Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 168 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION II No. CV-25-472
Opinion Delivered March 11, 2026
ASHLEY MASK AND WYATT APPEAL FROM THE SHARP CONNER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT APPELLANTS [NO. 68JV-23-72]
V. HONORABLE ADAM G. WEEKS, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF JUDGE HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR CHILD APPELLEES AFFIRMED; MOTION TO WITHDRAW GRANTED
BRANDON J. HARRISON, Judge
The Sharp County Circuit Court terminated the parental rights of Ashley Mask and
Wyatt Conner 1 to their daughter (MC, born 09/27/20). Mask has appealed and argues that
the circuit court erred in finding that she had not remedied the conditions that caused
removal and erred in finding that termination was in MC’s best interest. Counsel for
Conner has filed a motion to withdraw and a no-merit brief pursuant to Linker-Flores v.
Arkansas Department of Human Services, 359 Ark. 131, 194 S.W.3d 739 (2004), and
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9(j) (2025), asserting that there are no issues of arguable
merit to support an appeal. The clerk of this court made multiple attempts to send copies
of counsel’s motion and brief to Conner, including at the address provided by Conner to
1 Conner and Mask were married when MC was born. 1 the clerk’s office, informing him of his right to file pro se points for reversal. The packet
was returned to the clerk’s office with the message “Return to sender/not deliverable as
addressed/unable to forward.” We affirm the termination of parental rights as to both
parents and grant the motion to withdraw.
On 30 October 2023, the Arkansas Department of Human Services (DHS)
petitioned for emergency custody of MC. The accompanying affidavit explained that
DHS’s history with this family began in 2008 with reports of substance abuse and
environmental neglect. The affidavit also noted that MC has five siblings who have been
removed from Mask’s and Conner’s custody and adopted by other families.
The circumstances leading to MC’s removal began on October 26, when DHS
received a report of neglect and failure to provide necessary food, clothing, and shelter to
MC. The report alleged that MC was living with Conner in a camper with no electricity
or water and that Conner uses drugs in the home. The report also alleged that Conner
often leaves MC with an unknown male neighbor.
On Friday, October 27, DHS caseworker Ted Ford requested that officers from the
Sharp County Sheriff’s Office accompany him to Conner’s residence to investigate. Conner
was on probation for terroristic threatening toward a judge and DHS staff, and he also had
outstanding warrants. Officers met Conner at the front door of the camper and informed
him that he would be taken into custody for the outstanding warrants. Conner told DHS
that MC lived with her mother, not with him, but he was unable to reach Mask on the
phone. DHS exercised custody of MC and provided her with food and a medical exam,
which revealed a urinary tract infection. Mask contacted DHS and was told that DHS
2 would keep MC over the weekend. The circuit court granted DHS emergency custody on
October 30 after Mask tested positive for methamphetamine.
The court found probable cause to continue custody with DHS on November 1 and
found that the family would benefit from participating in the family-centered treatment
program. On December 5, the court adjudicated MC dependent-neglected on the basis of
parental unfitness due to drug use. The court set the goal of the case as reunification and
authorized DHS to arrange appropriate visitation. The court ordered the parents to
complete a myriad of tasks, including cooperate with DHS, comply with the case plan, and
obey the orders of the court; view the video The Clock is Ticking; remain drug free and
submit to random drug screens; notify DHS of any change of address or marital status; if
requested by DHS, submit to a drug-and-alcohol assessment and follow the
recommendations thereof; participate in and complete parenting classes; obtain and maintain
clean, safe, and stable housing with utilities turned on; obtain and maintain stable
employment or sufficient income to support the family; and resolve all criminal issues.
The court reviewed the case on 16 April 2024 and found that Mask was partially
compliant with the case plan. She was living with her boyfriend and his family, participating
in family-centered treatment court, and receiving drug and mental-health counseling.
However, the court noted that she had missed some visits with the child and was not present
for the review hearing. The court found that Conner was compliant; he had completed a
thirty-day inpatient drug treatment, secured stable income from a trust, submitted to drug
screens, and attended parenting classes. Finally, the court found that the parents have a toxic
3 relationship. The court reviewed the case again in July 2024 and found that both parents
were partially compliant with the case plan.
The court convened a permanency-planning hearing on 22 October 2024 and
changed the goal of the case to termination of parental rights. The court found the parents
unfit, citing Conner’s refusal to maintain regular contact with MC, the parents’ unstable
housing and employment situations, and the parents’ continued use of illegal substances.
