafa timely appealed.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal of a plaintiff’s operative complaint. West
v. Ky. Horse Racing Comm’n, 972 F.3d 881, 886 (6th Cir. 2020). A complaint “must contain
sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
3 No. 24-1763, Mustafa v. Ford Motor Co.
Plausibility sits somewhere between possibility and probability. Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d
605, 610 (6th Cir. 2012). And we use our “judicial experience and common sense” to help answer
whether a complaint plausibly states a claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. We “need not give
legal conclusions and unwarranted factual inferences a presumption of truth.” Heyward, 88 F.4th
at 653.
Title VII prohibits “discriminat[ion] against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s
race, . . . religion, . . . or national origin . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Under Title VII, it is
also unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee “because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice . . . or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing . . . .” Id.
§ 2000e-3(a). Mustafa alleges that Ford violated Title VII by disparately treating him and
terminating him because of his race, religion, and national origin. He also claims Ford retaliated
against him by firing him after he filed a complaint with Ford’s HR department regarding the
alleged discrimination.
III.
To survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need only plead “an adequate factual basis for a
Title VII discrimination claim.” Serrano v. Cintas Corp., 699 F.3d 884, 897 (6th Cir. 2012). It is
true that, at the summary judgment stage, a plaintiff must offer either direct evidence of
discrimination, or circumstantial evidence, which is evaluated under the familiar McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework. Id. at 892. But at the pleading stage, Mustafa need not
commit to—or even identify—the theory he wants to rely on. See id. at 898. Nor, under the
indirect evidence approach, must Mustafa establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas.
4 No. 24-1763, Mustafa v. Ford Motor Co.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511–12 (2002). Rather, the complaint must include
sufficient factual detail to allow the court to draw a “reasonable inference” that the defendant is
responsible for the alleged, legally culpable misconduct. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Conclusory
allegations will not suffice; the plaintiff must show more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id. In this Title VII suit, that means Mustafa need only allege sufficient
facts to support a plausible inference that Ford “discriminate[d] against [him] with respect to [his]
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of [his] race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.” Keys, 684 F.3d at 610 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l)).
With that framework in mind, we first examine whether the district court erred in
dismissing Mustafa’s discrimination claim for failure to state a claim. We then turn to whether
the district court also erred in dismissing his retaliation claim.
A.
We begin with Mustafa’s discrimination claim. The district court concluded Mustafa failed
to plausibly allege that Ford’s termination of his employment violated Title VII. We disagree. To
explain why, we first isolate the conduct that Mustafa may rely on to state his claim. We then
explain why the amended complaint plausibly alleged that Ford discriminated against Mustafa
because of a protected characteristic.
1.
Before they may file suit under Title VII, employees claiming workplace discrimination
must exhaust their administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). That includes filing
a Charge of Discrimination within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory conduct.1 Id. As noted,
1 Although the statute prescribes 180 days to file a Charge of Discrimination, that period extends to 300 days in states like Michigan, where the EEOC has a work-sharing agreement with the state agency. See Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino, 939 F.3d 824, 828 (6th Cir. 2019).
5 No. 24-1763, Mustafa v. Ford Motor Co.
Mustafa filed his Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC 299 days after his termination. The
parties do not dispute that Mustafa has satisfied this administrative remedy exhaustion prerequisite,
so we proceed on that basis.
Based on the amended complaint’s allegations, Mustafa presents two different theories to
support his discrimination claim. The first is that he was disparately treated through various
“adverse employment actions, including performance improvement plans [and] reprimands.”
R. 16, Am. Compl. ¶ 53, PageID 114. The second is that he was discharged because of his race,
religion, or national origin.
Of these, only Mustafa’s termination falls within the applicable limitations period, which
means it is the only discrete discriminatory act that may independently support his Title VII claim.
See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 (2002). So our analysis must focus
on whether the complaint has plausibly alleged that the termination itself was discriminatory. That
does not mean, however, that we must altogether ignore the earlier alleged incidents of
discrimination. Although time-barred, discrete acts cannot form the basis of liability, we may still
consider them “as background evidence in support of a timely claim.” Id. at 113.
So, in evaluating whether Mustafa’s termination plausibly occurred under discriminatory
circumstances, we may still consider his untimely alleged instances of discriminatory treatment.
