Ashley Meadows Farm, Inc. v. American Horse Shows Ass'n

609 F. Supp. 677, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19922
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedMay 10, 1985
Docket82 Civ. 5691 (RWS)
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 609 F. Supp. 677 (Ashley Meadows Farm, Inc. v. American Horse Shows Ass'n) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ashley Meadows Farm, Inc. v. American Horse Shows Ass'n, 609 F. Supp. 677, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19922 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).

Opinion

OPINION

SWEET, District Judge.

Plaintiff Ashley Meadows Farm, Inc. (“Ashley”) has moved for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 upon its claim for a permanent injunction under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 1px solid var(--green-border)">26. Defendant American Horse Shows Association, Inc. (“AHSA”) has moved to amend its answer to include a seventh defense based upon the Amateur Sports Act of 1978, 36 U.S.C. § 371 et seq. AHSA’s motion was granted at oral argument, and Ashley’s motion is denied.

Prior Proceedings

Ashley and Ashley’s president, Dolores Swann (“Swann!’), brought this action against AHSA and Ira Finkelstein (“Finkelstein”), counsel to AHSA, alleging conspiracies to violate and actual violations of the antitrust laws. In an opinion of September 28, 1983 I granted Finkelstein’s motion to dismiss but denied AHSA’s similar motion. In an opinion of September 20, 1984 I granted AHSA’s- subsequent motion for summary judgment with respect Swann. Ashley has now moved for .partial summary judgment, alleging that the mileage and protected date rules violate 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 1px solid var(--green-border)">26.

Facts

The facts as alleged with respect to AHSA’s structure and role in the horse showing community, Ashley, and the operation of AHSA’s “mileage” and “protected” date rules are set forth with sufficient specificity in the September 28, 1983 and September 20,. 1984 opinions, 593 F.Supp. 1184. Familiarity with these opinions is assumed.

Discussion

The parties agree that NCAA v. Board of Regents, — U.S. —, 104 S.Ct. 2948, 82 L.Ed.2d 70 (1984) (“NCAA”) is dispositive of this case. Two issues must be resolved in light of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in NCAA: should the per se rule *679 be applied to AHSA’s mileage and protected date rules, and, if not, are there material questions of fact which prevent granting summary judgment under a rule of reason analysis.

The Per Se Rule

In NCAA the Supreme Court evaluated a scheme pursuant to which the television committee of the NCAA was granted sole authority to negotiate all rights to televise member college’s football games. The scheme limited both the total quantity of televised intercollegiate football and the number of games that any one team could televise. Member schools were permitted to televise games only in accordance with the approved scheme, and when certain member schools began to negotiate additional sales of television rights, the NCAA threatened disciplinary action.

After a full trial, the district court found the scheme and its enforcement to constitute a “classic cartel,” and it found the plan to be both per se price fixing and a per se group boycott in violation of Section One of the Sherman Act. Board of Regents v. NCAA, 546 F.Supp. 1276, 1300-1313 (W.D.Okl.1982). The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the ground that the plan constituted per se price fixing. Bd. of Reg. of U. of Okl. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983).

The Supreme Court rejected the lower court’s application of the per se rule, invoking, in its stead, the rule of reason:

There can be no doubt that the challenged practices of the NCAA constitute a “restraint of trade” in the sense that they limit members’ freedom to negotiate and enter into their own television contracts.
It is also undeniable that these practices share characteristics of restraints we have previously held unreasonable____ By participating in an association which prevents member institutions from competing against each other on the basis of price or kind of television rights that can be offered to broadcasters, the NCAA member institutions have created a horizontal restraint — an agreement among competitors on the way in which they will compete with one another. A restraint of this type has often been held to be unreasonable as a matter of law. Because it places a ceiling on the number of games member institutions may televise, the horizontal agreement places an artificial limit on the quantity of televised football that is available to broadcasters and consumers. By restraining the quantity of television rights available for sale, the challenged practices create a limitation on output; our cases have held that such limitations are unreasonable restraints of trade____
Horizontal price-fixing and output limitation are ordinarily condemned as a matter of law under an “illegal per se” approach because the probability that these practices are anti-competitive is so high; ... Nevertheless, we have decided that it would be inappropriate to apply the per se rule to this case. [W]hat is critical is that this ease involves an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at all.
What the NCAA and its member institutions market in this case is competition itself — contests between competing institutions. Of course, this would be completely ineffective if there were no rules on which the competitors agreed to create and define the competition to be marketed____ And the integrity of the “product” cannot be preserved except by mutual agreement; if an institution adopted such restrictions unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field might soon be destroyed. Thus, the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college football to preserve its character, and as a result enables a product to be marketed which might otherwise be unavailable. In performing this role, its actions widen consumer choice — not only the choices available to sports fans but also those available to athletes — and *680 hence can be viewed as procompetitive____ Thus, despite the fact that this case involves restraints on the ability of member institutions to compete in terms of price and output, a fair evaluation of their of their competitive character requires consideration of the NCAA’s justifications for the restraints.

The Court reasoned in NCAA that where cooperation and rule creation among members of a sports organization are necessary to insure the existence of a product defined as the marketing of high caliber competition then the application of the per se rule may be inappropriate. This case is analogous.

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Bluebook (online)
609 F. Supp. 677, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19922, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ashley-meadows-farm-inc-v-american-horse-shows-assn-nysd-1985.