The court found that Mask had been participating in counseling but had missed several
sessions and “has yet to demonstrate any progress toward remedying the reasons for the
juvenile’s removal.” Mask had also refused to submit to drug screens, and a hair-follicle test
in May 2024 was positive for methamphetamine. As to Conner, the court found that he
consistently missed family-time visits; did not complete parenting classes; and refused to
submit to drug screens, although he admitted he had relapsed several times.
On 4 November 2024, DHS petitioned for termination of parental rights for both
parents citing grounds of failure to remedy (both parents), failure to maintain meaningful
contact (Conner), parental rights involuntarily terminated as to a child (Mask), aggravated
circumstances—little likelihood of reunification (both parents), and subsequent factors (both
parents). See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(i)(a), (ii)(a), (vii)(a), (ix)(a)(3), and
(ix)(a)(4) (Supp. 2023). In February 2025, DHS amended the termination petition to assert
that both Mask and Conner had their parental rights involuntarily terminated as to a child.
The court convened the termination hearing on 29 April 2025. Emily Rock, the
primary caseworker, testified that Conner had completed inpatient treatment but did not
pursue follow-up treatment and had relapsed. He had also started two parenting programs
4 but did not complete either of them. Conner receives $1300 a month from a structured
settlement but does not have stable housing or employment. He had not contacted DHS
or attended any visitation since January 2025. Rock said, “All the same things are still
present now that were present at removal.”
Rock testified that Mask had completed parenting classes and had gotten a job
approximately one month ago. Rock was unaware if Mask had addressed her drug use
because she refused to submit to drug screens. She had also refused to submit to another
hair-follicle test. DHS had not seen inside the house where Mask was staying because “they
won’t allow us at that house. They don’t want us there.” But from the outside, it did not
look appropriate for a four-year-old. Mask had exercised her four hours of weekly
supervised visitation but had not progressed to unsupervised visitation.
Rock did not think that further services or additional time would result in successful
reunification. Rock also said that MC is adoptable and happy in her current placement.
On cross-examination, Rock said Mask had never expressed a desire to attend inpatient
drug treatment.
Berkley Chafin, a program assistant with DHS, testified that she supervised visits for
both parents and helped with transportation. She said that with both parents, visitation was
more like hanging out with a friend, and there was not much parenting.
Mask testified that she would go to inpatient drug treatment but that it had never
been offered to her. She said she would “do anything the department asks” to prevent her
rights from being terminated. When asked why DHS could not enter the house where she
lived, she said, “It’s not me.” She said that the house is not dirty and that MC could live
5 there. She expressed willingness to take a drug test. Mask admitted it had taken her “a little
longer to do it,” but she was trying, and she said that it would not be in MC’s best interest
to lose her altogether.
On cross-examination, Mask was asked why she had not taken another hair-follicle
test, and she said, “Well, I got the paperwork, um, well, I didn’t get the paperwork. She
sent me the text message on where I needed to go and, well, I don’t like to drive especially
long places, you know, I, my anxiety gets the best of me sometimes.” She explained her
dismissal from family-centered treatment court by citing “trust issues” and “bad service” for
the Zoom calls.
Connor testified that he had gone to rehab and then to “transition” for about a
month. He claimed to be sober for seven months but that he relapsed approximately eleven
months ago after he was told his camper was not appropriate housing. He said he had
“never really done the home thing” and was currently “not really living anywhere right
now.” He agreed that his living situation was not suitable for MC but also agreed that it
was in her best interest to be with him. His plan was to stay with “an ex-police officer in
Horseshoe Bend” to get clean. He wanted to have more time to obtain housing and show
the court he is sober.
On cross-examination, he said he had not been attending visitation because he had
been falsely accused of threatening a DHS employee and was afraid to be charged with
threatening again. But he claimed to be willing to work with DHS moving forward.
6 David Kerley testified that he had known Conner for about two years and that
Conner and MC “were always great together.” Kerley put Conner in touch with the ex-
police officer and agreed to provide Conner with transportation.
The court ruled from the bench that it was granting DHS’s petition. The court’s
written order found that DHS had proved by clear and convincing evidence the statutory
grounds of failure to remedy, aggravated circumstances—little likelihood of reunification,
and involuntary termination of parental rights to a child for both parents; and the
subsequent-factors ground for Conner. The court also found that MC is adoptable and that
she would face potential harm if returned to either parent due to the parents’ continued
drug use and inadequate shelter. Both parents timely appealed.