At the pleading stage, these instances could support a reasonable inference that Ford’s stated
reason for the termination was pretextual. See, e.g., Clack v. Rock-Tenn Co., 304 F. App’x 399,
403 (6th Cir. 2008) (per curiam); Gibson v. Shelly Co., 314 F. App’x 760, 767 (6th Cir. 2008); see
also Kellogg v. Ball State Univ., 984 F.3d 525, 529 (7th Cir. 2021).2
2 Also at the district court, Mustafa argued—and the court rejected—that the continuing- violations doctrine applied, and Ford continues to defend against that argument in its appellate brief. But Mustafa abandoned this argument on appeal and instead concedes that his
6 No. 24-1763, Mustafa v. Ford Motor Co.
2.
Mustafa bears the burden of alleging facts that plausibly suggest a causal connection
between his protected status and the adverse employment action. See Keys, 684 F.3d at 610;
Serrano, 699 F.3d at 897–98. Allegations detailing a “specific event” in which Mustafa was
“treated differently” from his nonprotected colleagues, for example, could support a reasonable
inference of discrimination. Savel v. MetroHealth Sys., 96 F.4th 932, 944 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting
Keys, 684 F.3d at 610).
That, he contends, is where the district court went wrong. Mustafa argues that the court
failed to properly consider the allegations supporting his claim of discriminatory discharge. He
also maintains that he has established a prima facie case for discrimination. In support, Mustafa
relies on several pre-termination events—including the two negative performance reviews, the
dress-code-violation rebuke, and the denial of workplace support—as evidence that he suffered
disparate treatment based on his race, religion, and national origin. Although he acknowledges
these events occurred outside the 300-day EEOC filing window, he contends they nonetheless
“clearly” demonstrate evidence in support of his “claims of racial and religious animus.”
We reserve judgment on whether Mustafa has sufficiently alleged a prima facie case for
discrimination because he need not do so at this stage to survive a motion to dismiss. See
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511–12. But, considering all the allegations, we agree with Mustafa that
he has plausibly alleged that his discharge was the result of unlawful discrimination.
Our case law confirms this conclusion. In Keys, we reversed the dismissal of a Title VII
complaint where the plaintiff alleged “several specific events” in which she received different
discrimination claim must be cabined to the facts underlying only his discharge. We therefore decline to address the argument.
7 No. 24-1763, Mustafa v. Ford Motor Co.
treatment than did her white colleagues, identified supervisors by name or title, and claimed she
underwent several adverse employment actions despite satisfactory performance. 684 F.3d at 610.
We held that such allegations “easily state[d] a plausible claim” of discrimination at the pleading
stage because the factual allegations were “at least as detailed, if not more so, than those the
Supreme Court found” satisfactory under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 8(a). Id. (emphasis
added).
Similar to the complaint in Keys, Mustafa’s amended complaint details “several specific
events,” see id. at 610, where, in the lead-up to his termination, he was allegedly treated less
favorably than similarly situated, non-Middle Eastern, non-Muslim colleagues. These include
(1) receiving a negative performance evaluation following the withdrawal of engineering support
that had been promised, (2) being falsely accused of timecard fraud, (3) being the only employee
disciplined for wearing shorts, (4) being assigned the workload of a departed engineer, and
(5) being replaced by someone outside his protected classes. Critically, Mustafa alleges that the
same supervisor—Richei—was involved in many of these incidents and also played a role in the
decision to terminate him. Richei’s repeated involvement plausibly connects the earlier alleged
discrete discriminatory acts to the ultimate adverse employment action (termination), suggesting
the same discriminatory animus was at work. When considered collectively as “background
evidence,” rather than standalone claims of discrimination, these allegations support a reasonable
inference that race, religion, or national origin was at least a motivating factor in Ford’s decision
to fire Mustafa. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., 590 U.S. 644, 656–57 (2020).
What’s more, Mustafa alleges that his termination was based on false claims of poor
performance, which he contends were pretextual. He asserts that he met all his 2020 deliverables.
And he did so despite being assigned responsibilities outside of his defined role, receiving little
8 No. 24-1763, Mustafa v. Ford Motor Co.
support, and being undermined by his supervisors. This alleged inconsistency between
performance and termination further reinforces the plausibility of a discriminatory motive.
