Ashley v. F-W Chevrolet Co.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

Ashley v. F-W Chevrolet Co.

21 S.E.2d 834, 222 N.C. 25, 1942 N.C. LEXIS 8

CourtSupreme Court of North Carolina

DecidedSeptember 23, 1942

StatusPublished

Cited by11 cases

This text of 21 S.E.2d 834 (Ashley v. F-W Chevrolet Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of North Carolina primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Ashley v. F-W Chevrolet Co., 21 S.E.2d 834, 222 N.C. 25, 1942 N.C. LEXIS 8 (N.C. 1942).

Pincite

Opinion

Stacy, C. J.

Did Ashley’s death result from an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment? The record permits an affirmative inference.

By the terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, a compensable death is one which results to an employee from an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. Slade v. Hosiery Mills, 209 N. C., 823, 184 S. E., 844. An injury is said to “arise out of” the employment when it occurs in the course of the employment and is a natural or probable consequence or incident of it. Harden v. Furniture Co., 199 N. C., 733, 155 S. E., 728. “There must be some causal relation between the employment and the injury; but if the injury is one which, after the event, may be seen to have had its origin in the employment, it need not be shown that it is one’ which ought to have been foreseen or expected.” Conrad v. Foundry Co., 198 N. C., 723, 153 S. E., 266.

In the case of injuries inflicted by assault, the rule is that if one employee assault another solely from anger, hatred, revenge, or vindictiveness, not growing out of or as an incident to the employment, the injury is to be attributed to the voluntary act of the assailant, and not as an incident of the employment. Martin v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 216 Ala., 500, 113 So., 578. But if the assault be incidental to some duty of the employment, the injuries suffered thereby may properly be said to arise out of the employment. Jacquemin v. Turner & Seymour Mfg. Co., 92 Conn., 382, 103 Atl., 115. The statement of the rule, as' thus distilled from the authorities, is simple enough. Its application is sometimes fraught with puzzling effect. Here persuasive arguments may be advanced in favor of either conclusion, and were so *28 advanced on the hearing. When the record is such as to support either result, the findings of the Commission are controlling. Lockey v. Cohen, Goldman Co., 213 N. C., 356, 196 S. E., 342; Lassiter v. Tel. Co., 215 N. C., 227, 1 S. E. (2d), 542.

But for the custom or practice of borrowing tools in the plant, the incident here in question might not have occurred. Hence, it is permissible to infer that the injury by accident which resulted in harm to the employee arose out of the employment as an incident to the method of carrying on the work in the shop. It is clear that it occurred in the course of the employment. Conrad v. Foundry Co., supra.

The result is an affirmance of the judgment below.

Affirmed.

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Stacy, C. J.

Did Ashley’s death result from an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment? The record permits an affirmative inference.

By the terms of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, a compensable death is one which results to an employee from an injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. Slade v. Hosiery Mills, 209 N. C., 823, 184 S. E., 844. An injury is said to “arise out of” the employment when it occurs in the course of the employment and is a natural or probable consequence or incident of it. Harden v. Furniture Co., 199 N. C., 733, 155 S. E., 728. “There must be some causal relation between the employment and the injury; but if the injury is one which, after the event, may be seen to have had its origin in the employment, it need not be shown that it is one’ which ought to have been foreseen or expected.” Conrad v. Foundry Co., 198 N. C., 723, 153 S. E., 266.

In the case of injuries inflicted by assault, the rule is that if one employee assault another solely from anger, hatred, revenge, or vindictiveness, not growing out of or as an incident to the employment, the injury is to be attributed to the voluntary act of the assailant, and not as an incident of the employment. Martin v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 216 Ala., 500, 113 So., 578. But if the assault be incidental to some duty of the employment, the injuries suffered thereby may properly be said to arise out of the employment. Jacquemin v. Turner & Seymour Mfg. Co., 92 Conn., 382, 103 Atl., 115. The statement of the rule, as' thus distilled from the authorities, is simple enough. Its application is sometimes fraught with puzzling effect. Here persuasive arguments may be advanced in favor of either conclusion, and were so *28 advanced on the hearing. When the record is such as to support either result, the findings of the Commission are controlling. Lockey v. Cohen, Goldman Co., 213 N. C., 356, 196 S. E., 342; Lassiter v. Tel. Co., 215 N. C., 227, 1 S. E. (2d), 542.

But for the custom or practice of borrowing tools in the plant, the incident here in question might not have occurred. Hence, it is permissible to infer that the injury by accident which resulted in harm to the employee arose out of the employment as an incident to the method of carrying on the work in the shop. It is clear that it occurred in the course of the employment. Conrad v. Foundry Co., supra.

The result is an affirmance of the judgment below.

Affirmed.

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Bluebook (online)

21 S.E.2d 834, 222 N.C. 25, 1942 N.C. LEXIS 8, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ashley-v-f-w-chevrolet-co-nc-1942.

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