In order to terminate parental rights, a circuit court must find clear and convincing
evidence as to one or more of the grounds for termination listed in Ark. Code Ann. § 9-
27-341(b)(3)(B). Trogstad v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 443, 609 S.W.3d
661. The circuit court must also find by clear and convincing evidence that termination is
in the best interest of the juvenile, taking into consideration (1) the likelihood that the
juvenile will be adopted if the termination petition is granted; and (2) the potential harm,
specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the child, caused by returning
the child to the custody of the parent. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(A)(i) & (ii). Clear
and convincing evidence is defined as that degree of proof that will produce in the fact-
finder a firm conviction as to the allegation sought to be established. Posey v. Ark. Dep’t of
Health & Hum. Servs., 370 Ark. 500, 262 S.W.3d 159 (2007).
7 On appeal, the appellate court reviews termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo
but will not reverse the circuit court’s ruling unless its findings are clearly erroneous. Posey,
supra. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the
reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made. Id. In determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous, an
appellate court gives due deference to the opportunity of the circuit court to assess the
witnesses’ credibility. Lee v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 102 Ark. App. 337, 285 S.W.3d 277
(2008). Only one ground is necessary to terminate parental rights. Id.
Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 6-9(j)(1) allows counsel for an appellant in a
termination case to file a no-merit petition and motion to withdraw if, after studying the
record and researching the law, counsel determines that the appellant has no meritorious
basis for appeal. The petition must include an argument section that lists all circuit court
rulings that are adverse to the appellant on all objections, motions, and requests made by the
party at the hearing from which the appeal arose and an explanation why each adverse ruling
is not a meritorious ground for reversal. Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(j)(1)(A). Additionally, the
petition’s statement of the case and facts are required to contain all rulings adverse to the
appellant made by the circuit court at the hearing from which the order on appeal arose.
Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(j)(1)(B). In evaluating a no-merit brief, the issue for the court is
whether the appeal is wholly frivolous or whether there are any issues of arguable merit for
appeal. Linker-Flores, supra.
8 I. Mask’s Appeal
Mask asserts that the circuit court erred in finding that she failed to remedy the
situation that brought MC into DHS custody. She argues that she complied with the orders
of the court and had completed parenting classes, obtained employment, and visited MC
weekly. Regarding her drug use, she contends that she was willing to go to inpatient rehab,
but it had not been offered to her.
As noted above, only one ground is necessary to terminate parental rights. Lee, supra.
Mask challenges the failure-to-remedy ground but has failed to contest statutory grounds of
aggravated circumstances (little likelihood of reunification) and involuntary termination of
parental rights to a child. When an appellant fails to attack the circuit court’s independent,
alternative bases for its ruling, we will not reverse. Casarreal v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,
2010 Ark. App. 622.
Regarding best interest, Mask does not challenge the circuit court’s findings on
adoptability or potential harm. Instead, Mask asserts that there was no proof that “to sever
the bond between the mother and the child” was in MC’s best interest. She argues that the
DHS witnesses testified to “compliance issues” but did not address or even say the words
“best interest.” However, the circuit court is not required to make a finding on the bond
between mother and child, and even if such a bond existed, it is insufficient to warrant
reversal in light of the record before us. See, e.g., Lemon v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2022
Ark. App. 253 (holding that existence of a bond between biological parent and child may
not be sufficient to prevent termination of parental rights when weighed against other facts).
Also, while Rock and Chafin may not have said the words “best interest,” their entire
9 testimony demonstrated the potential harm MC would face if returned to either parent’s
custody, and, conversely, that not returning to either parent’s custody was in MC’s best
interest.
Having reviewed the record and the briefs presented by the parties, we hold that the
circuit court had sufficient evidence on which to find that it was in MC’s best interest for
Mask’s parental rights to be terminated and that statutory grounds for termination existed.
Thus, we affirm the termination of Mask’s parental rights.
II. Conner’s Appeal
Counsel asserts that any challenge to the circuit court’s determination that statutory
grounds existed under Ark. Code. Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)(B) for termination of Conner’s
parental rights would be frivolous. Only one ground is necessary for termination to occur,
Lee, supra, and counsel argues that the strongest ground relied on by the circuit court for
termination was the prior-involuntary-termination ground. Arkansas Code Annotated
section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(4) permits termination of parental rights when a “court of
competent jurisdiction, including the juvenile division of the circuit court” finds that the
parent had his “parental rights involuntarily terminated as to a child.” Here, it is undisputed
that Conner met the definition of a parent and that DHS introduced certified copies of two
orders terminating Conner’s parental rights to four children in previous dependency-neglect
cases. Thus, counsel argues, DHS clearly and convincingly proved that Conner had his
parental rights involuntarily terminated to a child.