Ford cites two cases for its argument that Mustafa’s amended complaint lacks the factual
specificity necessary to support more than a speculative inference of discrimination. But neither
justifies dismissal of Mustafa’s claims at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
First, consider Han v. University of Dayton, 541 F. App’x 622 (6th Cir. 2013). There, a
panel of this court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of a discrimination claim where the
plaintiff’s only concrete allegation was that, following his termination, his employer replaced him
with a white male in one of the several college courses that he taught. Id. at 626–27. The Han
complaint contained no details of how others outside of the plaintiff’s protected class were treated
differently. See generally id. In contrast, Mustafa’s amended complaint sets forth at least four
distinct examples of disparate treatment leading up to his termination, while also alleging that he
was replaced by an individual outside of his protected class.
Second, Ford relies on 16630 Southfield Ltd. P’ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502
(6th Cir. 2013). There, we affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint because it relied
solely on broad, conclusory statements made “upon information and belief,” without naming any
similarly situated individuals or providing facts demonstrating that persons of different national
origins received more favorable treatment. Id. at 506. We emphasized that such “naked
assertions,” unsupported by more concrete facts, are precisely what Iqbal and Twombly prohibit.
Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). The plaintiffs merely speculated that such comparators
existed, without any factual detail regarding the comparators’ identity or circumstances, or how
those circumstances were comparable. Id.
9 No. 24-1763, Mustafa v. Ford Motor Co.
Mustafa’s amended complaint, on the other hand, crosses the line from speculation to
plausibility. Although he does not identify comparators by name, he details how his non-Middle
Eastern, non-Muslim engineering colleagues were treated differently and more favorably—they
were allegedly assigned assisting engineers (some having two), credited for completing their work,
given raises and “commensurate” performance reviews, allowed to dress however they wanted,
and not given the duties of other departed colleagues, like Mustafa was. His discrimination claim
remains plausible despite that he did not identify or provide detailed information about his non-
Muslim, non-Middle Eastern coworkers he alleges received better treatment. As we have
emphasized, at the pleading state, Mustafa need only allege facts that provide Ford “fair notice of
what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). He need not plead a prima
facie case on the face of his complaint because that is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading
requirement. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510.
Although some of our cases noted comparator names or job roles to illustrate sufficiency
at the pleading stage, we have never required plaintiffs to include such detail. See e.g., Han, 541
F. App’x at 627; Downs v. Bel Brands USA, Inc., 613 F. App’x 515, 519 (6th Cir. 2015). What
we have required is that the complaint offer some factual content about “the other employees or
their differing treatment.” Smith v. Wrigley Mfg. Co., LLC, 749 F. App’x 446, 448 (6th Cir. 2018)
(emphasis added); House v. Rexam Beverage Can Co., 630 F. App’x 461, 464 (6th Cir. 2015)
(“House fails to provide any examples of how Rexam treated those substantially younger
employees more favorably, or any facts regarding how those employees are similarly situated.”
(emphasis added)). And Mustafa’s comparator allegations clear that bar. Demanding more at the
10 No. 24-1763, Mustafa v. Ford Motor Co.
pleading stage would improperly conflate pleading rules with summary judgment burdens—a
result the Supreme Court has cautioned against. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511–12.
Mustafa’s allegations support a plausible inference that he was terminated because of his
race, religion, or national origin. “Time—and, crucially, discovery—will tell whether [Mustafa]
satisf[ies] the prima facie case requirements.” See Savel, 96 F.4th at 944; see also Swierkiewicz,
534 U.S. at 512; Masaebi v. Arby’s Corp., 852 F. App’x 903, 909 (6th Cir. 2021) (resolving
employment discrimination claims on the pleadings is generally disfavored because key
evidence—especially regarding motive and intent—often rests in the hands of the employer). For
now, Mustafa has carried his burden, and the district court erred in dismissing his discrimination
claim.
B.
We move next to Mustafa’s retaliation claim. As before, we limit our review to the facts
surrounding his termination. Mustafa argues that the district court erred in dismissing his
retaliation claim because his amended complaint plausibly alleges that he was terminated in
retaliation for engaging in protected activity under Title VII. Specifically, he alleges that his
October 2020 HR complaint, in which he raised concerns of religious and racial discrimination,
led to a series of discriminatory actions culminating in his termination. Taken as true, these
allegations sufficiently support a plausible inference of retaliation at this motion to dismiss stage.
