Ashley Davis v. Frank Bisignano

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Georgia
DecidedFebruary 19, 2026
Docket6:25-cv-00011
StatusUnknown

This text of Ashley Davis v. Frank Bisignano (Ashley Davis v. Frank Bisignano) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Ashley Davis v. Frank Bisignano, (S.D. Ga. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA STATESBORO DIVISION ASHLEY DAVIS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) CV625-011 ) FRANK BISIGNANO, ) ) Defendant. ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION Plaintiff Ashley Davis seeks judicial review of the Social Security Administration’s denial of her application for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB). I. GOVERNING STANDARDS In social security cases, courts . . . review the Commissioner’s decision for substantial evidence. Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). . . . “We may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute our judgment for that of the Commissioner.” Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1178 (quotation and brackets omitted). “If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, this Court must affirm, even if the proof preponderates against it.” Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Mitchell v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014); see also Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019) (“Substantial

evidence . . . is ‘more than a mere scintilla.’ [Cit.] It means—and means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” (citations omitted)). Under the

substantial evidence test, “findings of fact made by administrative agencies . . . may be reversed . . . only when the record compels a reversal; the mere fact that the record may support a contrary

conclusion is not enough to justify a reversal of the administrative findings.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir. 2004). The burden of proving disability lies with the claimant. Moore v.

Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). The ALJ applies . . . a five-step, “sequential” process for determining whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(1). If an ALJ finds a claimant disabled or not disabled at any given step, the ALJ does not go on to the next step. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4). At the first step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). At the second step, the ALJ must determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments for which the claimant allegedly suffers is “severe.” Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At the third step, the ALJ must decide whether the claimant’s severe impairments meet or medically equal a listed impairment. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If not, the ALJ must then determine at step four whether the claimant has the [residual functional capacity (“RFC”)] to perform her past relevant work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv). If the claimant cannot perform her past relevant work, the ALJ must determine at step five whether the claimant can make an adjustment to other work, considering the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience. An ALJ may make this determination either by applying the Medical Vocational Guidelines or by obtaining the testimony of a [Vocational Expert (VE)]. Stone v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec. Admin., 596 F. App’x, 878, 879 (11th Cir. 2015). At steps four and five, the ALJ assesses the claimant’s RFC and ability to return to her past relevant work. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2004), superseded by regulation on other grounds, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c, as stated in Jones v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 2022 WL 3448090, at *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 17, 2022). RFC is what “an individual is still able to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairments.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)); Moore v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F. App’x 623, 624 (11th Cir. 2012). “The ALJ makes the RFC determination based on all relevant medical and other evidence

presented. In relevant part, the RFC determination is used to decide whether the claimant can adjust to other work under the fifth step.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 603 F. App’x 813, 818 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotes and cite omitted).

II. BACKGROUND Davis, born on June 29, 1988, applied for DIB in June 2021, alleging disability beginning August 12, 2020. Tr. 188. She alleged

disability due to chronic migraines, light sensitivity, frequent migraines, light-headedness, difficulty sleeping due to pain, anxiety, depression, obesity, and sinus surgery. Tr. 205. She has a bachelor’s

degree, tr. 37, and past relevant work as a procurement clerk and invoice control clerk, tr. 18, 38-40, 50-51. The ALJ found Davis’ migraine headaches, anxiety, depression,

and impulse control disorder to be severe impairments,1 tr. 12-13, but determined they did not meet or medically equal a Listing, tr. 13-14. The ALJ then found that Davis retained the RFC to perform a full

range of work at all exertional levels, with the following limitations: [T]he claimant can frequently climb stairs and ramps but never climb ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. The claimant should avoid concentrated exposure to hazards, vibration, temperature extremes, fumes, odors, dust, and gases. The claimant is able to perform

1 The ALJ found Davis’ obesity, benign arachnoid cyst, acute upper respiratory illness, and sinusitis to be not severe. Tr. 13. and sustain simple, routine tasks for two-hour periods throughout an 8-hour workday. Tr. 14-18. The ALJ determined that Davis could not perform her past relevant work as actually or generally performed, tr. 18, but found that

there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that she could perform, tr. 18-19. Therefore, she was found to be not disabled. Tr. 18.

Because the Appeals Council denied Davis’ request for review, tr. 1-6, the ALJ’s December 6, 2023 decision, tr. 7-23, is the final decision of the Commissioner. Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir.

2001) (“When, as in this case, the ALJ denies benefits and the [Appeals Council] denies review, [courts] review the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final decision.”). Davis filed the instant lawsuit seeking

judicial review of the ALJ’s decision. See generally doc. 1; see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The parties have submitted their briefs, docs. 11, 13, & 14, and the matter is ripe for disposition. See Rule 5, Supplemental

Rules for Social Security Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The action is presented for decision by the parties’ briefs.”). III. ANALYSIS Davis challenges the sufficiency of the ALJ’s formulation of her

RFC. Doc. 11 at 11. She contends the ALJ failed to include an explanation as to how the limitations of the RFC account for her migraine condition, id. at 12, and failed to include any limitations

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Ashley Davis v. Frank Bisignano, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/ashley-davis-v-frank-bisignano-gasd-2026.