Counsel contends that it would also be frivolous to seek reversal on the circuit court’s
best-interest finding. Rock testified that MC is adoptable with no barriers to adoption, and
10 this court has held that a caseworker’s testimony that a child is adoptable is sufficient to
support an adoptability finding. See Cole v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 121,
543 S.W.3d 540. Regarding potential harm, the circuit court found that MC would be at
risk of potential harm if returned to Conner’s custody specifically due to her parents’
“continued drug use and inadequate shelter,” and the testimony supports this finding.
Conner stated that he was “not really living anywhere right now” and that the situation was
not appropriate for MC. He admittedly did not complete parenting classes, did not attend
most visitations, and was not sober. Counsel contends that Conner’s continued instability
demonstrated potential harm to MC, and no meritorious argument for reversal on best
interest can be made on appeal.
As required by Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 6-9(i)(1)(A), counsel has also reviewed the record
for all rulings adverse to Conner made by the circuit court on all objections, motions, and
requests made by the party at the hearing from which the appeal arose. In addition to the
termination order itself, which counsel addressed above, Conner moved for dismissal at the
close of DHS’s case, and the court denied the motion. Conner renewed his motion to
dismiss at the conclusion of the hearing and it was again denied by the court. Counsel
explains that in deciding the motions to dismiss, the circuit court must consider if “the
plaintiff’s evidence, given its strongest probative force, presents a prima facie case.”
Williamson v. Williamson, 2018 Ark. App. 236, at 12, 548 S.W.3d 816, 825. Counsel
contends that given the high hurdle that must be overcome in order for a circuit court to
grant a motion to dismiss, it was not reversible error for the court to find that DHS put
forth testimony and evidence sufficient to support the denial of Conner’s motions to dismiss.
11 Counsel also discusses the denial of Conner’s request for additional time to comply
with the court’s orders so that MC could be returned to him. Counsel asserts that it was
not reversible error for the court to deny the request considering the arguments stated above.
DHS had proved that termination was in MC’s best interest and that at least one statutory
ground for termination existed. Counsel explains that the intent of the termination statute
is to provide permanency in a child’s life in all instances where the child cannot return to
the family home, and it appears from the evidence that a return cannot be accomplished
within a reasonable period of time as viewed from the child’s perspective. See Ark. Code
Ann. § 9-27-341(a)(3). In addition, a circuit court is permitted to consider a parent’s past
behavior over a meaningful period of time as a good indicator of what the future may
present. Thompson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2010 Ark. App. 167, 374 S.W.3d 143.
Counsel concludes,
Sadly, due to Wyatt’s failure to make progress and the entirety of the evidence presented at the termination hearing, it was unclear when he would be capable of safely parenting MC. Thus, despite Wyatt’s love for MC, no meritorious argument can be made to support a reversal of the trial court’s decision to terminate his parental rights and that such a decision was in the best interests of MC.
There is one adverse ruling that counsel has not addressed: Conner’s request for a
final visit with MC. After the court announced it was terminating Conner’s parental rights,
his counsel asked that “if he doesn’t have a four-hour visit, we would at least ask, he would
[be] given a short period of time to just to have a final visit with [MC] because we think it’s
in her best interest to do so.” The court did not award Conner a final visit.
Generally speaking, if a no-merit brief in a termination-of-parental-rights case fails
to address all the adverse rulings, we will order rebriefing. Knerr v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs.,
12 2014 Ark. App. 550. However, where the adverse rulings are clearly not meritorious, we
decline to order rebriefing. Id. Such is the case here.
In Best v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2020 Ark. App. 485, 611 S.W.3d
690, we stated that any decision to grant a final visit in a termination hearing is within the
circuit court’s discretion and that our courts have a duty to protect the best interest of the
children. Here, the circuit court committed no abuse of discretion in denying a final visit
because Conner had not seen MC in at least four months, and the circuit court was acting
in MC’s best interest in denying the visit. We conclude that any challenge to this adverse
ruling would clearly be without merit.
Having reviewed the record and the brief presented by counsel, we hold that the
circuit court had sufficient evidence on which to find that it was in MC’s best interest for
Conner’s rights to be terminated and that statutory grounds for termination existed. Thus,
we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and affirm the termination of parental rights.
Affirmed; motion to withdraw granted.
VIRDEN and BARRETT, JJ., agree.
Terry Goodwin Jones, for separate appellant Ashley Mask.
Jennifer Oyler Olson, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for separate appellant
Wyatt Conner.
Kaylee Wedgeworth, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services, Office of Chief Counsel, for
appellee.
Dana McClain and Linda J. Hamilton, attorneys ad litem for minor child.