Ashley Cody v. Department of Labor

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided July 19, 2024·No. AT-315H-23-0036-I-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ASHLEY CODY, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, AT-315H-23-0036-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, DATE: July 19, 2024 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Ashley Cody , Austell, Georgia, pro se.

Kathryn C. Hagerman and Monica Moukalif , Atlanta, Georgia, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman Henry J. Kerner, Member*

*Member Kerner did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which dismissed her appeal of her probationary termination for lack of jurisdiction. For

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

the reasons set forth below, the appellant’s petition for review is DISMISSED as untimely filed without good cause shown. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e), (g).

BACKGROUND ¶2 The agency appointed the appellant to a career-conditional competitive service position as a Safety and Occupational Health Specialist effective March 27, 2022, subject to a 1-year probationary period. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 6. The agency subsequently notified the appellant during her probationary period that she would be terminated, effective October 4, 2022, for performance problems, time and attendance issues, and misuse of her Government-issued credit card. Id. at 7-9. ¶3 The appellant filed a timely Board appeal alleging that the agency should have given her “the option to resolve the matter through an alternative dispute resolution before termination.” Id. at 3. The administrative judge ordered the appellant to file evidence and argument demonstrating that the Board had jurisdiction over her appeal, but the appellant did not respond. IAF, Tab 3. In an initial decision dated November 28, 2022, the administrative judge dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the appellant failed to raise a nonfrivolous allegation of marital status discrimination, or that her termination was based on partisan political reasons or pre-employment misconduct. IAF, Tab 9, Initial Decision (ID) at 4. The initial decision informed the appellant that it would become the Board’s final decision on January 2, 2023, unless she filed a petition for review by that date. ID at 4. ¶4 The appellant filed a petition for review on January 17, 2023, asserting that the Board should reconsider her appeal “due to [her] status of being a protected veteran.” Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1 at 2. In a January 18, 2023 acknowledgement letter from the Office of the Clerk of the Board, the Acting Clerk informed the appellant that the Board may dismiss her petition for review as untimely filed unless she submitted a motion showing that her petition for 3

review was timely filed or that good cause existed for the filing delay. PFR File, Tab 2. The Clerk’s Office enclosed a “Motion to Accept Filing as Timely and/or to Ask the Board to Waive or Set Aside the Time Limit” and informed the appellant that she had until February 2, 2023, to file such motion. Id. The appellant did not respond. The agency filed a response to the appellant’s petition for review. PFR File, Tab 3.

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW ¶5 A petition for review generally must be filed within 35 days after the date of issuance of the initial decision or, if the party filing the petition shows that the initial decision was received more than 5 days after it was issued, within 30 days after the party received the initial decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e). The appellant does not claim that she received the initial decision more than 5 days after it was issued. PFR File, Tab 1. Further, because the appellant elected to be an e-filer, she is deemed to have received the initial decision on the date of electronic submission, November 28, 2022. IAF, Tab 1 at 2, Tab 10; see Palermo v. Department of the Navy, 120 M.S.P.R. 694, ¶ 3 (2014); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.14(m)(2) (2023). Therefore, her petition for review was due by January 2, 2023, and it is thus over 2 weeks late. ¶6 The Board will waive its filing deadline only upon a showing of good cause for the delay. Gaetos v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 201, ¶ 5 (2014); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(g). To establish good cause for the untimely filing of an appeal, a party must show that she exercised due diligence or ordinary prudence under the particular circumstances of the case. Alonzo v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 180, 184 (1980). To determine whether an appellant has shown good cause, the Board will consider the length of the delay, the reasonableness of her excuse and her showing of due diligence, whether she is proceeding pro se, and whether she has presented evidence of the existence of circumstances beyond her control that affected her ability to comply with the time 4

limits or of unavoidable casualty or misfortune that similarly shows a causal relationship to her inability to timely file her petition for review. Gaetos, 121 M.S.P.R. 201, ¶ 5; Moorman v. Department of the Army, 68 M.S.P.R. 60, 62-63 (1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table). ¶7 Here, we find that the appellant has failed to show good cause for a waiver of the filing deadline. The appellant did not submit a motion showing that her petition for review was timely filed or that good cause existed for the filing delay or otherwise respond to the Clerk’s acknowledgement order informing her that her petition for review was untimely filed. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(g). She has not submitted any evidence or argument on the timeliness of her petition for review. Further, her 2-week filing delay is not insignificant. See, e.g., Crozier v. Department of Transportation, 93 M.S.P.R. 438, 441 (2003) (finding a 13-day delay not minimal); Winfrey v. National Archives and Records Administration , 88 M.S.P.R. 403, ¶ 6 (2001) (finding that a 48-day delay was not minimal). Although the appellant’s pro se status is a factor weighing in her favor, it is insufficient to excuse her untimeliness. See Allen v. Office of Personnel Management, 97 M.S.P.R. 665, ¶¶ 8, 10 (2004) (declining to excuse a pro se appellant’s 14-day, unexplained delay in filing a petition for review). ¶8 As noted above, the appellant stated in her petition for review that the Board should reconsider her appeal “due to [her] status of being a protected veteran.” PFR, Tab 1 at 2. She submits a 1-page letter from the Department of Veterans Affairs indicating that she has a service-connected disability rating of 100%, effective May 2020, but she does not provide any other information or explanation. Id. at 3. It is unclear whether the appellant is attempting to raise a claim of discrimination based on military service under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C.

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