Ford disagrees. It maintains that the district court properly concluded that no causal
relationship existed between Mustafa’s protected activity and his termination, which would doom
his claim. The district court concluded that the nine-month gap between Mustafa’s complaint and
his discharge undermined any inference of causation. Mustafa asked the court to discount his
medical leave for six of those nine months, but the court declined to do so because Mustafa offered
11 No. 24-1763, Mustafa v. Ford Motor Co.
no supporting legal authority. The court also rejected Mustafa’s claim that the negative
performance review he received in December 2020 demonstrated “a campaign of retaliation
against him.” R. 25, Op. & Order, PageID 225.
Although Mustafa contends that he has satisfied his prima facie burden, we once again
decline to answer whether he has adequately pleaded a prima facie case of retaliation under the
McDonnell Douglas framework. Nevertheless, Mustafa still must put forth some allegation of
causation that permits this court to plausibly infer a connection between the alleged protected
activity and his termination. See Ogbonna-McGruder v. Austin Peay State Univ., 91 F.4th 833,
841 (6th Cir. 2024); cf. Upshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 576 F.3d 576, 588 (6th Cir. 2009) (burden to
prove causation, even at the prima facie stage, is “minimal”).
Mustafa has done so. He appropriately lays out a sequence of closely timed events that led
to his termination. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514. He states that (1) he filed his complaint in
October 2020; (2) two weeks later, his direct supervisor accused him of falsifying his timecard;
(3) soon after that, he received a negative performance review; and (4) “[a]lmost immediately
following the performance review,” R. 19, Pl. Brief, PageID 194, he took leave for an injury that
he suffered around the same time he filed his complaint. In light of Ford’s actions preceding
Mustafa’s leave, the company’s immediate termination of him upon his return bolsters the
plausible inference of retaliatory conduct.
Ford’s rebuttal is twofold. First, it contends that the performance review lacks retaliatory
significance. Not so. The narrow time gap between the performance review, the HR complaint,
and the timecard accusation supports Mustafa’s theory of escalating retaliation. See Mickey v.
Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 526 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[S]uch other evidence of retaliatory
conduct has commonly included evidence of additional discrimination occurring between the date
12 No. 24-1763, Mustafa v. Ford Motor Co.
at which the employer learned of the protected activity and the date of termination or other adverse
employment action.”). Although the district court treated these events as isolated or unconnected,
at the pleading stage, they need only support a reasonable inference of retaliation. Cf. Keys, 684
F.3d at 610 (reversing dismissal where plaintiff alleged a plausible sequence of discriminatory
acts). Moreover, Mustafa further alleges that he met his performance goals, the review itself
acknowledged this, and Ford wrongly credited his colleagues with being the actual reason the work
was completed. See id. (Rule 8 satisfied where complaint alleged adverse actions despite
satisfactory performance).
Second, Ford argues that Mustafa has not adequately alleged that Richei—a key person
involved in the allegedly retaliatory action—had knowledge of the HR complaint. But we are not
persuaded that the pleading stage requires more factual specificity about Richei’s knowledge.
Such facts regarding intent and motive may (or may not) surface in discovery. See Masaebi, 852
F. App’x at 909. When viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to Mustafa, we
reasonably infer that formally submitting a complaint to Ford’s HR department gives the employer,
including Richei, knowledge of that complaint. Although Mustafa may ultimately have to produce
more evidence at summary judgment, his allegations suffice to withstand dismissal at this early
stage.
In their full context, Mustafa’s allegations rise to more than a speculative possibility of
retaliation. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. His allegations reasonably suggest that he may later
establish a prima facie case once he receives the benefit of factual development. See Swierkiewicz,
534 U.S. at 512 (the benefit of discovery includes “unearth[ing] relevant facts and evidence”
pertinent to the prima facie case). Ford seeks to place a heavier burden on Mustafa than the law
requires at this stage, expecting him to disprove any other cognizable explanations or theories for
13 No. 24-1763, Mustafa v. Ford Motor Co.
his termination, before any discovery. But Mustafa need only plead facts that “give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Keys, 684 F.3d at 608
(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007)). Because Mustafa has carried that burden at
the pleading stage, we hold that the district court erred in dismissing his retaliation claim.
For these reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of Mustafa’s discrimination
and retaliation claims and REMAND the case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.